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Abstract
For most of its history the United Nations was reluctant to deal with intelligence and major powers were reluctant to share intelligence with it. But as the UN's peacekeeping operations intensified in some of the world's hot spots in the early 1990s, the UN found it both necessary and wise to create an information analysis capability at UN headquarters in New York. To funnel selected intelligence to the headquarters, several countries (including the US, UK, France and Russia) loaned intelligence officers to the UN's Situation Centre on a secondment basis. This paper describes the activities of the SitCen's Information and Research (I&R) Unit that existed from 1993 to 1999 under the informal motto ‘Keeping an Eye on the World’. Using a case study of I&R reporting on the situation in Eastern Zaire (1996), where UN-run refugee camps were under attack, it is possible to examine the nature and utility of the intelligence provided by the intelligence officers to UN decision-makers and the planners of the Canadian-led multinational force in the region. It reveals that the Unit provided significant and useful intelligence about arms shipments, belligerent activities, and the status of refugees and made several prescient predictions and warnings. The Unit sought to minimize national bias and incomplete information, though both problems were still in evidence. Still, in many ways, the I&R Unit remains a useful model for the development of a future intelligence capability.
Notes
1 The Peacekeepers Handbook, the authoritative guide for UN peacekeepers in the late 1970s and 1980s, even stated: ‘The UN has resolutely refused to countenance intelligence systems as part of its peacekeeper operations; intelligence, having covert connections, is a dirty word.’ International Peace Academy, Peacekeepers Handbook (NY: Pergamon Press, 1984 edition), p.39.
2 The advertised ‘Intelligence Analyst’ position was in the Investigations Section of the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The job description was to conduct ‘in-depth research and analysis regarding criminal investigations of the conflict with information obtained from multiple sources related to the activities of persons under investigation’ which required ‘specialized areas of analysis (military, police or federal/national intelligence analysis agencies)’.
3 A. Walter Dorn and David J.H. Bell, ‘Intelligence and Peacekeeping: The UN Operation in the Congo 1960–64’, International Peacekeeping, 2/1 (Spring 1995), pp.11–33, available at http://www.rmc.ca/academic/gradrech/dorn9_e.html, accessed 15 May 2005.
4 A compilation of papers on peacekeeping intelligence, including ‘seminal past publications’ (starting from 1994), is available in Ben de Jong, Wies Platje and Robert David Steele (eds.), Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future (Virginia: OSS International Press, 2003).
5 Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (Secretary-General), Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, General Assembly Official Records (GAOR), Supplement No. 1, United Nations, NY, 1991, UN Doc. A/46/1 of September 1991.
6 J.O.C. Jonah, ‘Office for Research and the Collection of Information (ORCI)’, in H. Chestnut (ed.), International Conflict Resolution Using Systems Engineering: Proceedings of the IFAC Workshop in Budapest, Hungary, 5–8 June 1989 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1990).
7 ‘9 Senators Try to Block Funds for U.N. Office Asked by U.S.’, New York Times, 18 April 1987.
8 ‘UN Veteran Takes on New Role’, The Interdependent (Washington: United Nations Association of the USA, 1987).
9 Ibid., p.7.
10 One ORCI officer, however, suggested that the Office had played a role in warning the Secretary-General of ethnic strife in Burundi and helped in initiatives to end the Iran–Iraq War and deal with conflicts in Sri Lanka and Fiji (New York Times (1989), p.4). Other officials in ORCI suggested that the role of ORCI in these cited cases was not important and that the warning role had been played by others (author's interview with ORCI officials, 1990).
11 At the time of ORCI's creation there were less than a half dozen UN missions in the field, all small. By late 1993, there were over 70,000 peacekeepers under UN ‘operational control’ in over a dozen missions in some of the most difficult ‘hot spots’ of the world (e.g., Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda).
12 Initially called the ‘Situation Room’ (SitRoom) in April 1993, the name ‘Situation Centre’ (SitCen) was adopted in October 1993. The mandate of the Situation Room was ‘to speed up, complement and amplify the information flows generated in the field so as to facilitate timely decisions by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping operations. Its role is to maintain communications links with all missions, to solicit information from the field as well as to process and analyze raw incoming information …’ Gen. Maurice Baril, at the time Military Adviser to the UN Secretary-General, and Kofi Annan, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping oversaw the creation of the SitCen. Source: Kofi Annan, ‘Memorandum from Mr. Annan to Mr. Baudot’, New York: United Nations (internal memo), author's collection, 22 June 1993.
13 A US intelligence officer came to the I&R Unit in October 1993 and was joined two months later by a French military intelligence officer and a British logistics/intelligence officer. A Russian officer arrived in March 1995.
14 William R. Clontz, ‘C3I Issues from a United Nations Perspective – Revisited’, Center for Information Policy Research, Harvard University, January 1999, p.102, available at http://www.pirp.harvard.edu/pubs_pdf/clontz%5Cclontz-i99-2.pdf, accessed 22 May 2005.
15 Copies of the reports on the crisis in Eastern Zaire were typically provided to: the Under-Secretary-General for peacekeeping operations (Kofi Annan); the Secretary-General's Military Adviser; the Head of DPKO's Africa Division; and one senior political adviser in DPKO. The point of contact (POC) listed in the reports is often the French intelligence officer in the I&R Unit. The reports were usually hand-numbered and hand-delivered to the addressees.
16 Robert J. Allen, ‘Intelligence Support for Peace Operations’, in Perry L. Pickert (ed.), Intelligence for Multilateral Decision and Action (Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 1997).
17 Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke (eds.), The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire (Rutgers, NJ: Transaction Books, 1999).
18 Nik Gowing, ‘New Challenges and Problems for Information Management in Complex Emergencies: Ominous Lessons from the Great Lakes and Eastern Zaire in late 1996 and early 1997’, paper presented at the conference ‘Dispatches from Disaster Zones: The Reporting of Humanitarian Emergencies’, London, 27–28 May 1998, found at http://www.usip.org/events/pre2002/gowing.pdf, accessed 15 May 2005. Gowing demonstrates how humanitarian agencies and NGOs competed for media attention after their evacuation from the increasingly insecure refugee camps in October 1996. ‘UNICEF projected that some one thousand Hutus in Eastern Zaire were probably dying each day’ after an attack of cholera and malaria and NGOs reported that some ‘50,000 [refugees] were dead’, writes Gowing, the BBC news anchor (p.23). Even the Secretary-General indulged in hyperbole: ‘I call it a genocide by starvation … So we must act, and we must act immediately.’ Quoted in Gordon Smith and John Hay, ‘Canada and the Crisis in Eastern Zaire’, in Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall (eds.), Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1999), p.91.
19 Paul Kagame, who served as the Rwandan Vice President and Defence Minister in 1996, has since admitted that that attacks were determined in part by the passage of Security Council resolution 1080. Source: Smith and Hay, ‘Canada and the Crisis in Eastern Zaire’ (Footnotenote 18), p.99.
20 Vice President Kagame told Nik Gowing of the BBC: ‘We used communication and information warfare better than anyone … our strength was to keep information from them [Western humanitarian organizations and the international media].’ Gowing (Footnotenote 18), p.15.
21 Human Rights Watch/Africa, ‘What Kabila is Hiding: Civilian Killings and Impunity in Congo’, Report, 9/5 (October 1997), pp.28–34.
22 For excellent insights into the illicit mining activities of Rwanda, Uganda and rebel forces, and the complicity of Western businesses, see the UN reports of the ‘Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ found in UN Docs. S/2001/357 of 12 April 2001, S/2002/1146 of 16 October 2002, and S/2003/1027 of 23 October 2003, United Nations, NY, available at http://www.un.org, accessed 18 May 2005.
23 Quote from Gowing (Footnotenote 18), p.37.
24 Information and Research (I&R) Unit, ‘Zaire/Kivu’, reports dated 20 June 1996, 26 August 1996, 24 October 1996, 4 November 1996, 19 December 1996, 1 January 1997, 6 February 1997, unpublished. The dates of the reports are given in the text.
25 Interviews were conducted by A. Walter Dorn with a half dozen persons associated with UN actions in Eastern Zaire, including officers in the I&R Unit and the SitCen, during the Zaire crisis in November–December 1996, as well as in 2004. Those individuals prefer to remain anonymous. The Commander of the Multinational Force, Gen. Maurice Baril, was also interviewed on 22 September 2004 and 19 February 2004.
26 An example of a disclaimer is found in the report ‘Zaire/Kivu’ of 20 June 1996: ‘The following text reflects a variety of informed sources, which in turn have drawn from a number of individual reports. As such, the information necessarily includes elements which may be regarded by some as speculative or [that] cannot be independently substantiated.’ One confidentiality provision was that the reports were often ‘hand-numbered’ and ‘hand-delivered’ to the indicated recipients.
27 These agencies would, in turn, have relied on the traditional methods of intelligence-gathering: human sources (Humint), signals (Sigint), Imagery (Imint) and other technical means (Measurement and Signature Intelligence or Masint). They would use both open source (OSINT) and covet methods of information gathering.
28 Gowing (Footnotenote 18), p.18.
29 Ibid., p.19, referencing John Pomfret, ‘Rwanda Planned and Led the Attack on Zaire: Interview with Vice President Paul Kagame’, Washington Post, 9 July 1997. Kagame told US officials in June 1996 that the Hutu refugee camps ‘had to be dismantled, and that if the United Nations would not remove them, somebody would have to do it’. Kagame then said: ‘The US response was no response.’
30 See evidence in the report from Human Rights Watch/Africa (Footnotenote 21) and the testimony of Wayne Madsen before the House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, ‘Suffering and Despair: Humanitarian Crises in the Congo’, Serial No. 107-16, 17 May 2001, pp.35–43. See also Wayne Madsen, Genocide and Covert Operations in Africa 1993–1999 (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press 1999).
31 Evidence for US complicity can be found in various sources, including: Colum Lynch, ‘U.S. Agents were Seen with Rebels in Zaire: Active Participation is Alleged in Military Overthrow of Mobutu’, Boston Globe, 8 October 1997, p.A2.
32 ‘Church Committee report’ of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, 94th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Report 94-465 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975).
33 Especially valuable resources in the region were coltan (columbite-tantalite ore, used in mobile phones and computer chips), copper, gold and diamonds. Western companies profiting from illegal mining of these minerals in the Congo are listed and described in reports of the UN panel (see Footnotenote 22).
34 PeaceLink for Africa Campaign, ‘Goma/Bukavu: Eye-Witness Report November 1996–January 1997’, 19 February 1997, http://web.peacelink.it/africa/za_297e.html, re-accessed 15 May 2005.
35 Gowing (Footnotenote 18), p.42. See also the UN Department of Humanitarian Assistance ‘Summary of Media Reports’ of 22 November 1996 (available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/0/520a59f941385b81c12563ed003f0c07, accessed 15 May 2005). In it, the UNHCR Spokesman in Goma, Ray Wilkinson, calls General Smith's reports of refugee movements ‘absurd’.
36 Gen. Maurice Baril, private communication with the author, Toronto: Royal Canadian Military Institute, 22 September 2004.
37 One I&R Unit officer, who requested anonymity, said it was obvious that the US was providing faulty satellite imagery. For instance, the sky over Kivu was perfectly clear while the pictures were alleged to have been taken recently (during the rainy season), indicating that the pictures were actually from a much earlier period when refugees were much fewer. Besides, reconnaissance gathered with Mirage 4 planes showed a completely different situation. Furthermore, Gowing (Footnotenote 18, p.57) reports that NGOs and UNHCR officials also disputed the validity of the images. Nick Stockton, Emergencies Director for Oxfam, ‘cynically labeled the US handling of reconnaissance data as “Operation Restore Silence” in which “misinformation was so successful” and “the US, UK and other governments who managed the magical disappearance [of refugees] have escaped all scrutiny”’.
38 Confidence in this figure is based on the congruence of two very rough estimates. The projected number of refugees based on aerial observation was around 200,000. Combing the estimated number of soldiers in the ex-FAR (20–30,000) with that of militiamen in the Interahamwe and other militias (40–50,000) puts the total number of genocidaires fearing return at 70,000. Assuming a typical Rwandan family size of 3–4 persons, and including an ‘attrition rate’ of 50–60,000 due to the extenuating circumstances, this final figure also comes to some 250,000. Author's interview with General Baril, 19 February 2004. A similar calculation was performed for the Canadian Department of National Defence: ‘Multinational Force in Eastern Zaire: Assessment of the Situation, 10 December 1996’, doc. 3350-1 (Op Assurance – Comd), obtained in Access to Information, request number 96/1168, released 2 February 1998. See also Gowing (Footnotenote 18), pp.55 and 75.
39 There were many reports of atrocities by rebel forces against Hutus and many others. But the victorious Laurent Kabila would not allow human rights teams access to the territories he controlled (eventually the entire country). See Footnotenote 20.
40 Information and Research (I&R) Unit, ‘I&R Information Memorandum, Subject: Scenario Flow Charts to Support I&R Analysis Work on Eastern Zaire’, 12 November 1996, unpublished.
41 Kofi Annan, Transcript of Press Conference by Secretary-General Elect Kofi Annan (Ghana), Press Release GA/9212 of 18 December 1996, http://iggi.unesco.or.kr/web/iggi_docs/01/952476023.pdf, accessed 24 May 2005. Italics added.
42 United Nations Secretary-General, Reports of the ‘Commission of Inquiry to Investigate Reports of the Sale and Supply of Arms and Related Materiel to Former Rwandan Government Forces and Militias’, third report, UN Doc. S/1997/1010 of 24 December 1996 and its addendum S/1998/63 of 26 January 1998.
43 See articles by Lynne Duke in the Washington Post: ‘US Military Role in Rwanda Greater Than Disclosed’, Washington Post, Saturday, 16 August 1997, p.A01, found at http://www.udayton.edu/∼rwanda/articles/usrole.html, accessed 16 May 2005, and ‘Africans Use US Military Training in Unexpected Ways’, Washington Post, Tuesday, 14 July 1998, p.A01, found at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/overseas/overseas3a.htm, accessed 16 May 2005.
44 Department of National Defence, ‘Operation Assurance: Lessons Learned Staff Action Directive’ (declassified parts), 3452-12-8 (J3 Lesson Learned), Ottawa, 25 February 1998, para.23.5. A similar observation was made in a joint Foreign Affairs and National Defence study, later sanitized and published as ‘Lessons Learned from the Zaire Mission’, James Appathurai and Ralph Lysyshyn, Canadian Foreign Policy, 5/2 (Winter 1998), pp.93–105.
45 For the example of UN intelligence and the Rwandan genocide, see: Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003); and A. Walter Dorn, and J. Matloff, ‘Preventing the Bloodbath: Could the UN have Predicted and Prevented Genocide in Rwanda?’, Journal of Conflict Studies, XX/1 (Spring 2000), pp.9–52.
46 Gen. Maurice Baril, private communication with the author, New York: United Nations, 17 February 2005; and Paul Heinbecker, email to the author of 15 May 2005 and James K. Bartleman, Rollercoaster: My Hectic Years as Jean Chrétien's Diplomatic Advisor, 1994–1998 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2005). All three men were deeply involved in the Canadian efforts to launch a mission in Eastern Zaire.
47 Reliefweb (http://www.reliefweb.int) was launched in October 1996 so it was not yet up to speed at the time of the Eastern Zaire crisis in the autumn of 1996 but the IRIN (http://www.irinnews.org/) covering the Great Lakes conflict had been operating since 1995. It was disseminating by email dozens of reports a day from the media, UN humanitarian agencies and NGO relief agencies. By sending previously unavailable source material (particularly situation reports from the field) to the public and later placing them on the Web, IRIN was revolutionizing humanitarian information accessibility. The I&R Unit unofficially provided information on Eastern Zaire to IRIN during that time.
48 United Nations (UN News Service), ‘UN Experts find Broad Rwandan Involvement in Eastern DR of Congo Conflict’, New York: United Nations, 21 July 2004, found at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/8119ccbcabd839dc85256ed8006f2f0a, accessed 15 May 2005.
49 A. Walter Dorn, ‘Blue Sensors: Technology and Cooperative Monitoring for UN Peacekeeping’, Cooperative Monitoring Centre (CMC) Occasional Paper 36 (April 2004), revised and updated at http://www.cfc.dnd.ca/Dornfiles/bluesensors.pdf.
50 At the time of the 1996 Zaire crisis, de Mello was appointed as the Regional Humanitarian Coordinator with the UN's Department of Humanitarian Affairs for that situation. In 2003, when he lost his life in the attack on UN headquarters in Iraq, he was the UN Envoy for Iraq and responsible for the new UN mission there (UNAMI).
51 Stan Carlson, email to the author, 4 December 2003.
52 See, for instance: Paul Johnston, ‘No Cloak and Dagger Required: Intelligence Support to UN Peacekeeping’, Intelligence and National Security, 12/4 (October 1997), pp.102–12 and the ‘Response’ by Thomas Quiggin, Intelligence and National Security, 13/4 (Winter 1998), pp.203–7.
53 A. Walter Dorn, ‘The Cloak and the Blue Beret: The Limits of Intelligence-Gathering in Peacekeeping’, Pearson Paper No. 4, Nova Scotia: Pearson Peacekeeping Centre; reprinted in the International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 12/4 (Winter 1999), pp.414–47.