Architecture of a broken dream: The CIA and Guatemala, 1952–54

Abstract

In 1954, the United States launched a coup against Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz. In 2003, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State declassified new documents pertaining to the fall of the Arbenz regime. In this paper I argue that although the new information does not substantially alter the overall debate about the causes and consequences of the action, it offers a portrait of the operation which is richer and more complex than what has been seen before. The documents reveal details of the operation which have been hidden for half a century. They illustrate how the mission faltered under the weight of security breaches and miscommunications. They also offer a fascinating glimpse at a shadowy figure in the plot to topple the Arbenz regime who has until now largely evaded the public record. In the end the documents affirm what many scholars had previously concluded, that at the end of the day it was the actions of the Guatemalan Army that made the difference between victory and defeat in the crusade to oust a democratically elected head of state.

Notes

1 Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1982), p.61.

2 Stephen Streeter, Managing Counterrevolution: The United States and Guatemala, 1954–1961 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Centre for International Studies, 2000), p.12.

3 Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944–1954 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), p.50.

4 Immerman (note 1), p.46.

5 Gleijeses (note 3), p.33.

6 Ibid., p.36.

7 Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1983), p.45.

8 Ibid.

9 Immerman (note 1), p.4.

10 Ibid., p.364.

11 Nick Cullather, Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), p.18.

12 Gleijeses (note 3), p.182.

13 Schlesinger and Kinzer (note 7), p.59.

14 Ibid., p.182.

15 Cullather (note 11), p.27.

16 Central Intelligence Agency, Background Information on Guatemala (1 December, 1953), Case No. SS 2003-00002 (Washington DC: CIA Archives and Records Center, 1953), p.1.

17 Central Intelligence Agency, General-Operational-Return of PBSuccess Documents (26 March, 1954), Case No. 2003-00002 (Washington DC: CIA Archives and Records Center, 1954), p.5.

18 The Department of State, United States of America, NIE 62 ‘Present Political Situation in Guatemala and Possible Developments During 1952’ (11 March 1952), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1952).

19 Cullather (note 11), p.29.

20 The Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Guatemalan Situation, from [ ] (9 July, 1952), Case No. SS 2003-00004 (Washington DC: CIA Archives and Records Center, 1952).

21 The Central Intelligence Agency, Conference with Seekford (4 August, 1952), Case No. SS 2003-00004 (Washington DC: CIA Archives and Records Center, 1952).

22 Ibid.

23 Cullather (note 11), p.30.

24 The Central Intelligence Agency, Cable to Director from [ ] (30 October, 1952), Case No. 2003-00002 (Washington DC: CIA Archives and Records Center, 1952).

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 The Central Intelligence Agency, Operation-Hediger's Reports (24 March, 1954), Case No. SS 2003-00004 (Washington DC: CIA Archives and Records Center, 1954), p.4.

28 The Central Intelligence Agency, Report Number 10, New Plans of Calligeris after the Loss of Arms Support (27 October 1952), Case No. SS 2003-00002 (Washington DC: CIA Archives and Records Center, 1952), p.2.

29 The Central Intelligence Agency (note 27), p.4.

30 Cullather (note 11), p.32.

31 Immerman (note 1), p.10.

32 Ibid., p.22.

33 Gleijeses (note 3), p.178.

34 Immerman (note 1), p.104.

35 The Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum on the Agrarian Reform of Guatemala - Its Origins and Results (26 February, 1953), Case No. 2003-00004 (Washington DC: CIA Archives and Records Center, 1953), p.9.

36 The Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum: CIA's Role in the Overthrow of Arbenz, (12 May, 1975), Case No. SS 2003-00002 (Washington DC: CIA Archives and Records Center, 1975).

37 Immerman (note 1), p.139.

38 Evan Thomas, The Very Best Men, The Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), p.115.

39 Immerman (note 1), p.139.

40 The Central Intelligence Agency, Project PBSuccess (16 November 1954), Case No. SS 2003-0002 (Washington DC: CIA Archives and Records Center, 1954), pp.1–14.

41 Ibid., p.20.

42 Ibid., p.17.

43 Ibid., p.17.

44 Ibid., p.18.

45 Ibid., p.19.

46 Ibid., p.19.

47 Roland H. Ebel, Misunderstood Caudillo: Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes and the Failure of Democracy in Guatemala (New Orleans: Tulane Studies in Political Science and University Press of America, 1998).

48 Streeter (note 2), pp.23–4.

49 Ibid., p.24.

50 The Central Intelligence Agency, Stage One Report Annex B Friendly Assets and Potential (15 December, 1953), Case No. 2003-00002 (Washington DC: CIA Archives and Records Center, 1953).

51 Cullather (note 11), p.51.

52 Ibid., p.51.

53 Ibid., p.34.

54 Ibid., p.51.

55 The Central Intelligence Agency (n.40).

56 The Central Intelligence Agency, Report No. AL-1, from Jacob R. Seekford to Chief, WH for Dunbar, Seekford, Calligeris Visit Gen. A. Somoza and Gen. Somoza's Son (15 December, 1953), Case No. SS 2003-00002 (Washington DC: CIA Archives and Records Center, 1953).

57 The Central Intelligence Agency (note 40), p.21.

58 The Central Intelligence Agency, Covert Training, Vincent C. Pivall (16 November, 1953), Case No. 2003-00002 (Washington DC: CIA Archives and Records Center, 1953).

59 Thomas (note 38), p.115.

60 Burton Hersh, The Old Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992), p.341.

61 The Central Intelligence Agency, Index of De-Briefing Reports (1 September, 1954), Case No. 2003-00002 (Washington DC: CIA Archives and Records Center, 1954).

62 Ibid.

63 Gleijeses (note 3), p.258.

64 The Central Intelligence Agency (note 40), p.55.

65 Ibid., p.55.

66 The Central Intelligence Agency, Contact Report (29 January, 1954), Case No. 2003-00002 (Washington DC: CIA Archives and Records Center, 1954).

67 The New York Times, 21 February and 4 March 1954.

68 The Central Intelligence Agency (note 61), p.8.

69 Ibid., p.8.

70 Ibid., p.24.

71 Ibid., p.5.

72 Schlesinger and Kinzer (note 7), p.155.

73 The Central Intelligence Agency, Cable To SLINC From Director, CIA RE Guatemala 1954 Coup (24 February, 1954), Case No. 2003-00004 (Washington DC: CIA Archives and Records Center, 1954).

74 The Department of State, United States of America, ‘Memorandum for the Record’ (2 March 1954), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1954).

75 The Central Intelligence Agency, Progress Report – PBSuccess for the Period 9–15 March 1954 (15 March, 1954), Case No. 2003-00002 (Washington DC: CIA Archives and Records Center, 1954).

76 Cullather (note 11), p.XI.

77 The Central Intelligence Agency, Progress Report – PBSuccess for the Period 8–14 June, 1954 (15 June, 1954), Case No. 2003-00002 (Washington DC: CIA Archives and Records Center, 1954).

78 Thomas (note 38), p.115.

79 The Central Intelligence Agency (note 61), p.76.

80 Cullather (note 11), p.84.

81 Ibid., pp.84–92.

82 Ibid., p.84.

83 The Central Intelligence Agency (note 61), p.76.

84 Cullather (note 11), p.98.

85 Ibid., p.99.

86 Ibid., p.87.

87 Ibid., p.90.

88 Ibid., p.95.

89 Immerman (note 1), p.186.

90 Ibid., p.97.

91 Robert Dallek, An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917–1963 (Boston, New York, and London: Little, Brown, 2003), p.362.