Harry Howe Ransom and American intelligence studies

Abstract

In this interview Harry Howe Ransom, a leading American scholar of intelligence studies over the past 50 years, discusses how he entered the field and his views regarding some key intelligence topics. Foremost on his research agenda has been the study of whether in democratic societies secret agencies can operate side-by-side with an otherwise open government without violating basic civil liberties – the difficult balancing act between the need for security, on the one hand, and the cherished value of liberty, on the other. He has also been a leading critic of intelligence politicization, noting in this interview that there is a tendency for intelligence systems to provide information they think their top bosses want to hear, and for the top bosses – more often than not – to do what they wish in spite of intelligence to the contrary. Professor Ransom began his research into intelligence as a young political scientist at Harvard University and continued this work throughout his subsequent distinguished career at Vanderbilt University and into his retirement years.

Notes

The author would like to express his appreciation to Lawrence J. Lamanna, an assistant editor for this journal, for his help in transcribing the tape-recorded interview.

1 Harry Howe Ransom, Central Intelligence and National Security (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1958); and ‘How Intelligent Is Intelligence?’, New York Times Magazine, 22 May 1960, pp.26, 80–3; ‘Secret Mission in An Open Society’, New York Times Magazine, 21 May 1961, pp.20, 77–9.

2 Harry Howe Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1970).

3 See, for example: ‘Strategic Intelligence and Foreign Policy’, World Politics 28 (October 1974) pp.131–46; ‘Being Intelligent about Secret Intelligence Agencies’, American Political Science Review 74 (March 1980) pp.141–8; ‘Don't Make the C.I.A. and K.G.B.’, New York Times, 24 December 1981, p.27; ‘Strategic Intelligence and Intermestic Politics’, in Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf (eds.) Perspectives on American Foreign Policy: Patterns and Process (New York: St. Martin's Press 1983) pp.299–319; and ‘Intelligence and Partisan Politics’, in Alfred C. Maurer et al. (eds.) Intelligence: Policy and Process (Boulder, CO: Westview 1985).

4 Personal correspondence to the author (17 February 2000).

5 Abridged slightly from a longer list presented by Ransom, ‘Central Intelligence: Some Continuing Questions’, at the International Studies Association, 41st Annual Convention (15 March 2000), San Diego, California.

6 Harry Howe Ransom, ‘The Intelligence Function and the Constitution’, Armed Forces and Society 14 (Fall 1987) p.53.

7 Harry Howe Ransom, ‘Secret Intelligence Agencies and Congress’, Society 12 (March–April 1975) p.35; Loch K. Johnson, ‘Accountability and America's Secret Foreign Policy: Keeping a Legislative Eye on the Central Intelligence Agency’, Foreign Policy Analysis 1 (March 2005) pp.99–120.

8 Harry Howe Ransom, ‘A Half-Century of Spy Watching’ in Loch K. Johnson (ed.) Strategic Intelligence, Vol. 5: Intelligence and Accountability: Safeguards Against the Abuse of Secret Power (Westport, CT: Praeger 2007).

9 President George W. Bush appointed former ambassador John D. Necroponte as the first Director of National Intelligence (DNI), beginning 20 April 2005, replacing the office of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) established in 1947.

10 Ransom, Central Intelligence.

11 The Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community (the Aspin–Brown Commission, led by former secretaries of defense Les Aspin and Harold Brown) examined the quality of Presidential Daily Briefs in 1995–96 and concluded that sometimes they added value to publicly acquirable knowledge and sometimes they did not. The PDB proved especially helpful on matters dealing with terrorism, closed societies (like North Korea), and global weapons proliferations; they were sometimes less helpful than good newspapers on political events in major nations. For the report, see Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1 March 1996); and for a commentary on the Commission, see Loch K. Johnson, ‘The Aspin–Brown Intelligence Inquiry: Behind the Closed Doors of a Blue Ribbon Commission’, Studies in Intelligence 48 (Winter 2004) pp.1–20.

12 See Loch K. Johnson, America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society (New York: Oxford University Press 1987) ch.10.

13 The 16 American intelligence agencies include: the National Security Agency (NSA); the National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA); the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); the four service intelligence agencies (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines); the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); the Coast Guard; the intelligence unit of the Department of Homeland Security; Intelligence and Research in the Department of State; the intelligence units in the Department of Energy and the Department of Treasury; and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

14 On the A-team/B-team approach to competitive analysis, see Johnson, America's Secret Power, p.248; Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 3d ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press 2006) p.135.

15 See Harry Howe Ransom, ‘The Politicization of Intelligence’ in Stephen J. Cimbala (ed.) Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational 1987) pp.25–76, reprinted in Loch K. Johnson and James J. Wirtz, Strategic Intelligence: Windows Into a Secret World (Los Angeles: Roxbury 2004) pp.171–82.

16 See, for example, H. Bradford Westerfield, ‘America and the World of Intelligence Liaison’, Intelligence and National Security 11 (July 1996) pp.523–60.

17 Roger Hilsman, Strategic Intelligence and Decision Making (Glencoe, IL: Free Press 1956); Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1949; revised in 1965); and Willmoore Kendall, ‘The Function of Intelligence’, World Politics 1 (1949) pp.542–52.

18 Ransom, Central Intelligence.

19 Ransom, ‘How Intelligent Is Intelligence?’; ‘Secret Mission in an Open Society’.

20 For a list of the participants at one of the meetings and the minutes of the session, see the appendix in Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (New York: Knopf 1974) pp.357–76.

21 Ibid.