Britain and the Missile Gap: British Estimates on the Soviet Ballistic Missile Threat, 1957–61

Abstract

Between 1957 and 1961, American National Intelligence Estimates overestimated the Soviets’ capabilities to produce and deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles, creating the ‘missile gap’ controversy. This article examines the contemporaneous estimates of British intelligence on the Soviet ballistic missile program, which were based upon very similar, if not the same, raw intelligence. It demonstrates that British estimates of the Soviet ICBM program were more accurate. However, this success did not continue in the analysis of the medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile (M/IRBM) threat, which was relatively poor for most of the period. It concludes that the reasons for this lie in the different assumptions held by intelligence analysts on both sides of the Atlantic, and a degree of conservatism in both intelligence establishments.

Notes

1 CAB 159/31 JIC(59)1st meeting, ‘Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles’, 1 January 1959.

2 DEFE 23/23, Kenneth Strong to Permanent Secretary CDS, 27 April 1961.

3 Ibid.

4 See for example, Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon & Schuster 1983); Lawrence Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat (Hong Kong: Princeton University Press 1986); John Prados, The Soviet Estimate (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1986).

5 Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, p.67.

6 See Richard J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence (London: John Murray 2001) p.557; Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, Planning Armageddon (Amsterdam: Harwood 2000) p.245.

7 David Reynolds, ‘A “Special Relationship”? America, Britain and the International Order Since World War Two’, International Affairs 62/86 (1985) p.11.

8 Christopher Andrew, ‘Intelligence and International Relations in the Early Cold War’, Review of International Studies 24/3 (1998) p.322.

9 Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p.57.

10 See for example CAB 158/26, JIC (56) 23, ‘US/UK Guided Weapons Conference’, 2 February 1956.

11 Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, p.78.

12 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive (London: Penguin 2000) p.230.

13 Richard J. Aldrich, ‘British Intelligence and the Anglo-American “Special Relationship” During the Cold War’, Review of International Studies 24/3 (1998), p.343.

14 DEFE 23/23, Kenneth Strong to Permanent Secretary CDS, 27 April 1961.

15 Paul Maddrell, Britain's Exploitation of Occupied Germany for Scientific and Technical Intelligence on the Soviet Union, unpublished PhD thesis, (Cambridge University 1998) pp.98–103, p.181.

16 Indeed, recent research concluded that he was not a chief rocket scientist as he claimed, but an ordinary member of staff in the Soviet Military Administration in Germany. See Paul Maddrell, Spying on Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006) p.70.

17 Maddrell, Britain's Exploitation of Occupied Germany for Scientific and Technical Intelligence on the Soviet Union, pp.182–3, p.277.

18 CAB 158/26, JIC (56) 23, ‘US/UK Guided Weapons Conference’, 2 February 1956.

19 Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, The Ties that Bind (Boston: Allen & Unwin 1985), p.188.

20 Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, p.69.

21 Richelson and Ball, The Ties that Bind, p.188.

22 Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, p.69. JIC papers indicate that the radar stations were an important source. In 1956, the JIC noted that new information had become available during the past year. And later that year, they noted a heavy testing program at Kapustin Yar. Whilst the source is not noted, it seems reasonable to assume that the radar stations were the most significant. CAB 158/26, JIC (56) 34, ‘Russian Ballistic Rocket Development’, 6 March 1956.

23 Twigge and Scott, Planning Armageddon, p.237.

24 Paul Lashmar, Spy Flights of the Cold War (Stroud: Sutton 1996) pp.146–150, p.184.

25 Walter Laqueur, The Uses and Limits of Intelligence (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers 1995) p.145.

26 CAB 158/42, JIC (61) 1/10, ‘Periodic Intelligence Summary for NATO Commands’, 31 October 1961.

27 CAB 158/28, JIC (57)25, ‘Russian Research and Development up to the End of 1956’, 23 May 1957.

28 Kevin C. Ruffner (ed.), CORONA: America's First Satellite Program (Washington DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence 1995) p.3.

29 Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only (New York: Harper Collins Publishers 1996) pp.249–250.

30 Len Scott, Macmillan, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis (London: Macmillan 1999) p.120.

31 For an account emphasizing the significance of Penkovsky see, Jerrold L. Schecter and Peter S. Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved The World: How a Soviet Colonel Changed the Course of the Cold War (London: Brassey's 1995) pp.101–102.

32 Percy Cradock, Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World (London: John Murray 2002) p.51.

33 NIE 11-5-57, 12 March, 1957, Steury, Intentions and Capabilities, p.59.

34 Ibid, p.61.

35 CAB 158/28, JIC (57)28, ‘Soviet Capabilities and Probable Program in the Field of Guided Weapons’, 11 April 1957.

36 Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, p.69.

37 NIE 11-5-57, Steury, Intentions and Capabilities, p.59.

38 Twigge and Scott, Planning Armageddon, p.244.

39 CAB 158/27 JIC (57)3, ‘Sino-Soviet Bloc War Potential, 1957–1961’, 15 February 1957.

40 NIE 11-5-57, Steury, Intentions and Capabilities, p.61.

41 CAB 158/27, JIC (57)7 The Soviet Strategic Air Plan in the Early Stages of a Global War’, 28 February 1957.

42 CAB 158/28, JIC (57)41, ‘Soviet Ground-to-Ground Missile Threat to the UK’, 3 May 1957.

43 CAB 158/27, JIC (57)7, The Soviet Strategic Air Plan in the Early Stages of a Global War’, 28 February 1957.

44 CAB 158/28, JIC (57)41, ‘Soviet Ground-to-Ground Missile Threat to the UK’, 3 May 1957.

45 NIE 11-5-57, Steury, Intentions and Capabilities, p.61.

46 Robert P. Berman and John C. Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution 1982) p.41.

47 CAB 158/29, JIC (57)46, ‘Comments on Standing Group Estimate SG161/10’, 29 April 1957.

48 CAB 158/28, JIC (57)39, ‘Likely Scale and Nature of Attack in the United Kingdom in the Early Stages of a Global War up to 1961’, 19 June 1957.

49 NIE 11-5-57, Steury, Intentions and Capabilities, p.62.

50 CAB 158/28, JIC (57)28, ‘Likely Scale and Nature of Attack in the United Kingdom in the Early Stages of a Global War up to 1961’, 19 June 1957.

51 Dragon Returnee Alfred Klippel provided intelligence on the presence of a factory producing V2 components in the area of Stalingrad and Tashkent. Maddrell, Britain's Exploitation of Occupied Germany, p.275.

52 CAB 158/28, JIC (57)28, ‘Likely Scale and Nature of Attack in the United Kingdom in the Early Stages of a Global War up to 1961’, 19 June 1957.

53 CAB 158/28, JIC (57)41. The JIC estimated from the tests and Kapustin Yar that ten missiles a month were being produced. This study has not utilized this figure as it was slightly out of date at the time, and as the context in which it appears does not break down the figure into battlefield, medium range, or any other types of missiles. CAB 158/28 JIC (57)25, ‘Russian Research and Development up to the End of 1956’, 23 May 1957.

54 NIE 11-5-57, 12 March 1957, accessed at <www.foia.cia.gov>.

55 Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, p.69.

56 Michael S. Goodman, British Intelligence Estimates of the Soviet Nuclear Weapons Programme, and their impact on Strategic Planning, 1945–1958, PhD thesis, (University of Nottingham 2004) pp.395–396.

57 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p.576.

58 CAB 159/29 JIC(58)2nd Meeting, ‘Fifth Anglo/Canadian/American Electronic Intelligence Conference’, 2 January 1958.

59 SNIE 11-10-57, 11 December 1957, Steury, Intentions and Capabilities, p.63.

60 NIE 11-5-58, 19 August 1958, Steury, Intentions and Capabilities, p.67.

61 CAB 158/30 JIC(57)119, ‘Some Reasons For Soviet Technological Successes’, 15 November 1957.

62 CAB 158/32 JIC(58)24, ‘Minimum Essential Force Requirements, 1958–1963’, 18 February 1958.

63 NIE 11-5-58, Steury, Intentions and Capabilities, p.67.

64 CAB 158/32 JIC(58)24, ‘Minimum Essential Force Requirements, 1958–1963’, 18 February 1958.

65 CAB 158/31 JIC(58)4, ‘Soviet Strategy in a Global War up to the End of 1962’, 24 January 1958.

66 Benjamin Cole, ‘British Technical Intelligence on the Soviet Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile Threat, 1952–1960’, Intelligence and National Security 15/2 (1999) p.81.

67 CAB 158/30 JIC(57)117, ‘Six-Monthly Intelligence Digest for the Ministry of Supply’, 29 January 1958.

68 NIE 11-5-58, Steury, Intentions and Capabilities, p.67.

69 Prados, The Soviet Estimate, pp.69–70.

70 NIE 11-5-58, Steury, Intentions and Capabilities, p.68.

71 Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, p.162.

72 NIE 11-5-58, Steury, Intentions and Capabilities, p.68.

73 Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p.61.

74 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p.557.

75 DEFE 13/342, ‘Memorandum: CIA, Comments on Various Factors Affecting Soviet Capabilities and Intentions Over the Next Five Years’ (at Annex), 22 October 1957.

76 Twigge and Scott, Planning Armageddon, p.245.

77 CAB 158/30 JIC (57)108, ‘Assessment of the Soviet Attitude on Disarmament’ 3 January 1958.

78 CAB 158/30 JIC(57)117, ‘Six-Monthly Intelligence Digest for the Ministry of Supply’, 29 January 1958.

79 CAB 158/31 JIC(58)7, ‘Soviet Strategic Air Plan in the Early Stages of a Global War, 1958–1962’, 24 February 1958.

80 Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, p.70.

81 Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p.82.

82 Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, p.165.

83 NIE 11-5-58 M/H, 25 November 1958, accessed at <www.foia.cia.gov>.

84 Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, p.75.

85 NIE 11-4-58, 23 December 1958, accessed at <www.foia.cia.gov>.

86 Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p.79.

87 CAB 158/31 JIC(58)1/9, ‘Periodic Intelligence Summary for NATO Commands’, 23 September 1958.

88 CAB 158/34 JIC(58)107, ‘Six-Monthly Intelligence Digest for the Ministry of Supply, Mid-May 1958 to Mid-November 1958’, 14 January 1959.

89 CAB 158/35 JIC(59)3, ‘Sino-Soviet Bloc War Potential, 1959–1963’, 11 February 1959.

90 CAB 158/31 JIC(58)1/9, ‘Periodic Intelligence Summary for NATO Commands’, 23 September 1958.

91 CAB 158/35 JIC(59)7, ‘The Soviet Strategic Air Plan in the Early Stages of a Global War, 1959–63’, 24 February 1959.

92 CAB 158/34 JIC(58)107, ‘Six-Monthly Intelligence Digest for the Ministry of Supply, Mid-May 1958 to Mid-November 1958’, 14 January 1959.

93 CAB 158/35 JIC(59)3, ‘Sino-Soviet Bloc War Potential, 1959–1963’, 11 February 1959.

94 NIE 11-4-58, 23 December 1958, accessed at <www.cia.gov>.

95 CAB 158/32 JIC(58)48, ‘Likely Scale and Nature of Attack on the UK in the Early Stages of Global War up to 1962’, 12 June 1958.

96 Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, p.70.

97 NIE 11-8-60, 1 August 1960, Steury, Intentions and Capabilities, p.111.

98 Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p.111.

99 Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, p.71.

100 NIE 11-8-60, 1 August 1960, Steury, Intentions and Capabilities, p.109.

101 CAB 158/35 JIC(59) 1/10, ‘Periodic Intelligence Summary for NATO Commands’, 22 October 1959.

102 CAB 158/38 JIC(59)96, ‘Six-Monthly Intelligence Digest for Technical Departments – mid-May 1959 to mid-November-1959’, 11 February 1960.

103 CAB 158/36 JIC(59)36, ‘Current Soviet Capability to Attack the West with Manned Aircraft and Missiles’, 26 May 1959.

104 Licklider, ‘The Missile Gap Controversy’, Political Science Quarterly 85/4 (1970) p.608.

105 NIE 11-8-59, 9 February 1960, Steury, Intentions and Capabilities, p.74

106 Ibid, p.75.

107 NIE 11-8-60, 1 August 1960, Steury, Intentions and Capabilities, p.111

108 Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, p.77.

109 NIE 11-8-60, 1 August 1960, Steury, Intentions and Capabilities, p.111.

110 CAB 158/39 JIC(60)7, ‘The Soviet Strategic Air Plan in the Early Staged of a Global War, 1959-1961’, 28 April 1960.

111 CAB 158/39 JIC(60)25, ‘Soviet Defence Policy in the Period up to 1970’, 6 February 1961.

112 CAB 158/36 JIC(59)35, ‘Current Soviet Capability to Attack the West with Aircraft and Missiles’, 26 May 1959.

113 CAB 158/42 JIC(61)4, ‘Soviet Strategy in the Opening Phase of Global War up to 1965’, 9 February 1961.

114 Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, p.73.

115 CAB 158/39 JIC(60)3, ‘Sino-Soviet Bloc War Potential, 1960–1964’, 1 March 1960.

116 NIE 11-8-59, 9 February, 1960, Steury, Intentions and Capabilities, p.86.

117 CAB 158/38 JIC(59)96, ‘Six-Monthly Intelligence Digest for Technical Departments – mid-May 1959 to mid-November-1959’, 11 February 1960.

118 CAB 158/42 JIC(61)4,’Soviet Strategy in the Opening Phase of Global War up to 1965’, 9 February 1961.

119 NIE 11-8-59, Steury, Intentions and Capabilities, p.86.

120 CAB 158/42 JIC(61)4, ‘Soviet Strategy in the Opening Phase of Global War up to 1965’, 9 February 1961.

121 CAB 158/42 JIC(61)3, ‘Sino-Soviet Bloc War Potential, 1961–1965’, 26 April 1961.

122 CAB 159/33 JIC(60)20th meeting, ‘American Suspicions of the British Approach to the East-West Conflict’, 13 April 1960.

123 Ruffner (ed.), CORONA: America's First Satellite Program, pp.16–22.

124 Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, p.72.

125 Richard J. Aldrich, Espionage, Security and Intelligence in Britain, 1945–1970 (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1998) p.61.

126 Twigge and Scott, Planning Armageddon, p.246.

127 Transcript of Penkovsky debrief, ‘Meeting No 1 (London) at Most Royal Hotel’, 20 April 1961, accessed at <www.foia.cia.gov>.

128 Schecter and Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved the World, p.274.

129 Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, p.73.

130 Memorandum of Conversations with Messrs Ed Proctor and Jack Smith Re: The Use of Chickadee Material in NIE 11-8-61, 7 June 1961, accessed at <www.foia.cia.gov>.

131 NIE 11-8/1-61, 21 September 1961, accessed at <www.foia.cia.gov>.

132 Steven J. Zaloga, The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword: The Rise and Fall of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1945–2000 (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press 2002) p.76.

133 Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p.121.

134 CAB 158/45 JIC(62)28, ‘The Soviet Missile Threat up to the End of 1966’, 20 March 1962.

135 CAB 158/45 JIC(62)4, ‘Soviet Strategy in General Nuclear War up to the End of 1966’, 25 January 1962.

136 CAB 158/45 JIC(62)28, ‘The Soviet Missile Threat up to the End of 1966’, 20 March 1962.

137 Transcript of Penkovsky debrief, ‘Meeting No 1 (London) at Most Royal Hotel’.

138 NIE 11-8/1-61, 21 September 1961.

139 Ibid.

140 Raymond Garthoff, Estimating Soviet Military Intentions, accessed at <www.cia.gov/library/centre-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/watching-the-bear-essays-on-cias-anaylsis-of-the-soviet-union/article05.html>.

141 CAB 158/42 JIC(61)1/10, ‘Periodic Intelligence Summary for NATO Commands’ 30 October 1961.

142 CAB 158/45 JIC(62)28, ‘The Soviet Missile Threat up to the End of 1966’, 20 March 1962.

143 NSC-68, April 1950, accessed at <www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm>.

144 For an in-depth discussion of the Gaither Report, see Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, chapter 8.

145 Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, p.161.

146 Peter J. Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 1995) p.46.

147 Laqueur, The Uses and Limits of Intelligence, p.150.

148 Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, p.79.

149 Maddrell, Britain's Exploitation of Occupied Germany, p.269.

150 Twigge and Scott, Planning Armageddon, p.244.

151 CAB 159/28, JIC(57)105th meeting, 19 December 1957.

152 Goodman, British Intelligence Estimates of the Soviet Nuclear Weapons Programme, p.327.

153 CAB 159/31, JIC(59)24th meeting, ‘Confidential annex – Statement by Maj. Gen. C. R. Price’, 25 March 1959.

154 CAB 158/28, JIC (57)28, ‘Soviet Capabilities and Probable Program in the Field of Guided Weapons’, 11 April 1957.

155 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p.558.

156 CAB 158/39, JIC(60)2, ‘Khrushchev's Statements on Attack Weapons’, 29 January 1960.

157 Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, p.78.

158 Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, p.161.

159 See Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, p.164, and Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, p.71.

160 Garthoff, Estimating Soviet Military Intentions and Capabilities.

161 Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, p.79.

162 For the public debate see Licklider, ‘The Missile Gap’, and Christopher A. Preble, ‘“Who Ever Believed in the ‘Missile Gap?” John F. Kennedy and the Politics of National Security’, Presidential Studies Quarterly 33/4 (2003), pp.801–826.

163 Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, p.161.

164 Laqueur, The Uses and Limits of Intelligence, p.157.

165 CAB 158/36 JIC(59)29, 23 May 1959.

166 CAB 158/39, JIC(60)2, 29 January 1960.

167 CAB 158/31 JIC(58)4, 24 January 1958.

168 CAB 159/30 JIC(58)47th Meeting, ‘Strength and Composition of the Soviet Long-range Bomber Force’, 10 July 1958.

169 AIR 8-1953, note by ACAS (I), S. O. Bufton, ‘Templer Report’, 31 January 1961.

170 Cole, ‘British Technical Intelligence on the Soviet Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile Threat, 1952–1960’, p.81.

171 Berman and Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces, pp.102–103.

172 AIR 8-1953, note by ACAS (I), S. O. Bufton, ‘Templer Report’, 31 January 1961.

173 Twigge and Scott, Planning Armageddon, p.23.

174 John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945–1964 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2006) p.138.

175 Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, pp.226–227.

176 CAB 158/30 JIC(57)119, 15 November 1957.

177 CAB 159/27 JIC(57) 61st meeting, ‘Progress Report by the Chairman of the Working Party on Long-Range Ground-to-Ground Guided Weapons Order of Battle’, 4 July 1957.

178 Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p.77.

179 Maddrell, ‘British-American Scientific Intelligence Collaboration’, p.81.

180 CAB 158/32 JIC(58)24, 18 February 1958.

181 Len Scott, The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Threat of Nuclear War: Lessons from History (London: Continuum 2007) p.47.

182 See Richard K. Betts, ‘Analysis, War, and Decision, World Politics 31/2 (1978) p.70.

183 Twigge and Scott, Planning Armageddon, p.258.

184 Michael Herman, ‘Assessment Machinery: British and American Models’ in David A. Chatters, A. Stuart Farson and Glenn P. Hastedt (eds.) Intelligence Analysis and Assessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001) p.43.