Germany and Chongqing: Secret Communication during WWII

Abstract

The currently accepted narrative regarding WWII in China suggests that Nationalist China and the Third Reich had no diplomatic connections after their official break of diplomatic relations in July 1941. Based on archival material from Germany, China and Taiwan, this article challenges this narrative. As I hope to demonstrate, communications between Germany and China continued well after July 1941 through back channels. From Switzerland, Chinese agents maintained connections with the German party intelligence service (RSHA), and Germany acted as a mediator between China and Japan. It is the role that intelligence personnel played in maintaining this communication channel and their role in clandestine Sino-German relations, which form the foundation of this paper.

Acknowledgements

The PhD research and fieldwork, on which this article is partially based, have been funded and supported by the University of Sheffield (Faculty of Social Sciences Tuition Fee Waiver) and by the Universities' China Committee in London (Research Grant for fieldwork in the People's Republic of China). An earlier version of this article was presented at the 22nd Columbia University Graduate Student Conference on East Asia, 15–16 February 2013. I would like to thank Jeremy E. Taylor for comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper.

Notes

¹ For more information see Hans Rothfels, ‘The German Resistance in its International Aspects’, International Affairs 34/4 (1958) pp.477–89; Peter Hoffmann, ‘The Question of Western Allied Co-operation with the German Anti-Nazi Conspiracy, 1938–1944’, The Historical Journal 34/2 (1991) pp.437–64; Klemens von Klemperer, ‘Adam von Trott zu Solz and Resistance Foreign Policy’, Central European History 14/4 (1981) pp.351–61.

² Richard Breitman, ‘A Deal with the Nazi Dictatorship?: Himmler's Alleged Peace Emissaries in Autumn 1943’, Journal of Contemporary History 30/3 (1995) pp.411–30; Raymond Palmer, ‘Felix Kersten and Count Bernadotte: A Question of Rescue’, Journal of Contemporary History 29/1 (1994) pp.39–51.

³ See for example Hans van de Ven, War and Nationalism in China 1925–1945 (London, NY: Routledge Curzon 2003); Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2009); Rana Mitter, China's War With Japan, 1937–1945: The Struggle for Survival (London: Penguin Books 2013).

⁴ This US-centric view has been criticized by scholars such as van de Ven, War and Nationalism in China 1925–1945, pp.5–6. It can be seen in publications such as Taylor, The Generalissimo; Jonathan Fenby, Chiang Kai-shek and the Nation He Lost (NY: Carroll & Graf 2004).

⁵ Wang Jingwei formed a ‘Central Government’ in Nanjing in March 1940, following his defection to and cooperation with Japan.

⁶ For example see William C. Kirby, Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1984); Stefan Berleb, ‘For China's Benefit’: The Evolution and Devolution of German Influence on Chinese Military Affairs, 1919–1938, PhD thesis (Queensland University of Technology 2005).

⁷ Kirby notes that the three main partners of Republican China, Germany, the Soviet Union and the US, were not approached at the same time. Initially Germany, then the Soviet Union and, from 1941 onwards, the US were approached by Republican China and all three countries served different needs in different situations: William C. Kirby, ‘Youxian de huoban guanxi: 1928–1944 Nian Zhongguo yu Deguo, Sulian he Meiguo de Guanxi’, in Yang Tianshi and Hou Zhongjun (eds.) Zhanshi Guiji Guanxi (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press 2011) pp.3–37, p.33.

⁸ See Berleb, ‘For China's Benefit’.

⁹ See John P. Fox, Germany and the Far Eastern Crisis 1931–1938, A Study in Diplomacy and Ideology (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1982); Udo Ratenhof, Die Chinapolitik des Deutschen Reiches 1871–1945: Wirtschaft – Ruestung – Militaer (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag 1987).

¹⁰ Kirby, Germany and Republican China; Bernd Martin (ed.), Die deutsche Beraterschaft in China 1927–1938: Militär, Wirtschaft, Aussenpolitik (Düsseldorf: Droste 1981); Hsi-Huey Liang, The Sino-German Connection: Alexander von Falkenhausen between China and Germany 1900–1941 (Amsterdam: Van Gorcum 1987); Hsi-Huey Liang, ‘China, the Sino-Japanese Conflict and the Munich Crisis’, Diplomacy & Statecraft 10/2-3 (1999) pp.342–69.

¹¹ Nazi Germany here refers to the official government of the Third Reich, including the Reichsicherheitshauptamt (the Reich Main Security Office, hereafter RSHA), the party intelligence service.

¹² The RSHA was attached to the Gestapo and the Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service) under the control of Gestapo Chief and head of the German police Heinrich Himmler. The director of the SD, and also the RSHA, was Reinhard Heydrich. The RSHA controlled different departments of German security and police, carrying out intelligence operations domestically and abroad, but also monitoring any internal opposition: Robin Lumsden, The Allgemeine SS (Oxford: Osprey Publishing 1993) p.9. The office inside the RSHA responsible for foreign espionage was Department VI and, from June 1941 onwards, this was headed by Walter Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs (London: Andre Deutsch 1956) p.222. For information on other back channels to Japan see John Hunter Boyle, China and Japan at War, 1937–1945: The Politics of Collaboration (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1972).

¹³ Liang, The Sino-German Connection; Liang, ‘China, the Sino-Japanese Conflict and the Munich Crisis’.

¹⁴ Yang Tianshi, ‘Kangzhan Qijian ZhongDe Guanxi de Jingtian Mimi-Jiang Jieshi Cedong Deguo Jundui Tuifan Xitele’, Zhuanji Wenxue 96/3 (2010) pp.4–16.

¹⁵ G.R. Berridge and Alan James, A Dictionary of Diplomacy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2003) p.18.

¹⁶ Anthony Wanis-St.John, ‘In Theory: Back-Channel Negotiation: International Bargaining in the Shadows’, Negotiation Journal (2006) pp.119–144, p.120.

¹⁷ For more information on back-channel diplomacy see Wanis-St.John, ‘In Theory: Back-Channel Negotiation: International Bargaining in the Shadows’, p.120; Niall Ò Dorchtaraigh, ‘Together in the Middle: Back-Channel Negotiation in the Irish Peace Process’, Journal of Peace Research 48/6 (2011) pp.767–780, p.768.

¹⁸ During the 2013 nuclear talks, high-ranking US and Iranian diplomats conducted clandestine talks that they kept hidden even from US allies such as Israel, as it was probably feared that Israel would negatively influence any negotiations; BBC, ‘Iran Agrees to Curb Nuclear Activity at Geneva Talks’ < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25074729> (accessed 24 November 2013).

¹⁹ Tai-Chun Kuo, ‘A Strong Diplomat in a Weak Polity: T.V. Soong and Wartime US-China Relations, 1940–1943’, Journal of Contemporary China 18/59 (2009) pp.219–231, p.219; p.228–229. A second back channel ran through Chinese general Yang Jie, who worked as Chiang's private representative to Russia in 1938, and as ambassador until 1940: Zhenguang Li, Minguo Waijiao (Beijing: Zhonghua Dabai Kequan Shu Chubanshe 2012) p.187; John W. Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations 1937–1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1988) p.16.

²⁰ Kuo, ‘A Strong Diplomat in a Weak Polity’, p.222.

²¹ For more information see Liang, ‘China, the Sino-Japanese Conflict and the Munich Crisis’.

²² Representative of this new scholarship are works such as Taylor, The Generalissimo, and Mitter, China's War with Japan, 1937–1945. Appraisals of the Nationalist Chinese economy and nation-building efforts [Karl Gerth, China Made: Consumer Culture and the Creation of the Nation (London: Harvard University Asia Centre 2003); Margherita Zanasi, Saving the Nation, Economic Modernity in Republican China (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press 2006)] have also emerged, as has a re-evaluation of the whole period itself. Frank Dikötter's work The Age of Openness: China before Mao (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press 2008) challenges the common idea of revolution being the key to China's well-being and the perception of Republican China being a ‘time of darkness’ (Dikötter, The Age of Openness, p.1). Julia C. Strauss's work [Julia C. Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: State Building in Republican China, 1927–1940 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998)] on governmental institutions has also contributed to the field. The new approaches and views of Republican China that have emerged in this works have started to challenge, contest, and even overturn some of the assumptions made by the earlier generations of scholars.

²³ Rana Mitter, ‘Modernity, Internationalization, and War in the History of Modern China’, The Historical Journal 48/2 (2005) pp. 523–543, p.523.

²⁴ Parks M. Coble, ‘China's “New Remembering” of the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance, 1937–1945’, The China Quarterly 190 (2007) 394–410, p.402.

²⁵ van de Ven, War and Nationalism in China 1925–1945, p.232.

²⁶ ‘France, Great Britain and Germany were now all preoccupied on their own fronts and had little time or energy to spare for east Asia’ in Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (NY and London: W.W. Norton & Company 1990) p.441. The Soviet Union, even though she supported Chongqing China, was never fully trusted by Chiang Kai-shek; Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations 1937–1945, p.90.

²⁷ van de Ven, War and Nationalism in China, pp.16, 246. It is not my intention to discuss the Ichigo Campaign at this point. The Japanese Ichigo Offensive in 1944 had been far worse than the year 1940, as Japanese troops nearly reached the wartime capital Chongqing.

²⁸ Arthur N. Young, China's Wartime Finance and Inflation 1937–1945 (Cambridge; MA: Harvard University Press 1965) p.345, quoted in Ratenhof, Die Chinapolitik des Deutschen Reiches 1871, p.492.

²⁹ Indeed, several Chinese scholars have explored divisions inside the Nationalist Chinese government at this time, and have demonstrated how such factional divisions influenced foreign policy, such as Zuo Shuangwen, ‘Zhuanxiang lian De, Haishi Jixu Qin Ying Mei?‘, Jindai Shi Yanjiu 2 (2008) pp.38–49.

³⁰ Yang Tianshi, ‘Lian De Haishi Lian Ying Mei?’, Tongzhou Gongjin 3 (2010) pp.37–40, p.37, is quoting Wang Zihuang's and Wang Shijie's diaries (Wang Zizhuang, Wang Zizhuang Riji, 6; Wang Shijie, Wang Shijie Riji, 2), in which Sun Fo is quoted as declaring in a governmental meeting in July 1940 that England was without power in Europe and that German victory was in its grasp. The only reason which, according to Yang (‘Lian De Haishi Lian Ying Mei?’, p.39), stopped Chiang Kai-shek from an alliance with Germany, was America's war preparations in the Pacific, which Chiang regarded as crucial for a victory over Japan. The Third Reich was also seen as a potential ally against the Soviet Union and as way to curb Soviet influence in China. In a report from 14 August 1941, the members of the pro-German group Yu Dawei, minister of war He Yingqing, Zhu Jiahua, and others are named as supporters of a Sino-Russian war. The report claimed that individuals inside China were willing to cooperate with Germany and, as a result, resources available to Yen'an by the Soviet Union would be reduced significantly [Mechthild Leutner (ed.), Deutschland und China 1937–1945: Politik, Militaer, Wirtschaft, Kultur (Berlin: Akademie 1998) p.158], citing Wilhelm Trendels Transocean report, General Yu Dawei, minister of war He Yingqing, Zhu Jiahua and others are named as members of a pro-German lobby. See Leutner, Deutschland und China 1937–1945, p.158; Lagebericht des Mitarbeiters der deutschen Transozean, Wilhelm Trendel, 14 August, 1941; BArch, Rp01, DBC, Nr. 1600, Bl. 92-108.

³¹ Kirby, Germany and Republican China, pp.249–50.

³² Ibid., p.158. Bernd Martin (ed.), Deutsch-Chinesische Beziehungen 1928–1937: ‘Gleiche’ Partner unter ‘ungleichen’ Bedingungen (Berlin: Akademie Verlag 2003) p.44.

³³ Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PA AA): Peking, 185, Akten der Deutschen Gesandschaft in Peking, China-Deutschland, Shanghai Times, ‘Leaning to the Reich’, 6 June 1940.

³⁴ Walter H. Donald acknowledges on 30 October 1940 (Leutner, Deutschland und China 1937–1945, p.146) that there were several occasions when Chiang Kai-shek considered changing sides, for example after the closure of the Burma Road in summer 1940. The British failed in showing any kind of commitment to China, despite several offers from the Chinese side, which Donald (Leutner, Deutschland und China 1937–1945, p.147) sees as a major mistake. (Walter H. Donald to the secretary of the British Foreign Office, Berkely Gage on 30 October 1940, PRO, FO 371/24702, F5084/3281/10 in Leutner, Deutschland und China 1937–1945, pp.145–7). Even though Chiang Kai-shek supported a pro-US/Britain foreign policy, China's National Assembly released a statement on 6 July 1940, in which it stressed efforts to improve ties with Germany and Italy.

³⁵ See for example: Leutner, Deutschland und China 1937–1945, p.45.

³⁶ See for example: Taylor, The Generalissimo.

³⁷ Laura Tyson Li, Madame Chiang Kai-shek: China's Eternal First Lady (NY: Atlantic Monthly Press 2006) p.168.

³⁸ Mitter, China's War with Japan, 1937–1945, p.14.

³⁹ Thomas Nowotny, ‘Introduction to the Transaction Edition’ in Johanna Menzell Meskill, Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan: The Hollow Diplomatic Alliance (New Brunswick/London: Aldine Transaction 2012) pp.xi-xxvii, p.xiii.

⁴⁰ For more information on this period see Kirby, Germany and Republican China. Kirby's work, 30 years after its publication, is still a very good introduction to the topic of Sino-German relations during the 1920s and 1930s.

⁴¹ Due to rife factionalism inside the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek, there existed at least two ‘secret services’, each run by a different body of people. One of these was the much documented Central Statistics Bureau, associated with the C.C. Clique; the second was General Dai Li and his Military Investigation and Statistics Bureau, also known as Juntong, which infiltrated domestic political and opposition movements (such as the Chinese Communist Party) while carrying out intelligence operations against the Japanese [Brian G. Martin, ‘Shield of Collaboration: The Wang Jingwei Regime's Security Service, 1939–1945’, Intelligence and National Security 16/4 (2001) pp.89–148, p.89]. The C.C. Clique was led by the brothers Chen Lifu and Chen Guofu. They enjoyed very close ties with Chiang Kai-shek [Frederic Wakeman Jr., Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service (Berkeley: University of California Press 2003) p.89]. The brothers founded the so-called ‘Central Statistic Bureau’, which was in essence ‘an elaborate secret service system’ [Hung-Mao Tien, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927–1937 (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1972) p.50].

⁴² While there exists substantial literature on the RSHA and the Abwehr, research on Republican Chinese security and intelligence agencies has not received comparable attention. Cooperation between the United States and the Chinese secret service is well documented; Yu Shen, ‘SACO Re-Examined: Sino-America Intelligence Cooperation During World War II’, Intelligence and National Security 16/4 (2001) pp.149–74.

⁴³ For more information see Chen Chern, ‘Deguo zai Hua junshi qingjiguan (1941–1945)’, Taida Lishi Xuebao 44 (2009) pp.153–94.

⁴⁴ Richard B. Spence, ‘K.A. Jahnke and the German Sabotage Campaign in the United States and Mexico, 1914–1918’, The Historian (1996) pp.89–112, p.92. While in America, Jahnke made a fortune by shipping tin-covered caskets of dead Chinese citizens to China [Ulrich Schlie, ‘Carl Marcus (1911–1989) und das Jahnke-Büro’, in Reinhard R. Doerries (ed.), Diplomaten und Agenten, Nachrichtendienste in der Geschichte der Deutsch-Amerikanischen Beziehungen (Heidelberg: Universitaetsverlag C. Winter 2001) p.91]. Following the war, Jahnke made the acquaintance of the Soong Family and Sun Yat-sen (Spence, ‘K.A. Jahnke and the German Sabotage Campaign in the United States and Mexico, 1914–1918’, p.92). Schellenberg speculates that Jahnke has been made part of the family of Sun Yat-sen, in order to honour his service, and that his excellent intelligence connections stem from this time (Schellenberg, Walter Schellenberg-Memoiren, p.43). There exists no record in Chinese supporting these claims, or whether Jahnke was actually given a kind of honorary status.

⁴⁵ Liang, The Sino-German Connection, p.117.

⁴⁶ Walter Schellenberg headed Department VI of the RSHA and in a later part of his career was directly subordinate to Heinrich Himmler.

⁴⁷ Schellenberg, Walter Schellenberg-Memoiren, p.44.

⁴⁸ The National Archives (TNA): Public Record Office (PRO) KV2/755, ‘Jahnke Kurt, Interrogation of Carl Marcus’.

⁴⁹ For more information see Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs; Schellenberg, Walter Schellenberg-Memoiren. Chinese agent Gui Yongqing also mentions connections between Jahnke and leading Nazis. Moreover, Jahnke regularly informed Gui about developments inside the Nazi clique. Jahnke had met Hitler in the early 1920s in Bavaria and, as Liang argues, Jahnke narrowly escaped death in 1934 only because he was not at home [Charles Drage, Als Hitler nach Canossa ging (When Hitler went to Canossa), (Berlin: ikoo Buchverlag 1982), p.90; Liang, The Sino-German Connection, p.118].

⁵⁰ Cheng Xuehua, ‘Gui Yongqing, Jiangxi Minggugong Jizhang’, Zhongshan Fengyu, 4 (2001), pp. 55–56, p.55.

⁵¹ Wakeman, Spymaster, p.57.

⁵² Xu Youchun, MinGuo Renwu Da Cidian (Shi Jia Zhuang: Hebei Renmin Chubanshe 1991) p.643; Cheng, ‘Gui Yongqing’, p.55.

⁵³ The translation for Lixingshe (Society for Vigorous Practice) in this thesis is based on the translation used by Wakeman (Spymaster, p.46). The Lixingshe Society was founded at the end of February 1932 (Wakeman, Spymaster, p.66). The Lixingshe Society was a secret society ‘within what the public called the Whampoa Clique’ (ibid., p.46). Its members followed a ‘military freemasonry’ and admired fascism (ibid.).

⁵⁴ Wakeman, Spymaster, pp.57, 62).

⁵⁵ Yang (‘Kangzhan Qijian ZhongDe Guanxi de Jingtian Mimi-Jiang Jieshi Cedong Deguo Jundui Tuifan Xitele’, p.4) summarizes Gui's work, and that of his colleague Qi Jun, as to ‘observe, investigate and to make new “friends” in the German authority’.

⁵⁶ TNA: PRO WO 208/232 China, Chapter 1: Political; Chungking Government's Relations with Germany, Telegram: Special Distribution and War Cabinet, 19 August 1940.

⁵⁷ Ibid., Cipher telegram to the Marques of Lothian (Washington) Foreign Office, Chungking telegram to Shanghai No. 246 [of 19 August: appointment of General Kuei as Chinese Military Attaché at Berlin], 5 September 1940:

Chinese Minister of Foreign Affair … categorically denied the report and states that the General was only going as Military Attache … Nevertheless if you see a suitable opportunity I shall be glad if you will suggest to the State Department desirability of instructing the United States Embassy at Berlin to keep an eye open for the General's activities when he reaches there.

⁵⁸ In the course of two weeks (6 October–16 October 1940), Gui and Goering met at least four times.

⁵⁹ Academia Historica (AH): ‘Dui Ying Fa DeYi guanxi (6)’, ‘Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Wenwu’, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-090103-000160-167, Entry Number: 002000002105A.

⁶⁰ Liang, The Sino-German Connection, p.164. Also see Liang, ‘China, the Sino-Japanese Conflict and the Munich Crisis’, p.357. At this point, Liang is citing p.57 of Gui Yongqing's unpublished memoirs, which were in his possession.

⁶¹ Liang, The Sino-German Connection, p.163.

⁶² AH: ‘Geguo Qingbao (Intelligence Reports on Various Countries) (3)’, ’Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Wenwu’, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-080107-00003-001, Entry Number: 002000001306A.

⁶³ PA AA: Bern 3604. Letter to the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin, written by Koecher in consulate Berne, 24 November 1944.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Berridge and James, A Dictionary of Diplomacy, p.243. Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv (CH-BAR): CH-BAR#E2001D#1000/1553#1271^*; Kwei, Yun-Chin.

⁶⁶ CH-BAR#E2001D#1000/1553#1271^*; Kwei Yun-Chin.

⁶⁷ Dossier, ‘Gen Kwei Yun Chin’, Bundesarchiv Berne, EPD 1943/45 Sch.80, quoted in Liang, The Sino-German Connection, p.164.

⁶⁸ Institut für Zeitgeschichte (IfZ): ED90, Schellenberg, Walter, SS-Gruf. Memoiren 1939–1944, Volume 4, pp.629. One of these ‘contacts’ in Switzerland was a good friend of Jahnke's by the name Victor Chi Tsai-hoo (Hu Shuzi).

⁶⁹ Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, pp.302–3.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p.303.

⁷¹ Bundesarchiv (BArch): RW 4/693. Fernost: Japan, China Indien, Fiche 0247166, Partial Copy of Report of German Military Attaché in Bern, 27 January 1944.

⁷² TNA: PRO HS 1/165, Far East China: OSS/SOE Co-Operation, 11 May 1943.

⁷³ British Library (BL): India Office Records (IOR), L/ P&S/ 12/ 2293, China, Sino-British Relations File 15, September 36–April 46. From Chongqing to Foreign Office, from Sir H. Seymour, 2 April 1942.

⁷⁴ TNA: PRO WO 208/376A, War Cabinet Distribution from China from Chungking to Foreign Office, Sir H. Seymour, 1 August 1942. TNA: PRO FO 371/35825, Telegram by Sir H. Seymour Chungking, 20 February 1943.

⁷⁵ John Hunter Boyle faced similar issues when exploring Operation Kiri, a Sino-Japanese back channel negotiation taking place in Hong Kong in 1939 and 1940; Boyle, China and Japan at War, 1937–1945, p.289.

⁷⁶ AH: ‘Geguo Qingbao (Intelligence reports from various countries (3)’, ‘Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Wenwu’, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-080107-00003-001, Entry Number: 002000001306A, p.57.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ AH: ‘Dui Ying Fa De Yi guanxi (Material on relations with Britain, France, Germany and Italy (5)’, ‘Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Wenwu’, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-090103-00015-001, Entry Number: 002000002104A. Given Jahnke's work in the RSHA, these cadres are likely Walter Schellenberg, Heinrich Himmler, and Reinhard Heydrich.

⁸¹ There exist no reports by Gui Yongqing between 17 February 1942 and July 1942. Therefore it is assumed that the two men did not meet again until July 1942.

⁸² Dossier, ‘Gen Kwei Yun Chin’, in Federal Archive Berne, EPD 1943/45 Sch.80, quoted in Liang, The Sino-German Connection, p.164. It is highly likely that Jahnke referred to the above mentioned treaty proposal, but there also exists the possibility, that Jahnke is referring to a proposal for a Sino-German alliance directed against British-India. According to the then Chinese Consul Lin Qiusheng, Gui was also approached with this second proposal in early 1942 (Liang, The Sino-German Connection, p.164).

⁸³ Schellenberg, Walter Schellenberg-Memoiren; Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs.

⁸⁴ Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p.303.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ As Boyle describes very well, Japan continued to approach Chiang Kai-shek for a peace deal, even after she had established and recognized the Wang Jingwei government; Boyle, China and Japan at War, 1937–1945.

⁸⁹ Schellenberg, Walter Schellenberg-Memoiren, p.234.

⁹⁰ Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p.304.

⁹¹ Ibid., p.305.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ IfZ: ED90, Schellenberg, Walter SS-Gruf. Memoiren 1939–1944, Volume 4, p.630.

⁹⁴ Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p.305.

⁹⁵ Qi Jun's involvement in clandestine Sino-German relations during WWII is also part of my current research project, but is beyond the scope of this article.

⁹⁶ AH: ‘Jiao nigao jian – minguo sanshiyi nian sanyue zhi minguo sanshiyi nian liuyue (Draft of Exchange Proposal – March 1942 to June 1942)’, ‘Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Wenwu’, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-070200-00014-026, Entry Number: 002000000922A.

⁹⁷ Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p.305.

⁹⁸ AH: ‘Geguo Qingbao (Intelligence reports on various countries) (3)’, ‘Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Wenwu’, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-080107-00003-001, Entry Number: 002000001306A, p.63, Gui Yongqing to Chiang Kai-shek, Berne, 22 October 1942.

⁹⁹ AH: ‘Geguo Qingbao (Intelligence reports on various countries (3)’, ‘Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Wenwu’, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-080107-00003-001, Entry Number: 002000001306A, p.77.

¹⁰⁰ Agostino von Hassel, Sigrid MacRae, with Simone Ameskamp, Alliance of Enemies: The Untold Story of the Secret American and German Collaboration to End World War II (NY: Thomas Dunne Books 2006) p.196.

¹⁰¹ In 1944, Schellenberg started to send out peace feelers, first via Switzerland and later through Count Bernadotte of the Swedish Red Cross. For more information see: Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, pp.428–54.

¹⁰² AH, ‘Geguo Qingbao (Intelligence reports on various countries (3)’, ‘Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Wenwu’, Guoshiguancang, Document Number: 002-080107-00003-001, Entry Number: 002000001306A, p.78.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p.77.

¹⁰⁴ Schlie, ‘Carl Marcus (1911–1989) und das Jahnke-Büro’, p.105. It is unclear what happened to Jahnke during the Soviet advance on Berlin in 1945.

¹⁰⁵ The scope of the article does not allow further exploration of post-war influence of this back channel. However, for more information see Chern Chen, ‘Deutsche Militaerberater in Taiwan’, Vierteljahreshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte 51/3 (2003) pp.385–404.

¹⁰⁶ After the end of the Gui-Jahnke channel in Berne, the RSHA attempted to mediate between China and Japan again in 1944. This time negotiations ran through RSHA agents in Shanghai; Ratenhof, Die Chinapolitik des Deutschen Reiches 1871–1945, p.532.

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Nele Friederike Glang

Nele Glang is currently in the last stages of her PhD in East Asian Studies at the School of East Asian Studies (University of Sheffield). Born in Germany in 1986, Mrs. Glang studied East Asian Studies in Germany (BA), and continued her studies in the United Kingdom (MA and PhD). The focus of her research is on Modern Chinese History, especially the Republican Chinese period. The research on which this article is based explored Sino-German diplomatic relations and Republican Chinese foreign policy approaches during the Second World War.