Intelligence gathering and the relationship between rulers and spies: some lessons from eminent and lesser-known classics

Abstract

This paper aims to examine the relevance of intelligence gathering as an essential prerequisite for any political or military decision, and the resulting special relationship between rulers and spies, through a theoretical comparison between renowned classics and niche literature on strategy, literature, philosophy and political science belonging to several periods and historical contexts. Findings suggest that criticism on intelligence does not concern its utility, but rather the reliability of the sources, the obstacles presented by intelligence gathering and the ethics of spying. Spies are often described as ‘ramifications’ of the ruler, to whom they are tied by a special relationship of trust, rooted in a spirit of sacrifice, adequate remuneration and honours.

Acknowledgements

Riccardo di Guida, Matthew Bishop, Morgan Price, Fabrizio Genovese, Adriano Pitoni, Francesca Giampaoli, Roberta Bonalume, M. Manzurrotte and Prof. Fabio Armao provided helpful comments. Special thanks go to the anonymous referees for their constructive comments. I also thank Ivana Cavaliere for her encouragements. Any mistakes that may appear in this article are my own.

Notes

1. Navarro Bonilla, “Secret Intelligences”, 283–301.

2. See the excellent argument in Margolis, “The Lack of HUMINT”, 43–60.

3. Handel, Masters of War, xxiv.

4. See: Kahn, The Codebreakers.

5. Nizam al-Mulk, The Book of Government, 66.

6. Ibid., 67.

7. Dvornik, Origins of Intelligence Services, 3–4.

8. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 144. For more details on the use of spies in The Art of War, see: Warner, “The Divine Skein”, 483–92.

9. Guan Zhong, Guanzi, 130.

10. Sawyer, “Subversive Information”, 32.

11. Machiavelli, “The Art of War”, 415.

12. On the logic of strategic thinking see: Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict.

13. Luraghi, Le Opere di Raimondo Montecuccoli, 295 (translated from Italian).

14. Ibid., 299–300 (translated from Italian).

15. Musashi, The Book of Five Rings, 23–4.

16. For a more detailed analysis on the Japanese strategic thought, with particular reference to the classics, see: Cleary, The Japanese Art of War, ch.5.

17. Musashi, The Book of Five Rings, 48–9.

18. Ibid., 49.

19. Ibid., 47.

20. Bobbio, Teoria Generale della Politica, 366 (translated from Italian).

21. See for example: Magee, “Countering Nontraditional HUMINT”, 509–20; Hansen, “Intelligence Contracting”, 58–81; Diaz Matey, “The Use of Intelligence”, 272–87.

22. Hobbes, On the Citizen, 146.

23. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 10–11. For a comparison between Hobbes and Kant on the use of spies, see also: Erskine, “As Rays of Light”, 132.

24. Sheldon, Intelligence Activities, 34–6.

25. Sallust, The War with Catiline, 72.

26. Frontinus, The Stratagems, 9–23.

27. Scanlon, A Muslim Manual of War, 28–9.

28. Furse, Information in War, 238.

29. Ibid., 240. See also: Warner, The Rise and Fall, 22.

30. Kautilya, The Arthashastra, 470.

31. Davies, “The Original Surveillance State”, 50.

32. Clausewitz, On War, 117.

33. Ibid.

34. Rosello, “Clausewitz’s Contempt for Intelligence”, 113.

35. Ibid., 105.

36. Sawyer, “Subversive Information”, 32.

37. Jomini, The Art of War, 268–9.

38. Ibid., 272.

39. Plutarch, “The Life of Crassus”, 372–3. For an excellent analysis of the intelligence failures in Parthia, see: Sheldon, Intelligence Activities, ch.5.

40. Ammian, Roman History, 364.

41. Rohatgi, Spy System in Ancient India, 179.

42. Jones, Negotiating Change, 126.

43. Albanese, Cronache di una Rivoluzione, 15.

44. Abels, Alfred the Great, 158. For other English kings in disguise, see: Hutjens, “The Disguised King”, 75–89.

45. Jones, Negotiating Change, 126.

46. Ibid., 127.

47. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 147.

48. Homer, The Odyssey, 215–6.

49. Ibid., 216.

50. Plutarch, “The Life of Lysander”, 251.

51. II Samuel 15.

52. Machiavelli, “The Prince”, 89.

53. Rohatgi, Spy System in Ancient India, 49–50.

54. Numbers 13:1–2.

55. Homer, The Iliad, 188. The reference to the ugly appearance that hides some spy skills recalls not only the description of the ‘living spy’ made by Sun Tzu, but also the covers that Kautilya considers valuable because they appear harmless. These covers include blind, deaf and stupid persons, and the dwarves. See: Kautilya, The Arthashastra, 474.

56. Homer, The Iliad, 190–1.

57. Navarro Bonilla, “Secret Intelligences”, 297.

58. Oppenheim, “The Eyes of the Lord”, 173–4.

59. Xenophon, The Cyropaedia, 291 (my italics).

60. See: Dedijer, “Ragusa Intelligence and Security”, 101–14; Preto, I servizi segreti di Venezia, 235–46.

61. Sawyer, The Tao of Spycraft, 35–7.

62. Al-Asmari, “Origins”, 91.

63. Oppenheim, “The Eyes of the Lord”, 174.

64. See: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/spy (accessed 17 February 2016).

65. Ripa, Della più che novissima iconologia, 90.

66. Romaniello, Dalla tenebra alla luce semantica, 10–11.

67. Kautilya, The Arthashastra, 472.

68. See for example: Champion, “Spies (Look) Like Us”, 530–64.

69. Herodotus, The Histories, 297–300.

70. Sawyer, “Subversive Information”, 38–9.

71. Al-Asmari, “Origins”, 96–7.

72. Dio Cassius, Roman History, 429–31.

73. Bobbio, Teoria Generale della Politica, 357 (translated from Italian).

74. Luraghi, Le Opere di Raimondo Montecuccoli, 296.

75. Taylor, The Thirty-Six Stratagems, 124–6.

76. Scanlon, A Muslim Manual of War, 52.

77. Ibid.

78. Vauban, Science Militaire, 10–11. Even in recent times a scholar has confirmed that ‘People coerced into espionage rarely make ideal agents’, and that ‘Coercion often creates agents who are angry, resentful, and only willing to do just enough to avoid whatever punishment may await for them’. See: Burkett, “An Alternative Framework”, 11.

79. Navarro Bonilla, “Secret Intelligences”, 300.

80. Luraghi, Le Opere di Raimondo Montecuccoli, 296.