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Abstract
The post-World War II Australian military war crimes trials of Japanese from 1945–51 have been criticised for using a rule of evidence considerably relaxed from the ordinary requirements of a criminal trial, one that did not require witnesses to give evidence in person. Circumstantial evidence suggests that, in relation to a trial held in Darwin in March 1946 for war crimes committed in Timor, the secretive Special Operations Australia, otherwise known as the Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD), took advantage of the rule. This article argues that the SRD did not allow their members to give evidence in person in an attempt to control and limit the dissemination of information about their operational and security failures in Timor from 1943–45. The SRD operation was adjudged by its own official historian as displaying ‘gross inefficiency and criminal negligence’. While the SRD’s failures were known to select personnel at the time, access restrictions to archival records in the post-war period, including the war crimes trials, meant that the extent of its failures and how it appeared to manage knowledge of them has not been widely known.
Notes
1. Darwin D1 trial proceedings, 14 March 1946, pleadings by Lt Takeda Keisuke, National Archives of Australia (NAA): A471, 80708 (hereafter Darwin D1 trial).
2. See, for example, Kahn, The Codebreakers; Ball, “Allied Intelligence Cooperation”; Stripp, Code Breaker in the Far East; and Drea and Richard, “New Evidence on Breaking the Japanese Army Codes”. For an analysis of the shifting focus in the literature, see Rohwer, “Signal Intelligence and World War II”.
3. Horner, “Special Intelligence in the South-West Pacific Area”, 325–26.
4. See Herbig, “American Strategic Deception in the Pacific”; Howard, “The Far East, 1942–45”; and Holt, The Deceivers.
5. Richard Aldrich suggests that while some historians have been seemingly unable to ‘move beyond the ‘intractable historical quagmire’ of the ‘Pearl Harbor controversy’, others have assumed that relevant archival material is unobtainable or unexaminable: Aldrich, “Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service”, 180.
6. One of the exceptions is Allen, “Japanese Intelligence Systems”.
7. Everest-Phillips, “The Pre-War Fear of Japanese Espionage”; Dower, War Without Mercy.
8. Holt, The Deceivers, 109, 289.
9. See, for example, Iwashima, Jōhōsen ni kanpai shita Nihon. One of the exceptions is Ken Kotani’s affirmation in “Could Japan Read Allied Signal Traffic?”.
10. Herbig, “American Strategic Deception”, 260, 278, 289–91.
11. The general editor of the Official History, Gavin Long, apparently hoped to include a section on Intelligence but space restrictions did not allow it: Horner, “Special Intelligence in the South-West Pacific Area”, 325.
12. Long, “The Allied Intelligence Bureau”, 619.
13. Nabbie, “A Small South Pole.”
14. See, for example, Fitzpatrick, McCormack, and Morris, eds., Australia’s War Crimes Trials 1945–51.
15. Courtney, Silent Feet; and Powell, War by Stealth.
16. At a war crimes trial held at on Manus Island in 1950, for instance, it was the Japanese wartime executions of three SRD members which comprised the charges.
17. Darwin D1 trial, 4 March 1946, 1–2.
18. Ibid., 4 and 14 March 1946, defending officer’s closing address tendered as exhibit 28, 4.
19. Ibid., defending officer’s closing address, 4. This is because Cole did not require that his closing address be recorded in full, as noted on top of the exhibit.
20. Darwin D1 trial, 1 March 1946, 1–2.
21. Section 9(1) War Crimes Act 1945 (Cth), no. 48 of 1945, assented to 11 October 1945.
22. Darwin D1 trial, 14 March 1946, prosecuting officer’s closing address tendered as exhibit 27, 1.
23. Ibid., 4 March 1946, 2.
24. See Silver, Deadly Secrets.
25. Long, “The Allied Intelligence Bureau”, 621.
26. See, for example, the certification attached to the proforma for “Debriefing of Operatives for Purpose of Consolidated Operational Reports”, n.d., NAA: A3269, O2/A.
27. See “Press Release. Allied Intelligence Bureau Activities 1942–1945”, 13 September 1945, NAA: A3269, O2/A.
28. See the account of the activities of Sgt Barry Lawrence in “He Parachuted into Timor.” Lawrence was a victim named in the first Darwin trial.
29. Second page of letter from Maj – to unknown, n.d. but ca. early 1946, NAA: A3269, V17.
30. For example, SRD Capt A.D. Stephenson and various other ranks joined Army and War Graves’ search operations and carried out interrogations of suspected war criminals in Timor, see “Second Progress Report – Timor”, 3 Aust PW Contact and Inquiry Unit, Koepang, Timor, 22 March 1946, NAA: B3856, 145/4/238.
31. Message from Timforce to Landops, no. A1444, n.d. but ca. 4 December 1945), Australian War Memorial (hereafter AWM): AWM54, 1010/1/37.
32. This was Australian Army Maj C.H. Locke, known as ‘Z’, who became commanding officer of Z Special Unit in January 1945 and was responsible for liaising with ordinary services.
33. Message from Landops to Landforces and AMForce, no. AG6595, 6 December 1945, quoting message A1444 with handwritten note, NAA: MP742/1, 336/1/1213.
34. Lagarto is Portugese for ‘lizard’. The name was probably picked because some of the personnel for the operation were drawn from the earlier ‘Portolizard’ operation in Timor: see “Official History of Special Operations – Australia”, vol. 2: Operations, part 1, 23, 2nd edition, March 1946, NAA: A3269, O8/A (hereafter “Official History of Special Operations”). For an outline of the Lagarto operation, see “Timor Mission: Directive to Lieut. M. de J. Pires”, 12 June 1943, NAA: A3269, D4/A. For Lagarto’s capture, see “Operational Report on Lagarto by VX67548 Capt A.J. Ellwood”, SRD HQ, Melbourne, 24 October 1945, 3, NAA: A3269, V17 (hereafter “Operational Report on Lagarto”).
35. “Operational Report on Lagarto”, ibid., 5–6.
36. Ibid., 6.
37. For Cobra’s capture, see “Report on Cobra Party by VX109980 Capt J.R. Cashman, (O.C. Party)”, 23 October 1945, NAA: A3269, V17. For Cobra’s capture from Ellwood’s perspective, see “Operational Report on Lagarto”, ibid., 7–8.
38. Telegram to Lagarto, no. 40, n.d., NAA: A3269, D4/A.
39. Telegram from Lagarto, no. 60, n.d., ibid.
40. “Operational Report on Lagarto”, 8.
41. Telegram from Lagarto, no. 81, n.d., NAA: A3269, D4/A.
42. S.O.A. Summary of Activities, December 1944, 4, and January 1945, 4, National Archives (UK) (TNA): HS1/243.
43. Telegram from SRD to Lagarto, no. L36, n.d. but ca. January 1945, NAA: A3269, D4/A.
44. S.O.A. Monthly Summary, April 1945, 3, TNA: HS1/243.
45. S.O.A. Monthly Summary, May 1945, Group D Only, 2–3, ibid.
46. See LMS Status Report for week ending 17 June 1945, AWM: AWM54, 627/1/1.
47. Reported in message from Brisbane to Morotai, no. BM10, n.d., NAA: A3269, D4/A.
48. “Chronological Report on Cobra, Lagarto, Suncob, Sunable, Sunlag Projects”, 26 October 1945, NAA: A3269, V17.
49. Message from Morotai to SRD, ML97, July 1945, NAA: A3269, D4/A.
50. “Operational Report on Lagarto”, 10.
51. Message from Lagarto to LMS, n.d., NAA: A3269, D4/A.
52. Message from SRD to Lagarto, n.d., ibid.
53. Telegram from SRD to Cobra repeated to Lagarto, August 1945, ibid.
54. S.R.D. Operations, Weekly Sitrep, no. 1, 13 August 1945, 5, TNA: HS1/244.
55. S.R.D. Operations, Weekly Sitrep, no. 9, 15 October 1945, 2, ibid.
56. “Operational Report on Lagarto”, 5.
57. Australia’s Secret Heroes.
58. See the correspondence in NAA: MT885/1, E/2/1694.
59. See letter from G.B. Courtney to Alan Wood, 22 July 1985, Papers of Allan Wood, Item 2 of 22, AWM: PR85/325. There is, for example, no court-martial file for Ellwood in the records of courts-martials.
60. “Report on S.R.D. Parties Inserted in Timor in 1943–44”, attached to memorandum from Lt Col J.W. Flannagan, Director of Prisoners of War and Internees, AHQ Melbourne, to 2 Aust War Crimes Section, Tokyo, “War Crimes Timor – Ill-treatment of SRD Personnel”, 5 January 1948, NAA: MP742/1, 336/1/1213.
61. “Official History of Special Operations”, vol. 1: Organisation, part 1, Chapter XII, 31.
62. Telegram from LMS to Lagarto, no. L8, n.d.; and telegram from Lagarto, no. 110, n.d. but ca. December 1944, NAA: A3269, D4/A.
63. Timor Section, Progress Report for period ending 21 October 1943, held in Papers of Henry Blyth Manderson, Wallet 1, AWM: PR91/101.
64. Timor Section, Progress Report for period ending 10 November 1943, ibid.
65. “Operational Report on Lagarto”, 6–7.
66. Ibid., 7.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Courtney contends that it was not until early 1945 that SRD wireless operators were trained in Morse “finger printing”: Courtney, Silent Feet, 209, 231. However, the “Official History of Special Operations” covers this training in depth, explaining that if a wireless set was used by the enemy, “the home Station will know immediately that a stranger is using the set”, see “Official History of Special Operations”, vol. 3: Communications, ch.XIII, 65A-68. As has been noted, wireless sending ‘styles’ or ‘fists’ were forged in the European theatre of the war, which is why style alone was not relied upon as a measure to check the identity of the operator: Foot, SOE: An Outline History, 161–62.
70. “Operational Report on Lagarto”, 6, 8.
71. Telegram from SRD to Lagarto, no. 42, n.d. but ca. March 1944, NAA: A3269, D4/A.
72. “Official History of Special Operations”, vol. 2: Operations, part 1, 33.
73. Timor Section, Progress Report for period ending 27 March 1944, held in Papers of Henry Blyth Manderson, Wallet 1, AWM: PR91/101.
74. Telegram from “Wood” to SRD, no. ZL78, n.d. but ca. early 1945, NAA: A3269, D4/A.
75. Timor Section, Progress Report for period ending 10 November 1943, held in Papers of Henry Blyth Manderson, Wallet 1, AWM: PR91/101.
76. Telegram from SRD to Lagarto, n.d. but ca. March 1944, NAA: A3269, D4/A.
77. Telegram from SRD to Lagarto, no. 42, n.d. but ca. March 1944, ibid.
78. Italics for emphasis, ibid.
79. Drea and Richard, “New Evidence on Breaking the Japanese Army Codes”, 62–63.
80. Courtney, Silent Feet, 209, 216.
81. Erskine, “When a Purple Machine went Missing”, 187.
82. See, for example, Drea, MacArthur’s ULTRA.
83. Courtney, Silent Feet, 212.
84. Powell, War By Stealth, 145–46.
85. See, for example, SRD Group D Progress Report, 6 June 1945, NAA: A3269, H6. Weekly status reports about Lagarto to the Allied Intelligence Bureau Controller were similarly innocuous: AWM: AWM54, 627/1/1.
86. Courtney, Silent Feet, 235.
87. “Official History of Special Operations”, vol. 2: Operations, part 1, 31.
88. Brierley edited the Official History, although much of the text was written by others: see “Special Operations Australia. Preface to the First Edition”, “Special Operations Australia being the History of Inter-Allied Services Department and Services Reconnaissance Department”, 1st edition, 5 December 1945, TNA: HS7/88.
89. Italics added for emphasis: “Official History of Special Operations”, vol. 2: Operations, part 1, 32, 34.
90. Operations and Planning Branch, HQ SRD Morotai, “SRD Projects Summary”, September 1945, 12, 23, TNA: HS7/93.
91. Ibid., 12.
92. Italics added for emphasis but capitals in the original: memorandum from Lt Col C.H. Locke, Comd. ‘Z’ Special Unit, to LHQ, Melbourne, 29 October 1945, NAA: MT885/1, E/2/1694.
93. “Z. The SRD Story”, unpublished account, 14–15, held in Private Papers of J.E.B. Finlay CBE OBE TD, Imperial War Museum (UK), 16406.
94. See the “Special Note” at the beginning of the “Official History of Special Operations”, vol. 2: Operations. The SRD Director’s name was not mentioned but this was probably Lt Col H.A. Campbell.
95. Ibid. It is a bit unclear who was meant by this designation, as C-in-C Gen Sir T.A. Blamey retired at the end of November 1945 while Lt Gen V.A.H. Sturdee was acting C-in-C from then until the end of February 1946, at which point the post was abolished and he took the title of Chief of General Staff. Most probably the copy went to Sturdee.
96. See, for example, Charlett, “Japs Faked Code”; “Darwin Tricked by Fake Messages”; “Japs Admit Ill-treatment of Australians”; “Broke Darwin’s Code, Say Japs”; and Charlett, “Japs Feared Attack”.
97. Darwin D1 trial, Exhibit 7 – “Report on Treatment While Prisoner of War in Timor by VX67548 Capt A.J. Ellwood”, 26 October 1945. This “Report” is drawn from Ellwood’s much longer “Operational Report on Lagarto”, dated two days earlier.
98. See Capt William Kerr, “Capture of Members of ‘Z’ Special Unit on Timor Island”, 12 November 1946, NAA: MP742/1, 336/1/1213.
99. Ibid.
100. See, for example, “Demands for Sterner Darwin Trials”.
101. “Six Acquitted at Darwin Trials”.
102. Charlett, “British Law on Side of Japanese”; and “Darwin Court Will Not Be Stampeded”.
103. “Darwin War Crime Sentences”.
104. See, for example, the pleadings of Lt Takeda Keisuke, Darwin D1 trial, 14 March 1946.
105. Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 20 March 1946, 415 (White).
106. Ibid. (Forde).
107. “Jap Sentences. Court’s Reply to Criticism”.
108. Adjutant-General to Brig Ian G. Fullarton, Mildist Darwin, 18 March 1946, NAA: MP742/1, 336/1/1602.
109. Brig Fullarton to Adjutant-General, 19 March 1946, ibid.
110. Memorandum from Lt Col Hubert H. Beven, O.C. 1 Aust War Crimes Section, Singapore to AHQ Melbourne, 23 December 1946, NAA: MP742/1, 336/1/1213.
111. Memorandum from Col E.A. Griffin, Director of Prisoners of War and Internees to 1 Aust War Crimes Section, Singapore, 11 March 1947, ibid.
112. Morotai M9 trial proceedings, 13 December 1945, 53, NAA: A471, 80718.