Making future leaders in the US intelligence community: challenges and opportunities

Abstract

This article explores what factors are important in developing the future leaders of the US intelligence community in the post-9/11 security environment. It surveys traditional leadership theory to assess whether any of its perspectives are applicable to understanding leadership in the intelligence context. It argues, that although some leadership theory may be applicable, the intelligence studies field may be better served by developing its own body of leadership theory. Second, any leadership theory needs to consider together the two synergistic components of intelligence leadership: personal leadership development and the ability to lead organization reform. Furthermore, the role of intelligence governance may be the most critical factor in promoting better leaders of US intelligence agencies and the broader community.

Notes

1. On organizational and bureaucratic factors for intelligence failure, see Zegart, Spying Blind. On leadership and management deficiencies behind intelligence failures see, Walsh, Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis. Also see, The 9/11 Commission Report; Betts, “Analysis, War and Decision,” 61–89.

2. For a recent example of studies of organizational arrangements such as fusion centers, see Van Puyvelde, “Fusing Drug Enforcement,” 1–15. On organizational structural issues, see: Hammond, “Intelligence Organizations and the Organization of Intelligence,” 680–724, and Best Jr., “Leadership of the US Intelligence Community,” 253–33. On leadership and management pathologies related to the analytical process see; Gentry, “Managers of Analysts,” 154–77, and Gentry, “Has the ODNI Improved US Intelligence Analysis,” 637–61. Also see, Johnson, “A Conversation with James R Clapper Jr,” 1–25.

3. For a good overview of a range of leadership theoretical perspectives, see: Bryman et al., The Sage Handbook of Leadership. See also, Day, The Oxford Handbook of Leadership and Organizations; Grint, The Arts of Leadership; Goethals and Sorrenson, The Encyclopaedia of Leadership; Lussier and Achua, Leadership: Theory Application, and Skill Development.

4. For example, over the last two decades transformational leadership has been well researched and evidenced though other such as ‘adaptive leadership’ provide a theoretical framework rather than empirically being tested in specific leadership environments.

5. Machiavelli quoted in Keith Grint, “A history of leadership,” 7.

6. Grint, “A history of leadership,” 8.

7. Ibid., 8–9.

8. Van Fleet, “Organizational Differences in Critical Leader Behaviours,” 27–36.

9. Ibid., 9.

10. New public sector management philosophies emerging in the 1990s in the UK were particularly influential in shaping the development of policing organizations. In particular, they in part drove new ideas about the role of efficient service delivery of intelligence in policing. New public sector managerialism, thus was influential particularly in the development of new intelligence led policing models at the time. Walsh, Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis, 152.

11. Dinh et al., “Leadership Theory and Research in the New Millennium: Current Theoretical Trends and Changing Perspectives,” 47.

12. For a discussion on charismatic leadership, go to: Conger, “Charismatic Leadership”.

13. Podsakoff et al., “Transformational Leader Behaviours and the Effects on Followers,” 107–42.

14. For discussion on the multifactor leadership questionnaire see, Bass and Riggio, Transformational Leadership.

15. Podsakoff et al., “Transformational Leader Behaviours,” 112.

16. Quoted in Diaz-Saenz, “Transformational Leadership,” 306. See also, Eeisenbeis and Boerner’s study which argues that there is a strong correlation between transformational leaders and employee satisfaction, creativity, goal attainment and follower wellbeing, “A Double Edged Sword,” 54–69.

17. For a critique on transformational leadership see, Yukl, “An Evaluation of the Conceptual Weaknesses in Transformational and Charismatic Leadership Theories,” 285–305.

18. Examples of researchers working in the follower-centric theory category include: Bligh, “Followership and Follower-centres Approaches,” 425–36; Hansen et al., “Aesthetic Leadership,” 544–60; Howell and Boas Shamir, “The Role of Followers in the Charismatic Leadership Process,” 96–112.

19. Bligh, “Followership and Follower-centres Approaches,” 427.

20. For a more detailed discussion on the evolution of follower-centric theories see: Bligh, “Followership and Follower-centres Approaches,” 425–36.

21. Romancing leaders perspectives focus on how leaders and followers romanticise and sometimes demonise the importance of leaders in different organizations. It relies on a range of behavioural attributes, perspectives and identities that are not easily measured in any organizational context including those in the intelligence context. Aesthetic leadership is based on the ‘felt meaning’ followers have for leaders. Unlike transformational leadership, who focus on rational and technical understanding of leadership, aesthetic theorists argue how followers ‘feel’ or perceive leaders are grounded in subjectivity and emotions. Given feelings, perceptions are based on emotions, therefore how followers engage with leaders is based on their own subjectivity and sense making rather than rational or technical understanding of the leader’s capabilities. Hansen et al., “Aesthetic Leadership,” 544–60.

22. Brown et al., “Ethical Leadership: A Social Learning Theory Perspective for Construct Development,” 120.

23. Ibid.

24. Avolio and Walumbwa, “Authentic Leadership Theory, Research and Practice,” 334.

25. Positive psychology studies the strengths that enable individuals and communities to thrive and be more resilient. On the influences of positive psychology, see Lopez and Snyder, Oxford Handbook of Positive Psychology, and Cameron, “Paradox in Positive Organizational Change,” 7–24.

26. Ibid., 332.

27. Luthans and Avolio, “Authentic Leadership Development,” 243.

28. Avolio and Walumbwa, “Authentic Leadership Theory, Research and Practice,” 340–42.

29. For detailed discussion on the developments in servant leadership, see Ehrhart, “Leadership and Procedural Justice Climate as Antecedents of Unit Level Organizational Citizenship Behaviour,” 61–94; Van Direndunck, “Servant Leadership,” 1228–61; Walumbwa et al., “Servant Leadership Procedural Justice Climate,” 517–29; Liden et al., “Servant Leadership,” 331–57.

30. Ehrhart, “Leadership and Procedural Justice Climate,” 73.

31. Ibid., 65.

32. Liden et al., “Servant Leadership,” 362–66.

33. For further discussions on distributed and shared leadership theories see, Gronn, “Distributed Leadership as a Unit of Analysis,” 423–51; Morgeson et al., “Leadership in Teams,” 5–39; Pearce and Sims, “Leadership as Predictors of the Effectiveness of Change Management Teams,” 172–97.

34. Wang et al., “Multilateral Issues in Leadership Research,” 154.

35. Peter Gronn provides a taxonomy of distributed leadership, see Gronn, “Distributed Leadership,” 423–51.

36. James Meindl cited in Bligh, “Followership and Follower-centres Approaches,” 428.

37. Conger, “Charismatic Leadership,” 91.

38. Johnson, “A Conversation with James R. Clapper,” 2.

39. Ibid.

40. Kitfield, “Flynn’s Last Interview”.

41. Bligh, “Followership and Follower-centres Approaches,” 431.

42. ODNI, Strategic Human Capital Plan.

43. Miller and Goldman, “Eye Wash”.

44. Burke et al., “Team Leadership,” 348.

45. Gentry, “Has the ODNI Improved US Intelligence Analysis?,” 641, 648.

46. Walsh, Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis, 235–46; Marrin, Improving Intelligence Analysis.

47. Walsh, Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis, 283–98.

48. For discussions on progressing intelligence theory building in general, see Walsh, Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis, 295–8, and Gill et al., Intelligence Theory.

49. Zegart, Spying Blind. Other authors have also examined similar political and management issues to Zegart that result in intelligence failure. See for example, Goodman, “9/11,” 59–71; Hedley, “Learning from Intelligence Failures,” 435–50; Hitz and Weiss, “Helping the CIA and FBI Connect the Dots,” 1–42.

50. Walsh, Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis, 92–130.

51. For a detailed discussion of my intelligence framework study see, Walsh, Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis, 132–51; also see, Walsh, “Building Better Intelligence,” 123–42.

52. For a detailed discussion of core intelligence processes and key enabling activities go to: Walsh, Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis, 132–51; Also see, “Building Better Intelligence,” 123–42.

53. Ibid., 135.

54. Kitfield, “Flynn’s Last Interview,” and Johnson, “A Conversation with James R Clapper Jr,” 1–25.

55. Brennan, “Unclassified Version of March 6 Message to the Workforce from CIA Director John Brennan”.

56. When referring to ‘future leaders’ I define this as not just including heads of agencies, but also heads of departments/sections–i.e., personnel senior enough that they have financial delegation over financial, technical and human resources.

57. Gentry, “Managers of Analysts,” 154–77.

58. On developments in US analytical training, see Marrin, “Training and Educating US Intelligence Analysts,” 131–46 and, Marrin, “CIA’s Kent School Improving Training for New Analysts,” 609–37. On developments in other ‘Five Eyes’ countries see Walsh, Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis, 255–71.

59. For example, the University of Maryland College has a Master of Science in Management: Intelligence Management course, which includes subjects such as: organizational theory, communications, financial decision-making, strategic management aimed at mid-career intelligence professionals. The NIU is currently offering certificates of intelligence studies in leadership and management in the intelligence community, which includes subjects like: leadership and intelligence; national security law and ethics and organizational management and change.

60. ODNI, Strategic Human Capital Plan.

61. The intelligence studies literature on intelligence evaluation provides some ideas about how intelligence products and processes can be measured but further research is required. See for example, Walsh, “Knowledge from Evaluating Intelligence,”31–49; Moore et al., “Evaluating Intelligence,”204–20; Turner, “Issues in Evaluating US Intelligence,” 275–85.

62. Walsh, Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis, 171–5.

63. Ben Haim, “Policy Neutrality and Uncertainty,” 1–15.

64. Employee attrition rates can vary over time and be the result of many factors. For example, in a 2004–2005 inspection of attrition at the CIA, a report found that it was high with employees with less than six years’ experience. In 2009, the attrition rates were lower with internal Agency survey results indicating that impact of the Global Financial Crisis reduced alternative employment options in the intelligence community. Interestingly, one of the reasons cited by employees for leaving was poor management. See, CIA, Report of the Follow Up Inspection Retention in the Agency (July 2010). Unclassified.

65. Sims and Gerber, Vaults, Mirrors and Masks, 19–51.

66. Sangar, “Russian Ships Near Date Cables Are Too Close for U.S Comfort”.

67. Walsh and Miller, “Rethinking ‘Five Eyes’ Security Intelligence Collection,” 345–68.

68. Ibid.

69. Johnson, “Ostriches, Cheer Leaders, Skeptics and Guardians,” 93–108.