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Abstract
This article examines the lack of policy response to the 1990 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that predicted the collapse of Yugoslavia. Contrary to common criticisms of estimative intelligence, the NIE was accurate and unambiguous. Why was good intelligence unheeded? For some policymakers, the analysis was not closely tied to their interests and competed with other priorities for attention; for those who were substantive experts, the NIE’s grim message was hard to accept. Moreover, policymakers read intelligence reports in the context of popular concepts – a lingering Cold War lens distorted more than it clarified. Finally, while the NIE made hard-hitting judgments, it did not include any analysis of opportunities to influence the outcome. Rather than pushing an already difficult estimate to the breaking point, including opportunities would likely have increased the odds of policymakers taking action. These lessons have broader implications for analytical tradecraft and the often-challenging relationship between intelligence and policy.
Notes
* A Board member of this journal, Professor Robert Jervis of Columbia University, brought this unclassified piece to our attention, originally published as an in-house study at the Center for the Study of Intelligence (affiliated with the Central Intelligence Agency). With special thanks to Andrew Vaart of the Center, we present it here for the edification of our readers.
1. The estimate has been declassified. See NIE 15-90, “Yugoslavia Transformed,” 18 October 1990, in Yugoslavia: From “National Communism” to National Collapse: US Intelligence Community Estimative Products on Yugoslavia, 1948–1990 (NIC 2006-004), US Government Printing Office, December 2006 (Hereafter cited as “NIC 2006-004.”). The publication is also available at www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_home.html under Declassified NIC Publications
2. Rosenfeld, “A Timely Warning; The CIA predicts a blowup in Yugoslavia,” Washington Post, 30 November 1990.
3. Interview with Robert Hutchings, former Director for European Affairs, National Security Council, 27 June 2014. (Hereafter cited as “Hutchings interview, 2014.”)
4. Interview with David Gompert, former Senior Director for Europe and Eurasia, National Security Council, 2 July 2014. (Hereafter cited as “Gombert interview, 2014.”)
5. Interview with James Dobbins, former acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, State Department, 14 August 2014. (Hereafter cited as “Dobbins interview, 2014.”)
6. Hutchings interview, 2014.
7. Interview with Martin van Heuven, former National Intelligence Officer for Europe, 30 June 2014. (Hereafter cited as “Van Heuven interview, 2014.”)
8. Van Heuven interview, 2014.
9. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War, 321.
10. The term “Yugoslav experiment” first appears in the estimative record as the title of NIE 15-67, The Yugoslav Experiment, 13 April 1967. (See NIC 2006-004)
11. Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe, 6.
12. The first NIE on Yugoslavia in 1950 highlights the country’s strategic importance to the Western and Soviet blocs, both for control of the Eastern Mediterranean and as a launching point for attacks. See NIE-7, The Current Situation in Yugoslavia, 21 November 1950, in NIC 2006-004.
13. Van Heuven, “Introduction,” in NIC 2006-004, xiii.
14. NIC 2006-004, vii.
15. Van Heuven, the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) who commissioned the 1990 Yugoslavia NIE, contends that labeling this a failure is unfair because an Intelligence Community had not yet been formed to make such an assessment. Van Heuven, “Introduction,” in NIC 2006-004, xi.
16. Van Heuven, “Introduction,” in NIC 2006-004, ix.
17. “Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (in Response to NSSM 129) (27 July 1971),” in NIC 2006-004, 356. (Hereafter cited as “Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal.”)
18. NIE 15-61, Outlook for Yugoslavia (23 May 1961), in NIC 2006-004, 257.
19. NIE 15-67, The Yugoslav Experiment (13 April 1967), in NIC 2006-004, 307.
20. Ibid., 316.
21. NIE 15-73, Yugoslavia After Tito (5 July 1973) in NIC 2006-004, 513.
22. “Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal,” 368.
23. Memo, “Tito’s Time of Troubles” (17 November 1972), in NIC 2006-004, 489.
24. “Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal,” 379.
25. CIA, “Yugoslavia: Military Dynamics of a Potential Civil War,” March 1991, 1.
26. Van Heuven, “Introduction,” in NIC 2006-004, xii.
27. NIE 31-55, Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation (23 February 1955), in NIC 2006-004, 167.
28. Gates, interview for George H. W. Bush Presidential Oral History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia, 23–24 July, 2000. (Hereafter cited as “Gates Interview, 2000.”)
29. SNIE 15-83, “Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis?” (31 January 1983), in NIC 2006-004, 633.
30. Ibid., 647.
31. Ibid., 641.
32. Van Heuven, “Testing the New Germany: The Case of Yugoslavia,” German Politics and Society 29 (Summer 1993): 56.
33. “Yugoslavia: Troubled Party Congress,” National Intelligence Daily, 25 June 1982, approved for release: 1995, FOIA Collection 000037.
34. “Yugoslavia: Key Questions and Answers on the Debt Crisis,” An Intelligence Assessment, EUR-84-10011, January 1985, approved for release: 12 May 2011.
35. Zimmerman, Origins of a Catatrophe, 54.
36. Ibid., 64.
37. Ibid., 65.
38. NIC, “The Future of Eastern Europe: A Conference Report,” 3 November 1989.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. See note 8 above.
42. Van Heuven, quoted in “A National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia,” in NIC 2006-004, 709.
43. Van Heuven, remarks as delivered at the Wilson Center introduction of From “‘National Communism’ to National Collapse,” 7 December 2006.
44. “Appendix B: A National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia, August 2006” in NIC 2006-004, 710.
45. NIE 15-90, Yugoslavia Transformed (18 October 1990), in NIC 2006-04, 669. (Hereafter cited as Yugoslavia Transformed.)
46. CIA, “Bosnia-Hercegovina: On the Edge of the Abyss,” memorandum, 19 December 1991, 2.
47. Yugoslavia Transformed, 656.
48. Ibid., 670.
49. See note 8 above.
50. Yugoslavia Transformed, 672.
51. Ibid., 659.
52. Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe, 84.
53. See note 8 above.
54. Van Heuven, “Introduction,” in NIC 2006-004, xxix.
55. Binder, “Evolution in Europe; Yugoslavia Seen Breaking Up Soon,” 28 November 1990.
56. See note 6 above.
57. President Bush, “A Europe Whole and Free,” remarks as delivered at Rheingoldhalle, Mainz, Federal Republic of Germany, 31 May 1989.
58. US Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Milestones: 1989–1992 – Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, 1989,” 31 October 2013.
59. “Oral History: Colin Powell,” Frontline: The Gulf War, PBS, 1996.
60. “Oral History: James Baker,” Frontline: The Gulf War, PBS, 1996.
61. Secretary of State Baker, “US Concerns About the Future of Yugoslavia: Excerpts from remarks at the Federation Palace, Belgrade, Yugoslavia (21 June 1991),” US Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 2, No. 26, 1 July 1991.
62. Baker, 1991.
63. Congressional Record of the 101st Congress, Yugoslavia (Senate – 20 September 1990), S13488.
64. Cheney, interview for George H. W. Bush Presidential Oral History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia, 16–17 March 2000 (hereafter cited as “Cheney interview, 2000”).
65. Ross, interview for George H. W. Bush Presidential Oral History Project, Miller Center, University of Virginia, 2 August 2000 (hereafter cited as “Ross interview, 2000”).
66. Ross interview, 2000.
67. Dobbins interview, 2014.
68. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War, 307.
69. See note 8 above.
70. Ibid.
71. “Appendix B: A National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia, August 2006” in NIC 2006-004, 713.
72. See note 8 above.
73. “Appendix B: A National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia,” in NIC 2006-004, 712–13.
74. Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, 30–31.
75. Cheney interview, 2000.
76. Gates interview, 2000.
77. See note 67 above.
78. Gompert interview, 2014.
79. See note 67 above.
80. See note 6 above.
81. See note 8 above.
82. Ibid.
83. Interview of senior official who preferred to remain anonymous, 17 April 2014.
84. See note 8 above.
85. Van Heuven, quoted in “A National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia.”
86. Ibid.
87. See note 6 above.
88. Interview of senior official who preferred to remain anonymous, 2014.
89. See note 75 above.
90. US Department of State, Daily Press Briefing No. 128, 3 September 1991.
91. Quoted in Meyer, “Editorial Notebook,” New York Times, 14 August 1991.
92. See note 9 above.
93. See note 76 above.
94. During the Cold War neither the Soviet Union nor the United States would have permitted such an eventuality. One or the other or both might well have intervened militarily to forestall the other. Yugoslavia was thus held together not just by Tito’s leadership, but by countervailing East-West pressures. With the end of the Cold War, neither side cared about Yugoslavia’s future alignment.
95. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War, 302.
96. Ibid., 304.