When generals consume intelligence: the problems that arise and how they solve them

Abstract

Strategic intelligence is a critical input to national security decision-making. Research indicates decision-making is negatively affected when strategic intelligence creates cognitive problems. In this qualitative study, the opposite was found to be true. Twenty-one very senior landpower generals with command experience in Iraq and Afghanistan were interviewed. Their problems with strategic intelligence – resulting from their perceptions of contradictions – had a positive affect on decision-making. The generals resolved problems using a three-prong, socially embedded, hierarchically diverse, problem solving strategy consisting of self-learning, learning from others, and mentoring others. Such a strategy could be incorporated into professional military education throughout an officer’s career.

Notes

1. Ferris and Handel, “Clausewitz, Intelligence, Uncertainty,” 1–58; and Davies, “Intelligence and the Art of Command, 1799–1945,” 589–600.

2. Intelligence refers to information that meets the stated or understood needs of policymakers and decision-makers, and has been collected, processed, and narrowed to meet those needs. See Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 2. The definition of strategic intelligence is stated in Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 2-0, x. Sometimes national security professionals refer to national intelligence as kinds of collection assets. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended in 2004, Section 3, redefines ‘national intelligence’ as ‘all intelligence, regardless of the source from which derived ….’ Strategic intelligence and national intelligence have been used synonymously but they are different. Here, in this paper, we are focusing on strategic intelligence, regardless of the method of collection.

3. Handel, “Intelligence and Military Operations,” 1–95; and Dempsey, Joint Education.

4. For examples, see Handel, “Intelligence and Military Operations”; Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails; Jensen, “Intelligence Failures,”; and Lamb, “National-level Coordination and Implementation,” 219–22.

5. For a discussion of how inquiry-based dialogue helps resolve contradictions, see Argyris and Schon, Organizational Learning, 146; and Schon, The Reflective Practitioner, 246. With regard to how surprising critical thinking surfaced as a key element in resolving contradictions, I thought the generals would say their biggest concern with strategic intelligence was their lack of understanding satellite and human intelligence capabilities and limitations; yes, these were mentioned but only occasionally, and when they were, they were low on their list of concerns.

6. Festinger, Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, 4.

7. See a discussion about the ‘fallacy of misplaced concreteness’, the idea that something complex is erroneously presented as simplistic, in Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, 51.

8. Schumacher, Guide for the Perplexed, 122–6; and Rothenberg, “Janusian Process,” 107–8.

9. Bazerman, Judgment in Managerial Decision Making, 34–5.

10. Handel, “Leaders and Intelligence,” 3–39.

11. Deutsch, “Commanding Generals and the Uses of Intelligence,” 194–260.

12. Davies, “Intelligence and the Art of Command, 1799–1945.”

13. Jervis, “Why Intelligence and Policymakers Clash,” 185–204.

14. Ibid., 194–5.

15. Leslau, “Effect of Intelligence on the Decision-making,” 426–48.

16. Jervis, “Political Psychology,” 481–93.

17. Walker, “Psychodynamic Processes and Framing Effects,” 697–717.

18. Ibid., 715.

19. Bar-Joseph and Kruglanski, “Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure,” 75–99.

20. Gookins, “Role of Intelligence in Policy Making,” 65–73.

21. Immerman, “Intelligence and Strategy,” 1–23.

22. Ibid., 2.

23. Houghton, Decision Point, 14.

24. Fiske and Taylor, Social Cognition, 54.

25. Deutsch, “Commanding Generals and the Uses of Intelligence.”

26. Deutsch, “Commanding Generals and the Uses of Intelligence”; and Ferris and Handel, “Clausewitz, Intelligence, Uncertainty.”

27. For examples of the word ‘consumption’ has been used as an outcome in the national security literature: Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision”; Hughes, “Fate of Facts in the World of Men”; Thomas, “Intelligence Production and Consumption,” 125–39; Hulnick, “Intelligence Producer-consumer Relations”; Petersen, “What I Learned in 40 Years”; and Wilder, “Educated Consumer is Our Best Customer.”

28. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 82.

29. For a psychological description of face-to-face interaction, see Watzlawick, Bavelas, and Jackson, Pragmatics of Human Communication, 50; and Goffman, “The Interaction Order.”

30. Myers, Qualitative Research in Business and Management, 5.

31. Silverman, Interpreting Qualitative Data, 71.

32. Peirce, “What Pragmatism Is”; and Glaser and Strauss, Discovery of Grounded Theory, 1–6.

33. See these examples for how grounded theory has been applied in the intelligence literature: Prunckun, “Grounded Theory of Counterintelligence”; Zohar, “Intelligence Analysis as a Manifestation”; and Wolfberg, “Communication Patterns between the Briefer and the Policy-maker.”

34. Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory, 1–12.

35. Ibid., 113–5.

36. Fischhoff, “Communicating About Analysis,” 231–4.

37. In order to reduce chances of identification, a range of three years was used to indicate the time period of those general officers that were retired.

38. Biernacki and Dan Waldorf, “Snowball Sampling.”

39. Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory, 46.

40. Ibid., 54.

41. Joint Publication 2-0, II-12.

42. For a discussion of the Army Operating Concept, see McMaster, “Continuity and Change.”

43. Marrin, “Intelligence Analysis Theory.”

44. Red teams are used to gain alternative perspectives about a problem set. For examples of how red team analysis is used in intelligence analysis, see Heuer and Pherson, Structured Analytic Techniques, 243–4; and Marrin, Improving Intelligence Analysis, 32.

45. Fischer and Spiker, Critical Thinking for Army Officers, 3.

46. Bonn, “Improving Strategic Thinking”; and Halpern, Thought and Knowledge, 8.

47. Piaget, Construction of Reality in the Child, 350–4.

48. Lehman et al., “Inducing and Tracking Confusion,” 171–8.

49. Bass and Avolio, “Implications of Transactional,” 241–3.

50. Alfieri et al., “Does Discovery-based Instruction Enhance Learning?”

51. Schein, “How Can Organizations Learn Faster?”

52. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, 5; Vera and Crossan, “Strategic Leadership and Organizational Learning”; and Argote and Miron-Spektor, “Organizational Learning.”

53. Handel, “Intelligence and Military Operations”; Odom, “Intelligence Analysis”; and Dempsey, Joint Education.

54. Ulrich, “A Primer on Civil-Military Relations,” 305–314.

55. DiBella, “Military Leaders and Global Leaders.”

56. Ibid.

57. Fingar, Reducing Uncertainty, 25.

58. Freidman and Zeckhauser, “Assessing Uncertainty in Intelligence.” The United States Intelligence Community is required to describe uncertainty and ambiguity, mandated by United States Government, Intelligence Community Directive 203: Analytic Standards, referred to as ICD 203.

59. Odom, “Intelligence Analysis.” ICD 203 requires analysts to provide products that address the needs of decision-makers.

60. Handel, “Intelligence and Military Operations”; Ferris and Handel, “Clausewitz, Intelligence, Uncertainty”; Kovacs, “Using Intelligence”; and Davies, “Intelligence and the Art of Command, 1799–1945.”

61. United States Army, Army Human Dimension Strategy 2015.

62. Army maneuver officers spend their career perfecting their tradecraft, the technical skills germane to their warfare specialty, and perfecting their understanding of the adversary’s capabilities. The system rewards them for these professional developments. To introduce a timetable to organically migrate from a technical to a strategic mindset much earlier in their career than at the colonel or general officer rank would take a cultural shift in the Army.

63. Page, The Difference, 9–10; and Fischhoff, “The Realities of Risk-cost-benefit Analysis.”