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Notes
1. Remarks by the President to Stewart, “The Daily Show.”
2. Earlier INS forums have included: Johnson, ed., “An INS Special Forum,” 793–810; and Phythian, ed., “An INS Special Forum,” 8–27.
3. Kakaes, “Chapter 10: The UN’s Drones and Congo’s War,” 87.
4. BBC News, “Goma: M23 rebels capture DR Congo city.”
5. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2098 (2013).
6. MONUSCO, “MONUSCO Facts and Figures.”
7. MONUSCO, “About.”
8. Kakaes, “Chapter 10: The UN’s Drones and Congo’s War,” 91.
9. France24, “M23 rebels announce ‘end of rebellion’ in DR Congo.”
10. Nigeria Today, “Arrest of 3 top FDLR commanders could mark major divisions.”
11. Hoyle, “UN picks Falco UAS for DRC peacekeeping mission.”
12. United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo, “Interoffice Memorandum,” 3.
13. Dorn, “Smart Peacekeeping,” 9.
14. Ibid., 3.
15. MONUSCO, “MONUSCO Peacekeepers rescue 14 people from sinking boat on Lake Kivu.”
16. Tafirenyika, “Drones are effective in protecting civilians.”
17. Isango, “Drone Crashin in Congo Kills 1, Injures 2.”
18. O’Grady, “How a U.N. Drone Crashed in Congo and Was Promptly Forgotten.”
19. Lynch, “U.N. wants to use drones for peacekeeping missions.”
20. Kagire, “Rwanda president: No issue with UN drones in Congo.”
21. Karlsrud and Rosen, “Lifting the fog of war?” 51.
22. iRevolutions, “Humanitarians in the Sky.”
23. Relief Web, “Joint INGO Position on Humanitarian Use of UAVs.”
24. Ibid.
25. Karlsrud and Rosen, “Lifting the fog of war?” 57.
26. See note 1 above.
27. Rietjens and Dorn, “The Evolution of Peacekeeping Intelligence.”
28. Kakaes, “Chapter 10: The UN’s Drones and Congo’s War,” 90.
29. Kakaes, “Chapter 10: The UN’s Drones and Congo’s War,” 93.
30. At one point, several of the UN’s UAVs were transported from Goma in the East to the capital, Kinshasa, in the West to help with observation over the capital, during a particularly tense election.
31. Karlsrud and Rosén, “In the Eye of the Beholder?” 6.
32. Ibid.
33. Apuuli, “The Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Drones) in United Nations Peacekeeping.”
34. Dorn, “Smart Peacekeeping: Toward Tech-Enabled UN Operations,” 21. The notion of the ‘Technology Contributing Country’ was first introduced to the UN’s Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in Peacekeeping by one of the authors (W. Dorn) while he served on the panel.
35. Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping, “Performance Peacekeeping: Final Report,” 54.
36. Nichols, “U.N. seeks surveillance drones for Mali, shelves plans for Ivory Coast.”
37. Personal conversations by one of the authors with DPKO officials at UN Headquarters who were involved with the UAV programme. For information on French UAVs, see France, Ministry of Defense, “Reaper Drones In Sahel Now Part of ISR Assets of French Armed Forces.”
38. Ahronheim, “Israel’s Heron drone completes first successful mission in Mali.”
39. Aviation Week, “Unmanned Peacekeepers in Africa.”
40. See note 33 above.
41. Eshel, “Unmanned Peacekeepers over Africa.”
42. Aviation Week, “Unmanned Peacekeepers in Africa.”
43. Turse, “US Military is Building a $100 Million.”
44. Obama, “Full Text.”
45. Obama, “Fact Sheet”.
46. Savage, “Harsher Security Tactics?”
47. Cronin, “Why Drones Fail.”
48. Johnston, “Does Decapitation Work?” 47–79.
49. Cronin, “Why Drones Fail”; and Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark,” 7–38.
50. Brennan, “The Efficacy and Ethics.”
51. Atherton, “Russia’s New Drone Rules.”
52. Goldsmith and Waxman, “The Legal Legacy of Light-footprint Warfare,” 7–21.
53. Goodman, “Targeting Al-Shabaab’s Godane.”
54. Ackerman, “Obama Claims US Drones Strikes.”
55. “The Presidential Candidates on Drones,” Center for the Study of the Drone, available at http://dronecenter.bard.edu/the-presidential-candidates-on-drones/.
56. Schultz, “Tying Hands and Washing Hands,” 105–42.
57. Goldsmith and Waxman, “The Legal Legacy of Light-footprint Warfare.”
58. Bueno de Mesquita et al., “Testing Novel Implications,” 363–88; Reiter and Stam, Democracies at War.
59. www.tagesschau.de/inland/drohnen-129.html (4 June 2016); www.tagesschau.de/inland/heron-bundeswehr-101.html (21 August 2016).
60. White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (July 2016).
61. Hans-Arthur Marsiske, Deutsche Roboter sollen Waffen tragen, in: Telepolis (15 January 2016).
62. Matthias Monroy, Kampfdrohnen der Bundeswehr fliegen mit Raketen aus Israel und Verschlüsselung aus Deutschland, in: www.Netzpolitik.org (21 August 2016); www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/Bundeswehr-Drohne-fliegt-mit-deutscher-Kryptierung-3341890.html (8 October 2016).
63. Israel Close to Purchasing 3 Nuclear Submarines from Germany", in Jerusalem Post (21 October 2916).
64. www.tagesschau.de/inland/drohnen-gericht-von-der-leyen-101.html (16 September 2016).
65. Klaus Wittmann, Mehr Differenzierung, bitte!, in The European (12 July 2013).
66. www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/drohnen-135.html (30 November 2016).
67. Figures for 2015 taken from IISS, The Military Balance 2016 (Routledge, London 2016). No carefully calculated figures exist for comparing intelligence budgets across national borders.
68. Panetta, “Director’s Remarks at the Pacific Council.”
69. Gunneflo, Targeted Killing, 111.
70. For statistics on drone strikes, see data from The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, The Long War Journal, or the New America Foundation, each of which show variations in numbers but similarities in trends. For data on terrorist attacks see the Global Terrorism Database and Chicago Suicide Attack Database.
71. Weber, “Keep Adding,” 111.
72. General Michael Hayden, former director of the NSA and the CIA, confirmed that people are killed based on meta-data not in the US but on foreign soil. See Cole, “We Kill People Based on Metadata.”
73. Nye, “Power and Foreign Policy,” 11.
74. Nye, “Power and Foreign Policy,” 12.
75. McChrystal, “Generation Kill.”
76. Arendt, On Violence, 79–80.
77. McChrystal, “Generation Kill,” n.p.
78. Cohen, “Israel is Largest Exporter of Drones, Study Finds.”
79. For a technological and market analysis of Israel’s drone squadrons and industries see Sadot, “Proliferated Drones.”
80. Sharabi, “How Did We Get.”
81. ‘The first UAV squadron’, Israeli Airforce website, http://www.iaf.org.il/4968-33518-he/IAF.aspx.
82. Bohbot, “40 Years after the Aircraft Crash.”
83. Peleg, “Operation Song of Populus.”
84. Until today, controversy rages within the IDF as to the causes of the disaster. Three military committees of investigation investigated the case. While one committee concluded that Hezbollah forces placed a random ambush in Ansariya, two other commissions were convinced the ambush was planned in advance, meaning the Hezbollah had advance knowledge of the raid. See Druckman, “Heroism of the Radioman.”
85. Nachmias, “Nasrallah.”
86. Kaspit, “The True Story.”
87. Issacharoff, “The Killers vs. The Hesitants.”
88. The term ‘aerial vehicle’ is often used by the Israeli media to signify both manned and unmanned aircraft.
89. Meo, “How Israel Killed Ahmed Jabari.”
90. The differentiation between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ drone operators dates back to earlier days in which those responsible for takeoff and landing were physically standing outside by the runways, able to see the drone and instantly correct any mishap, while those directing the mission flights were sitting inside enclosed wagons.
91. Peper, “Phantom Squadron.”
92. Koots-Bar, “Playing With Fire.”
93. Peper, “Phantom Squadron.”
94. Koots-Bar, “Playing with Fire.”
95. Bohbot, “I Thought I Saw Everything.”
96. Gabor, “It is all from Above.”
97. Ibid.
98. Background discussion of US drone use can be found in Williams, “The CIA’s Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan 2004–2010,” 871–92; and Fuller, “The CIA’s Lethal Drone Program,” 769–92. See the reference section that follows these notes.
99. Ibid.
100. Byman, “Why Drones Work,” 32–43.
101. Gertler, “US Unmanned Aerial Systems,” 2, 9.
102. For a summary of benefits in using armed drones for killing terrorists (especially leadership figures) see, Byman, “Why Drones Work,” 32–43.
103. Even outgoing CIA Director, John Brennan himself said at his Senate confirmation hearing that ‘the CIA should not be doing such traditional military activities,’ cited in Segalini, “Drones, Covert Action, & Counterterrorism,” (online source).
104. See, Fuller, “The CIA’s Lethal Drone Program”; and Braun and Brunstetter, “Rethinking the Criterion for Assessing CIA targeted Killings,” 304–24.
105. See note seven above.
106. Commonwealth of Australia, Use of Unmanned Air, Maritime, 40.
107. McNeal, “Targeted Killing and Accountability,” 681–794.
108. Wroe, “Australia to Start Making Military Drones Ahead of Future Warfare Dominated by Machines.”
109. Ibid.
110. Commonwealth of Australia, Use of Unmanned Air, Maritime, iii–77.
111. Ibid., 37–47.
112. Walsh, Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis, 196–203.
113. The US military thought that Prakash had been killed by a drone strike in May, though it was found in early November 2016 that he had only been injured. He has now been arrested and is at an undisclosed location. Schliebs, “Islamic State Recruiter Australian Neil Prakash Arrested in the Middle East.”
114. Wroe, “Islamic State Recruiter Neil Prakash Killed by US Strike in Iraq.”
115. The history of military operations, however, is replete with accidental weapons discharges, friendly fire incidents, ‘normal accidents’, and all sorts of lethal operational glitches in which humans were the culprits. After reading about the Mars Bluff incident, in which a B-47 managed to drop a Mark 36 hydrogen bomb over South Carolina, one might want to re-assess one’s preference about keeping a ‘human in the loop’ [see Schlosser, Command and Control, 184–7].
116. My uncle, Ralph Wirtz, who fought in the Third Army during Second World War as an ammunition carrier for a 30-caliber machine gun, once told me that his squad spent every waking minute removing the tracer bullets from their ammunition belts and replacing them with normal ammunition. I told him I was surprised they made this substitution because it would make it difficult to discern exactly what they were shooting at. He replied that it also made it difficult for the other guy to figure out exactly who was doing the shooting.
117. Contemporary drone architectures, for example, would be unlikely to operate effectively in a future combat environment over the South China Sea. For a description of this future situation, see Biddle and Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific,” 7–48.
118. Rosenberg and Markoff, “At Heart of U.S. Strategy,” A1.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid.
121. Cohn, ed., Drones and Targeted Killing.