![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Abstract
Since 1949 intelligence reform efforts have resulted in extensive studies on every aspect of the intelligence community. One common aspect of commission comment has been how policy-makers interact with the intelligence products, commonly known as the producer–consumer relationship. Decades of successive commissions identify the same or similar problems with the relationship and recommend organizational changes aimed at improving the analyst – policy maker interaction. Eventually, the same issues arise because most structural reforms are incapable of addressing critical aspects of this relationship. Future efforts should first consider previous commission results as well as understand what reforms can and cannot impact this relationship.
Notes
1. Kent, Strategic Intelligence, 180.
2. For some insight into the unique nature of the military producer–consumer relationship see Wolfberg, “When Generals Consume Intelligence.”
3. WMD Commission, 389.
4. In Warner and McDonald; “U.S. Intelligence Community Reform Studies,” 10.
5. The Schlesinger Report, 9.
6. The Ogilvie Report, 13–14.
7. WMD Commission, 3.
8. Ibid., 389.
9. Hughes, The Fate of Facts, 5.
10. The Ogilvie Report, 13, 14.
11. The Murphy Commission, 101.
12. The Aspin/Brown Commission, xv.
13. Ibid., xvi.
14. Ibid., xxi.
15. Road Map for National Security, 83.
16. WMD Commission, 418.
17. Project on National Security Reform, A6-664.
18. The Schlesinger Report, 45.
19. The Aspin/Brown Commission, xv.
20. The Murphy Commission, 101.
21. George, Presidential Decision-making, 110.
22. The Aspin/Brown Commission, 58.
23. Ibid., 33.
24. HPSCI IC 21, Section I. Overview and Summary, 12–13.
25. The Hart-Rudman Commission, 81.
26. WMD Commission, Final Report, 6.
27. WMD Commission, 7.
28. WMD Commission, Appendix B.
29. ODNI Progress Report on WMD Commission Recommendations.
30. PNSR, 139.
31. Laqueur, A World of Secrets, 93.
32. The Murphy Commission, 92.
33. Zelikow, The Evolution of Intelligence Reform, 14.
34. PNSR, 214.
35. HPSCI IC 21, Section I. Overview and Summary, 5.
36. The Schlesinger Report, 10a.
37. The Eberstadt Report, 50.
38. WMD Commission, 312.
39. Ibid., 26.
40. Ibid., 388.
41. Ibid., 312.
42. Clarke, American Defense and Foreign Policy, 144.
43. Jervis, Why Intelligence and Policymakers Clash, 204.
44. The Murphy Commission, 103.
45. PNSR, 144.
46. Marrin, Why Strategic Intelligence Analysi, 725.
47. Kent, Strategic Intelligence, 203.
48. George, Presidential Decision-making, 110.
49. Gates, The Use of Intelligence, 36.
50. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 465.
51. Turner, Secrecy and Democracy, 116.
52. PNSR, i.
53. WMD Commission, 390.
54. The Aspin-Brown Commission, 83.
55. WMD Commission, 418.
56. Warner and McDonald “U.S. Intelligence Community Reform Studies,” 8.