Post-9/11 wartime intelligence analysis

ABSTRACT

A few years into the Iraq War, those engaged in that fight realized that the methods of intelligence analysis, refined in Cold War, were not sufficient for wartime. To manage the massive increase in intelligence data new analytic tools were adopted for unearthing and connecting key developments and individuals hidden from view within it. Only then could the secret networks of Iraqi insurgents be uncovered. Several of these changes were put into practice by the US counterterrorism force that deployed to Iraq as Task Force 714. The study describes what these changes encompassed, and how they were employed to support those given the mission of attacking and dismantling Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s networked underground.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. The 9/11 Commission Report.

2. Medina, ‘The New Analysis,’ 239.

3. Ibid., 240.

4. Ibid., 241.

5. Long, ‘Activity Based Intelligence,’ 7–16.

6. There was a small cadre of analysts that during the Cold War focused on low intensity conflicts and in the 1990s concentrated on what were called Military Operations Other than War or Peace Operations and also international organized crime and terrorism.

7. Doherty, ‘Should There Be a Human Warfighting Domain (HWD)’.

8. Smith, The Utility of Force, 19.

9. U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3–24-Counterinsurgency.

10. For an assessment of counterinsurgency in Iraq see Shultz, The Marines Take Anbar.

11. McChrystal, My Share of the Task, 153–154.

12. Treverton, ‘Creatively Disrupting the Intelligence Paradigm’.

13. Clark, Intelligence Analysis, 45.

14. The concept ‘pattern-of-life’ is a key part of Activity-Based Intelligence (ABI), an analysis methodology that emerged toward the end of the first decade of 21^st century irregular wars. ‘ABI practitioners have advanced the concept of large-scale data filtering of events, entities, and transactions to develop understanding through spatial and temporal correlation across multiple data sets.’ In Iraq, TF 714 adopted the idea of accessing the pattern-of-life found in AQI networks. As we shall see later in this article, it did so focusing on ‘the specific set of behaviors and movements associated with a particular entity over a given period of time. The focus on the individual is the fundamental uniqueness of the ABI method and drives the need for a new set of techniques and approaches to intelligence analysis.’ While ABI as a formal approach to intelligence analysis appears to have emerged toward the end of TF 714s operations in Iraq, the way TF 714 approached intelligence driven operations has much in common with ABI. See Biltgen, Bacastow, Kaye, and Young, ‘Activity-Based Intelligence,’ 24–27.

15. FM 3–60, The Targeting Process, B-6.

16. Biltgen and Ryan, Activity-Based Intelligence, 139–140.

17. Medina, ‘The New Analysis,’ 241.

18. Pendall, ‘Persistent Surveillance,’ 42.

19. Nakashima and Warrick, ‘For NSA chief.’

20. Atwood, ‘Activity-Based Intelligence,’ 26.

21. Cukier and Mayer-Schoenberger ‘The Rise of Big Data.’

22. Biltgen and Ryan, Activity-Based Intelligence, 140.

23. Ibid., 12–13.

24. Clark, Intelligence Collection, 497.

25. Biltgen and Ryan, Activity-Based Intelligence, 12–13.

26. Berkowitz, ‘The Soviet Target’.

27. See note 22 above.

28. Ibid.

29. Atwood, ‘Activity-Based Intelligence: Revolutionizing Military Intelligence Analysis,’ p. 27.

30. Cited in Kristin Quinn, ‘A Better Toolbox,’ Trajectory (Winter 2012), p. 13.

31. Ibid.

32. Biltgen and Ryan, Activity-Based Intelligence, p.41.

33. Atwood, ‘Activity-Based Intelligence,’ 26.

34. Biltgen and Ryan, Activity-Based Intelligence, 257.

35. ‘An algorithm is a set of [mathematical] instructions designed to perform a specific task…. Search engines use proprietary algorithms to display the most relevant results from their search index for specific queries. In computer programming, algorithms are often created as functions…For example, an image viewing application may include a library of functions that each use a custom algorithm…designed to process image data.’ Very complex and sophisticated versions of such algorithms are employed by National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). See https://techterms.com/definition/algorithm.

36. Flynn, Juergens, and Cantrell, ‘Employing ISR,’ 57.

37. Site exploitation is described as actions taken to ‘ensure that documents, material, electronics and personnel are identified, collected, protected, and evaluated to facilitate follow-on actions.’ It provides ‘intelligence for future operations.’ Tactical Site Exploitation.

38. See note 22 above.

39. Clark, Intelligence Analysis, 41.

40. Ibid, 45.

41. DeRosa, Data Mining, 3.

42. Clifton, ‘Data Mining’.

43. Chen, Sakaguchi, and Frolick, ‘Data Mining Methods’.

44. See note 42 above

45. Clark, Intelligence Analysis, 177.

46. Ressler, ‘Social Network Analysis’.

47. Ibid.

48. See note 45 above.

49. In its latest iteration, IBM describes it as ‘a visual analysis tool that helps you turn data into intelligence. The solution provides innovative features such as connected network visualizations, social network analysis, and geospatial or temporal views to help you uncover hidden connections and patterns in data.’ See IBM i2 Analyst’s Notebook.

50. Ibid.

51. Clark, Intelligence Analysis, 179.

52. For a review of these studies see Burnes, ‘Complexity Theories’.

53. Sargut and McGrath, ‘Learning to Live with Complexity,’ 68.

54. Snowden and Boone, ‘A Leader’s Framework,’4.

55. See note 53., 68 above.

56. Ibid., 64.

57. Clark, Intelligence Analysis, 185.

58. Ibid.

59. Chauhan and Panda, Hacking Web Intelligence.

60. Ibid., 217.

61. Clark, Intelligence Analysis, 192.

62. Chauhan and Panda, Hacking Web Intelligence, 217.

63. Ibid., 218.

64. Ibid., 221.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid., 222.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. Clark, Intelligence Analysis, 176, 182.

71. Ibid., 191.

72. U.S. Joint Forces Command, Commander’s Handbook.

73. Ibid., III-1.

74. Ibid., III-6.

75. Ibid.

76. McChrystal, My Share of the Task, 92.

77. Interview with Lieutenant General Michael Flynn.

78. Ibid.

79. Interview with Admiral William McRaven.

80. McChrystal, My Share of the Task, 105.

81. Byman, ‘The Intelligence War on Terrorism,’ 845.

82. Interview with General Stanley McChrystal. These issues cited from interviews with General McChrystal are also discussed in McChrystal, My Share of the Task, 105–107, 138–140, 153–157, 199.

83. Shultz, ‘U.S Counterterrorism Operations during the Iraq War.’

84. Interview with General Stanley McChrystal.

85. Flynn, Juergens, and Cantrell, ‘Employing ISR,’ 58–59.

86. McChrystal, My Share of the Task, 157–158.

87. Interview with a former senior intelligence officer who was a leader in the synchronization of analysis, intelligence targeting, and operational fusion in TF 714 and similar organizations, December 2017.

88. Follow up interview with Admiral William McRaven.

89. See note 77 above.

90. Ibid.

91. McChrystal, My Share of the Task, 155.

92. Interview with a former senior intelligence officer.

93. See note 85., 59 above.

94. See note 92 above.

95. McChrystal, My Share of the Task, 153.

96. Follow up interview with General Stanley McChrystal.

97. Ibid.

98. See note 92 above…

99. McChrystal et al., Team of Teams, 25.

100. Interview with General Stanley McChrystal.

101. Shultz, ‘U.S Counterterrorism Operations during the Iraq War,’ 20.

102. See note 40., 21 above.

103. Ibid.

104. See note 22 above.

105. See note 57 above.

106. See note 96 above.

107. Quoted in Shultz, The Marines Take Anbar, 203.

108. On this point, the author had the opportunity to confirm the extent to which COIN-CT integration took place at the operational level during the Surge in Iraq with one of the contributing authors to the two-volume official history of the US Army in the Iraq War. On this COIN-CT synergy in Iraq also see Ostlund, ‘Irregular Warfare’.

109. Crane, Cassandra in Oz, 176–177.

110. FM 3–24 Counterinsurgency, 3–33.

111. On this point, the author also had the opportunity to confirm the extent to which COIN-CT intelligence collaboration took place at the operational level during the Surge in Iraq with one of the contributing authors to the two-volume official history of the US Army in the Iraq War.

112. Ibid.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Richard Shultz

Richard Shultz is the Lee E. Dirks Professor and Director of the International Security Studies at The Fletcher School, Tufts University.