EU INTCEN: a transnational European culture of intelligence analysis?

ABSTRACT

This article aims to gain a better understanding of EU INTCEN’s analytic culture and the use of structured analytic techniques by EU analysts; an under researched topic in the intelligence studies literature. The Intelligence Analysis and Situation Centre of the European Union (EU INTCEN) is a directorate of the European Union External Action Service (EEAS) that has been characterized as an EU analytic structure similar to the State Department’s INR. The article reviews relevant literature and presents findings based on the analysis of a questionnaire on ‘Intelligence analysis and production in EU INTCEN/SITCEN, that was distributed to EU INTCEN intelligence analysts (EEAS officials having worked as analysts in EU SITCEN/INTCEN between June 2005 and June 2014), and in-depth phone interviews to better understand INTCEN analytical process. Analytic projects at EU INTCEN are initiated with Requests for Information to which replies can be received. The analysts count as well with previous contributions and assessments, open sources, and diplomatic reporting. Among other findings, the study reveals that SATs are little used in practice in spite of most EU INTCEN analyst has received some training on SATs.

KEYWORDS:

• EU INTCEN
• intelligence culture
• analytic culture
• intelligence analysis and production
• structured analytic techniques
• European Union External Action Service

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the management of EU INTCEN, in particular the Head of the Analysis Division, and the eleven INTCEN analysts that answered the questionnaire for their invaluable help in the conduct of this research. They also want to thank the EEAS Register for having authorized their access to the Style Manual used by INTCEN. Many thanks also to Stephen Coulthart and Julian Richards for their comments and suggestions during the preparation of this article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 8.

2. Ibid.

3. Kier, “Culture and French military doctrine,” 203.

4. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 2.

5. Ibid., 10.

6. Hofstede, Cultures and organizations, 5.

7. Ibid., 7–8.

8. Berkowitz and Goodman, 148.

9. See: De Graaf and Nyce, 2016.

10. Heuer, “Strategies for Analytical Judgment,” 65.

11. The book was published in the year 1978, and raised from a panel of the International Studies Association. See: Heuer, Quantitative Approaches to Political Intelligence.

12. National Research Council, Intelligence Analysis for Tomorrow, 33.

13. Clauser and Weir, Intelligence research methodology, 192.

14. Dhami et al., “Improving Intelligence Analysis With Decision Science,” 753.

15. Richards, The Art and Science of Intelligence Analysis, 144.

16. Heuer and Pherson, Structured analytic techniques for intelligence analysis.

17. ‘The Art of Intelligence Analysis.’ In an article published by Studies in Intelligence in 1986, good sense and experience were seen as the basis of sound analysis. There was no reference to any kind of structured techniques and the anonymous authors highlighted the differences between academic and intelligence writing.

18. Heuer and Pherson, Structured analytic techniques for intelligence analysis, 8.

19. US Government, A tradecraft primer.

20. Heuer and Pherson, Structured analytic techniques for intelligence analysis, 9.

21. The list of books that mention an earlier version of A Tradecraft Primer includes among other: Why Intelligence fails (p. 224), Secret Intelligence: A reader (p. 225), Improving intelligence analysis (p. 163), and Reasoning for intelligence analysis (p. 52) among others.

22. Defense Intelligence Agency, A Tradecraft Primer.The Pherson Associates’ Handbook of Analytic Tools and Techniques, published in 2008 as well, included 22 SATs.

23. Pherson and Heuer, Structured analytic techniques: a new approach to analysis, 232.

24. See: Folker, Intelligence analysis in the theater joint intelligence centers. See also: Marrin, ‘Intelligence analysis: structured methods or intuition.’ In his memoir book Rethinking Intelligence: Richards J. Heuer Jr.’s Life of Public Service, Heuer has commented on this opposition as well: ‘In 2006, CIA asked me to undertake a project on “defining and developing the Domain of Structured Analytic Techniques.” This project was funded by CIA’s Kent School and the office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). Apparently, some senior officials in the Defense Department and the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) were unsure about what CIA was calling Structured Analytic Techniques. From their perspective, there were only two types of intelligence analysis. One was intuitive analysis, where the analysts conducted research, took notes, thought a problem out of his or her head, and then wrote down the analysis in a crisp format. This is what most of us did for decades in the CIA and thought the broader Intelligence Community. The other type was a form of scientific analysis that included empirical testing and systematic modeling during the process of making an analytic judgment’ (p.70).

25. Folker, Intelligence analysis in the theater joint intelligence centers, 32.

26. Ibid., 33.

27. Chang et al., “Restructuring structured analytic techniques in intelligence,” 351.

28. On the same point, Julian Richards agrees that ‘generally unstructured analysis, that is not the same necessarily as “intuition”, should be balanced against the use of SATs; the latter should only ever be seen as an aide and not machines that provide the answers. Art and Science should work together in this process.’ Email exchange with the authors. 11 December 2018.

29. Ibid., 340.

30. Mandel et al., “Boosting intelligence analysts’ judgment accuracy,” 616.

31. Ibid., 618.

32. Heuer, “The Evolution of Structured Analytic Techniques”.

33. Ibid., 2.

34. Heuer, Rethinking Intelligence: Richards J. Heuer Jr.’ Life of Public Service, 49.

35. Randy Pherson, Email exchange with one of the authors. 9 December 2018.

36. Coulthart, “Why do analysts use structured analytic techniques?”

37. Davis Cross, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 388–402.

38. Bruxelles 2, ‘L’IntCen … le lieu des échanges … d’analyses Top secret’.

39. The original question said: ‘The intelligence community appears to be seeing a demographic shift, with an influx of younger analysts. Do you think this will have an impact on the use of structured analytic techniques? Why or why not?’. In general, this idea of the ‘demographic shift’ is not applicable to the intelligence communities of many EU member states, and certainly not to the EU INTCEN.

40. For the question ‘Several kinds of “structured analytic techniques” are used by analysts. These include Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH), link analysis, and red teaming, among others. Have you received any training in any of these structured analytic techniques?’ the answers offered by Coulthart were Yes / No / I cannot remember. We have preferred to go into more detail, taking into account that most INTCEN analysts had received some training in the use of SAT. Consequently, the question was slightly modified (‘How have you heard about SAT (ACH, red team and others)?’) and the answers offered were different: I received training in INTCEN / I had received training before / From other colleagues / By myself, reading literature on intelligence analysis.

41. The choice of dates was not arbitrary. 2005 is when the EU SITCEN, which had been created in late 2001, reached an initial level of maturity with the creation of a CT task force. The final date, 2015, guarantees that all respondents have worked at least three years in EU INTCEN at the time the questionnaires were distributed and were thoroughly familiar with its internal procedures and specific professional culture.

42. For INTCEN, this is not true any more, as the current management has changed the recruitment model and significantly increased the percentage of analysts with a background in national intelligences agencies. Head of INTCEN’s Analysis Division, in personal email to one of the authors, 10 December 2018.

43. Palacios, ‘Hacia un concepto europeo de inteligencia’, 106. For more details on the different European intelligence cultures and training systems.

44. Richelson, The US Intelligence Community, Pos. 3734.

45. Coulthart. Op.cit., 934.

46. Ignatius, “Spy world success story.”

47. European Parliament, “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton (E-009092/2012)”.

48. Sénat, “Projet de loi de finances pour 2016 : Défense.”

49. BND, “Allgemeine Informationen.” http://www.bnd.bund.de/DE/Karriere/Allgemeine%20Informationen/Allgemeine%20Informationen_node.html (accessed: 17 December 2017).

50. Justin Rood, ‘Inside the one spy agency that got pre-war intelligence on Iraq – and much else – right.’ ‘Among the civil servants who make up two-thirds of its staff are many scholars lured out of the academy who come with years of knowledge. (…) The other third of INR’s staff are Foreign Service officers rotating through who usually have spent several diplomatic tours in the country or region they are focusing on at INR, and who thus have both a reservoir of knowledge about its personalities and history and a deep well of personal contacts’.

51. European Parliament, “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton (E-006017).”

52. At the time the questionnaire was distributed.

53. Marrin, “Training and educating US intelligence analysts.” For details on US intelligence training.

54. Palacios, “Intelligence Analysis Training,” 47–49.

55. ‘In contrast, intelligence on economic and diplomatic matters needs to be very timely because those areas move very quickly; State’s intelligence needs are very tactical in nature. (…) INR does a lot of tactical support – conveying a lot of information orally. INR’s papers concentrate on longer-term issues.’ Thomas Fingar, interview (9–11 Commission). https://es.scribd.com/document/20300423/Mfr-Nara-t2-Dos-Fingar-Tom-11–19-03–00542#download (access: 4 December 2018).

56. House of Lords, “Evidence given by former SITCEN Director William Shapcott,” 6.

57. Ignatius, Op.cit.

58. EEAS (2019). Vacancy notice: Contrat Agent FG IV post within EU INTCEN/Hybrid Fusion Cell EEAS Headquarters, Vacancy notice : Contract Agent FG IV post within EU INTCEN/Hybrid. 21 January 2019 https://eeas.europa.eu/ … /vacancy-notice-contract-agent-fg-iv-post … .

59. Ibid.

60. Matei, “Structured analytical techniques in international intelligence vs national intelligence”. Dr. Matei is a former EU INTCEN analyst.

61. Interview to EU analysts #10, 29 November 2017.

62. Ibid.

63. Wallsten et al., “Preferences and reasons for communicating probabilistic information in verbal or numerical terms,” 135. See also Ho et al., “Improving the communication of uncertainty in climate science and intelligence analysis.”

64. This is the approach suggested by the SIAC Style Manual, 2014 edition. Access to this document was authorized by the EEAS Register on 16 April 2018.

65. In-depth telephonic interview with EU analyst #10. 29 November 2017.

66. ‘Flash Briefing Note’ may be an informal internal name for the product officially labelled as “Intelligence Summary”. See, for example, a 2015 INTCEN report leaked to the Turkish website Ahval News (https://ahvalnews.com/terrorism/ahval-reveals-top-secret-eu-report-akp-commissioned-isis-ankara-massacre).

67. Ibid.

68. Matei, “Structured analytical techniques in international intelligence vs national intelligence.”

69. Ibidem.

70. Interview, EU analyst #10, 29 November 2017.

71. Ibid.

72. Arcos and Palacios, “The impact of intelligence on decision-making.”

73. In a later personal email to one of the authors (10 December 2018), the Head of INTCEN’s Analysis Division pointed out that, in his opinion, ‘the SATs are not and will not be used every day, and not by all analysts. For their effective use, it is necessary to have projects going beyond current events and to count on properly trained analysts, with experience in the use of SATs’.

74. Reichheld, “The One Number You Need to Grow.”

75. Zaki et al., “The fallacy of the net promoter score.”

76. Palacios, “Intelligence Analysis Training,” 43–44.

77. Rüter, European External Intelligence Co-operation. Structures, Problems, Implications and Perspectives. Julia Rüter had observed in 2007 that ‘SITCEN personnel are representatives and “sellers” of their intelligence services performance back home’. That was a good reason to second good analysts to SITCEN (the current name of INTCEN).

78. Interview with EU analysts #4. 21 November 2017.

79. Ibid.

80. Palacios, “Intelligence Analysis Training: A European Perspective,” 51.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Rubén Arcos

Rubén Arcos, PhD, is lecturer and researcher of communication sciences and director of the postgraduate program of Specialist in Strategic Communication, Hybrid Threats, and Security at Rey Juan Carlos University in Madrid. He is founding co-director of International Intelligence Hub, freelance contributor to Jane’s Intelligence Review and deputy editor of The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs. He is a member of the research group Ciberimaginario. He was appointed national member of the NATO/STO Research Task Group SAS-114 on “Assessment and Communication of Uncertainty in Intelligence to Support Decision-Making”. His latest book (edited with William J. Lahneman) is The Art of Intelligence: More Simulations, Exercises and Games (Rowman & Littlefield, 2019).

José-Miguel Palacios

José-Miguel Palacios, PhD, was between 2011 and 2015 Head of the Analysis Division in the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN) of the European External Action Service in Brussels. He joined the EU Situation Centre (renamed EU INTCEN in 2012) in 2006 as an analyst, after having worked for the Spanish government since 1986 in several analytical roles. Currently he is an independent lecturer in Intelligence Studies and Conflict Management. He holds a PhD in Political Science.