From committees of parliamentarians to parliamentary committees: comparing intelligence oversight reform in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK

ABSTRACT

Some form of legislative oversight of intelligence has become the norm in most democratic states. The near universal acceptance of the need for democratic oversight does not, however, mark the end of a process of intelligence accountability. In many states following a period of establishment and then consolidation, intelligence oversight mechanisms have begun to evolve as oversight committees have sought extra powers and developed new roles. This article examines reforms in parliamentary intelligence oversight committees in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK, focusing on the form, mandate, membership, powers and resources of the committees as well as their engagement with other parliamentary actors.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Olson, Democratic Legislative Institutions; and Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy.

2. Monk, “A framework for evaluating the performance.”

3. Walsh, Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis, 231–2; and Johnson, Spy Watching.

4. Barker et al., Oversight of the Intelligence Agencies, 9.

5. L’Estrange and Marchant, 2017 Independent Intelligence Review, 121.

6. Bronskill, “Canada looking to British model.”

7. Barker et al., Oversight of the Intelligence Agencies, 9. This research paper was published simultaneously by the parliamentary libraries of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK. In the interest of consistency page numbers refer to the version published by the UK House of Commons library.

8. Born and Leigh, Making Intelligence Accountable.

9. Bochel, Defty and Kirkpatrick, Watching the Watchers, 8–11.

10. Born and Leigh, Making Intelligence Accountable; Born, Johnson and Leigh, Who’s Watching the Spies; Gill, “Evaluating intelligence oversight committees”; and Bochel, Defty and Kirkpatrick, Watching the Watchers.

11. Davies and Gustafson, “An agenda for the Comparative Study,” 4; and Andrew and Dilks, The Missing Dimension.

12. Gill, “Knowing the Self, Knowing the Other”; and Andregg and Gill, “Comparing the Democratisation of Intelligence.”

13. Gill, “Knowing the Self, Knowing the Other”; and Davies and Gustafson, ‘An Agenda for the Comparative Study.”

14. Davies and Gustafson, “An Agenda for the Comparative study,” 7.

15. Gill, “Knowing the self.”

16. Glees, Davies and Morrison, The Open Side of Secrecy.

17. See for example, Baldino, Democratic Oversight; Bochel, Defty and Kirkpatrick, Watching the Watchers; Born and Caparini, Democratic Control; Born, Johnson and Leigh, Who’s Watching the Spies; Davies and Gustafson, Intelligence Elsewhere; Johnson, Spy Watching; and Zegart, Eyes on Spies.

18. See note 8 above.

19. Baldino, Democratic Oversight; Born and Caparini, Democratic Control; and Born and Leigh, Making Intelligence Accountable.

20. See note 15 above.

21. Gill, “Evaluating Intelligence Oversight Committees”; and Born and Leigh, Making Intelligence Accountable.

22. Bochel, Defty and Kirkpatrick, Watching the Watchers.

23. Farson, “Canada’s long road.”

24. Farson, “Parliament and its Servants”; and Farson, “Canada’s long road.”

25. Farson, “In Crisis and in Flux?”

26. Farson, “Canada’s Long Road.”

27. National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act 2017.

28. Jones, “Intelligence and National Security”; and Weller, “Oversight of Australia’s Intelligence Services.”

29. Jones, “Intelligence and National Security,” 832.

30. Intelligence Services Act 2001 s.29.

31. Weller, “Oversight of Australia’s Intelligence Services”. There is a useful history of the parliamentary committee in Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Annual Report, 1–12.

32. L’Estrange and Merchant, 2017 Independent Intelligence Review.

33. Bochel, Defty and Kirkpatrick, Watching the Watchers, 58.

34. Intelligence Services Act, 1994 s.10.

35. Defty, “Coming in from the Cold.”

36. Justice and Security Act 2013.

37. Intelligence and Security Committee Act, 1996; and Rolfe, “New Zealand.”

38. Barker et. al., Oversight of the Intelligence Agencies, 43.

39. Cullen and Reddy, Intelligence and Security in a Free Society.

40. Intelligence and Security Act 2017.

41. Farson, “Canada’s Long Road”; and Roach, “Review and Oversight.”

42. Bochel, Defty and Kirkpatrick, “New Mechanisms.”

43. Patman and Southgate, “National Security and Surveillance”; and Defty “Coming in from the Cold.”

44. L’Estrange and Marchant, 2017 Independent Intelligence Review, 8.

45. See note 21 above.

46. Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Annual Report; and Martin, “Intelligence and National Security.”

47. Intelligence Services Act, 2001, Sch.1 Part 3; and Intelligence and Security Act, 2017, s.196 (1, 2), s.199 (2).

48. See note 35 above.

49. Justice and Security Act 2013, s.1 (3, 4).

50. National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, 2017, s.5 (1), s.6 (1).

51. Ibid, s.4(3).

52. Wark, “Imitating the Lion’s Roar?”; and Atkey, Forcese and Roach, “Making Spies Accountable.”

53. Intelligence Services Act, 2001, s.28 (1).

54. Intelligence and Security Act, 2017, s.196(1).

55. Justice and Security Act, 2013, s.1(1).

56. Intelligence and Security Committee. Press release 23 November 2017. http://isc.independent.gov.uk/news-archive/23november2017; See also Defty, “Coming in from the Cold.”

57. National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, 2017, s.5 (1.1).

58. Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 2016–2017.

59. Intelligence Services Act, 2001, s.28(2).

60. National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, 2017, s.4(1, 2).

61. Justice and Security Act, 2013, s.1(2).

62. Bill C-22 s.4(1); and Bochel, Defty and Kirkpatrick, Watching the Watchers, 62.

63. Intelligence and Security Act, 2017, s.194(1).

64. See note 8 above.

65. Intelligence and Security Committee, Activities.

66. Intelligence Services Act, 2001, s.28(3).

67. National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, 2017, s.4(2).

68. Ibid. s.6(1).

69. Justice and Security Act, 2013, s.1(6).

70. Intelligence and Security Act, 2017, s.194(2).

71. Patman and Southgate, “National Security and Surveillance.”

72. Rolfe, “New Zealand,” 123.

73. Intelligence and Security Act 2017, s.194(2).

74. Intelligence Services Act, 1994,.

75. Phythian, “The British Experience.”

76. Justice and Security Act, 2013, s.2(1).

77. Memorandum of Understanding agreed between the Prime Minister and the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, in Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 2013–14.

78. Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 2013–14, 13–14.

79. L’Estrange and Merchant, 2017 Independent Intelligence Review, 116.

80. Intelligence Services Act 2001, s.29 (3).

81. Norman, “MPs calls”.

82. Intelligence and Security Act, 2017, s.193 (2b).

83. National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, 2017, s.8(b).

84. Wark, “Imitating the Lion’s roar?”

85. National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, 2017, s.8(a).

86. Ibid.

87. Intelligence and Security Act 2017, s.193 (1) (e).

88. Intelligence Services Act, 2001, sch.1, Part 1.

89. National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, 2017, s.8(1b).

90. Justice and Security Act, 2013, sch.1, s.4(4).

91. Intelligence and Security Act, 2017, s.203 (2).

92. Cf. s.13(1) of Bill C-22 and National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, 2017.

93. Intelligence Services Act, 2001, sch.1 pt.1 s.3(1).

94. Intelligence Services Act, 2001, sch.1 pt.1 s.3(3).

95. Intelligence and Security Act, 2017, s.201.

96. Justice and Security Act, 2013, sch1 s.4.

97. Intelligence and Security Committee, UK Lethal Drone Strikes; Intelligence and Security Committee, Detainee Mistreatment and Rendition; Defty, “Coming in from the Cold.”

98. UKISC website. http://isc.independent.gov.uk/home.

99. National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, Annual Report 2018, p.110.

100. House of Representative, Sessional Orders 8 November 2018, https://www.parliament.nz/media/5311/sessional-orders-52nd-parl-20181108.pdf.

101. Barker et al., Oversight of the Intelligence Agencies, 15.

102. L’Estrange and Marchant, 2017 Independent Intelligence Review, 122.

103. Intelligence Services Act 2001, sch.3 pt.3(21).

104. Barker et al., Oversight of the Intelligence Agencies, 17.

105. Intelligence and Security Act 2017, sch.3 pt.4 (25).

106. Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 2013–14.

107. National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, Annual Report 2018, 9; See also 2018–2019 Departmental Plan – Secretariat of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, https://www.canada.ca/en/secretariat-national-security-intelligence-committee-parliamentarians/corporate/transparency/departmental-plan/2018-2019.html.

108. See note 100 above.

109. See note 42 above.

110. Northern Ireland Affairs Committee (2009), The Omagh Bombing: access to intelligence, Annex, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmniaf/873/873.pdf.

111. Intelligence Services Act, 2001, s.29 (1); Dalla-Pozza, “The Parliamentary Joint Committee”; and Barker et al., Oversight of the Intelligence Agencies.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Andrew Defty

Andrew Defty, Associate Professor of Politics in the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Lincoln.