Intelligence collection in Arabia: Britain’s roaming information-gatherers in the Trucial States, 1956-1971

ABSTRACT

Imperial powers, facing considerable information challenges in far-flung territories, adapted intelligence practices and machinery to fit local conditions. In contrast to the attention placed on British intelligence activities in territories considered within the ‘formal empire’ (i.e. where Britain was in direct control), we know very little about intelligence arrangements in ‘informal empire,’ where external powers exerted influence and protected their interests by working through local elites. Exploiting declassified documents and drawing upon interviews with retired intelligence officials, this article reveals Britain’s unique intelligence system in a remote corner of empire – the Trucial States (today’s United Arab Emirates) – which was built around a group of roaming officers tasked with collecting full-spectrum intelligence.

Acknowledgements

The authors wishes to thank the following for their contribution to this article: Tim Dickerson, Bill Woodburn, Tom Sneyd, Hugh Steadman, Nick Weekes, Robin Hitchcock, Anthony ffrench Blake, Bill Stevens, Jon Cousens, Michael Curtis, Michael Butler, Miles Stockwell, Tim Cooper, Hooky Walker and Tom Walcot.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. “Transcript of interview with Sir Terence Clark,”.

2. Cousens, “Desert Intelligence Officer in Buraimi, 1966–67.”

3. Thomas, Empires of Intelligence, 15.

4. Ibid.

5. For example, Allfree in his autobiography recounts a year and a half spent as a Political Officer in Allfree, Hawks of the Hadhramaut. And Hinchcliffe describes the work of Political Officers in Western Aden Protectorate in a chapter of the book Without Glory in Arabia: The British Retreat from Aden. Hinchcliffe, Ducker, and Holt, Without Glory in Arabia. In addition, Leach describes his work as a desert intelligence officer (DIO) in Oman in 1959–61, see Leach, “Memoirs of a Desert Intelligence Officer (1959–1961).” Mockaitis describes the roles of FIOs during the Mau Mau conflict in Kenya in the 1950 s, see Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 1919–60, 131. Kalinga notes the arrival of FIOs in 1959 in Nyasaland and their consequence, Owen Kalinga, “The 1959 Nyasaland State.” Bennet mentions the close relationship between the FIOs and Special Branch in Kenya, Bennett, “Soldiers in the Court Room.” Heather notes how an FIO created a double agent in the Mau Mau ranks, Heather, “Intelligence and Counter‐insurgency in Kenya, 1952–56,” . Jones states that FIOs were prized targets for insurgents in Aden, see Jones, “Among Ministers, Mavericks and Mandarins.”

6. One important exception to this is Jones’ article which notes the importance that intelligence played (including the DIOs) in consolidating the ruling dynasty across modern-day Oman and benefits of oil development. “Military Intelligence, Tribes, and Britain’s War in Dhofar, 1970–1976,”.

7. Technically his title before 1966 was Political Resident Persian Gulf. The change to Political Resident Gulf was to avoid tensions with Arab leaders over the Gulf’s name. Changes also occurred to the names of regional military forces, such as HQ Land Forces Persian Gulf becoming HQ Land Forces Gulf. This paper just uses the post 1966 nomenclature for consistency.

8. At the start of the 1950s, the most senior representative ‘on-the-ground’ in the Trucial States was up until 1959 the political officer based in Sharjah. Thereafter the post was upgraded to a political agent and moved to the most important emirate, Dubai. From there, the political agent directly managed relations with Dubai, Sharjah and the northern emirates (Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, Ras Al Khaimah and Fujairah), and indirectly with Abu Dhabi via a recently installed political officer. The establishment of a political office in Abu Dhabi reflected that sheikhdom’s growing power and wealth following the discovery of commercial quantities of oil in 1958. In 1961, the post in Abu Dhabi was elevated to become a political agent, and consequently his reporting line was no longer to Dubai but directly to the political resident in Bahrain.

9. Rossiter, Security in the Gulf.

10. Ajjaj, “Social Development of the Pirate Coast,” 76 quoted in Barratt, “British Influence on Arab Military Forces in the Gulf: The Trucial Oman Scouts” (MA, American University of Beirut, 1972).

11. Bradshaw, “The hand of Glubb.”

12. The first Directive (an instruction given to the force’s commanders) was issued on 22 April 1951 and stated ‘Except in an emergency, the Levies will only undertake an operation at the request of the Political Officer, Trucial Coast … The Political Officer will define the particular object of each operation, and the Commandant will decide the method to be employed.’ UK Foreign Office, “Historical Summary of Events,” 274.

13. At this time, it had a strength of 680 men which by mid-1960 grew to 1,300, and by 1971 to 1500.

14. This is seen in the Chiefs of Staff Committee’s 1967 Directive to the last regional British military commander, the Commander British Forces Gulf, which stated that the TOS was ‘controlled by the Political Resident Gulf and their employment is subject to his authority, exercised where appropriate through the Political Agent, Dubai and Abu Dhabi.’ Maj Gen J.H. Gibbon, Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, “Directive for the Commander, British Forces Gulf,” in CAB 163/116 (TNA, 1967).

15. Bayne, Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, to Commander British Forces Gulf, “Directive for the Commander, British Forces Gulf,” in CAB 147/97 (TNA, 1969).

16. Watson, “Field Intelligence Officers,” 59–64.

17. Minister of Defence, “Desert and Field Intelligence Officers in the Arabian Peninsula – Background,” in FO 371/157,038 (TNA, 1961).

18. An anonymous DIO quoted in Ritchie, The RAF, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 142.

19. An anonymous DIO quoted in ibid.

20. Tom Sneyd, Desert Intelligence Officer West, February to June 1964, email, 27 July 2019.

21. Generally PMIOs started out living in a regional military post, but over time they moved out. Mann, The Trucial Oman Scouts, 127–8.

22. For example, Captain HWR (Hugh) Steadman, DIO Wadi Sumail 1967–69 operated out of a mud house rented in Sumail and while he team slept there, due to security reasons he slept 17 km away in the Muscat Regiment’s barracks in Bid Bid. Captain H.W.R. Steadman, Desert Intelligence Officer Sumail (Oman), January 1967 to July 1969, email, 27 July 2019.

23. Capt G.P. Gowlett, TOS DIO West, 1966–69 & ADDF FIO West, 1970–74, phone interview, 24 August 2015.

24. In 1959, the FIO posts in Aden were transferred from the RAF to the Army. Van Der Bijl, Sharing the Secret, 245; and Yates, The Evolution of the UAE Armed Forces, chapter 6.

25. Cousens.

26. Captain A.O’B. ffrench Blake, DIO Batinah, May 1966-November 1966, & DIO Ras Al Khaimah, November 1966-January 1968, email, 19 July 2019.

27. Burdett, ed. Records of the Emirates 1966–1971, Political Agent in Dubai, The internal Security Situation in the Trucial States (less Abu Dhabi) in 1966, 228.

28. Captain Peter Clayton noted that in January 1956 about 30 force members based in Sharjah while waiting to garrison the force’s new Liwa post walked out in protest over the arrest of one of their number over a prisoner escape. They demanded to be released from the force, and consequently the Commander TOS discharged them. It was some time later that the real cause was identified – anxiety over the safety of their families in the Liwa caused by Saudi radio propaganda. Clayton, Two Alpha Lima, 86.

29. Ibid., 88.

30. Military Co-ordination Committee (Persian Gulf), “The Organisation and Deployment of Land Forces in the Persian Gulf, Muscat and Oman,” in FO 371/126,951 (TNA, 1957).

31. C.W. Woodburn, Desert Intelligence Officer Masafi & Force Intelligence Officer, TOS, January 1961-November 1962, email, 26 July 2019.

32. Captain W.H. Stevens, TOS Assistant Intelligence Officer, January 1958-January 1960 & DIO Buraimi April 1959-January 1960, email, 19 July 2019. Due to operations in Oman and shortages of rifle squadron officers, he filled other roles for months at a time. ‘In March ‘58 I spent several weeks with Major Tim Budd’s Squadron at Muti on the south side of Jebel Akhdar. I was there to assist Budd and his 2 IC [TOS Captain Peter] Chambers in their various tasks and was involved in the action in which Chambers was killed. In June ‘58 I commanded “D” Squadron at Ibri for six weeks while Budd was on home leave. In October ‘58 I was with TOS in Oman in operations leading to final defeat of Talib’s rebellion in which SAS played the leading role. Once again I was attached to a Squadron as platoon commander, rather than intelligence officer’. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Major General, General Officer Commanding, Middle East Land Forces, “Revised Establishment Proposal for the Trucial Oman Scouts,” in FO 371/163,046 (TNA, 1962).

35. Ibid.

36. Modified from Yates, The Evolution of the UAE Armed Forces.

37. Ibid., Chapter 4.

38. (EF Henderson, Political Agent, Abu Dhabi, “Minutes of the Abu Dhabi LIC meeting on 17 April 1968,” in FCO 8/900 (TNA, 1968).)

39. See note 25 above.

40. On his desert patrols, Gowlett dressed like an Arab, including the traditional bedu dress of flowing robes (kandura, ghutra and agal; curved dagger (khanjar) and waistbelt of bullets. He carried old Martini Enfield rifle like locals, rather than.303 or SLR which was in army service at that time.) Gowlett.

41. This was from Middle East Command (Aden), then from 1962 HQLFG.

42. For example, Captain Woodburn, DIO Masafi 1961 had previously served as a Regimental Intelligence Officer.

43. The various military semi-independent forces which had taken part in putting down the Imamate rebellion were merged into the Sultan’s Armed Forces as part of the overhaul implemented by Colonel David Smiley, the first CO of SAF, in 1958. This was composed of the Muscat Regiment, the Northern Frontier Regiment, the Oman Gendarmerie, and supported by an artillery unit, a naval unit, mechanical workshop, signals, recruit training centre, air wing and HQ. The Dhofar Force, under British and later Pakistani contract officers, was under the strict control of Sultan Said with very limited contact permitted between it and SAF. This remained the situation until the accession of Sultan Qaboos in July 1970.

44. Clayton, Two Alpha Lima, 133.

45. Eickelman and Dennison, “Arabizing the Omani Intelligence Services,” 6; Watson, “Field Intelligence Officers in the Aden Protectorate”; and Leach, “Memoirs of a Desert Intelligence Officer (1959–1961),” 54.

46. D.M.H. Riches, to Lt Col P.R.C. Hobart, MO.4, War Office, “Draft Letter 96,” in FO 371/126,994 (TNA, 1957).

47. This arrangement was different in Oman. For example in the late 1960 s, the DIOs Sumail worked directly for the British contract officer, Malcolm Dennison, in charge of SAF’s intelligence network and the ‘TOS in Sharjah and the HQ LFG in Bahrain did not enter into the equation at my level of operation. In effect, I worked entirely for Dennison.’ Steadman. If information was of local relevance only and no particular significance to Bahrain, it was communicated only to the TOS. Reflections of Woodburn.

48. This position had disappeared by mid-1960.

49. An additional DIO was in fact deployed in Oman. In late 1961 it was in Rostaq, by 1964 was in Bid Bid, then returning to Rostaq in 1965. In 1964 there were DIOs at Rostaq, Ibri, Izki and Sohar, some seconded and some contract.

50. Woodburn.

51. Trucial Oman Scouts, “Trucial Oman Scouts Intelligence Summary No 20,” in WO 337/11 (TNA, 1964).

52. Correspondence/interview with Anthony O’Brien ffrench Blake. There was already a TOS IO covering Ras al-Khaimah, but this post was moved to the east coast at Khor Fakkan.

53. The history of the DIOs until the end of 1971 is unclear.

54. In addition to political residency staff, this included military intelligence directorates from the three services, officers from SIS and MI5 (from 1967), and (from 1965) the Gulf Intelligence Centre/Joint Intelligence Group (Gulf). The latter was a Bahrain-based intelligence assessment body formed in 1965 as the Gulf Intelligence Centre, and renamed in 1969 the Joint Intelligence Group (Gulf). It was effectively the regional office of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

55. This is seen in the 1961 Directive to the Commander which stated that intelligence ‘priorities and specific targets will be laid down from time to time by LIC Gulf in consultation with LIC Trucial States.’ Military Co-ordination Committee (Persian Gulf), “Directive to the Commander Trucial Oman Scouts,” in FO 371/156,692 (TNA, 1961).

56. Trucial Oman Scouts, “Trucial Oman Scouts Intelligence Summary No 20.”

57. ffrench Blake.

58. HQ Land Forces Persian Gulf, “For Chairman JIC from Chairman LIC (PG),” in FO 371/163,045 (TNA, 1962).

59. Thomas, Empires of Intelligence, 295, 300.

60. For example, Captain Woodburn, DIO in Masafi in 1961, attended a six-month course. The first three months was a course for officers going to TOS and other Arab forces, the next three months was mostly one-to-one for me. Woodburn.

61. Gowlett.

62. Walcot, “The Trucial Oman Scouts 1955 to 1971,” 24.

63. Gowlett.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. An anonymous DIO quoted in Ritchie, “The RAF, Small Wars and Insurgencies,” 142.

67. Lt Colonel J.B. Lindsay, for General Officer Commanding Middle East Land Forces, “Entertainment-Desert Intelligence Officers,” in FO 371/168,934 (TNA, 1963).

68. Gowlett.

69. Steadman.

70. See note 25above.

71. Sneyd.

72. Capt A.O’B. ffrench Blake, DIO Ras Al Khaimah, “JS/POL/006,” in WO 337/16 (TNA, 1967).

73. Walcot, DIO Sharjah June 1962-September 1963, DIO Mirfa September 1963-February 1964, email, 4 August 2019.

74. Clayton, Two Alpha Lima, 142.

75. ffrench Blake, “JS/POL/006.”

76. See note 57 above.

77. For TOS priorities, see Military Co-ordination Committee (Persian Gulf), “Directive to the Commander Trucial Oman Scouts.” For ADDF priorities, see Abu Dhabi Defence Force, Induction Booklet for New british,” 5.

78. For example, this report noted where a seismic line was shot and the location of the exploration camp. Capt G.P. Gowlett, ADDF FIO West, “Visit to Mijan, 16–22 June 1972.”

79. Bullard, Political Agent, Dubai, “Major Henchman.”

80. Ash, IO North West, “Meeting with the Ruler of Fujairah,” in WO 337/16 (TNA, 1969).

81. Capt G.P. Gowlett, TOS DIO West, “Discussion with Ruler of Abu Dhabi,” in Gowlett files (Collection of Athol Yates, Abu Dhabi, 1966/8?).

82. See note 75 above.

83. Saif Mohammad Obaid Bin-Abood, “Britian’s withdrawal from the Gulf: with particular reference to the Emirates” (PhD, Durham University, 1992), 75. Based on an interview with Major Jim Stockdale, Dorset, 1987.

84. Abu Dhabi Defence Force, “‘Tribes of Abu Dhabi,” in Gowlett files (Abu Dhabi: Collection of Athol Yates, Abu Dhabi, 1970).

85. See note 25 above.

86. Ibid.

87. Gowlett. Operating in the Western Region of Abu Dhabi.

88. Citation for Stockdale’s MBE, “TOL/TOS Scrapbook,” (TOS Association, n.d.).

89. Walcot, “The Trucial Oman Scouts 1955 to 1971,” 29; and ffrench Blake, “JS/POL/006.”

90. See note 57 above.

91. Watson, “Field Intelligence Officers in the Aden Protectorate.”

92. See note 69 above.

93. HQ Land Forces Persian Gulf, “For Chairman JIC from Chairman LIC (PG).”

94. A key body making the recommendations was the Persian Gulf Working Group of the Cabinet-level, Counter-Subversion Committee. Arabian Department Foreign Office, “Counter Subversion in the Persian Gulf,” in CAB 148/56 (TNA, 1967).The group which recommended this was the Joint Working Group for the Gulf and Aden of the Counter Subversion Committee. The Counter Subversion Committee was formed by the Foreign Office as an interdepartmental committee in 1962. Its standing members were representatives from Foreign Office, Colonial Office, Commonwealth Relations Office, Ministry of Defence, MI5 and SIS. The Committee’s purpose was to ‘to initiate and coordinate plans for projects in territories overseas, designed to counter hostile propaganda, subversion and penetration; to allocate the responsibility for their execution and to review the progress and effectiveness of the consequent operations.’ In 1964, the Counter Subversion Committee was elevated to become a Cabinet-level Committee under the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee. Glass, Joint Secretary, “Counter Subversion Committee,” in CAB 164/1161 (TNA, 1972).

95. Foreign Office, “Counter Subversion in the Persian Gulf.”

96. Major C. St G. Rich, HQ British Forces Gulf, “Minutes of a meeting held in the Commander, Trucial Oman Scouts, Office on 23 August 1967 at 0930hrs,” in Special Branch files (Collection of Athol Yates, Abu Dhabi, 1967).

97. Burdett, ed. Records of the Emirates 1966–1971, MS Weir, Political Resident Bahrain to DJ McCarthy; Arabian Department FCO, “Intelligence in the Trucial States,” 23 April 1969, 284–85.

98. See note 25 above.

99. The British withdrawal also saw the DIOs in Oman become seconded officers, and reported solely to the SAF HQ. From 1971 the mix of contract and seconded DIOs in Oman remained much as before.

100. Agar, UK Defence Attaché, “Intelligence Report No 11,” in FCO 8/2371 (TNA, 1974), Annex B to DA/Int/51, dated 6 May 1974.

101. “Annual Report for 1973 by Defence Attaché United Arab Emirates,” in FCO 8/2371 (TNA, 1974). Of the three IOs, two returned to Britain, with one retiring and being engaged by the Ruler of Ras Al Khaimah to become an advisor within the Ruler’s small military. Major T (Tim) Ash joined the Ras Al Khaimah Mobile Force as a contract officer, with Major WF (Jim) Stockdale and Major REBC (Ron) Gibson returning to the UK. “Intelligence Report No 11,” Annex B to DA/Int/51, dated 6 May 1974.

102. Yates, ‘The Formation of Military Intelligence in the United Arab Emirates.’

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Athol Yates

Athol Yates works at the Institute for International and Civil Security, Khalifa University, Abu Dhabi, teaching security, disaster management and public policy.

Ash Rossiter

Ash Rossiter is Assistant Professor of International Security in the Institute of International and Civil Security, Khalifa Univeristy Abu Dhabi.