Oversight mechanisms, regime security, and intelligence service autonomy in South Sudan

ABSTRACT

Statutory oversight mechanisms for South Sudan’s intelligence service are weak and ineffective. The weakness of these mechanisms is directly related to the sense of security that the regime experiences. Internal threats facing the regime after South Sudan’s independence have resulted in an increase in the autonomy and influence of the National Security Service to counter opposition. Democratic principles, such as independent legislative oversight and respect for human rights have become subordinate to the political survival of the regime and its leaders.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for useful critiques that improved the thrust of this paper. I am also thankful to Dr. Alexandra Luce, Dr. Amir Idris of Fordham University, Sandra Tombe, PhD candidate, School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University, and Julius Nyambur for reviewing initial drafts and offering useful comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. United Nations Security Council, Final Report of the Panel, 52.

2. Matei and Halladay assert that American scholars of intelligence studies use the term agency while in other parts of the world, academics prefer the word service. Both are used to mean the same thing in this paper. Matei and Hallady, “The Role and Purpose of Intelligence,” 18.

3. Hassan and Kodouda, “Sudan’s Uprising,” 911.

4. Ibid., 91.

5. Ibid., 91.

6. In May 2019, a youth group called the Red Card Movement mobilised protestors online for a public demonstration in the capital Juba, Australia and the U.S.A, rattling the regime, and prompting a warning from President Salva Kiir. Since a rebellion surfaced in December 2013, other insurgent groups, such as the National Salvation Front and South Sudan United Front, have emerged to challenge the state and to compete in the same political space as the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), the main rebel group that initially challenged the government.

7. United Nations Security Council, Final Report, 52.

8. Lewis, “Salazar’s Ministerial Elite,” 622.

9. International Monetary Fund, IMF Country Report No. 19/53, 9–10.

The IMF acknowledges this opaqueness in its 2019 Article IV consultations with government officials, noting that “Non-transparent oil advances, oil-backed loans, and off-budget transactions are undermining fiscal discipline and budgetary integrity, which have led to high corruption vulnerabilities.”

10. Ministry of Justice, “Laws of South Sudan,” 24.

11. Voice of America, “Journalists Report Harassment.”

12. Human Rights Watch, South Sudan: Free Detained Editor.

13. Civil society activist in a phone interview with the author, July 2019.

14. This paper classifies the political system in South Sudan as authoritarian or a dictatorship because of its poor record on handling processes intrinsic to democracy. The paper uses the terms authoritarianism and dictatorship interchangeably to mean one and the same thing.

15. Frantz, “Autocracy,” 3.

16. Ibid., 7.

17. Freedom House, Freedom in the World: South Sudan Profile.

18. Bruneau and Dombroski, “Reforming Intelligence,” 2–3.

19. Ibid., 2–3.

20. Phythian, “Cultures of National Intelligence,” 36.

21. Bruneau and Dombroski, “Reforming Intelligence,” 3.

22. A security consultant, in an interview with the author, July 2019.

23. Ibid.

24. Rolandsen, “Another Civil War,” 167–168.

25. United Nations Security Council, Final Report, 52.

26. Boswell, “Insecure Power and Violence,” 7.

27. Phythian, “Cultures of National Intelligence,” 34.

28. General Oyai Deng Ajak, South Sudan’s first minister of National Security (July 2011 to July 2013) in an interview with the author, November 2019. Ajak said “They wanted a photocopy of what Salah Gosh (NISS chief) was doing in Khartoum.”

29. Ibid.

30. United Nations Security Council, Final Report, 52. For an explanation of the NSS’s arsenal, refer to Kuol Deim Kuol, “Confronting the Challenges.”

31. United Nations Security Council, Interim Report, 28.

32. Kuol, “Confronting the Challenges.” Also see, Boswell, “Insecure Power and Violence,” 7.

33. Greitens, “Dictators and their Secret Police,” 18.

34. Ibid., 25.

35. Ibid., 13.

36. African Union, Final Report, 22.

37. Civil society activists, in interviews in October 2018 and November 2019.

38. George, “Statement on my Kidnap.”

39. Constitute, “South Sudan”s Constitution,” Articles 101(g), 101(r), 40–41.

40. Sudan Tribune, “Kirr Threatens to Dissolve Parliament.”

41. Rolandsen, “Another Civil War,” 166.

42. Ibid., 166.

43. Ibid., 166.

44. The Republic of South Sudan, “White Paper on National Security,” 9.

45. Rolandsen and Daly, A History of South Sudan, 107–108.

46. See note 44 above.

47. Ibid., 9.

48. Lacey, “Sudan and South Sudan Rebels Sign Deal Ending War.”

49. Adeba, “Beyond Force Transformation,” 58.

50. Rolandsen and Daly, A History of South Sudan, 141.

51. Former official in the ministry of national security interview, July 2018.

52. Ibid.

53. See note 44 above.

54. See note 51 above.

55. Republic of South Sudan, Ministry of National Security, “Briefing to National Legislative Assembly,” 1.

56. Ibid.

57. Ajak, “Re: White Paper and Organizational Structure.”

58. In Ethiopia, a director general, who answers to the prime minister, heads a unitary National Intelligence and Security Service. In Uganda, two directors general lead two separate intelligence organisations. Both report directly to the president. In Sudan, a director general heads the National Intelligence and Security Service and reports directly to the president.

59. Uganda has two civilian intelligence agencies: The Internal Security Organisation and the External Security Organisation.

60. Constitute, “South Sudan”s Constitution,” Chapter III, Sections 159, 160, 161.

61. Herdie, “Report on Visit to Juba,” 1.

62. Constitute, “South Sudan’s Constitution,” Chapter III, Section 160 (3), 161.

63. Herdie, “Report on Visit to Juba,” 3.

64. Ibid., 1–3.

65. A legislator #1, in an interview with the author, August 2019.

66. Civil Society activist, in an interview with the author, August 2019.

67. Since the start of the civil war in December 2013, the Director General of the Internal Security Bureau has more influence than the minister of national security.

68. Lam Akol, SPLM-SPLA: Inside an African Revolution, 114.

69. Hilde Johnson, South Sudan, the Untold Story, 152.

70. Sudan Tribune, “Confidential Report.”

71. United Nations Security Council, Final Report, 54.

The budget of the NSS is housed in the office of the president, rather than the ministry of finance. The budget of the office of the president can be audited by the auditor general but its particulars are not disclosed publicly as other accounts of government business.

72. Herdie, “Report on Visit to Juba,” 8.

73. Republic of South Sudan, “National Security Service and Intelligence Bill,” 16.

74. Public Radio International, “Press Freedom Hard to Come.”

75. Committee to Protect Journalists, “South Sudan Security Detains.”

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.

78. A security consultant on South Sudan, in an interview with the author, July 2019.

79. Wambugu, Post-Conflict Security in South Sudan, 14.

80. Rands, “In Need of Review,” 32.

81. Warner, The Role of Military Integration, 157–60.

82. Interview with security consultant, July 2019.

83. Republic of South Sudan, “National Security Bill, 2012,” Section 18 and 19, 22–23.

84. Ibid, Section 18, Part 2 (a), 22.

85. Ibid, Section 18, Part 2 (c), 22.

86. Ibid, Section 19, Parts 1, 2, 3, & 4, 23.

87. Ibid, Section 19, Part 4, 23.

88. Ibid, Section 19, Part 5, 23.

89. African Union, Final Report, 53–54.

90. Ibid., 54.

91. Ibid., 54.

92. Kuol, “Confronting the Challenges.”

93. Government of Southern Sudan, “SPLA White Paper on Defence,” 5–7.

94. Adeba, “Beyond Force Transformation,” 61.

95. Radio Dabanga, “Sudan, South Sudan to Adjust Pipeline.”

96. See note 82 above.

97. Sudan Tribune, “SPLM Deputy Chairman Says.”

98. African Union, Final Report, 61.

99. Africa Confidential, “Talks or Treason Trial.”

100. Mayar, “S. Sudan Violates Human Rights.”

101. A political commentator, Isaiah Abraham, was among the first well-known individuals shot by the “unknown gunmen,” in late 2012. See Sudan Tribune, “South Sudan Police Investigate Killing.”

102. Tisdall, “South Sudan President Fires.”

103. See note 51 above.

104. Republic of South Sudan, “Briefing to National Legislative Assembly,” 2.

105. It was not until July 2014 that the assembly passed the NSS bill under controversial circumstances.

106. United Nations Security Council, Final Report, 52.

107. Africa Confidential, “The Fall of King Paul.”

108. Ministry of Justice, “National Security Service Act, 2014,” Chapter 1, Article 6 (b) (f), 8.

109. Ibid, Chapter II, Article 8, 11.

110. Ibid, Chapter IV, Article 19, 14.

111. Ibid, Chapter IV, 20.

112. Ibid, Chapter II, Article 10 (1), 9–10.

113. Constitute, “South Sudan’s Constitution of 2011,” Articles 101(g), 101(r), 40–41.

114. Ibid, Article 160, 61.

115. According to Oyai Deng Ajak, in an interview with the author in November 2019, Akol Koor, head of the Internal Security Bureau and Thomas Duoth, head of the General Intelligence Bureau were both appointed to their positions before his nomination as minister of national security.

116. Koor and Douth were both appointed in 2011 and still retain their positions.

117. Leigh, “More Closely Watching the Spies,” 6.

118. The Council includes the President as chair, the vice president as deputy chair, the ministers of defence, finance, foreign affairs, justice, interior, and national security.

119. Ministry of Justice, “National Security Act 2014,” Chapter IV (19), 14.

120. Ibid, Chapter IV (20) (5), 15.

121. Interviews in August 2019 with various sources in civil society organisations, with legislators, and reporters reveal that the board may not have been established and is not functional. In December 2019, the NSS established a tribunal to try security operatives who break regulations.

122. Legislator #2 in an interview with the author, July 2019.

123. Adeba, A Hope from Within? 16,.

124. United Nations Security Council, Final Report, 54.

125. See note 82 above.

126. Global Witness, Capture on the Nile, 7.

127. Ibid.

128. See note 82 above.

129. Ibid.

130. Ibid.

131. Dehéz, “Intelligence Services,” 62.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Brian Adeba

Brian Adeba is a PhD student in War Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada