The third eye: Canada’s development of autonomous signals intelligence to contribute to Five Eyes intelligence sharing

ABSTRACT

Canada established independent signals intelligence in 1946, after years of British and American guidance. The dominant driver was inclusion in postwar intelligence sharing. Wartime intelligence negotiations depict Canadians framing themselves relative to their allies, seeking to shake off a ‘younger brother’ mindset and to migrate from British-led models towards autonomous intelligence sharing with the Americans. This paper traces the origins of autonomous Canadian signals intelligence in the context of postwar intelligence sharing with the United States and United Kingdom, demonstrating Canada’s prioritization of capabilities that would ensure inclusion in the intelligence-sharing partnership known today as Five Eyes.

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to Alan Barnes, Ralph Erskine, John Ferris, Michael Goodman, Kurt Jensen, and Bill Robinson, and Wesley Wark for their advice and insights, and would also like to thank the University of Toronto’s Canada Declassified project and the Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project, and the Centre for Military, Security, and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary.

Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 2019 Symposium on Cryptologic History, the 2019 Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project Symposium, and the 2019 International Studies Association Conference.

Disclosure statement

The author has no conflicts of interest to report.

Notes

1. For examples of the UK building or sustaining SIGINT facilities to meet American intelligence needs, see Aldrich, GCHQ.

2. See Perry, “Quid Pro Quo or National Security”; and Jensen, Cautious Beginnings, 168, for references to speculation by scholars over the nature of Anglo-American postwar intelligence sharing.

3. Farson, “Cover Story,” 78. Also see Perry, “Quid Pro Quo or National Security.”

4. See Bill Robinson’s Lux Ex Umbra blog for thorough documentation and analysis of the recent declassifications at www.luxexumbra.blogspot.com.

5. Wark, “The Road to CANUSA.”

6. Jensen, Cautious Beginnings.

7. Robinson, “The Fall and Rise of Cryptanalysis in Canada”; and “70 Years of Eavesdropping in Canada”; also see several posts on Lux Ex Umbra, including “ATIpper #8: CANUSA ‘Almost Identical’ to UKUSA Agreement” (13 January 2017); “ATIPical Story: U.S. Releases Partial CANUSA Appendices” (26 March 2019); “CSE Facilities” (26 June 2011); and “CANUSA Agreement Declassified” (23 April 2017).

8. Rudner, “Historical Evolution”; “CSEC, Signals Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism”; and “Contemporary Threats, Future Tasks.”

9. Wark, “Cryptographic Innocence”; “Favourable Geography”; and “The Road to CANUSA.”

10. O’Neill, History of the CBNRC, copy courtesy Wesley Wark.

11. See Rudner, “Britain Betwixt and Between”; and “Cold War to Globalization.”

12. NSA and GCHQ, UKUSA Agreement, “Agreement and Outline – 5 March 1946”, TNA HW80/04, with examples such as Article 6, “The Dominions.”

13. O’Neill and Hughes, History of the CBNRC, “Liaison with Collaborating Centres, Section 11.13”, 397.

14. Colonel O’Connor to Travis, “Notes on Sigint Cooperation with Canada during World War II,” 1943, TNA HW50/08, 6.

15. “Joint Meeting of ANCIB and ANCICC”, 29 October 1945, NSA and GCHQ, UKUSA Agreement, TNA HW80/01.

16. See note 5 above.

17. Commander Edward Travis, GC&CS, to Sir Stewart Menzies, SIS, 16 February 1943, in “Notes on Sigint Cooperation,” TNA HW50/08, 5.

18. Wark, “Cryptographic Innocence,” 643.

19. Examination Unit, WWII—9 Pt. 1: XU Correspondence: 1939-1941, LAC RG24, Vol. 29164.

20. “Appendix A,” Meeting in London on 28 July 1937, Examination Unit, WWII—9 Pt. 1: XU Correspondence, LAC RG24, Vol. 29164.

21. Ibid.

22. Decrypts of intercepted German and Japanese diplomatic signals, Examination Unit, LAC RG24, Vol. 20306 and Vol. 20307.

23. See note 18 above..

24. Letter from Pearson to Massey, 22 August 1941. Examination Unit, WWII—9 Pt. 1: XU Correspondence 1939-1941, LAC RG24, Vol. 29164.

25. “Dossiers of Canadian Liaison,” 9 September 1942, TNA HW50/08, 4.

26. Budiansky, “Difficult Beginnings of US-British Codebreaking Cooperation,” 53.

27. Ibid.

28. Wark, “Cryptographic Innocence,” 654.

29. Capt. K.J. Maidment, “Dossiers of Canadian Liaison,” 21 August 1943, TNA HW50/08, 6.

30. Robinson, “History of the Examination Unit,” File WWII-31, 47.

31. Ibid.

32. Skaarup, Out of Darkness—Light.

33. Wark, “Cryptographic Innocence,” 648-9.

34. “Dossiers of Canadian Liaison,” 12 December 1941, TNA HW50/08, 3.

35. Ibid., 4.

36. “Dossiers of Canadian Liaison,” Y Committee Papers: 24 July 1942, TNA HW50/08.

37. Robinson, “History of the Examination Unit,” 46.

38. Ibid.

39. Geoffrey Stevens to Alistair Denniston, “Dossiers of Canadian Liaison,” September 2, 1942, TNA HW50/08, 4.

40. Colonel O’Connor to Commander Edward Travis, “Notes on Sigint cooperation with Canada during World War II,” 1943, TNA HW50/08, 6.

41. Erskine, “Holden Agreement on Naval Sigint,” 187.

42. Smith, “Sharing Ultra in World War II,” 70, and correspondence with Ralph Erskine.

43. For example, “Notes on Discussions Held during Dr. Robinson’s Visit to Signal Security Agency, May 17-20, 1945”, in Examination Unit. WWII—22: XU—Liaison with Washington, LAC RG24, Vol. 29166. These discussions included the setting of Canadian signals intelligence collection targets, including targeting communications in France and Northern China.

44. Robinson, “History of the Examination Unit,” 47-48.

45. Ibid., 46.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Rudner, “Historical Evolution,” 68.

49. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, Vol. III, 320.

50. Jensen, Cautious Beginnings, 169.

51. See note 49 above.

52. Rudner, “Cold War to Globalization,” 100.

53. Cooper, CFIS: A Foreign Intelligence Service for Canada, 14.

54. Jensen, Cautious Beginnings, 124.

55. Ibid.

56. Barnes, “A Confusion, Not a System,” 465.

57. Jensen, Cautious Beginnings, 127.

58. Wark, “Favourable Geography,” 324.

59. Jensen, Cautious Beginnings, 123.

60. Ibid.

61. O’Neill and Hughes, History of the CBNRC, Vol. I, Ch. 2, p.3.

62. Department of National Defence, “Memorandum: Hydra Communications.”

63. Jensen, Cautious Beginnings, 161.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid., 128-129.

66. Perry, “Quid Pro Quo or National Security,” 80.

67. Ibid., 163.

68. Ibid.

69. Robinson, “CSE Facilities.”

70. Jensen, Cautious Beginnings, 164-165. Gander and Massett were only used for direction-finding.

71. Wark, “The Road to CANUSA,” 24.

72. Communications Security Establishment Canada, “The Beginning.”

73. Smith, “Sharing Ultra in World War II,” 70.

74. Ibid.

75. NSA and GCHQ, UKUSA Agreement, “Agreement and Outline – 5 March 1946”, TNA HW80/04.

76. O’Neill and Hughes, History of CBNRC, Vol. III, Ch. 11, “Liaison with Collaborating

Centres,” copy courtesy of Wesley Wark.

77. See NSA, UKUSA Agreement: “Principles of UKUSA Collaboration with Commonwealth Countries Other Than the UK; Appendix J 13 February 1961”: specifically: ‘At this time, only Canada, Australia and New Zealand will be regarded as UKUSA-collaborating Commonwealth countries.’ In addition, Annexure J1 lays out ‘UKUSA arrangements affecting Australia and New Zealand.’

78. Jensen, Cautious Beginnings, 164.

79. Proc, “Canadian Communications Centres.”

80. Travis to Menzies, 16 February 1943, TNA HW50/08.

81. Ibid.

82. See note 57 above.

83. See note 15 above.

84. See note 15 above.

85. Perry, “Quid Pro Quo or National Security,” 90.

86. “Joint Meeting of ANCIB and ANCICC”, 29 October 1945, TNA HW80/01.

87. Rudner, “Britain Betwixt and Between,” 574.

88. See note 15 above.

89. See note 15 above.

90. See note 5 above.

91. See note 86 above.

92. See note 86 above.

93. NSA, “New UKUSA Agreement - 10 May 1955”, 47, carried over from the original 1946 documents.

94. See note 15 above..

95. Robinson, “ATIpper #8.”

96. There was precedent from as early as 1937 for Canada assuming responsibility for targeting a wide variety of locations due to its natural geographic advantage. See: Decrypts of intercepted German and Japanese diplomatic signals, Examination Unit, LAC RG24, Vol. 20306 and Vol. 20307.

97. NSA, UKUSA Revised Agreement, 14 February 1952, Appendix P, Section 8.

98. Rudner, “Contemporary Threats, Future Tasks,” 148; and Wark, “Favourable Geography.”

99. Rudner, “Britain Betwixt and Between,” 573.

100. See note 86 above.

101. See note 80 above.

102. See note 69 above.

103. Wark, “Road to CANUSA,” 29.

104. Ibid.

105. See note 63 above.

106. Y Committee Papers, 24 July 1942, “Notes on Sigint Cooperation with Canada during World War II,” TNA HW50/08.

Additional information

Funding

The archival research for this project was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada through a Joseph-Armand Bombardier Canada Graduate Scholarships Program Master’s Scholarship from 2011-2012. The author is grateful for the support.

Notes on contributors

Maria A. Robson

Maria A. Robson is a PhD Candidate in Political Science at Northeastern University in Boston, where her dissertation research focuses on the expansion of intelligence sharing to encompass private sector actors. She holds a Master’s in Military, Security, and Strategic Studies from the University of Calgary, where her thesis explored the historical development of Canadian signals intelligence, and a Bachelor of Arts (Honours) in International Relations, Economics, and History from the University of Toronto. She has intelligence analysis experience in the private sector. Her work has been published in the Journal of Intelligence History and the Journal of European and American Intelligence Studies. She can be reached at [email protected].