Getting it right: Canadian intelligence assessments on Iraq, 2002-2003

ABSTRACT

The partial release of Canadian intelligence assessments on Iraq during 2002 and 2003 has made it possible for the first time to examine the role that intelligence played in informing the Chrétien government’s decisions in the lead-up to the war in Iraq. Canadian assessments of US policy on Iraq, Baghdad’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities, the regional implications of an invasion, and the subsequent internal instability of Iraq proved to be largely accurate, in contrast to much of the analysis on Iraq by other members of the Five Eyes intelligence partnership.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to acknowledge Dr. Timothy Sayle and John Hannigan for commenting on drafts of this paper.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions presented in this article are those solely of the author, and are not representative of any view, opinion, or policy of any department, agency, or office of the Canadian government.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Chrétien, My Years as Prime Minister, 306.

2. Sayle, “’But he has nothing on at all!’ 11. The article was later republished as: Sayle, “Taking the Off-Ramp.”

3. PCO has provided a partial release of IAS assessments in response to Access to Information (ATI) request A-2015-00423. PCO’s refusal to release any further portions of the reports is being challenged in Federal Court, but the conclusion of this case is likely to take considerable time.

4. DND assessments on Iraq were released in response to ATI requests A-2014-00310 and A-2018-00348. Many of the assessments dealing with issues other than WMD have only minor redactions. The current article will make some general comments on the DND non-WMD assessments, but space constraints preclude a more detailed treatment of these reports.

5. CSIS has refused to release any assessments on Iraq in response to ATI request A-117-2018-257. The only report on Iraq that CSIS appears to have released to date is the one described in Stewart Bell, “'Axis' harbours nuclear plan.”

6. The interviewees from the intelligence community worked in PCO, DND and CSIS. Four agreed to be cited by name; the others asked that they remain anonymous. All interview subjects are retired from government service and were speaking in their private capacity. In the citations, the anonymous interviewees are identified by department/agency and position that they held in 2002–03. In addition to the interview subjects from the intelligence community, six government officials who received Iraq assessments were interviewed in order to gauge the impact of these reports on Iraq policy; all but one (who requested anonymity) are cited by name and position at the time. Regrettably, other senior officials with relevant knowledge of the Iraq reporting declined to be interviewed.

7. The key judgements of the intelligence reports – and in some cases the report titles (indicated by single quotation marks in the citations) – have been reconstructed as accurately as possible from the recollections of those involved, but are presented in general terms only. Given the limits of memory and the heavily-redacted documentary record, it has not been possible to provide direct quotations from the assessments.

8. For a description of strategic intelligence assessment in Canada up to the time of the Iraq crisis, see Barnes, “A Confusion, not a System.”

9. Fadden’s full title was Deputy Clerk, Counsel and Security and Intelligence Coordinator; Bilodeau’s and Wright’s title was Associate Secretary to the Cabinet, Deputy Minister to the Deputy Prime Minister, and Security and Intelligence Coordinator. The titles make clear the Coordinators’ extensive responsibilities beyond the security and intelligence portfolio.

10. Privy Council Office, “The Canadian Security and Intelligence Community,” 14. The IAS continues to perform this function today.

11. The remaining members of the IAS were managers, production and registry staff and a small graphics team.

12. Cox, “Transforming Canadian Defence Intelligence,” 179; DND National Capital Region Telephone Directory, 2002.

13. Barnes, “A Confusion, not a System,” 11.

14. Privy Council Office, “The Canadian Security and Intelligence Community,” 14–15.

15. This judgement would later be raised by some government officials to criticize IAS analysis on Iraq in 2002–03.

16. See note 13 above,  12.

17. Lavertu, Confidences Diplomatiques, 146. For an overview of the personalities and ideas that were shaping US policy on Iraq during this period see Bamford, Pretext for War, 261–267, 282–295. At the time IAS analysts were aware of some, but not all, of these policy influences which only became fully apparent in retrospect.

18. IAS Intelligence Memorandum (IM) 27/2002, USA/Iraq: Decision Time, 22 February 2002.

19. IAS IM 49/2002, ‘USA/Iraq: Washington Looking to Build Support Build Support for Military Action,’ 17 April 2002. Another version of this paper had been published the previous week as IAS IM 44/2002, ‘USA/Iraq: Making a Case for Action against Saddam,’ 8 April 2002. The analysis in the two versions was the same, but the 8 April paper contained two additional paragraphs explaining the role of the IAS in producing independent Canadian analysis, including analysis of the policies and actions of key allies. It was distributed to a more restricted list of officials.

20. IAS IM 68/2002, ‘USA/Iraq: The Pentagon’s Possible Strategies,’ 7 June 2002.

21. IAS IM 89/2002, ‘USA/Iraq: War Clouds Looming,’ 28 August 2002; IAS IM 99/2002, ‘Iraq: Likely Shape of Military Action,’ 30 September 2002.

22. Interview, George Kolisnek, DND Director of Strategic Intelligence, 28 June 2017.

23. Interview, Gaëtan Lavertu, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, 14 April 2016.

24. Interview, Greg Fyffe, IAS Executive Director, 28 November 2016.

25. United States Select Senate Committee on Intelligence, “Report on the US Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq,” 307–312.

26. These points were reiterated in a detailed IAS analysis produced in early 2003, but by that time the terrorism issue had taken secondary place to the US focus on Iraq’s WMD programs (IAS IM 16/2003, ‘US Evidence on Iraqi Links to al-Qaida,’ 3 February 2003).

27. Interview, Phil Gurski, CSIS strategic analyst, 19 May 2017.

28. IAS IM 31/2002, ‘Iraq: The Return of UN Inspectors?’ 27 February 2002.

29. IAS IM 33/2002, Iraq: Weapons of Mass Destruction Update, 5 March 2002.

30. E-mail, IAS analyst, 23 April 2018.

31. IAS IM 72/2002, United States: Concerns over WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, 18 June 2002; E-mail, IAS analyst, 23 April 2018.

32. The previous week, scientific analysts in DND had produced an overview paper on Iraq’s WMD (DSI Assessment, Iraq: Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), 22 August 2002) which, along with previous IAS papers on the subject, provided the foundation for the drafting of the IAC paper.

33. IAS analyst e-mail to Iraq IEG participants, 28 August 2002. This condensed process for producing an IAC assessment – from tasking to final report in five days – was highly unusual.

34. IAC Current Intelligence Brief (CIB) 4/2002, ‘Iraq: Weapons of Mass Destruction,’ 30 August 2002; Interview, IAS analyst, 3 November 2016. The assessment was four pages long, a typical length for IAC papers which aimed to provide a succinct view of a given issue for senior officials, with an emphasis on analytical conclusions and forward-looking judgements rather than detailed background information.

35. Interview, DND scientific analyst, 4 May 2017; E-mail, DND scientific analyst, 12 January 2020.

36. This was a violation of UN resolutions, but it would be hard to see such a marginal breach as reasonable justification for military action against Iraq.

37. Interview, DND scientific analyst, 15 January 2019; E-mail, DND scientific analyst, 9 January 2020. A few months after this meeting, the CIA passed to the media information concerning the possible provision of smallpox to Iraq. See Millar, “CIA Hunts Iraq Tie to Soviet Smallpox.”

38. Cox, Canada and the Five Eyes Intelligence Community. The current article uses the term “Five Eyes” as a convenient shorthand for this key intelligence alliance. However, at the time of the Iraq crisis, the reality was closer to “Four ½ Eyes.” Some aspects of intelligence sharing with New Zealand were limited by restrictions imposed by the US following Wellington’s refusal to allow nuclear-armed vessels to dock in New Zealand. During this period, Canada could not share US-origin information with New Zealand.

39. Fyffe, “The Canadian Intelligence Community after 9/11,” 6.

40. Minutes of the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee, 15 August 1956, Library and Archives Canada RG146 Vol. 6040 File IA10-4-8-56.

41. For example, see Bamford, Pretext for War, 326–27 for a discussion of disagreements inside the US intelligence community over the quality of the available intelligence.

42. Canada has several liaison officers in Washington and London representing the IAC, DND, CSIS, and other agencies. The DND military intelligence liaison officers are very closely integrated into their host organizations (Skaarup, Out of Darkness – Light, Vol. 3, 49–51, 78–80.)

43. Fyffe, “The Canadian Intelligence Community After 9/11”; Interviews, Greg Fyffe, 28 November 2016, George Kolisnek, 28 June 2017, DND intelligence manager, 22 January 2018, and DND scientific analyst, 15 January 2019.

44. IAS assessment [un-numbered, limited distribution], Comments on Vice-President Cheney’s 26 August Speech Concerning Iraq, 4 September 2002.

45. IAS assessment [un-numbered, limited distribution], Preliminary Assessment of UK Dossier on Iraq, 24 September 2002.

46. Jones, Failing Intelligence, 80–96, 228.

47. IAS IM 98/2002, Iraq: The Return of Weapons Inspectors, 20 September 2002.

48. IAS IM 9/2003, ‘Iraq: Weapons Inspectors at Work,’ 24 January 2003.

49. Interviews, IAS analyst, 3 November 2016, and DND intelligence manager, 22 January 2018.

50. Director of Central Intelligence, “Iraq”s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs.”

51. National Intelligence Council, “Iraq”s Continuing Program for Weapons of Mass Destruction.” A heavily-redacted version of this NIE was released publicly in April 2004.

52. Interview, IAS analyst, 3 November 2016.

53. IAS IM 15/2003, ’Iraq: US Evidence on Iraqi WMD,’ 3 February 2003, IAS IM 16/2003, ‘US Evidence on Iraqi Links to al-Qaida,’ 3 February 2003.

54. Partial draft of IAS assessment, Comments on Vice-President Cheney’s 26 August Speech Concerning Iraq, undated.

55. The CSIS Counter-Proliferation Branch – an operational group that carries out investigations related to counter-proliferation cases in Canada – was also involved in work on Iraq. However, it is not an analytic unit and does not produce all-source assessments for distribution within government; for that reason its work is outside the scope of the article’s discussion of Canada’s assessments on Iraq.

56. Bell, “'Axis' harbours nuclear plan.” Bell provided additional details of this CSIS report in a later article: Bell, “Canada's case against Saddam.”

57. See note 24 above.

58. See note 22 above.

59. Interviews, Greg Fyffe, 28 November 2016, and IAS manager, 11 May 2016. This question will only be answered when CSIS releases its reports on Iraq from this period.

60. Interviews, DND intelligence manager, 22 January 2018, and DND scientific analyst, 15 January 2019.

61. DND recently released over 80 reports from 2002 and 2003 dealing with Iraq. The reports on WMD issues are almost entirely redacted. A full account of DND’s analysis of other aspects of the Iraq crisis is beyond the scope of this article.

62. DSI Assessment, Iraq: Access to Smallpox, 29 August 2002; Interview, DND scientific analyst, 15 January 2019; National Intelligence Council, “Iraq's Continuing Program for Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 7. See also DSI Assessment, Worldwide: Assessment of the Smallpox Threat, 18 December 2002.

63. DSI Assessments, Iraq: Anthrax, 15 October 2002, and The Iraqi Anthrax Threat to CF Personnel in UAE, 28 November 2002; E-mail DND scientific analyst, 9 January 2020.

64. DSI Report, Country Study: Iraq, Annex B – Biological Warfare Agents, 3 January 2003.

65. DSI Assessment, Iraq: BW Threat to CF NATO Personnel, 27 February 2003.

66. DSI Assessments, Iraq: Weapons Inspectors-Pawns in a Predetermined Game, 6 September 2002, Iraq: UNSCR 1441, UNMOVIC, Material Breaches and an Inevitable Conflict, 2 December 2002, Iraq: “Currently Accurate Declaration” Expected this Weekend, 5 December 2002, and Iraq: UNMOVIC Capabilities, 6 December 2002.

67. DSI Assessment, Iraq: Some Major Outstanding Deficiencies in Previous Biological Full, Final and Complete Disclosures (FFCD), 2 January 2002; E-mail, DND scientific analyst, 9 January 2020.

68. E-mail, DND scientific analyst, 9 January 2020.

69. IAS IM 6/2003, Iraq: Saddam’s Strategy, 20 January 2003.

70. IAS IM 22/2003, Iraq: Kurds in the Middle, 12 February 2003.

71. IAS IM 33/2003, ‘Iraq: Will Saddam Use Terrorism in a War with the US?’ 7 March 2003; Interview, IAS analyst, 2 July 2018.

72. IAS IM 97/2002, ‘Middle East: Potential Impacts of a War in Iraq,’ 16 September 2002.

73. IAS IM 100/2002, Israel: Reaction to Events Linked to a War in Iraq, 2 October 2002, IAS IM 32/2003, ‘Israel: Strategic Implications of a War in Iraq,’ 6 March 2003.

74. IAS IM 105/2002, ‘Terrorism: Al-Qaida and War in Iraq,’ 22 October 2002.

75. IAS IM 21/2003, ‘Turkey: Watching and Waiting,’ 5 February 2003, IAS IM 37/2003, Iran: Concerned About a War in Iraq, 13 March 2003.

76. IAS IM 25/2003, USA/Middle East: Seeking to Promote Arab Democracy, 19 February 2003.

77. IAS IM 106/2002, ‘Russia/Iraq: Moscow Balancing its Interests,’ 25 October 2002.

78. IAS IM 36/2003, ‘Europe: Impact of Iraq War on Relations with Washington,’ 13 March 2003.

79. IAS IM 96/2002, ‘USA/Iraq: How Will War Affect Oil Markets?’ 3 September 2002.

80. IAS IM 6/2003, ‘Iraq: Financial Sector Views on Impact of War,’ 20 January 2003.

81. IAS IM 44/2003, Iraq: Response to Questions, 21 March 2003.

82. IAS IM 49/2003, Iraqi Missile Launches, 25 March 2003.

83. IAS IM 55/2003, Iraq: Ansar al-Islam on the Run, 2 April 2003; Interview, IAS analyst, 2 July 2018. US officials had sought to use the presence of Ansar al-Islam in Iraq as proof of Baghdad’s links to terrorism and al-Qaida. However, this small group operated in a remote area near the Iranian border that was not under the control of either the Iraqi government or the autonomous Kurdish authorities in northern Iraq.

84. IAS IM 41/2003, Iraq Map Folio I, 20 March 2003, IAS IM 52/2003, Iraq Map Folio II, 27 March 2003, IAS

IM 56/2003, Iraq Map Folio III, 3 April 2003, IAS IM 57/2003, Iraq Map Folio IV, 9 April 2003.

85. IAS IM 109/2002, ‘Iraq: What Happens after Saddam?’ 28 October 2002.

86. IAS IM 12/2003, ‘Iraq: Paying for Reconstruction,’ 29 January 2003; E-mail, IAS analyst, 30 April 2018.

87. See note 24 above.

88. IAS IM 51/2003, Iraq: Post-War Governance, 27 March 2003; IAS IM 58/2003, ‘USA/Iraq: Difficult Stabilization Stage,’ 10 April 2003.

89. Interview, DND scientific analyst, 15 January 2019; E-mail, DND scientific analyst, 9 January 2020. See DSI Assessment, Iraq: Assessment of UNSCOM 1995 Debrief of Hussein Kamal al-Majid, 6 March 2003. Hussein Kamal al-Majid was Saddam’s son-in-law and the senior official responsible for Iraq’s WMD programs. He fled to Jordan in August 1995. In debriefings with UN inspectors and the CIA he stated that Iraq had shut down its WMD programs in 1991. The details of the briefings were not shared with Canada at that time, but media reports provided an abbreviated version of this information. The transcripts of the UN debriefings were not available to DND scientific analysts until March 2003.

90. DSI Assessment, Iraq: No Smoke, No Gun, 11 March 2003.

91. See note 68 above.

92. Interviews, IAS analyst, 3 November 2016, and George Kolisnek, 28 June 2017.

93. IAC CIB 2/2003, Iraq: Looking for Weapons of Mass Destruction, 14 April 2003; Interviews, IAS analyst, 3 November 2016, and George Kolisnek, 28 June 2017.

94. Duelfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor. The US also found trailers that it initially claimed were Iraqi mobile BW production facilities. DND scientific analysts, consulting closely with their UK colleagues, concluded that the trailers were hydrogen gas production facilities used for filling Iraqi artillery weather balloons. These conclusions were reported in the DSI Assessment Iraq: Suspect Mobile BW Production Facility, two versions, 18 and 24 March 2002, and classified ‘CEO’ because it disagreed with the US assessment (E-mail, DND scientific analyst, 9 January 2020).

95. IAS IM 63/2003, ‘Iraq: Chalabi’s Political Role,’ 16 April 2003.

96. IAS IM 81/2003, Iraq: Political Groups and Leaders, 12 May 2003, IAS IM 103/2003, Iraq: Leadership and Factions, 8 July 2003.

97. IAS IM 83/2003, Iraq: Northern Exposure, 13 May 2003.

98. IAS IM 115/2003, ‘Iraq: The Growing Shia Political Role,’ 31 July 2003.

99. IAS IM 181/2003, Iraq: Outlook for the Insurgency, 18 December 2003; Interview, IAS analyst, 2 July 2018.

100. IAS IM 99/2003, Iraq: The Boon and Bane of Oil, 26 Jun2 2003, IAS IM 110/2003, Iraq: Currency and Monetary Challenges, 23 July 2003.

101. IAS IM 69/2003, Syria: Support for Iraq, 24 April 2003, IAS IM 78/2003, ‘Iran: Intervention in Iraq,’ 5 May 2003.

102. IAS IM 66/2003, ‘USA: What Next After Iraq?’ 23 April 2003.

103. IAS IM 74/2003, Russia: Implications of the War for Moscow’s Foreign Policy, 30 April 2003.

104. IAS IM 76/2003, The UN Security Council and Post-Conflict Developments: Tough Bargaining Ahead, 2 May 2003.

105. See note 24 above.

106. Interview, IAS manager, 11 May 2016.

107. The question of the politicization of Iraq intelligence in the US and UK has generated a large literature. Among many other writers, Bamford describes numerous instances of pressure on analysts to produce assessments that supported the Administration’s policy (Bamford, Pretext for War, 225–336). Others take a more charitable view. Robert Jervis disagrees that the US analysis on Iraq WMDs would have been markedly different in a different political environment; he nevertheless provides several examples of political pressure on analysts (Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, 131–136). For an examination of the political dynamic at play when intelligence becomes the subject of public debate, see Rovner, Fixing the Facts.

108. See note 24 above.

109. Plamondon, Shawinigan Fox, 160, and Stein and Lang, Unexpected War, 59–61.

110. Interview, DFAIT foreign service officer, 3 May 2018.

111. Livermore, Detained, 252. Livermore, the Director General of DFAIT’s Intelligence and Security Bureau during this period, was commenting specifically on the agencies involved in security intelligence, but this view was pervasive throughout the Canadian intelligence community.

112. Interviews, IAS manager, 11 May 2016, and IAS analyst, 3 November 2016.

113. See note 1 above.

114. For an overview of the Canadian decision-making process on Iraq see Sayle, “But he has nothing on at all!“ In his memoirs, Prime Minister Chrétien describes in detail the policy considerations that shaped his thinking but only alludes indirectly to the Canadian intelligence assessments on Iraq (Chrétien, My Years as Prime Minister).

115. E-mail, Greg Fyffe, 28 February 2019.

116. Sayle, “But he has nothing on at all!” 11.

117. Interview, Claude Laverdure, Foreign and Defence Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister, 12 January 2017.

118. Chrétien, My Years as Prime Minister, 309.

119. Ibid.

120. Interview, Claude Laverdure, 12 January 2017.

121. Ibid.

122. Sayle, “But he has nothing on at all!” 12–13.

123. Interview, Paul Heinbecker, Ambassador to the UN, 19 July 2018.

124. Ibid.

125. See note 23 above.

126. Lavertu, “Foreign Intelligence and Policy-making.”

127. A DFAIT briefing paper of September 2002, “Iraq: Weapons of Mass Destruction,” appears to be largely based on the IAC 30 August assessment (Barry, “Chrétien, Bush, and the War in Iraq,” footnote 15).

128. See note 23 above.

129. Interview, James Wright, Assistant Deputy Minister for International Security Affairs, 14 January 2019.

130. One of the arguments of those who oppose the idea of Canada carrying out “intelligence” analysis of the US is that this is properly the responsibility of DFAIT, with its close connections to US officials and deep knowledge of US politics and government. At this critical time, however, DFAIT was not fulfilling this role.

131. See note 110 above.

132. See note 129 above.

133. See note 110 above.

134. Graham, “For Canada, jaw-jaw is better than war-war”; Thompson, “Ottawa readies aid package for Iraq”; Sallot, “Mounties could be sent to Iraq.” See also Barry, “Chrétien, Bush, and the War in Iraq,” 228–234.

135. Interview, Roman Jakubow, DND Director of Strategic Analysis, 24 June 2019.

136. See note 22 above.

137. For the views of senior DND officials, see Stein and Lang, Unexpected War, 59–61, and Barry, “Chrétien, Bush, and the War in Iraq,” 221.

138. See note 60 above.

139. See the exchange of e-mails involving the Canadian Embassy Tel Aviv, DFAIT headquarters Ottawa and DSI analysts on the subject of “Threat of Smallpox and Dirty Bombs in the Middle East,” 13–15 August 2002. The DND release is heavily redacted.

140. See note 24 above.

141. Cox, Canada and the Five Eyes Intelligence Community.

142. See note 24 above.

143. Ibid.

144. See note 68 above.

145. Interviews, George Kolisnek, 28 June 2017, and DND intelligence manager, 22 January 2018.

146. See note 22 above.

147. Interviews, IAS manager, 11 May 2016, George Kolisnek, 28 June 2017, and Phil Gurski, 19 May 2017. Bob Plamondon overstates the case when he says that “Canada was excluded from the “Five Eyes” community for a short period” (Plamondon, Shawinigan Fox, 166–167). Bill Graham makes similar comments in his memoirs (Graham, Call of the World, 305, 315). Canada was cut off from some US HUMINT reporting for several months in 2003, but there was no appreciable change in the volume of SIGINT Canada received during this period.

148. See note 24 above.

149. Interview, Denis Horak, IAC Liaison Officer (London), 29 March 2019.

150. Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails, 134 (italics in the original).

151. See note 24 above.

152. Whittington, “PM Convinced he Made Right Decision on Iraq War”, and Plamondon, Shawinigan Fox, 169.

153. Heinbecker, “Canada Got it Right on Iraq.”

154. This article does not seek to replicate the substantial literature examining the reasons for the Iraq intelligence failure in the US, UK and elsewhere. See Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails for a useful analysis of this question from a US perspective and references to many of the most relevant sources.

155. Interview, Greg Fyffe, 3 March 2016.

156. See note 23 above.

157. For a good overview of how Washington and London responded to the WMD enquiries see the relevant chapters in the two-volume work by Davies, Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States.

158. In mid-2003 Greg Fyffe met with his allied counterparts at the annual Heads of Assessment meeting; within months of that meeting, his US and Australian colleagues had been replaced. Tellingly, the UK representative was promoted by a government which wanted to deflect responsibility for the poor intelligence on Iraq.

Additional information

Funding

No outside funding was provided to support the preparation of this article.

Notes on contributors

Alan Barnes

Alan Barnes is a Senior Fellow of the Centre for Security, Intelligence and Defence Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada and is Co-Leader of the Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project. From 1995 to 2011 he was Director of the Middle East and Africa Division, Intelligence Assessment Secretariat, Privy Council Office. He has also served in the Canadian Forces Intelligence Branch and the Political Intelligence Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.