The UK National Security Council and misuse of intelligence by policy makers: reducing the risk?

ABSTRACT

The National Security Council was created to bring together decision makers and experts to discuss and implement the UK’s National Security Strategy. Its creation may have decreased the likelihood of some types of intelligence failures by policy makers, for example misunderstanding the nature and limitations of intelligence, but there is conflicting evidence regarding whether it has mitigated the risk of others, like groupthink bias. Moreover, the NSC is neither a statutory institution nor is its use by members of the executive obligatory or prescribed. Therefore, its effectiveness continues to be subject to the whim of the prime minister of the day.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. UK Government, “National Security Council.”

2. UK Government, “Supporting the National Security Council (NSC).”

3. Ibid., 1.

4. Aldrich and Cormac, The Black Door, 459.

5. UK Government, “Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 160 (para 67).

6. Ibid., 146-147 (para 606).

7. Committee of Privy Counsellors, “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry,” 268 (para 8).

8. Ibid., 267 (para 3).

9. UK Government, “Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 11.

10. UK Government, “Supporting the National Security Council (NSC),” 1.

11. House of Commons Defence Committee, “Decision-Making in Defence Policy,” 47.

12. Seldon and Snowdon, Cameron at 10, location 8015.

13. House of Commons, “Hansard Records of Debates (Column 339).”

14. Ibid.

15. Thornton, “Chilcot.”

16. “Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 152.

17. UK Government, “Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 9–10.

18. Goodman, “The British Way in Intelligence,” 127–28.

19. Jones and Blick, “The PM and the Centre of UK Government from Tony Blair to David Cameron. How Much Will Change in the Transition from Single-Party to Coalition Government.”

20. Prince, “Tony Blair Sidelined Cabinet over Iraq Because He Couldn’t Trust Ministers Not to Leak.”

21. Cracknell, “Blair Orders Cabinet.”

22. Committee of Privy Counsellors, “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry,” 56.

23. Aldrich and Cormac, The Black Door, 456.

24. Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, “National Security Strategy Evidence from the Prime Minister (30 January 2014),” 10.

25. Aldrich and Cormac, The Black Door, 460.

26. Seldon and Snowdon, Cameron at 10, location 2156.

27. Devanny and Harris, “National Security Planning Should Be an Important Part of Any Party’s Preparations for Government,” 25. NSC(L) referred to the NSC subcommittee on Libya.

28. Seldon and Snowdon, Cameron at 10, location 1469.

29. Ibid., location 6153.

30. UK Government, “National Security Capability Review,” 3. The Fusion Doctrine is the National Security Adviser’s initiative to fuse capabilities across government to fulfil national security requirements.

31. Ibid.

32. For example, Coletta, “Politicising Intelligence.”

33. Betts, “Analysis, War and Decision,” 66.

34. Goulter, “The British Experience,” 157.

35. UK Government, “Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 14 (para 49).

36. Kreuzer, “Professionalizing Intelligence Analysis,” 592.

37. Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, “National Security Strategy Evidence from the Prime Minister (30 January 2014),” 22.

38. UK Government, “Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 2.

39. Ibid., 6.

40. Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, “Annual Report 2005-2006,” 22.

41. Handel, “Leaders Intell.,” 15.

42. “Cabinet Reshuffle.”

43. UK Government, “Supporting the National Security Council (NSC),” 2.

44. Committee of Privy Counsellors, “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry,” 46.

45. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, “The Decision to Go to War in Iraq, Ninth Report of Session 2002-2003, Volume I,” 3 (para 8).

46. Ibid., 5 (para 22).

47. Intelligence and Security Committee, “Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and Assessments,” 21 (para 64).

48. UK Government, “Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 6.

49. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, “Libya,” 3.

50. Ibid., 15.

51. House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, “Oral Evidence,” Q45.

52. Committee of Privy Counsellors, “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry,” 56 (para 400).

53. House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, “Lessons Still to Be Learned from the Chilcot Inquiry,” 15.

54. Strachan, “British National Strategy,” 49.

55. Devanny, “Coronavirus and the NSC.”

56. House of Commons Defence Committee, “Decision-Making in Defence Policy,” 42.

57. Swarbrick, “Our National Security Council Is a Joke.”

58. UK Parliament, “Assessing the UK’s Foreign Policy Approach to Afghanistan,” para. 155.

59. Ibid., para. 154.

60. House of Commons Defence Committee, “Decision-Making in Defence Policy,” 38.

61. UK Parliament, “Assessing the UK’s Foreign Policy Approach to Afghanistan,” para. 157.

62. Aldrich and Cormac, The Black Door, 410, 412.

63. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, “Libya,” 20.

64. Devanny and Harris, “The National Security Council,” 34.

65. Aldrich and Cormac, The Black Door, 467.

66. Ibid.

67. UK Government, “Libya Crisis,” 3.

68. Ibid., 7.

69. See note 24 above.

70. UK Government, “Libya Crisis,” 8.

71. Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, “First Review of the National Security Strategy 2010,” 15.

72. UK Government, “Libya Crisis,” 15.

73. Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, “National Security Strategy Evidence from the Prime Minister (30 January 2014),” 7.

74. Aldrich and Cormac, The Black Door, 467.

75. Hart, “Irving L. Janis’ Victims of Groupthink,” 247.

76. Norton-Taylor, “Intelligence Heads under Fire.”

77. House of Commons Hansard, “Report of the Iraq Inquiry.”

78. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, “Libya,” 21.

79. Barry, “Britain’s Difficult War in Iraq,” 169.

80. Committee of Privy Counsellors, “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry,” 11.

81. UK Government, “Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 9.

82. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, “Libya,” 22.

83. See note 77 above.

84. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, “Libya,” 2.

85. UK Government, “National Security Capability Review,” 61.

86. Betts, “Analysis, War and Decision,” 61.

87. Pillar, Intelligence and US Foreign Policy, 111.

88. Committee of Privy Counsellors, “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry,” 12 (para 67).

89. Handel, “Leaders Intell,” 5.

90. Aldrich and Cormac, The Black Door, 462.

91. Seldon and Snowdon, Cameron at 10, location 2014.

92. See note 60 above.

93. Thomson and Blagden, “A Very British National Security State.”

94. Western, “The War over Iraq,” 106.

95. Ibid., 110.

96. Ibid., 138.

97. Ibid., 124.

98. Smith, “US Bureaucratic Politics and the Decision to Invade Iraq,” 102.

99. Gioe, Goodman, and Frey, “Unforgiven.”

100. Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, “Oral Evidence,” 6.

101. UK Government, “National Security Capability Review.”

102. Asthana et al., “Russian Spy Poisoning.”

103. Ibid.

104. Swinford and Hymas, “Theresa May Defies Security Warning of Ministers and US to Allow Huawei to Help Build Britain’s 5G Network.”

105. Woodcock, “Theresa May Will Leave Decision on Whether Huawei Should Be Involved in 5G Development to next PM.”

106. TheyWordForYou, “UK Telecommunications - Statement.”

107. Ibid.

108. Ibid.

109. See note 101 above.

110. Quoted in Gerald Hughes and Stoddart, “Hope and Fear,” 635.

111. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, “The Decision to Go to War in Iraq, Ninth Report of Session 2002-2003, Volume I,” 4 (paras 12 & 18).

112. House of Commons Defence Committee, “Decision-Making in Defence Policy,” 36.

113. Ibid., 37.

114. Lunn, Brooke-Holland, and Mills, “The UK National Security Council (Briefing Paper Number 7456),” 4.

115. Ibid., 10.

116. Bearne et al., “National Security Decision-Making Structures and Security Sector Reform,” iv.

117. Bangham and Shah, “The National Security Council and the Prime Minister,” 2.

118. Ibid.

119. Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, “First Review of the National Security Strategy 2010,” 32.

120. UK Government, “National Security Capability Review,” 10.

121. Ibid.

122. Aldrich and Cormac, The Black Door, 410.

123. Ibid., 457.

124. Ibid., 459.

125. Ibid., 498.

126. See note 77 above.

127. See note 28 above.

128. See note 54 above.

129. Aldrich and Cormac, The Black Door, 436.

130. See note 73 above.

131. Aldrich and Cormac, The Black Door, 458.

132. Devanny, “Co-Ordinating UK Foreign and Security Policy,” 24.

133. See note 11 above.

134. Seldon and Snowdon, Cameron at 10, location 7998.

135. Devanny and Harris, “The National Security Council,” 1.

136. Thomson and Blagden, “A Very British National Security State,” 581.

137. Parker and Warrell, “Boris Johnson Calls off Meeting on Defence Review after Policy Split.”

138. Sabbagh, “UK National Security Council Has Not Met since January.”

139. Ibid.

140. See note 55 above.

141. Ibid.

142. UK Government, “National Security Capability Review,” 61.

143. Marrin and Davies, “National Assessment by the National Security Council Staff 1968–80,” 646; and Cradock, Know Your Enemy, 296.

144. Aldrich and Cormac, The Black Door, 498.

145. See note 60 above.

146. Aldrich and Cormac, The Black Door, 498.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Celia G. Parker

Celia G. Parker is a PhD candidate at King’s College London, looking at leadership of the UK’s Intelligence Community. She completed her MA in Intelligence and Security at the University of Leicester in 2019. Before her post-graduate study, she worked as an analyst at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). Since leaving the FCO she has been teaching intelligence analysis across the world.