Russian covert operations: using history to establish motivations and bounds

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Notes

1. On this long history of continuity, see Hughes and Kislenko, “Fear Has Large Eyes.”

2. Jasper, Russian Cyber Operations, 4.

3. Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual 2.0. See, for example, Jasper, Russian Cyber Operations, 11–12.

4. Jasper, Russian Cyber Operations, 65.

5. Ibid., 35.

6. Ibid., 39.

7. Ibid., 57.

8. Ibid., 17.

9. Ibid., 101.

10. Ibid., 16, 119.

11. Ibid., 79

12. Ibid., 124.

13. FBI Most Wanted notification; Flade and Mascolo, “Bärenjagd” (“Bear Hunt”).

14. Jasper, Russian Cyber Operations, 83, 110.

15. “Defection of KGB Officer,” British intelligence summary shared with the FBI.

16. Kalugin, Spymaster, 147.

17. SAVAK (Iran, 1957–1979) – Sāzemān-e Ettelā’āt va Amniyat-e Keshvar (trans: “National Organization for Security and Intelligence”).

18. Andrew and Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way, 173–174.

19. See, for example, the now famous speech by Russian General Valery Gerasimov, “Ценность науки в предвидении: Новые вызовы требуют переосмыслить формы и способы ведения боевых действий” (“The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations”).

20. Jasper, Russian Cyber Operations, 99–105.

21. Ibid., 102; Rid discusses NotPetya in Active Measures, 419–21.

22. U.S. Department of State, Policy Planning Staff Memorandum, “The inauguration of organized political warfare,” 4 May 1948. Jasper’s reference is Russian Cyber Operations, 82; Rid also refers to this document: Active Measures, p. 64.

23. “Montenegro jails “Russian coup plot” leaders,” BBC.

24. Rid, Active Measures, 197, 277, 317.

25. Compilation of Ginzberg’s MI5 debriefings, 63–68.

26. Jasper, Russian Cyber Operations, 1.

27. Ibid., 15.

28. ‘Russian military admits significant cyber-war effort,’ BBC.

29. ‘Балуевский: победа в информационной войне важнее, чем в классической’ (‘Baluyevskiy: Victory in Information War is More Important than Classical’), RIA Novosti.

30. U.S. State Department, Soviet ‘Active Measures’: Forgery, Disinformation, Political Operations.

31. U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive), 59.

32. Rid, Active Measures, 123–41, 201–2, 206–8, 313.

33. Ibid., 210.

34. Ibid., 190–3.

35. Ibid., 208.

36. Ibid., 267.

37. Ibid., 202–4, 211–3, 424.

38. Ibid., 213.

39. Ibid., 312.

40. Jasper, Russian Cyber Operations, 78–80.

41. Ibid., 139–40.

42. Mitrokhin (ed.), KGB Lexicon, 13.

43. Rid, Active Measures, 240.

44. Ibid., 433.

45. Jasper, Russian Cyber Operations, 162–80, 188–94.

46. CIA Memo, “Interagency Working Group on Soviet Covert Action and Political Deception.”

47. More and Spinella, “Germany summons Russian ambassador over hacking attack on parliament.”

48. See Darczewska, Defenders of the Besieged Fortress.

49. Rid, Active Measures, 8.

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Kevin P. Riehle

Kevin P. Riehle is an associate professor at the National Intelligence University. He has spent over 29 years in the U.S. government as a counterintelligence analyst studying foreign intelligence services. He has a PhD in War Studies from King’s College London, an MS in Strategic Intelligence from the Joint Military Intelligence College, and a BA in Russian and Political Science from Brigham Young University. He has written on a variety of intelligence and counterintelligence topics, focusing on the history of Soviet and Eastern Bloc intelligence services. Recent publication include ‘The Defector Balance Sheet: Westbound Versus Eastbound Intelligence Defectors from 1945 to 1965ʹ, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (2020); ‘Russia’s Intelligence Illegals Program: An Enduring Asset, Intelligence and National Security (2020); and ‘Early Cold War Evolution of British and US Defector Policy and Practice’, Cold War History (2019). Riehle’s book, Soviet Defectors: Revelations of Renegade Intelligence Officers, 1924-1954, was published in 2020.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or any U.S. government agency.