Explaining the depth and breadth of international intelligence cooperation: towards a comprehensive understanding

ABSTRACT

Despite neorealism's predominance in the academic debate, it is too narrow a basis for the comprehensive understanding of present-day international intelligence cooperation. This approach is perfectly capable of explaining what is currently not happening in international intelligence cooperation and why this is the case. However, it is inadequate to understand what does happen in international intelligence cooperation. To explain international intelligence cooperation, especially in long-standing multilateral arrangements such as the EU and NATO, additional approaches are needed. This article advocates stepping beyond a state-centric approach of international intelligence cooperation, viewing it as a process and using a sociological perspective.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Sebastiaan Rietjens, Thijs Brocades Zaalberg and Claudia Hillebrand for useful discussions on the topic of international intelligence cooperation and for critically reviewing earlier concepts of this research.

Disclosure statement

There is no potential conflict of interest.

Notes

1. Parker, “Director General Andrew Parker Speech to BfV Symposium.”

2. Lander, “International Intelligence Cooperation,” 481.

3. Alexander, Knowing Your Friends, 1–17; Aldrich, “Global Intelligence Co-Operation versus Accountability,” 27; Rathmell, “Towards Postmodern Intelligence,” 92; Svendsen, “Connecting Intelligence and Theory,” 700; Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 200.

4. See for example: Tucker, The End of Intelligence; Lahneman, “Is a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs Occurring?”; Denécé, “The Revolution in Intelligence Affairs”; Treverton and Wolf, Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information; Barger, “Toward a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs”.

5. Clough, “Quid Pro Quo,” 608–9.

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7. “AIVD Annual Report 2018,” 12.

8. Marrin, “Improving Intelligence Studies as an Academic Discipline,” 266.

9. Treverton, “Theory and Practice,” 473.

10. Svendsen, The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation, 68.

11. For an overview of the debate on EU Intelligence cooperation, for example see: Gruszczak, Intelligence Security in the European Union, 9–12.

12. Lander, “International Intelligence Cooperation,” 483–84; Wippl, “Intelligence Exchange Through InterIntel”; Hulnick, “Intelligence Cooperation in the Post‐cold War Era,” 458.

13. Kent, “The Need for an Intelligence Literature”.

14. See note 8 above, 269.

15. See note 10 above, 72.

16. See note 8 above, 278.

17. Warner, “Wanted: A Definition of ‘Intelligence’“; Wheaton and Beerbower, “Towards a New Definition of Intelligence,” 319–20.

18. Derived from, among others, Warner, “Wanted: A Definition of “Intelligence”“; Wheaton and Beerbower, “Towards a New Definition of Intelligence”; Breakspear, “A New Definition of Intelligence”; Warner, “Theories of Intelligence”; Lowenthal, Intelligence, 10; Gill and Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World, 7, 29; Walsh, The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing, 5–8; Svendsen, Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence, 10–16.

19. See for example: Rudner, “Hunters and Gatherers”; Labasque, “The Merits of Informality in Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation”; Van Buuren, “Analysing International Intelligence Cooperation: Institutions or Intelligence Assemblages?”

20. Breakspear, “A New Definition of Intelligence,” 679–80.

21. For example, the way information is processed in structures such as the Intelligence Division (INTDIV) of the EU Military Staff or their relationship with their civilian counterpart the Intelligence Centre (INTCEN) is in many cases only sideways about ‘partners from different nationalities working together’.

22. In this the article concurs with Damien Van Puyvelde & Sean Curtis (2016) “‘Standing on the shoulders of giants”: diversity and scholarship in Intelligence Studies.” Intelligence and National Security, 31:7, 1040–1041.

23. Fägersten, Sharing Secrets, 38–39; Westerfield, “America and the World of Intelligence Liaison”, 523; Lefebvre, “The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation”, 536; Munton, “Intelligence Cooperation Meets International Studies Theory”, 121.

24. See for example: Bensahel, “A Coalition of Coalitions”; Rudner, “Hunters and Gatherers”; Reveron, “Old Allies, New Friends”; Wetzling, “European Counterterrorism Intelligence Liaisons”; Aldrich, “US-European Intelligence Co-Operation on Counter-Terrorism”; Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror; Bures, “Intelligence Sharing and the Fight against Terrorism in the EU”; and Walsh, “Intelligence-Sharing and United States Counter-Terrorism Policy”.

25. See for example: Müller-Wille, “For Our Eyes Only Shaping an Intelligence Community within the EU”; Walsh, “Intelligence-Sharing in the European Union”; Dorn, “European Strategic Intelligence”; Müller‐Wille, “The Effect of International Terrorism on EU Intelligence Co-Operation”; Fägersten, “Bureaucratic Resistance to International Intelligence Cooperation – The Case of Europol”; and Nomikos, “European Union Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN): Next Stop to an Agency?”

26. See for example: Aldrich, “Global Intelligence Co-Operation versus Accountability”; Hillebrand, The CIA”s Extraordinary Rendition and Secret Detention Programme; Born, International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability.; McGruddy, “Multilateral Intelligence Collaboration and International Oversight”; and Manjikian, “But My Hands Are Clean”.

27. Munton, “Intelligence Cooperation Meets International Studies Theory”.

28. Thomson, “Prolegomenon to a Political Economy of Intelligence and Security: Can Microeconomic Analysis Explain Success or Failure in Intelligence Cooperation?”

29. Maras, “Overcoming the Intelligence-Sharing Paradox”.

30. Puyvelde and Curtis, “’Standing on the Shoulders of Giants’,“ 1041.

31. Ibid., 1044.

32. Masuda et al., “Culture and Aesthetic Preference”.

33. Syed, Rebel Ideas. The Power of Diverse Thinking., 15, 20; van Knippenberg and Mell, “Past, Present, and Potential Future of Team Diversity Research,” 139; and McChrystal, Team of Teams, 118–24.

34. See note 30 above, 1045.

35. Lefebvre, “The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation,” 536.

36. Alvarez, “Axis Sigint Collaboration”.

37. Rathmell, “Brotherly Enemies”.

38. Smith, The Ultra-Magic Deals and the Most Secret Special Relationship, 1940–1946.

39. Budiansky, “The Difficult Beginnings of US‐British Codebreaking Cooperation”.

40. Herman, “Understanding the UK-US Intelligence Partnership”.

41. Dittmer, “Everyday Diplomacy”.

42. Manjikian, “But My Hands Are Clean”.

43. See for example: Boer, “Counter-Terrorism, Security and Intelligence in the EU”; Boer, Hillebrand, and Nölke, “Legitimacy under Pressure”; McGruddy, “Multilateral Intelligence Collaboration and International Oversight”; Wetzling, “The Democratic Control of Intergovernmental Intelligence Cooperation”; and Hillebrand, The CIA”s Extraordinary Rendition and Secret Detention Programme.

44. Walsh, “Intelligence Sharing,” 295.

45. Aydinli and Tuzuner, “Quantifying Intelligence Cooperation,” 677.

46. Gill and Phythian, “Developing Intelligence Theory,” 469.

47. Gill, Marrin, and Phythian, Intelligence Theory, 2, 5.

48. Phythian, “Intelligence Theory and Theories of International Relations: Shared World or Separate Worlds?” 57.

49. Sims, “Foreign Intelligence Liaison,” 196.

50. See for example: Wirtz, “Constraints on Intelligence Collaboration”; Westerfield, “America and the World of Intelligence Liaison”; and Bensahel, “A Coalition of Coalitions”.

51. See for example: Clough, “Quid Pro Quo”; Lefebvre, “The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation”; and Svendsen, “Connecting Intelligence and Theory”.

52. See for example: Wetzling, “European Counterterrorism Intelligence Liaisons”; Bock, “Bilateral Intelligence Cooperation”; and Thomson, “Prolegomenon to a Political Economy of Intelligence and Security: Can Microeconomic Analysis Explain Success or Failure in Intelligence Cooperation?”

53. See for example: Richelson, “The Calculus of Intelligence Cooperation”; Doron, “The Vagaries of Intelligence Sharing”; O”Halpin, “Small States and Big Secrets”; Walsh, The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing; Munton and Fredj, “Sharing Secrets”; and Schaefer, “Intelligence Cooperation and New Trends in Space Technology”.

54. See for example: Walsh, “Defection and Hierarchy in International Intelligence Sharing”; Walsh, The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing; and Odinga, “’We Recommend Compliance’“.

55. Rathmell, “Towards Postmodern Intelligence,” 102.

56. Aldrich, “’A Profoundly Disruptive Force,,“ 153.

57. Crawford, “Intelligence Cooperation,” 2.

58. Jacobs, “Maximator: European Signals Intelligence Cooperation, from a Dutch Perspective,” 1–4, 8.

59. See note 57 above, 3.

60. Bigo, “Shared Secrecy in a Digital Age and a Transnational World,” 380; Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War.

61. Shiraz and Aldrich, “Globalisation and Borders,” 267; Aldrich, ““A Profoundly Disruptive Force”“, 142; Svendsen, “Connecting Intelligence and Theory,” 701–2; Wetzling, “European Counterterrorism Intelligence Liaisons”.

62. Fägersten, European Intelligence Cooperation; Fägersten, Sharing Secrets; Scott and Hughes, “Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century,” 9; Van Buuren, “Analysing International Intelligence Cooperation: Institutions or Intelligence Assemblages?” 81.

63. Omand, Securing the State, 136–37.

64. Boatner, “Sharing and Using Intelligence in International Organizations: Some Guidelines”.

65. Aldrich, “Dangerous Liaisons,” 54.

66. Marrin, “Evaluating Intelligence Theories,” 479.

67. See note 11 above, 12.

68. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 11–12, 54, 85.

69. Bowles and Gintis, A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution; Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 17, 42, 173; Tomasello et al., Why We Cooperate, 41, 57–58.

70. Tuzuner, “The State-Level Determinants of the United States” International Intelligence Cooperation”; Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 209, 218.

71. See for example: Aldrich, “Global Intelligence Co-Operation versus Accountability”; Svendsen, “The Globalization of Intelligence since 9/11ʹ; Fägersten, Sharing Secrets; Daghie, “Intelligence Cooperation – Sharing Secrets in a Multipolar World”.

72. Koops, “Theorising Inter-Organisational Relations,” 192.

73. O”Neil, “Australia and the “Five Eyes” Intelligence Network”; and Gordon, “Intelligence Sharing in NATO”.

74. Odinga, “’We Recommend Compliance’“.

75. Munton and Fredj, “Sharing Secrets”; and Fägersten, For EU Eyes Only?

76. Shpiro, “The Communication of Mutual Security: Frameworks for European-Mediterranean Intelligence Sharing,” 35.

77. Gebhard, “One World, Many Actors,” 39–44.

78. Svendsen, “Connecting Intelligence and Theory,” 714.

79. Marrin, “Enhancing Political Science Contributions to American Intelligence Studies,” 104.

80. Temby, “What Are Levels of Analysis and What Do They Contribute to International Relations Theory?”; Gebhard, “One World, Many Actors”; and Koops, “Inter-Organizationalism in International Relations: A Multilevel Framework of Analysis”.

81. Tomasello et al., Why We Cooperate.

82. Clough, “Quid Pro Quo”.

83. See for example: Walsh, “Intelligence-Sharing in the European Union”; Pleschinger, “Allied Against Terror: Transatlantic Intelligence Cooperation”; Bures, “Informal Counterterrorism Arrangements in Europe”; and Bures, “Intelligence Sharing and the Fight against Terrorism in the EU”.

84. Müller-Wille, “EU Intelligence Co-Operation. A Critical Analysis”.

85. See for example: Nomikos, “European Union Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN): Next Stop to an Agency?”; Bilgi, “Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union”; and Bures, “Intelligence Sharing and the Fight against Terrorism in the EU”.

86. Müller‐Wille, “The Effect of International Terrorism on EU Intelligence Co-Operation”; and Müller-Wille, “For Our Eyes Only Shaping an Intelligence Community within the EU”.

87. Fägersten, Sharing Secrets, 60–61, 80–82.

88. Ibid., 98–99.

89. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 203–4; Van Buuren, “Analysing International Intelligence Cooperation: Institutions or Intelligence Assemblages?”; and Clough, “Quid Pro Quo”.

90. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War.

91. Svendsen, “Contemporary Intelligence Innovation in Practice”.

92. Davis Cross, “The Limits of Epistemic Communities,” 98; Davis Cross, “A European Transgovernmental Intelligence Network and the Role of IntCen,” 288; Alexander, Knowing Your Friends; Aldrich, “US–European Intelligence Co-Operation on Counter-Terrorism”; and Brown and Farrington, “Democracy and the Depth of Intelligence Sharing”.

93. Nolan, “A Sociological Approach to Intelligence Studies,” 79, 90.

94. Aldrich, “US–European Intelligence Co-Operation on Counter-Terrorism”; and Pleschinger, “Allied Against Terror: Transatlantic Intelligence Cooperation”.

95. Soeters and Goldenberg, “Information Sharing in Multinational Security and Military Operations. Why and Why Not?”

96. Lander, “International Intelligence Cooperation”.

97. Svendsen, “Developing International Intelligence Liaison Against Islamic State”.

98. “PET Annual Report 2018,” 40.

99. Aldrich, “Dangerous Liaisons,” 54; Svendsen, “The Globalization of Intelligence since 9/11ʹ; Svendsen, Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence.

100. Goldman, “A Unique Initiative in Content and Format”; Van Puyvelde, “European Intelligence Agendas and the Way Forward”; Lledo-Ferrer and Dietrich, “Building a European Intelligence Community” Intelligence College Europe, Letter of intent signed 1 March 2020, https://www.intelligence-college-europe.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/LoI-English.pdf, last accessed 22 May 2020.

101. Fägersten, For EU Eyes Only?, 3; Lander, “International Intelligence Cooperation,” 487.

102. Gill and Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World, 23; Wiener, “Constructivism and Sociological Institutionalism,” 35–36.

103. Ben Jaffel, “Britain”s European Connection in Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Cooperation,” 5–6,12-13; Ben Jaffel, Anglo-European Intelligence Cooperation: Britain in Europe, Europe in Britain.

104. Brown and Farrington, “Democracy and the Depth of Intelligence Sharing”.

105. Brown, Lupton, and Farrington, “Embedded Deception,” 15–16.

106. Goede and Wesseling, “Secrecy and Security in Transatlantic Terrorism Finance Tracking”; Bigo, “Shared Secrecy in a Digital Age and a Transnational World,” 379–80; Soeters and Goldenberg, “Information Sharing in Multinational Security and Military Operations. Why and Why Not?”

107. Bean, “Organizational Culture and US Intelligence Affairs”, 492; Gill and Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World, 31; Svendsen, “Connecting Intelligence and Theory,” 709, 729; and Svendsen, “Contemporary Intelligence Innovation in Practice,” 108.

108. Koops, “Inter-Organizationalism in International Relations: A Multilevel Framework of Analysis”, 190–94; Gill and Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World, 42–43; Phythian, “Intelligence Theory and Theories of International Relations: Shared World or Separate Worlds?”, 61.

109. See note 66 above, 486.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Pepijn Tuinier

Pepijn Tuinier is a senior policy advisor at the Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands and Ph.D. candidate at the Netherlands Defence Academy (NLDA). His Ph.D. thesis takes a sociological perspective on the depth and breadth of present-day multilateral intelligence cooperation in the European Union (expected end of 2022). The views expressed in this article are the authors’ alone and do not reflect the official position of the NLDA, or the Netherlands Ministry of Defence.