Reflexive intelligence and converging knowledge regimes

ABSTRACT

What is true, or counts as a fact, for whom, under what circumstances, and what are the consequences? This article argues for the need for a reflexive attitude, as the object and subject of knowledge cannot be separated entirely. Intelligence is discussed in terms of a knowledge regime, with various transversal links to other security-related knowledge regimes: judicial and law enforcement, political and policy, news and social media, and science. Various examples illustrate some of the inherent tensions as knowledge flows from one domain to another. However, there are also signs of convergence among these knowledge regimes.

KEYWORDS:

• reflexivism
• critical
• intelligence
• knowledge
• regime
• transversal relations

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Tang, “How do we know?”; Eriksson, Swedish Military Intelligence; Eriksson, “A Theoretical Reframing of the Intelligence-policy Relation”; Bean, “Rhetorical and Critical”; Nolan, “A Sociological Approach to Intelligence Studies”; and Ben Jaffel, Anglo-European Intelligence Cooperation.

2. Ben Jaffel et al., “Collective Discussion,” 4.

3. Ibid., 5.

4. Furlong and Marsh, “A Skin Not a Sweater”.

5. Gill and Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World, 39–40.

6. Delanty and Strydom, Philosophies of Social Science, 370.

7. Salter and Mutlu, Research Methods, 3.

8. Cavelty and Mauer, “Postmodern Intelligence,” 139.

9. Agrell and Treverton, National Intelligence and Science, 33–35.

10. For example Splidsboel Hansen, “An Argument for Reflexivity in Intelligence Work”; Warner, “Fragile and Provocative”; and Gill, “Intelligence, Threat, Risk and the Challenge of Oversight”.

11. Vrist Rønn and Høffding, “The Epistemic Status of Intelligence”; and Räsänen and Nyce, “The Raw is Cooked”.

12. Dean et al., Organized Crime Policing Illegal Business Entrepreneurialism, 124; as in Rønn and Høffding, “The Epistemic Status of Intelligence,” 707.

13. Ratcliffe, Intelligence-Led Policing, 98; as in Rønn and Høffding, “The Epistemic Status of Intelligence,” 709.

14. Räsänen and Nyce, “The Raw is Cooked,” 667.

15. Splidsboel Hansen, “An Argument for Reflexivity in Intelligence Work,” 355.

16. Girard and Girard, “Defining Knowledge Management”.

17. Moore, Sensemaking.

18. For example see Aradau and Huysmans, “Assembling Credibility”; Aradau et al., Critical Security Methods; and Aradau and Huysmans, “Critical Methods in International Relations”.

19. Eriksson, Swedish Military Intelligence.

20. Moore, Sensemaking, 49.

21. For example the June 2018 edition of the Journal of European and American Intelligence Studies, or Nolan, “Ethnographic Research in the Intelligence Community”.

22. An example of this is the phased organization of oversight on the collection, processing and analysis of cable-bound big data in the new intelligence and security law 2017.

23. Phythian, Understanding the Intelligence Cycle, 35–37.

24. Eriksson, Swedish Military Intelligence.

25. Ibid.

26. For Western intelligence these percentages roughly equate to analytical categories of likely/probable and very/highly likely. See for example US ODNI, IC 203, 3.

27. Heuer and Pherson, Structured Analytic Techniques, 350.

28. These percentages have been symbolically defined as 20 and 5 percent. De Valk, “All-source Intelligence,” 517.

29. de Graaff and Wiebes, Villa Maarheeze.

30. CTIVD, “De gegevensverstrekking door de AIVD”.

31. For example Hitz and Weiss. “Helping the CIA and FBI Connect the dots” versus Hulnick, “Intelligence Reform 2007”.

32. For example Ratcliffe, Intelligence-led Policing.

33. van der Geest, Van Daderschap naar Intentie.

34. Modderkolk, “Syriër die opdook in debatcentrum De Balie ontkent oud-IS strijder te zijn”.

35. van Es and Stoffelen, “Wat hebben Fatah en Aziz in Syrië gedaan?”

36. de Jong, “Russische spionagepraktijken in de 21e eeuw”.

37. For example Hulnick, “Intelligence and Law Enforcement”.

38. Marrin, “Intelligence Analysis and Decision-Making”.

39. Eriksson, “A Theoretical Reframing of the Intelligence-Policy Relation”.

40. Marrin, “Why Strategic Intelligence Analysis has Limited Influence,” 729, 731.

41. Davids, Rapport Commissie van onderzoek.

42. de Graaff, “Inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten als schaamlap,” 28.

43. Ibid., 24–28.

44. Woodard, “Tasting the Forbidden Fruit”.

45. Marrin, “Why Strategic Intelligence Analysis has Limited Influence,” 737.

46. Ibid.

47. See note 30 above.

48. Bellingcat, “Bellingcat Policy Plan”.

49. Belllingcat, “JIT Indictments and Reactions”.

50. For example Rietjens, “Unraveling Disinformation”.

51. Bean, No More Secrets.

52. Marrin, “Analytic Objectivity and Science,” 359.

53. de Valk, “All-Source Intelligence,” 517.

54. For example Durbin, “The Scholar-Practitioner Divide in Intelligence”; Agrell and Treverton, National Intelligence and Science; and Marrin, “Is Intelligence Analysis an Art or a Science?”

55. Phythian, “Policing Uncertainty,” 200; and Agrell, and Treverton, National Intelligence and Science.

56. Tang, “How Do We Know?”

57. Mandel, “The Occasional Maverick of Analytic Tradecraft”; Marrin, Improving Intelligence Analysis, 33; Chang et al., “Restructuring Structured Analytic Techniques”; Jones, “Critical Epistemology”; Coulthart, “An Evidence-Based Evaluation”; and Artner et al., Assessing the Value of Structured Analytic Techniques.

58. Marrin, Improving Intelligence Analysis, 31.

59. Chang, “Restructuring Structured Analytic Techniques”.

60. Ibid.

61. Marrin, Improving Intelligence Analysis.

62. Heuer and Pherson, Structured Analytic Techniques; and de Werd, US Intelligence and Al Qaeda.

63. For example Jones, “Critical Epistemology” versus Räsänen and Nyce, “The Raw is Cooked”.

64. Marrin, Improving Intelligence Analysis, 49–52.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Peter de Werd

Peter de Werd is Assistant Professor in intelligence and security at the Netherlands Defence Academy and has worked for the Netherlands Department of Defence in various positions and deployments over the last two decades. He has an academic background in both military sciences and political science. His current research interests include contributing to the reflexivist and critical theoretical debate in intelligence studies, developing and implementing narrative methodologies for intelligence analysis, and innovating intelligence education.