Intelligence under democracy and authoritarianism: a philosophical analysis

ABSTRACT

This article compares the secret state intelligence activities of democracies and authoritarian systems, arguing that authoritarian intelligence is fundamentally different than democratic intelligence. The very meaning of the term ‘information security’ differs dramatically between the two regime types. In authoritarian systems, analytical objectivity in intelligence both is not and should not be the primary goal. Authoritarian intelligence systems are best understood as ‘Palace Guards’ whose primary aim is to secure the authoritarian regime against threats emanating most importantly from their domestic population. The relationship between Intelligence Studies and Philosophy is explored throughout the paper.

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Bill Bray, Jules Gaspard, David Gioe, Jacob Hatfield, Justin Mundy, Cullen Nutt, Giangiuseppe Pili, Michael Warner, and two anonymous reviewers for their suggestions to previous versions of this manuscript.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Of course, this is a dramatic oversimplification, and the very question of how, and whether, philosophy is to be distinguished from science, is itself a perennial philosophical question debated by many luminaries in the field, such as the Logical Positivists, Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos, W.V.O. Quine, and others. For a discussion on these topics, see Godfrey-Smith, Theory and Reality, 57–74.

2. Einstein, Relativity, 1–55; and Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 101–38.

3. There are exceptions to this, such as Jules Gaspard’s “Intelligence without Essence,” and the recent special issue on “Critical Intelligence Studies” edited by Hamilton Bean, Peter de Werd, and Cristina Ivan. However, even in cases of obvious overlap, such as Immanuel Kant’s argument against all forms of espionage, the field has been too often overlooked. See Hatfield, “Kant,” 232.

4. The term “intelligence system” is suggested by Michael Warner, in his groundbreaking “Building a Theory of Intelligence Systems,” as a conceptual construct around which comparative intelligence studies should be built.

5. Rawls, Theory of Justice, 15–19.

6. Ibid., Chapter two.

7. Plato, Republic, book II.

8. Turner, “Distinctive U.S. Identity,” 51.

9. Goodman, “Learning to Walk”; and Davies, “Twilight of Britain’s”.

10. Warner, “Definition of Intelligence.”

11. For an excellent anthology on this, see Davies and Gustafson, eds, Intelligence Elsewhere; Peter Mattis has done excellent comparative work on Western misunderstandings of Chinese intelligence, in “Assessing Western Perspectives,” “The Analytic Challenge,” and “Chinese Espionage”; John Ehrman discusses some of these issues in the context of counterintelligence in “What Are We Talking About”; Adda Bozeman’s now dated but still magisterial “Political Intelligence in Non-Western Societies” is a foundational text for all contemporary comparative research in Intelligence Studies; and Mark Phythian’s indispensable “Cultures of National Intelligence” considers some of the same topics as those taken up in the present essay.

12. Andrew, “Under-theorisation,” Sword and Shield, and “Mitrokhin Archive.”

13. McNeil, “The Evolution,” 14–17.

14. Ibid., 176–7.

15. Warner, “Building a Theory of Intelligence Systems,” 31.

16. Gustafson, “Echo of Empires,” 580.

17. Andrew, “Under-theorisation,” 176–7.

18. Ibid., 177.

19. Mattis and Brazil, “Chinese Communist Espionage,” and Introduction.

20. Groll, “A Brief History.”

21. Lefébvre and Porteous, “Inconsequential Adventure,” 458.

22. Schwirtz, “Top Secret Russian Unit.”

23. Soldatov and Borogan, “Special services”; and Service of Operational Information, “5th Service”.

24. Gustafson, “Echo of Empires,” 591.

25. Andrew, “Mitrokhin Archive,” 56.

26. Dearlove, “Interview”.

27. Kosseff, “Twenty-Six Words.”

28. US Gov., “Surveillance Court.”

29. NIST, “Information Security.”

30. Mattis, “Analytic Challenge,” 50.

31. GCHQ, “Cybersecurity.”

32. China MPS, “Ministry of Public Security” (emphasis mine).

33. Stanford, “China”s Great Firewall.”

34. Xinhua News Agency, “The General Office of the Central Committee.”

35. Banks, “Cyber Espionage,” 519.

36. China MPS, “Ministry of Public Security.”

37. Buckley, “China takes aims.”

38. Daly, “Control over Internet.”

39. Sanger, “Biden Assails.”

40. Sukhankin, “Russia’s Offensive and Defensive,” 302.

41. Ibid., 304.

42. Human Rights Watch, “Growing Internet Isolation.”

43. Sukhankin, “Russia’s Offensive and Defensive,” 320–1. Such overblown claims ignore the human factor in cybersecurity, which most researchers acknowledge to be the most vulnerable part of any information system. For a discussion on these points see Emmersen et al. The USNA’s Interdisciplinary Approach,” 53–54.

44. Russian Defense Policy, “NTsUO.”

45. Ibid., 305.

46. Lowenthal, Secrets to Policy, 67–81.

47. Andrew, “Under-theorisation,” 175.

48. FBI, “Game of Pawns.”

49. Lowenthal, Secrets to Policy, 468.

50. Ibid., 401.

51. Gioe, “Interview.”

52. For a discussion of the most important case of such recruitment, that of Oleg Penkovsky, see Hatfield, “Defense of Treason,” 196.

53. Belton, Putin’s People.

54. Taylor and Snow, “Cold War Spies,” see Figure 20.1, 270.

55. Ibid., 270.

56. See note 19 above.

57. Andrew, “Under-Theorisation,” 180.

58. Ibid., 179–80.

59. Ibid., 180–81.

60. Lowenthal, Secrets to Policy, 408.

61. Andrew, “Under-Theorisation,” 177.

62. I am speaking here in very general terms, and within this overall point of view there are many disagreements about the way it is to be characterized. The classic formulation is found in the work of the so-called “Vienna Circle” of Logical Positivists such as A. J. Ayer’s Language, Truth, and Logic, 1952; but see also Logical Positivism, 1959.

63. Jackson, Conduct of Inquiry, 58–82.

64. Neo-classical economics is the social science that most adamantly ascribes to this self-conception. See Hunt, Economic Thought, 465–466.

65. King et al., “Designing Social Inquiry.”

66. Within academic philosophy, by contrast, positivism has been extensively criticized and is no longer held, at least in its most simplistic forms, by many contemporary philosophers.

67. Again, these terms have important distinctions, one from another, and the proponents of these “schools” tend to criticize one another quite robustly. I will be drawing here on what they have in common, which is a set of critiques of Positivism.

68. Bohman, “Critical Theory.”

69. Cox, “Social Forces,” 128.

70. Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” Eleventh thesis.

71. See note 68 above.

72. Foucault, Discipline and Punish.

73. Foucault, Madness and Civilization.

74. Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic.

75. Foucault, History of Sexuality.

76. Rouse, “Power/Knowledge,” 92–114.

77. Foucault, Madness and Civilization, 26–32.

78. Foucault shows that the mad were not only confined to asylums but also made to undergo horrible “treatments,” such as perpetual cold and ice baths; Ibid., 128.

79. See note 72 above.

80. Blackburn, “Structuralism,” 353.

81. Derrida, Positions, 41.

82. For an application of social constructivist ideas borrowed from the sociology of science and science and technology studies to intelligence-related topics, see Tang, “How do we know.” In this paper, Tang criticizes the prevailing ontological realist concept of knowledge assumed in traditional intelligence analysis.

83. See note 68 above.

84. Andrew, “Mitrokhin Archive,” 56.

85. Andrew, “Under-Theorisation,” 177.

86. David, “Third World Alignment.”

87. Andrew, “Mitrokhin Archive,” 170–1.

88. Gustafson, “Echo of Empires,” 580–6.

89. Lefébvre and Porteous, “Inconsequential Adventure,” 454; Parfitt, “Putin Consoles.”

90. Lefébvre and Porteous, “Inconsequential Adventure,” 454 and 460.

91. Andrew, “Mitrokhin Archive,” 55.

92. This terminology is meant as a metaphor, since, for example, Russia did have an “Imperial Guard” that provided military protection to the Tsar prior to the Revolution.

93. Gustafson, in his insightful “Echo of Empires,” notes that the very distinction between overt and covert is blurred in Russia’s intelligence apparatus, which, he argues, is an echo of its Byzantine security cultural roots, 592.

94. Bergo, “Levinas.”

95. Carter, Price of Peace, 104–106.

96. The book’s impact was not faultless, however, as it was also a key point of reference for American critics of the war who sought to discredit the Treaty, reject further European entanglements, and push the United States toward a policy of post-war isolationism, which, in its own right, was a driving factor in the subsequent expansion of European despotism.

97. Lowenthal, in his Secrets to Policy, 408–410, includes a well-balanced discussion on the role of truth and objectivity in the work of intelligence analysts in their interaction with policymakers.

98. Ibid., 267–268.

99. Ibid., 67–81.

100. This is a slight modification of terms familiar in contemporary epistemology, namely “epistemic internalism” and “epistemic externalism,” Bernecker and Dretske, Knowledge, 66–71.

101. Quine, Methods, 190.

102. Ibid., 40–45.

103. This point has certain similarities to prominent analytic philosopher Donald Davidson’s use of an “omniscient interpreter” in his “Thought and Talk,” 155–70.

104. Lowenthal, Secrets to Policy, 408–410, and “Intelligence is NOT.”

105. Ibid., 410.

106. Religious counseling offers something of an analogy; for even if the counselor had lost her faith, there is value to her devout patients and the success of the counseling process in her continuing to frame her advice in religious terms.

107. Andrew, “Under-Theorisation,” 179–80.

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Notes on contributors

Joseph M. Hatfield

Joseph M. Hatfield (PhD Cambridge University) is an active-duty intelligence officer with more than a decade of overseas operational experience. He currently teaches a variety of courses in cybersecurity and intelligence at the US Naval Academy.