Predator’s Progress: the bureaucratic challenges to the Clinton administration’s development and deployment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (1993-2001)

ABSTRACT

The utilization of drone technology by successive American administrations continues to provoke global protest. However, the operational and political basis for their use can be found in the 1990s, when they first became viewed as a pragmatic, cost-effective surveillance platform during the Clinton administration. The evolution of the U.S. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) program reveals far greater continuity between successive administrations than has been previously acknowledged. This paper examines the bureaucratic challenges that the Clinton administration faced as it sought to implement the nascent UAV technology in its own war on terror, with little public scrutiny or outrage.

Acknowledgements

Many thanks to Luca Trenta for his words of assistance and provision of material in the production of this paper. Thanks also to the three reviewers whose supportive feedback greatly assisted the final version of this paper.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. White House, Remarks by President Biden on Afghanistan, August 16, 2021.

2. See Shaw, Predator Empire; Bartsch, Coyne and Gray, Drones in Society; Fuller, ‘The Eagle Comes Home to Roost’; Sweetman, ‘Drones: Invented and Forgotten’.

3. Weldes, “Bureaucratic Politics”, 218.

4. Drezner, ‘Ideas, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Crafting of Foreign Policy’, 735. See also Zegart, Flawed by Design, 1999.

5. Neustadt, Presidential Power, 33.

6. See Schilling, Hammond, and Snyder, Strategy, Politics, And Defense Budgets, 1962; Neustadt, Alliance Politics, 1970; Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 1967.

7. See Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy, 1972; Steinbrunner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision, 1974; Gallucci, Neither Peace Nor Honor, 1975; Spanier, J., and E. Uslaner, How American Foreign Policy is Made, 1974.

8. See Allison, The Essence of Decision, 1971; Allison and Halperin, ‘Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications’, 1972; Halpern, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 1974.

9. Allison, Essence of Decision, 167.

10. Hoyt, “Bureaucratic Politics and the Foreign Policy Process”, 2.

11. Miles, Jr., “The Origin and Meaning of Miles’ Law”, 399.

12. Allison and Halperin, ‘Bureaucratic Politics’, 44.

13. Art, “Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy”, 486.

14. Freedman, “Logic, Politics and Foreign Policy Processes”, 438.

15. Hoyt, “Bureaucratic Politics and the Foreign Policy Process”, 6.

16. van Dijk, “Discourse & Society”, 14.

17. Ikenberry, “American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror”, 26.

18. Boys, ‘A Lost Opportunity’; McAllister, ‘When to Go, When to Stay’, 40.

19. Clines, ‘Conflict in the Balkans’.

20. The events surrounding the deaths in Somalia were documented in Bowden, Black Hawk Down, and adopted into a film of the same name directed by Ridley Scott. The rescue of Scott O’Grady was the basis for the 2001 film, Behind Enemy Lines.

21. Author’s interview with Charles A. Kupchan, (Director for European Affairs, National Security Council, 1993–1994), January 24, 2104.

22. Art, ‘Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy’, 468.

23. EG, Draft memo to NS (Nancy Soderberg) et al, re: Investment Priorities or Restructured Military, August 11, 1992, Box 11, File 9, Anthony Lake Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

24. Sale, Clinton’s Wars, 103.

25. Whipple, Spy Masters,159.

26. See Sweetman, ‘Drones: Invented and Forgotten’, 34; Finn, ‘Rise of the Drone’.

27. Coll, Ghost Wars, 521–2.

28. Coll, Ghost Wars, 522.

29. Whittle, ‘The Man Who Invented the Predator’.

30. Coll, Ghost Wars, 527.

31. Whipple, Spy Masters, 159.

32. John M. Deutch, Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development & Acquisition, ‘Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Program’, July 12, 1993. Available at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB484/docs/Predator-Whittle%20Document%201%20-%20Deutch%20Endurance%20UAV%20Memo%2012%20July%201993.pdf.

33. Attachment to John M. Deutch, Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development & Acquisition, ‘Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Program’, July 12, 1993. Available at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB484/docs/Predator-Whittle%20Document%201percent20%20Deutch%20Endurance%20UAV%20Memo%2012percent20July%201993.pdf.

34. See Thirtle, Johnson, and J Birkler, The Predator ACTD.

35. William J. Perry, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, Undersecretaries of Defense, Subject: Assignment of Service Lead for Operation of the Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), April 9, 1996. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB484/docs/Predator-Whittle%20Document%202%20-%20Air%20Force%20assigned%20as%20Predator%20lead%20service%209%20April%201996.pdf.

36. Colonel James G. Clark, Memorandum for AF/CVA, From AF/CVSM, Subject: Predator, March 1997. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB484/docs/Predator-Whittle%20Document%203%20-%20Snake%20Clark%20Taszar%20trip%20report%20%2028%20April%201997.pdf.

37. Allison and Halperin, ‘Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications’, 53.

38. Colonel James G. Clark, Memorandum for AF/CVA, From AF/CVSM, Subject: Predator, March 1997. Available at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB484/docs/PredatorWhittle%20Document%203percent20%20Snake%20Clark%20Taszar%20trip%20report%20percent2028percent20April%201997.pdf.

39. Colonel James G. Clark, Memorandum for AF/CVA, From AF/CVSM, Subject: Predator, March 1997. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB484/docs/Predator-Whittle%20Document%203%20-%20Snake%20Clark%20Taszar%20trip%20report%20%2028%20April%201997.pdf.

40. Tara Sonenshine and Tom Ross to Mark Gearan; re: Six-Month Public Affairs Strategy, June 10, 1994, Clinton Presidential Records, National Security Council, Robert Boorstin (Speechwriting), OA/Box Number: 420, NSC – Public Affairs Strategy, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, Little Rock, AR.

41. Allison and Halperin, ‘Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications’, 43.

42. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, 344.

43. Wilson, Bureaucracy, 164.

44. Drezner, ‘Ideas, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Crafting of Foreign Policy’, 736.

45. Delors, quoted in Holbrooke, To End a War, 21; Poos, quoted in Dickie, Special No More, 248.

46. Author’s interview with Sir Malcolm Rifkind, October 8, 2013.

47. Operation Deny Flight ran from 12 April 1993 to December 20, 1995, following UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 816 granted it authority to intercept and, if necessary, shoot down aircraft violating the prohibition. The force was made up form aircraft provided by the United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey. The patrol aircraft were based in Italy, or on US, British, and French aircraft carriers in the Adriatic.

48. Sale, Clinton’s Secret Wars, 124.

49. Sargent, ‘Aircraft Used in Deliberate Force’, 256.

50. See Woods, ‘The Story of America’s Very First Drone Strike’.

51. Sargent, ‘Aircraft Used in Deliberate Force’, 256–257.

52. See Woods, ‘The Story of America’s Very First Drone Strike’.

53. Sweetman, ‘Drones: Invented and Forgotten’, 34.

54. Referred to in the United States as Operation Noble Anvil.

55. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo, v.

56. ‘Air Force Reluctant to Deploy All-Weather Predator UAVs to Balkans’, 1.

57. Becker, ‘Crisis in the Balkans’, A15.

58. General John P. Jumper, quoted in ‘Jumper on Air Power’, 42.

59. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo, 95–96.

60. Fulghum, ‘Kosovo Conflict Spurred New Airborne Technology Use’, 30.

61. Becker, ‘Crisis in the Balkans’, A15. For a miliary assessment of the UAV deployment in Kosovo, see Dixon, UAV Employment in Kosovo.

62. Kindervater, ‘The Emergence of Lethal Surveillance’, 231.

63. Dobbs, ‘An Obscure Chief in U.S. War on Terror’, A1. See also Gellman, ‘Struggles Inside the Government Defined Campaign’; Robert Suro and Dana Priest, ‘Plan to Overhaul Anti-Terrorism Strategy Would Boost NSC’s Role’; Weiner, ‘The Man Who Protects America from Terrorism’.

64. Clarke, Against All Enemies, 220.

65. Coll, Ghost Wars, 526; Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, 322–23.

66. National Security Council and NSC Emails, ‘Declassified Document Concerning Tarnak Farm’, Clinton Digital Library, available at https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/101152. Declassified memorandum from Richard A. Clarke to Simon N. Steven, September 8, 1998, detailing contents of memorandum from Richard Clarke to Samuel Berger, Update on Project, September 7, 1998. Clinton Presidential Records, NSC Emails Exchange-Record (Sept 1997- January 2001) ([Tarnak]), O/A Box Number 620,000. Folder Title: [10/15/1997-09/30/2000].

67. See Coll, Ghost Wars, 529–531, 542–544; Boys, Clinton’s War on Terror, 210–211.

68. Coll, Ghost Wars, 529.

69. Author’s interview with J.F.O. McAllister, July 26, 2017.

70. Coll, Ghost Wars, 529; Clinton made his comments in an interview with Jonathan Alter. ‘I don’t care … people will die’ is from Clinton’s speech to the British Labour Party conference, October 3, 2002.

71. Gellman, ‘A Strategy’s Cautious Evolution’.

72. Martha Crenshaw, ‘Counterterrorism Policy and the Political Process’, 329.

73. The only other sitting vice president to do so was George H. W. Bush in 1988.

74. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, 322.

75. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, 322.

76. Clarke, Against All Enemies, 221.

77. Coll, Ghost Wars, 523.

78. Coll, Ghost Wars, 524. See also Robinson, ‘Submarine to Test Linkup with Predator UAV Later This Year’, 345; Holzer, ‘U.S. Subs Gear for Broader Mission’, 3.

79. Soderberg, Superpower Myth, 160–61.

80. Whittle, ‘Hellfire Meets Predator’.

81. Soderberg, Superpower Myth, 160–61.

82. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVIII, Part 2, Document 31.

83. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, S. Rept. 94–465 at 258; 282, 7 (1975).

84. See Trenta, ‘Remote Killing?’ 468–488.

85. Whipple, Spy Masters,160.

86. See Banka and Quinn, ‘Killing Norms Softly’, 665–703; Trenta, “An Act of Insanity and National Humiliation”, 121–140.

87. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, 243; Nestler, Hearts, Minds and Hydras, 53.

88. For more insight into the Clinton administration’s response to terrorism, see Boys, Clinton’s War on Terror.

89. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-39, ‘US Policy on Counterterrorism’, June 21, 1995, 9. Available at https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12755.

90. Boys, Clinton’s War on Terror, 180.

91. Memorandum for the President from Anthony Lake, ‘Presidential Decision Directive on US Counterterrorism Policy’, June 12, 1995.

92. Cogan, ‘Hunters Not Gatherers’, 315.

93. Coll, ‘Legal Disputes Over Hunt Paralyzed Clinton’s Aides’, A17.

94. Waterman, ‘Assassination Ban “No Shield” for al-Qaida’.

95. ‘Ex-Counterterrorism Czar Richard Clarke: Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld Committed War Crimes’.

96. Chollet and Goldgeiger, American Between the Wars, 267.

97. Tenet, Center of the Storm, 125.

98. Tenet, Center of the Storm, 110.

99. 9/11 Commission, “Staff Statement No. 7”, Hearing before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 24 March 2004, 3.

100. 9/11 Commission, “Staff Statement No. 7”, Hearing before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 24 March 2004, 3.

101. For more, see Coll, Ghost War, 543.

102. Colonel James Clark, AF/CVAZ to Lt. Colonel Kenneth Johns, AF/CVAZ. Available at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB484/docs/PredatorWhittle%20Document%208percent20-%20INF%20Treaty%20%20Snake%20Clark%20email%208percent20September%202000percent20to%20LTG%20Begert%20warning%20of%20DOS%20v%20DOD%20on%20INF.pdf

103. Whittle, ‘Hellfire Meets Predator’.

104. Gellman, ‘A Strategy’s Cautious Evolution’, A1. On February 4, 2002, the first attempt to launch a Hellfire missile from a Predator resulted in the death of an innocent civilian, mistaken for Osama bin Laden. The first confirmed death of a targeted individual by a U.S. UAV came on November 4, 2002, when Al-Harethi, who had engineered the attack on the USS Cole bombing, was killed in Yemen.

105. Zenko, ‘Obama’s Final Drone Strike Data’.

106. White House, Remarks by the President’ at the National Defense University, May 23, 2013.

107. Savage, ‘U.S. Releases Rules for Airstrike Killing of Terror Suspects’.

108. Detsch, ‘Drones Have Come of Age in Russia-Ukraine War’; Axe, ‘Ukraine Isn’t Just Getting American-Made Killer Drones’.

109. See Nakashima and Ryan, ‘Biden Orders Temporary Limits on Drone Strikes Outside War Zones’; Hadley, ‘Pentagon Reveals Secretive New Drone the Air Force is Giving to Ukraine’.

110. Hoffman, ‘American Jihad’, 21.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

James D. Boys

Dr. James D. Boys is a Visiting Scholar at the Fletcher School’s Center for Strategic Studies. His current research examines the application of the Madman Theory in U.S. Grand Strategy. He has authored three books: Clinton’s Grand Strategy (Bloomsbury, 2015) Hillary Rising (Biteback, 2016), and Clinton’s War on Terror (Lynne Rienner, 2018). His research papers have been published in The Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Politics, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Intelligence and National Security, The Journal of Policy Studies, and Congress and the Presidency. In 2022 he helped convene and host the Two Days in June conference at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. Since 2007 his insight into U.S. politics and foreign affairs has made him a regular guest on CNN, the BBC, Sky News and CNBC. You can view James’ publications and media work at www.jamesdboys.com and follow him on Twitter @jamesdboys.