The perils of presidential openness: strikes, secrecy and performative opacity

ABSTRACT

In a world of increasing openness, secrecy retains its value. Covert operations, including strikes against individuals, can provide intelligence agencies with the ability to operate strategically, while limiting domestic entanglements and international provocation. But presidents increasingly push the boundaries, retrospectively using their decisions performatively for political advantage. This can confront agencies with a dilemma wherein they are pressed to demonstrate the rationale for a covert mission in ways that undermine future operational security. Evidence from the strikes on Osama bin Laden and Iran’s General Soleimani will be used to argue that retrospective briefs designed to enhance legitimacy or prestige are problematic. Instead, these active disclosures, sometimes by senior figures, can lead to a general unravelling of secrecy which has the potential to threaten future operational credibility and effectiveness.

KEYWORDS:

• CIA
• covert
• intelligence
• leaks
• presidents
• secrecy
• terrorism

Introduction

Covert activity has served heads of state as a tool of statecraft and foreign policy for centuries. Although the overall practice has not changed greatly, the expectations around its use and implementation are shifting. Increasingly, intelligence agencies have been pressured to publicly justify covert operations after they are completed, often through press briefings and hearings, but sometimes even films, thus forfeiting some of the advantages secrecy affords. One of the problems has been the indulgence of politicians and policymakers in performative covert operation, at the cost of professional secrecy. Accordingly, while the use of covert operations is often favoured by the public, media, and lawmakers, agencies have also been thrust under the microscope – criticized and questioned for their legitimacy, legality, and ethics. In the recent past, secrets have mostly been leaked by whistleblowers, but now we are seeing more post-op briefs ordered by those determined to wring political leverage from operational success. This has resulted in a shift towards what some have called overt-covert operations. While this is often welcomed in terms of greater accountability, some observers fear this is more about shaping the narrative.

Presidents Obama and Trump have behaved in remarkably similar ways in terms of signature strikes. Indeed, some have suggested that Trump was keen to emulate the obvious public success of his predecessor in exercising some overt-covert muscle. While approving the release of much top-secret information himself, even to Hollywood directors, Obama was also known as an energetic hunter of low-level leakers, prosecuting more individuals for such transgressions than all previous presidents put together. Trump seemed determined to equal his record and was no less zealous in pursuing officials who leaked from the bottom. In short, two presidents who clearly disliked each other and were both keen to stress their mutual differences in fact approached secrecy and covert operations in quite similar ways. While these issues have attracted partisan political comment there has been little academic analysis.¹

Here we argue that while the benefits of such openness are not ephemeral, typically contributing to improved public understanding, there are significant operational costs to this new style of overt-covert operation. Unless changes are made to the way covert operations are approached and conceived, offering after-the-matter reporting will do little to help any claims to legitimacy. Instead, it seems more likely that such briefs sometimes adversely impact the public’s perception of the operation in question, making them appear partisan, and reveal too much operational detail, damaging the agency charged with its execution, and the government in general. Moreover, these interventions sometimes reflect a degree of departmental infighting that seek to align journalists with particular micro-policy positions. Overall, there is perhaps a growing tension between transient political figures whose interests are short term and the longevity of covert methods that may need to be re-used by professionals next time. This in turn may reflect the rather politicised nature of the US bureaucracy, compared to other western democracies.

This article is focused on policy and operations rather than public receptions and will seek to explore the issue by investigating the practical implications of post-op reporting on covert operations. Historically, the media has always pressured intelligence agencies for post-operation briefs on the most spectacular covert operation failures/successes, stretching all the way back to the Bay of Pigs in 1961.² Since the strike on Osama bin Laden in May 2011, we have seen a growing taste for the active showcasing of covert operations on the part of the White House. Certainly, it was the executive office of the United States which pressured its own agencies into providing proactive briefs on operations such as the Qasem Soleimani strike.³ Conceptually, this question is situated in the burgeoning literature that is reconsidering the nature of secrecy in international relations, set against a background of rapidly changing technology and, some would claim, increased openness. The chosen case studies, the Bin Laden and Soleimani strikes, exemplify many of these issues.

The CIA’s shrinking secrecy and covert operations

Up until the early 1970s, the CIA enjoyed the luxury of significant secrecy, including the ability to conduct covert operations with little oversight from Capitol Hill.⁴ This, however, came at a price in the form of a precarious over-reliance on a Cold War cultural consensus that was fast being eroded by Vietnam, Watergate, and the oil shock.⁵ During the previous decade, a few journalists had already broken ranks and written critically about covert operation, most famously the best-selling Invisible Government, by David Wise and Thomas Ross. While CIA management evinced a pathological hatred of the book and its ‘rogue elephant’ thesis regarding covert operation, its revelations were rather limited, with the authors spending much of the book summarising what was already known about the Bay of Pigs fiasco.⁶ But their financial success encouraged emulators, including insider accounts by CIA memoir writers disillusioned by events in Southeast Asia.⁷

Vietnam accelerated the decline of government secrecy. This was underlined by the Pentagon Papers episode. Leaked by Daniel Ellsberg in 1970, the Pentagon Papers effectively consisted of a classified account of the Vietnam War and its origins, having little to do with the CIA. But the subsequent litigation which involved the Supreme Court reviewing the government’s efforts to supress publication by both the New York Times and the Washington Post was significant for the CIA simply in terms of prioritising First Amendment rights over government secrecy. Buttressing this important legal development, Watergate, with its team of ‘plumbers’, so called because they were supposed to deal with leaks, moved the spotlight somewhat closer to the CIA. Moreover, the 1976 Hollywood film of these events, All the Presidents Men, transformed investigative reporters, hitherto humble figures, into superstars.

The American press not only reaffirmed its remarkable constitutional privileges in reporting the realm of national security, but it also managed to divide and rule. Engrossed in ‘Beltway Battles’, typically over budgets, individual politicians, or policymakers often briefed journalists about secret matters to get ahead of their rivals. At times, Congress, the CIA, the FBI, and the White House, together with other intelligence agencies would work together, but more often they would individually lift the veil of secrecy to secure favourable press for a programme.⁸ Together with a spate of Congressional inquiries, this meant the CIA was on its backfoot by the late 1970s, lacked secrecy and carried out little covert operation. Hugh Tovar, previously the CIA’s head of covert operation programmes, declared his specialism to be ‘a dying art form’.⁹ To convince the public of their legitimacy, and reaffirm their commitment to accountability, openness, and transparency, the CIA began a series of public relations campaigns with the goal of convincing Americans that secrecy was, despite all they had heard, a good thing.¹⁰ To achieve this, the agency cited the most patriotic reason they could muster, saving American lives. The agency repeated the mantra, ‘our failures are known, our successes are not’, to remind the public that the pursuit and preservation of national security was worthwhile.¹¹

Covert operations were revived by Ronald Reagan. Campaigning on the electoral hustings in 1980, he promised that if he was elected, he would unleash the CIA. This reliance on covert operations became central to his foreign policy in not only South Asia and the Middle East but also in Central America. These various theatres illuminated the problem of expanded covert operation in the context of a country increasingly characterised by declining secrecy, indeed with a press that now effectively boasted full-time CIA correspondents. The so-called secret wars against the Russians in Afghanistan and against Hezbollah in Lebanon, which broadly met with press approval, were used by Bill Casey, Reagan’s CIA chief, to distract from the more dubious area of Iran-Contra. For a while the ploy worked, confusing even the best investigators. But when the Iran-Contra story finally leaked, it unleashed a controversy that almost removed President Reagan. Arguably the substantial illegality uncovered was more alarming than Watergate and confirmed many of the Washington press corps in their view that covert operation should be actively investigated and sometimes exposed in the name of a greater long-term good.¹²

CIA covert operations continued to follow cycles of boom and bust. During the 1990s, the end of the Cold War triggered significant retrenchment, albeit accompanied by the soft covert operation of democracy promotion. Not unlike the Reagan era, George W. Bush and the events of 9/11 triggered yet another bright new beginning for covert operation with a remarkable expansion of both CIA special activities and parallel units managed by DoD. But while covert operations were front and centre in the war against terror, a range of developments, including new information technologies continued to erode government secrecy. Moreover, the global nature of the war on terror transformed the CIA into a subject of fascination for the world’s media, not just the American press. The problem of an open society that increasingly defended itself by vast secret means became more intense, and this was perhaps most clearly illustrated by covert operation, together with the controversies over renditions and torture. How to conduct its operations in a climate of shrinking secrecy has been one of the most persistent headaches for CIA management over the last two decades. In parallel, and partly because the war on terror has driven the expansion of clandestine agencies, a substantial academic industry has developed around the debate over reducing or re-affirming national security secrecy, together with the general virtues of transparency.

Arguments for openness

CIA directors have often struggled to defend secrecy and arguments for increased openness have been dominant in the academic literature for decades. This partly reflects the fact that openness periodically uncovers major abuses and illegalities, including those not picked up by formal oversight mechanisms. Loch Johnson is among several luminaries that see journalists as the shock troops of accountability, with plodding committees merely following in their wake.¹³ In the 1970s, this included CIA domestic spying operations against anti-war protesters. In the 1980s, Iran Contra embraced activities specifically designed to undermine legislation on Central American such as the Boland Amendment. In more recent times, the secret prison saga in Europe caused considerable consternation and damaged relations with Western allies during the war on terror. The most recent academic arguments linking the secrecy around covert operation to undesirable outcomes are advanced by Lindsey O’Rourke.¹⁴

Alongside these many studies of intelligence oversight, the wider importance of transparency as a driver of improved governance has become increasingly sedimented in the political science literature. More broadly, the last twenty years has seen the rise of a ‘transparency industry’, often focused on regulatory reform across the global south and counter-corruption measures. Academics have produced mountains of literature suggesting that this is the answer to diverse administrative and management problems. Thereafter, NGOs and think tanks have spent much time promoting transparency without much qualification. The extent to which openness is expanding is much debated, but few academics doubt that openness is a good thing.¹⁵

Arguably, this enthusiasm for openness is not just driven by a desire for oversight or improved efficiency. It also reflects a broad and pragmatic alliance – with almost no-one really in favour of secrecy. Obviously, journalists, public intellectuals, and academics value America’s tradition of ventilating secret matters in public, because it gives them so much to talk and write about. White House officials love to boast about secret operations as it offers the illusion that they shape world events and are decisive. Mid-ranking politicians neglected by the media also enjoy talking about secret matters to affirm their own importance.¹⁶ Officials cannot resist leaking to do down their budgetary rivals in nearby departments. This, in turn, makes official security drives against ‘leakers’ look like an exercise in organised hypocrisy. Junior leakers like Manning did prolonged time in jail, while generals like Petraeus who mishandled TS/SCI material proved immune to prison and even seems to have been considered for the position of Secretary of State in 2016.¹⁷ The scale of leaking over the last twenty years from both the top and the bottom, assisted by technology, has given even the most energetic efforts to shore up secrecy a Canute-like feel. Yet there remain cogent arguments for secrecy.

Arguments for secrecy

The patient advocates of secrecy are not the most vocal, but their arguments are persuasive. Michael Warner has advanced one of the most cogent defences of secrecy in covert operation. Warner argues that covert operation cannot work well unless it ticks three important boxes.¹⁸ First, the action or mission must remain plausibly deniable. Second, it should employ or rely upon a certain level of trust to ensure that operatives, allies, and all those involved do not compromise the operation. Third, that covert operations must be relatively small scale to ensure that they are easier to control by limiting the number of those involved.¹⁹ In other words he implies that secret armies or silent warfare are oxymorons. For Warner, plausible deniability, trust, and the scale of an operation are all critical to ensuring that secrecy is maintained in covert operation.

Similarly, according to Michael F. Joseph and Michael Poznansky, the full benefits of covert operations can only be reaped if these missions remain secret. But they admit that this is becoming increasingly challenging, as the modern world is characterised by ease of communication and information dissemination. Even if, as the authors admit, ‘Cold War-style covert operations may well be a thing of the past’, they argue that leaders should nevertheless try and ensure the maintenance of some level of secrecy within covert operations.²⁰ They insist this is not just about their own domestic politics, but also the alliances they have forged with foreign nations which might be more squeamish about covert operation.

To avoid the consequences associated with exposure, and prevent implausible deniability, governments oftentimes seek to establish what is referred to as a veil of secrecy. According to Gibbs, there are three main reasons for this.²¹ The first is obvious and has oftentimes been cited since 9/11. It is the argument that secrecy increasingly protects those who shield democracies against external threats by non-state actors. Most terrorist groups are short-lived, but those that enjoy longevity tend to become quite adept at counterintelligence. Faced with the pervasive and existential threat of discovery, these extremist groups have taken it upon themselves to gather intelligence on the targeting tactics and strategies used by clandestine government agencies to circumvent those techniques and prolong their survival, even to strike back.²²

Without considerable secrecy in covert operation, extremist organizations could learn to pre-empt the standard procedures used to target them. After all, terrorist groups survive for as long as they do because they have developed sophisticated methods for staying hidden and so counter-terrorist forces are operating on the same playing field.²³ The survival, efficacy, and relevance of their operations rely, to a certain degree, on the ability to be unpredictable – surprising one’s adversary and ensuring that their tactical/operational playbook is not obvious.²⁴ Perversely perhaps, while the counterintelligence capabilities of extremist groups present a real threat for covert missions, it also provides agencies with the most politically plausible and helpful argument when demanding greater secrecy in their operations.

The second reason Gibbs identifies is bureaucratic inertia. He argues that politicians, particularly those at the executive level, seek to limit or prevent intelligence from becoming public with the intent of avoiding the bureaucratic friction costs and delays that come with internal review committees and legal/ethical reviews. There are certainly cases wherein this excuse is unmerited. Particularly when this is used as a reason to avoid oversight or accountability. However, there are also cases which do corroborate this claim, especially where time is of the essence.²⁵

The third and final reason Gibbs examines is the desire to manipulate the matrix of domestic politics.²⁶ One of the curious aspects of covert operation that academic commentators have identified is that the operations are rarely hidden from their target nations, more frequently they are hidden from the population, press, or politicians of the country that is launching them. Countries like the United States use their control over information to spin narratives and convince others of the legitimacy of covert operations, oftentimes without any appropriate evidence presented to substantiate such claims.²⁷ Although presented and examined separately, these three reasons are not mutually exclusive. The Soleimani drone strike, which will be examined later in this paper, demonstrates this quite evidently. Although the United States employed all these reasons at different stages, it ultimately chose to publicize its involvement, thus defeating the purpose of pursuing a veil of secrecy in the first place.

Recently we have seen some more nuanced treatments of secrecy. Austin Carson has produced perhaps the most influential recent text on its relationship to international stability. His core argument is that states often use covertness to limit escalation in conflict, or to keep provocative information that would inflame nationalist opinions from public view. Helpfully, he points out that despite their frustratingly interchangeable and inconsistent application in literature, secrecy and covertness are not one and the same. He explains that secrecy may be used to refer to ‘an intentional concealment of information from one or more audiences’ and ‘simply one way of making decisions and behaving in the world’. By contrast, covertness primarily refers to ‘government-managed activity conducted with the intention of concealing the sponsor’s role and avoiding acknowledgement of it’.²⁸ Thus, one is focused on the role of information and public perception of events, while the other is concerned with the role and responsibility of the actors involved, especially that of direction after the fact.

This matter is best explored through Carson’s compelling theatre analogy. He postulated that covert activity is not unlike a theatre play, wherein actors backstage are insulated (behind the curtain or veil of secrecy) from any potential humiliation or damage that a bad (or unsuccessful) performance (mission) on-stage may cause.²⁹ Hence, the curtain plays a crucial role, as the audience can only judge what they can see. If the curtain is pulled back, voluntarily, or forcefully and unexpectedly, the actors behind the scenes are no longer insulated – their secrets revealed, their involvement confirmed, their plausible deniability relinquished.³⁰

Jennifer D. Kibbe broadly supports Carson’s view of covert operation as a tool of foreign policy. However, she adds that covert operation presents a paradox. Because of its secrecy, precision, and rapidity of application, it can be more impactful than diplomacy and more economical than conventional military action, again acting as a way of reducing the scale of force or coercion used, thus making it more attractive to policymakers and potentially more ethical and stabilising. But there is a trade-off since democratic values are threatened each time covert operations are undertaken. Problems of oversight, transparency and accountability make it difficult to ascertain what laws govern each covert operation, and whether these are respected or infringed during such operations. It is also important to note that covert operations are not always Bondian extravaganzas. This study mostly discusses the most routinely called upon form of covert activity – namely, paramilitary action.³¹

But since 9/11, largely because of pressures generated by the ‘war on terror’, states have shifted in favour of a kinetic activity; effectively small-scale surprise attacks with a more Bondian feel, and which, are arguably more imperilled by openness and revelations. This has led respected theorists to argue that secret agencies therefore have a right not to be transparent. Clare Birchall, at King’s College London, contends that the populace cannot expect everything to be open and public just because there is a demand for it. There can only be a tentative expectation to a ‘right to opacity’.³² To ensure operational security, among other critical functions, governments should be afforded a level of opacity in conduct, albeit under stringent oversight and legal constraint. Understandably, the CIA should have the right to decide what intelligence could be reasonably shared without becoming detrimental to their commitment to, and pursuit of, national security. That said, no intelligence service should be allowed to use this as a ‘blanket justification for secrecy’.³³ Instead, it should be weighed against the interests of the public, international law, and Congress to ascertain whether disclosure would bring more harm than good. This is not an easy task. Traditionally, Congress has been pressured to make information public, clashing with the executive branch’s desire to keep things secret.³⁴ But Birchall joins others in observing that, in the current information technology context, ‘information control is an implausible goal’.³⁵

Perhaps, the most measured recent contribution is Necessary Secrets by Gabriel Schoenfeld. He questions the right of the press to make unilateral decisions to ‘publish and let others perish’. Beginning with the obvious starting point that no sensible person can dispute the reality that there are ‘necessary secrets’, like the names of spies, the movement of troops, the contents of codes and ciphers, the location of satellites and the nature of secret weapons. But equally he accepts that there are unnecessary secrets, often resulting from bureaucratic inertia, or the desire to use national security to cover up mistakes.³⁶

Turning to operational security Schoenfeld helpfully identifies a grey category. These are secrets which, if revealed would, in the view of the planners and policymakers endanger national security in the short term, but whose disclosure, in the view of the press, might ultimately serve the national interest. These sorts of cases prompt endless debate, but they also point to a bigger question, namely who decides how quickly secret are revealed? Schoenfeld’s main criticism is that secrecy is often called for by a government elected by the population as an aid to implementing a foreign policy underpinned by a democratic mandate, whereas openness is demanded by a press that claims to be acting in the public interest. But the press may in fact be taking unilateral decisions driven by the need to sell newspapers or solicit ‘clicks’. He calls for a more patriotic press and attacks papers like the New York Times as seeking to subvert the public’s right to decide, through legislation, that some secrets must be kept.³⁷

Schoenfeld’s account, while balanced and persuasive is nevertheless outdated. He fails to take account of the way in which the White House and the executive office have themselves episodically lifted the curtain of secrecy. Moreover, by focusing mostly on traditional US national newspapers, he ignores the problem of the internet and indeed competition from a globalised print media which have all developed a taste for stories about the CIA, ghost flights, and torture. Should we expect Der Spiegel to develop a sense of patriotic duty to protect the machinery of US foreign policy? The Internet, on the other hand, includes anonymous ‘publishers’ who are accountable to no one and yet have the power to reveal secrets with impunity, if not always with credibility. So, while Schoenfeld debates whether the press or Congress can be relied on to strike the appropriate balance, in practice Wikileaks and the White House press office have together put the issue in different hands.³⁸

Exposure and performative secrecy

Intelligence agencies are sensitive to the exposure of covert operations partly because the consequences are unpredictable.³⁹ Lisa Stampnitzky suggests that there are in fact two discernably different aspects of exposure. Developing an advanced conceptual framework for analyzing exposure as a process, she identifies two distinct aspects: the first is exposure, which refers to releases of information, whereas the second is revelation, which refers to the collective recognition that something has in fact been exposed.⁴⁰ This transition occurs when one can make sense of newly acquired information and leverage it. Accordingly, ‘revelation generally results from exposure, but not all exposures lead to revelations’.⁴¹ If one cannot make sense of the information, or its significance is not recognised, then revelation is not achieved. But if it is, some scholars have argued that there is another phase that lies beyond this – namely, escalation.

After a covert operation is revealed, escalation can be instigated either internally or externally. Jacob Otto and William Spaniel argue that after exposure ‘states that would escalate therefore choose to take secret action with impunity’.⁴² So, ‘exposure without consideration for the strategic selection into secret action will backfire’,⁴³ resulting in a higher chance of fallout, and a more aggressive position taken by the state. This serves as an additional motive for ensuring that covert operation is not exposed. Exposure also has the potential to threaten the general stability of international relations.⁴⁴ Since covert operation is a tool of foreign policy, alliances with foreign powers/allies are oftentimes solicited not only within what we might term epistemic communities but also within covert operation communities. Recent research has shown that ‘covert alliances have a cumulative effect’.⁴⁵ Thus, disclosing secret action, especially beyond the domestic realm, can be quite damaging to the ephemeral fabric of these connections.⁴⁶

Rory Cormac and Richard Aldrich have suggested that there is often very little that governments can do to hide a covert operation and that they frequently become public. When these covert operations are exposed, a government experiences what they term ‘implausible deniability’, no longer able to deny knowledge or involvement, and indeed often revelling in the grey light of semi-publicity of a purposeful and coercive act that conveys commitment and strategic purpose.⁴⁷ In strategic terms this is a problematic reversal as plausible deniability is classically thought to afford governments the ability to insulate themselves from the potential fallout such operations may garner and so this potentially suggests what we might call a revolution in covert military affairs.⁴⁸ Traditionally, covertness has offered states the opportunity to distance themselves, to a certain degree, from any infringements or violations of democratic norms, values, or legal standards. But Cormac and Aldrich suggest that durable deniability was often in short supply, and now we may well be moving into an era of performative opacity.

Importantly, scholars are now recognising that plausible deniability is a poorly conceptualized and historically weak concept, undermined by factors such as information technology, media demassification, fake news, private military actors, and the use of proxies.⁴⁹ But while many factors and facets are being reconsidered, there has been less attention directed towards the office of the president. Long ago, Gregory Treverton, a seasoned commentator on covert operation, suggested that for plausible deniability to be maintained, the US government must be able to ‘argue plausibly that … at least the President, had not been involved’.⁵⁰ Arguably, a sizeable aspect of the Iran-Contra inquiry revolved around the problem that the involvement of Ronald Reagan and his CIA Director Bill Casey was increasingly ‘implausibly deniable’.⁵¹ But what happens when presidents cease to deny the undeniable and instead want to claim the credit?

The strike on Bin Laden 2011

On 1 May 2011, American public attention was suddenly focused on the city of Abbottabad. Nestling near the mountains of northwest Pakistan, it was now the focus of one of the biggest news stories of the decade. In a classic covert operation, a strike team of US Navy SEALs had arrived by helicopter at a walled compound in the middle of the night and killed the world’s most wanted man. The intelligence effort to find and execute Osama Bin Laden had lasted for a decade and was perhaps the most closely held operational secret in modern American history. Moreover, the strike was a highly sensitive, politically fraught, and operationally risky mission that involved intruding into the territory of an awkward American ally to target someone who stood at the pinnacle of international terrorism. Some of the cutting-edge techniques and technologies, including biomedical intelligence, were specially developed for these operations and had never been tested before. Yet the Obama administration chose to release many of the details.

Exposing military secrets with the expectation of garnering certain political benefits is both dangerous and unpredictable. While political gains may be largely unknown, exposure always involves some costs. Presidential leaks are arguably more damaging as they legitimate others.⁵² According to former FBI Director, Robert Mueller, ‘leaks such as this threaten ongoing operations, puts at risk the lives of sources, [and] makes it much more difficult to recruit sources and damage our relationship with our foreign partners’. Still, the deliberate compromise of OPSEC in the pursuit of political gains is not uncommon. Remarkably, the Obama administration knowingly compromised OPSEC with classified details strewn throughout the speech announcing Osama Bin Laden’s death.⁵³

Only hours after confirmation of Bin Laden’s death, Obama delivered a televised speech detailing the operation.⁵⁴ The rapidity with which this announcement came thwarted any opportunity to capitalize on the intelligence seized at the raided compound.⁵⁵ It also alerted Bin Laden’s allies and followers to the news – with some going into hiding and others mobilizing retaliatory forces.⁵⁶ Had the Obama administration announced the death a few days later, these consequences could have been avoided. The CIA would have been given the opportunity to search through the acquired intelligence to determine whether they were of any value to ongoing missions, or whether it might be of any use to future operations.⁵⁷ A few extra days would have also been beneficial for intelligence agencies to learn more about the AQ network and identify any previously unknown accomplices. Thus, the timing of the speech compromised both OPSEC, as well as the potential for intelligence acquisition and actionability.⁵⁸

Information leaked from within the Obama White House also proved highly problematic. The cover name of the unit, as well as identifying information of the special mission operation, in addition to its location were also exposed. Indeed, so much information was released that even the name of the dog used in the operation became public knowledge.⁵⁹ The identity of the individuals involved in the raid made them potential targets for retaliatory attacks. But the speech itself was just the beginning. In the days that followed, disclosures stemming from the White House, whether intentional or not, compromised sources used in organizing the raid on Bin Laden’s compound.

Perhaps most notable remains the leaked information on the identity of a Pakistani doctor who helped track Osama and inform the US regarding his whereabouts and condition. After the Obama administration disclosed his identity, Dr Shakil Afridi was arrested and sentenced to 33 years in prison. He remains incarcerated despite concerted American efforts to free him.⁶⁰ The compromising of sources did not stop there, in a similar fashion the identity of a Yemeni agent was also revealed.⁶¹ Despite these disclosures, the Obama administration was unwilling to publicly disseminate the footage of the Bin Laden raid – with Obama noting that this was done to ensure that ‘very graphic photos of somebody who was shot in the head are not floating around as an incitement to additional violence or as a propaganda tool’ as the release of post-mortem images of the al-Qaeda leader could cause ‘exceptionally grave harm’ to Americans.⁶² In other words, the administration demonstrated that it could in fact ensure OPSEC when it felt like it.

Intelligence leaks, particularly those that threaten OPSEC, are far more acceptable when they’re deemed to be largely out of government control – especially if there are safeguards put in place to prevent against them.⁶³ However, deliberate dissemination of intelligence for entertainment purposes are arguably much harder to stomach. The Obama White House made some questionable dissemination decisions post-operation which compromised OPSEC to a greater degree than any of the aforementioned leaks had. In the months that followed Bin Laden’s death, Hollywood producer Katheryn Bigelow was invited to the White House and allegedly given a brief on the Bin Laden raid to ensure the authenticity and accuracy of her movie Zero Dark Thirty – which chronicles the raid on Bin Laden’s compound.⁶⁴

The brief, however, became the topic of serious public scrutiny when it was revealed that classified materials and high-level details (including the identity of the Navy Seal team commander of the raid) were disseminated to the filmmakers. These disclosures were unnecessary and dangerous. According to Judicial Watch, documents obtained through a freedom of information act request from the Department of Defence and the CIA, clearly ‘show that politically connected filmmakers were given extraordinary and secret access to Bin Laden raid information, including the identity of a seal team six leader’.⁶⁵ Thus, in combination, the timing, content, unofficial leaks, and inappropriate Hollywood briefings all compromised the OPSEC of the Bin Laden operation. Unfortunately, this was not the first nor last time the office of the president would compromise its own operations.

Indeed, within a year, thousands of pages of material, often eye-wateringly secret had been declassified and made available to journalists at the behest of the White House. Indeed by 2013, a film based partly on this material, Zero Dark Thirty, was vying for an Oscar. The film was seen as favourable to Obama and because it had received so much government support it was deemed potentially a case of directly supporting a future presidential candidate, thus its release had to be delayed until after the 2012 election. It’s hard to escape the notion that there was some blatantly political declassification here. Despite the embarrassment around the delay of the film release, on the campaign trail Vice President Biden milked the covert operation, often using the slogan ‘Bin Laden is dead, General Motors is alive’.⁶⁶

Critics were quick to ask questions about the seemingly partisan release of information. CIA spokesperson Marie Harf rationalized this by insisting ‘it makes sense to get behind a winning horse … Mark and Kathryn’s movie is going to be the first and the biggest’. The remarkable details provided to the filmmakers even included specifics on the compound’s floor plan. They were also given the identities of five CIA and military operatives – including the translator present at the raid – but refused to give this to any other requester. The film project also had the ‘full knowledge and full approval/support’ of CIA Director Leon Panetta, and received a 40-minute meeting with Deputy Director Mike Morell, in which he ‘talked some of the substance again, told them we’re here to help with whatever they need’.⁶⁷

All this moved in parallel with different treatment for their competitors. In August 2012, the Department of Defense wrote a letter to former Navy SEAL ‘Mark Owen’ who was publishing his firsthand account of the raid, No Easy Day. The Pentagon warned that he was ‘in material breach and violation’ of his non-disclosure agreements and that the DOD was ‘considering pursuing against you, and all those acting in concert with you, all remedies legally available to us in light of this situation’. In November 2012, seven SEALs who participated in the raid were reprimanded for disclosing classified material as paid consultants for a video game entitled, Medal of Honor: War fighter. In any case, while the Obama administration was giving presumably classified details of the UBL raid to its chosen film production team, its Department of Justice has been persecuting leakers and whistleblowers at an unprecedented rate, using the 1917 Espionage Act to indict six individuals for disclosing allegedly classified information critical of the US government to journalists.⁶⁸

Arguably this was not completely new. Some might even argue that it was pioneered by some US senatorial performative policies towards Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, which had been focused on an effort to persuade public opinion regarding covert operation. Certainly, after 9/11, the White House began pressuring intelligence agencies into providing more post-operation briefs of covert missions. The search for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq is perhaps a prelude. Killed in a conventional air strike in 2006, the US government distributed an image of Zarqawi’s corpse as part of the press pack associated with the media conference.⁶⁹ The desire to reassert the legitimacy of covert operations in the eyes of the world, but perhaps more poignantly in its domestic populace, has resulted in some rather superficial responses. Arguably these have been driven by the mistaken assumption that transparency in covert operations will allow the government to make its case and somehow achieve the desired effect of bestowing legitimacy on the intelligence agency, and by extension the government.⁷⁰

This is problematic not least because the policy has been only episodically implemented, creating a sense of show-boating and political opportunism. Obviously, it is logically inconsistent to permit governments to demand secrecy in covert operations, whilst picking and choosing which ones they expose. Moreover, an ethical tension exists between the obligation to preserve secrecy in covert techniques and the demand to justify the operational decisions undertaken within them. However, when faced with a dichotomy between operational security and favourable publicity, governments have usually opted for the easiest option.⁷¹ This is arguably because the political class have only a short-term planning horizon.

The growing practice of post-op briefing on covert operations is somewhat counterintuitive, and arguably dangerous. So then why do states choose to publicize actions in such detail by their covert services? Arguably, this phenomenon seems to be largely driven by politicians and their agendas. When elected officials publicly ask for explanation or justification on covert operation, they are typically justifying this by claiming that greater transparency would solidify their position, strengthen democracy or, at the very least, increase public confidence.⁷² In political terms ethicality in the intelligence world is somewhat malleable and is being deployed to justify publicity that might well have a political purpose.

The strike on Soleimani 2020

On 3 January 2020, Iranian major general Qasem Soleimani was the victim of an American drone strike as he arrived at Baghdad International Airport. Soleimani oversaw the Quds Force, the special forces element of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and was widely seen as the second most powerful person in Iran. He was enroute to visit the Prime Minister of Iraq, Adil Abdul-Mahdi, when he, along with nine others (including senior Iraqi figures), were killed. The Pentagon countered that Soleimani, and his troops, had been responsible for the deaths of hundreds of American and coalition personnel. This event occurred during a long-running crisis in the Arabian Gulf which include heightened US sanctions and Iranian sponsored attacks on American forces in the region.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, Trump felt he moved in the shadow of Obama’s Zero Dark Thirty triumph. It now seems as though Trump was motivated by the desire for publicity, and the unfounded belief that a claim over the elimination of Soleimani would garner him a personal achievement-one that might put him on par with his predecessor.⁷³ The election campaign was well under way at this time, and one way to affirm both his military strength and strategic prowess would be to demonstrate that he was able to eliminate another terrorist, not long after Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. In the wake of the strike there were a series of somewhat disorderly post-op briefings.

Indeed, in his efforts to match the perceived political wins of his predecessor, former US president Donald J. Trump deliberately violated the OPSEC of several covert missions. But by far the most remarkable was the strike against Iranian Gen. Qasem Soleimani – which he authorized the CIA to covertly execute via drone.⁷⁴ After the mission was successfully executed, Trump chose to publicly announce the operation. In doing so, he undermined the covert nature of the strike – admitting that the US government not only organized a covert strike on a foreign government official without sufficient evidence or trial, but did so whilst violating the sovereignty of a third-party state (which had previously and quite firmly expressed its outrage over being repeatedly treated as a lawless battlefield by American forces).⁷⁵ Moreover, the content of the speech also presented several issues.

In the weeks that followed, Trump gave numerous interviews on the topic, even vociferating about the Soleimani strike during political rallies, and through haphazard rants on Twitter.⁷⁶ Public outrage abounded – particularly fuelled by domestic debate regarding the lack of evidence presented to substantiate the White House claim that Soleimani posed an ‘imminent threat’.⁷⁷ In response, Trump demanded that intelligence officials give a post-operation brief on the strike. It should be noted that Trump already had a somewhat difficult relationship with the intelligence community (for a variety of reasons, but especially) since its conclusion that Russian meddling in the 2016 presidential election was aimed at helping him win.⁷⁸ While this political backlash was ensuing and questions began circulating regarding the legitimacy and motivation for the strike, Trump took to Twitter. He mostly used this platform to lash out against critics, but also threw a few threatening tweets Iran’s way.⁷⁹ Trump’s incendiary language also contributed to a fog of war that put Iran on high alert contributing to the accidentally shoot-down of a Ukrainian passenger jet carrying mostly Iranian-Canadian nationals.⁸⁰ Arguably, beyond merely compromising the OPSEC of the CIA and its stratagems used in the mission, it was also a contributory factor in a devastating international incident.

By announcing the strike, Trump also compromised the OPSEC of the executive office.⁸¹ His actions were carefully examined and analyzed by scholars, legal practitioners, military officials, politicians, the media, the public, and even Iran. It was as a result of this close scrutiny that a key piece of information came to light – namely, that Trump had authorized the strike on Soleimani seven months prior.⁸² This report contradicted the claim made by the Trump White House regarding Soleimani’s imminence, and it became one of very few pieces of verifiable evidence on the strike. So, the announcement of the Soleimani strike proved to be somewhat of a double-edged sword. Yet, Trump was not fazed. He continued to stand firm, and when his claim to imminence was waning, he simply claimed lawful authority derived from the office of the president. According to Jack Goldsmith, the ‘power of the President has been increasing (unconstrained) since 1973 and amplified following bush-era decisions’. This unchecked power has become dangerous, permitting legal infringements, whilst offering presidents with a blanket justification for unjustifiable actions. The Bush-era Office of Legal Council (OLC) opinions perpetuate this practice because of Article II of the US Constitution which permits self-defensive action. Still, the OLC is somewhat meaningless when it comes to regulating or justifying actions since it provides ‘no meaningful constraint on presidential power’, and therefore cannot be used as a test on the legality or legitimacy of presidential force.⁸³

The lack of constraint on presidential power has become far more evident, even in the post-Trump era, as concerns grow regarding the likelihood of US national security secrets being sold with impunity. Although the president has power to declassify any material to the public,⁸⁴ as evidenced through his declassification of sensitive and classified material to foreign governments and journalists, the more ardent question is whether Trump, even as a former president, might consider selling national security secrets to the ‘highest bidder’.⁸⁵ This concern is not necessarily unfounded as Trump has had a history of mishandling classified materials, even storing them at his Mar-a-Lago resort and refusing to return them when requested by intelligence agencies – somewhat hypocritical considering his criticism of Hilary’s emails.⁸⁶

Trump also could not be prosecuted for espionage or the leaking of information while he held the position of president as the classification which accompanies the title is of ultimate authority – he is, in essence, a self-declassifier. This has always been a real problem, although not one that we’ve noticed until now. ‘For 70 years, the US government has constructed the classified information system on the foundation of the president’s power and discretion. The designers of this system clearly did not have a president like Donald Trump in mind’.⁸⁷ Moreover, Trump has enjoyed using the political system for his own benefit, or to gain favours, particularly in the case of his circumvention of the Justice Department clemency process to grant pardons to associates and allies.⁸⁸ Some have wondered whether the former president might sell information post-presidency for fame, money, or favours.⁸⁹

Here an important distinction must also be made. Clandestine operations and covert operations are not one and the same. Some literature on the issue employs these terms interchangeably. This is incorrect. ‘Clandestine operations’ and ‘covert operations’ are two different things under US law and policy. The core distinction between the two is made in United States government documents and entrenched legally in title 10 and title 50.⁹⁰ This differentiation needs to be underlined as it has wider legal and political implications.⁹¹ One key distinction is that there is no effort to maintain plausible deniability of clandestine operations, as governments do often provide ‘briefs’ on them.⁹² While covert operations tend to remain ‘neither confirmed nor denied’.

Since the strike on Soleimani, intelligence on the operation has slowly been revealed. This material suggests that the Soleimani strike was a covert operation. Indeed, it is now public knowledge that the drone strike on Soleimani was in fact planned by the CIA, executed by JSOC, and aided by informants on the ground in Iran and Iraq.⁹³ Moreover, Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency, also admitted to providing the CIA with Soleimani’s phone number ahead of the Baghdad drone strike, allowing the US to track his whereabouts. This is evidence of intelligence acquisition and surveillance; all of which are mostly conducted by intelligence agencies, and more recently with the aid of units like JSOC.⁹⁴ Evidently, the Soleimani strike was in practice a covert operation, directed and led by the CIA, executed by JSOC, and aided by US allies and informants in the region. Issues of intelligence co-operation or ‘liaison’ have long been recognised as especially sensitive and likely to be imperilled by impromptu revelations.⁹⁵

It is important to emphasise that Soleimani was important beyond his rank.⁹⁶ Certainly within Iran, but also in select neighbouring countries, Soleimani was respected for his accomplishments as an orator, politician, tactician, and above all a strategic thinker in the world of covert warfare. He had spent years funding and training Hezbollah and the Quds Forces, providing them with both weapons and tactical training, and advising them on military strategy and operational security. He directed military campaigns in several major wars in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.⁹⁷ But, perhaps most curious of all, was his little-known connection with the CIA. For close to a decade, Soleimani had been acting as a covert messenger, facilitating discussions between Iranian intelligence and the CIA.⁹⁸ Indeed, Soleimani was not merely a mediator or facilitator amid the complexities of Middle Eastern politics. At times, he was also an ally working with the US against terrorist groups like IS, a common enemy, despite having been initially labeled a terrorist himself by the Americans in 2005.

Yet Soleimani’s relationship with the US had undoubtedly become a rocky one. At times it was diplomatic and transactional, other times it was combative and hostile. Finally, in 2008, the US seemingly clarified its position on the matter. During a covert joint-operation with Mossad, the CIA had communicated its desire to eliminate him. The mission in question, a car-bombing, was launched with the purpose of targeting Imad Mughniyeh, considered for decades to have been the mastermind behind several terror attacks, hijackings, and kidnappings.⁹⁹ However, on the night of the mission, something unexpected happened. Mughniyeh was seen with Soleimani, and the CIA was elated at the possibility of also terminating him. But reflecting on the international ramifications, Israeli intelligence refused to allow the CIA to trigger the car bomb while Soleimani remained within the blast radius.

More than a decade later, the US finally managed to eliminate Soleimani. The strategy employed was a different sort of covert operation, using a UAV remotely piloted by the CIA. Both the delegation of this mission to a clandestine service, and the use of a remote, stealth aircraft implies a desire to be politically distanced from the operation. Mossad had the foresight to recognize the political consequences of eliminating Soleimani without proper legal consideration, evidence of the threat he posed, or respect for due process. Not only did the US proceed with the mission lacking the requisites, but it chose to publicize its involvement – negating any benefits that a covert operation with a UAV strike provided.¹⁰⁰

In other words, Trump’s requirement for the CIA to provide evidence to quell any backlash from ethicists, lawmakers, policymakers, and the media, raised more questions than answers. Evidently, this post-op brief caused more problems for the US, and by extension the CIA, than it solved. There were inconsistencies and so it failed to prove the necessity of the strike, to provide evidence that he was an imminent threat, or demonstrate any consideration for international norms, together with the risk of escalation and retaliation.

Some have argued that eliminating Soleimani could had been a strategic win for the US. Unfortunately, when Trump publicly claimed ownership of the operation, he implicated the CIA in a provocative killing of a foreign government official – prompting international legal criticism, increasing international tensions, and even the threat of overt war. It is likely that the US drone strike which ultimately killed Soleimani was executed without proper evidentiary support to demonstrate that he posed an imminent threat. Obviously, this has legal and ethical consequences, but in practical terms this is water under the bridge.¹⁰¹ Arguably, post facto the key issue is OPSEC. To subdue the backlash stemming from these significant elements, the US attempted to engage in a superficial form of trial by public relations.¹⁰²

How might these matters be balanced and assessed? Contending arguments for secrecy or revelation might depend on the (i) importance/significance of the target, (ii) the exact degree of public exposure, (iii) lack or unavailability of evidentiary support to corroborate justifications, (iv) involvement of additional parties or allies, and (v) the perceived legitimacy or position of power of the state engaging in such actions. However, if the post-operation brief does not stand a reasonable chance of providing enough evidence to demonstrate the legitimacy of the operation, and/or justify the actions undertaken within it, then the balance shifts, as it would instead compromise the intelligence agency by revealing the operational planning/strategies they rely upon – thus threatening national security for little benefit.

The post-op brief on the Soleimani strike is an example of a case of zero-gain. It did not really provide useful information to determine the alleged ethicality of the attack. Certainly it failed to convinced lawmakers, government officials, scholars, ethicists, or the public of the legality or necessity of the operation.¹⁰³ More importantly, the eight leaders within the United States Congress who are routinely briefed on classified intelligence matters by the executive branch, known collectively as the ‘Gang of Eight’, voiced their disbelief in the lack of actual information presented to corroborate the claims of imminent threat, or necessary action frequently referenced by the president.¹⁰⁴

Instead, the post-op intelligence brief simply managed to publicize details about covert CIA operational planning with JSOC involvement, opening the US up to criticism while facilitating the counterintelligence pursuits of extremist organizations.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, it also fostered an air of mistrust, as allied countries, and their respective intelligence agencies now harbour hesitation to collaborate in the future. In their eyes, the US cannot be trusted to keep such operations, and their partnership with foreign intelligence agencies, secret. Obviously, covert intelligence operations will always involve a level of risk. The question is whether intelligence agencies would be willing to accept compounding this with the risk of exposure that post-op briefs might bring.

Other cases of performative opacity

The Bin Laden and Soleimani case studies were chosen for their high-profile nature, and because they occurred under consecutive presidencies. Still, there are many cases of performative opacity beyond the two examined here. Anwar Al-Aulaqi eliminated during the Obama presidency and Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi targeted under the Trump administration, are similarly emblematic of this practice. The case of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, chosen for its recency, will be furthermore discussed to reaffirm the increasing prevalence of performative opacity.

Al-Baghdadi rose to power following the execution of Al-Qaeda leader Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, killed by coalition airstrike in 2006. In the years that followed, Al-Baghdadi declared himself the leader of the Islamic State (IS), and in doing so became the world’s most wanted terrorist.¹⁰⁶ On 27 October 2019, the US ultimately killed the reclusive leader during a successful military raid in northwestern Syria. With the intended target eliminated, the mission was deemed a success. That was until President Trump delivered a 48-minute speech that revealed critical mission specifics that jeopardized the intelligence acquired during the raid, as well as potentially undermining the operational security of future missions. Raid specifics, intelligence acquisition methods, and even helicopter routes were publicized by the president. Informing the public of the death of Al-Baghdadi would have been sufficient. Unfortunately, the pleonastic details he included in the speech only served to benefit the political theatre, at the expense of the operational one.

According to current and former national-security and military experts, these ‘vivid description of the raid may have revealed too much – handing terrorists targeted by the US valuable information on evading capture or death’.¹⁰⁷ During the nearly hour-long speech, Trump reported that when US Special Forces ‘landed with eight helicopters, a large crew of brilliant fighters ran out of those helicopters and blew holes into the side of the building, not wanting to go through the main door because that was booby-trapped’.¹⁰⁸ Ironically, Trump emphasized that it ‘was a very secret mission’, before disclosing tactical details, including the helicopter routes which followed ‘an identical route’ in and out of the site.¹⁰⁹

Michael Leiter, former director of the US National Counterterrorism Center during the Bin Laden operation in 2011, was livid, noting that the ‘president disclosed more than what was necessary’, particularly when it came to ‘how many aircraft, where the aircraft are flying in, how they’re breaching a building, other technology they can bring to bear, knowledge about the tunnels and the mapping of those tunnels’, etc.¹¹⁰ Similarly, Army Lieutenant General (Rt.) Michael Nagata, former senior special operations commander in the Middle East, admitted that he ‘always get[s] a little bit nervous when people without knowledge of operations start describing operations … It’s a good story, and I can understand the impulse to tell a good story. Telling it can have positive benefits. But the benefits are unpredictable and marginal, whereas the harm could be more substantial’.¹¹¹ This is especially the case with the unnecessary disclosure of the helicopter route taken by US special forces to breach the Al-Baghdadi compound. ‘That’s the most worrisome’, noted Nagata, ‘the force is vulnerable throughout the operation, but arrival and departure by helicopter are very dangerous. For me, the idea that anyone would talk publicly about how we did the most dangerous part of the operation – the risks far outweigh the storytelling value’.¹¹²

Still, that was not the only information revealed in the speech. Trump also detailed the intelligence gathering operation which was undertaken at the compound after Al-Baghdadi was eliminated. According to the US president, operatives were ‘in the compound for approximately two hours … [and] took highly sensitive material and information from the raid, much having to do with ISIS origins, future plans, things that we very much want’.¹¹³ Critics have argued that details of this nature facilitate enemy counterintelligence, giving threat actors ‘another way to think about how long forces on the ground are vulnerable. Timing on an objective is something where you never want the bad guys to know what your procedure was or how long it took’.¹¹⁴ Other military officials in the region were similarly surprised with the ‘level of granularity’ the president took, especially since the publicized details were not all that ‘helpful to talk about’.¹¹⁵

Expectedly, those close to the president remained steadfast in their support of the speech, noting that ‘there’s always a risk in saying too much … but the thing I liked was, there were no pictures, there was no specification of types of aircraft used. Everything I saw in terms of what was released was quite vague.¹¹⁶ Perhaps, details disclosed during the Al-Baghdadi speech were not as difficult for Trump followers to accept, considering since nearly two months earlier, the president tweeted (to the disbelief of all in the intelligence community) a classified high-resolution photo of an Iranian rocket site while trying to nonchalantly claim that the US was uninvolved in an ‘accident’ on the launch platform.¹¹⁷

Nevertheless, the Al-Baghdadi speech exemplifies yet another case of performative opacity, showing a deliberate trade-off being undertaken by presidents-one which forgoes operational security for the prospect of political advantage such details might offer. Perhaps, it might be worthwhile for presidents to observe the US Navy SEAL motto: ‘the deed is all, not the glory’. Thus far, and regrettably so, in the practice of performative opacity, it seems that the inverse has proven true for both Obama and Trump.

Conclusion

Since 9/11, US intelligence agencies have changed. They have not only become much larger, they have also become ‘hunters as well as gatherers’, characterised by more aggressive and kinetic activity.¹¹⁸ Although the international community holds the shared belief that terrorism is abhorrent, many countries nevertheless seem comfortable with such tactics being employed by their intelligence agencies – if used covertly and as a tool of foreign policy.¹¹⁹ Richard Jackson, a prominent scholar in the field of critical terrorism studies, has argued that, statecraft now runs the risk of being reduced ‘to a struggle of terrorisms’.¹²⁰ This means that the public debate over issues like rendition, torture and assassination has increased and the pressure to legitimatize these actions by briefing and releasing supporting evidence has grown steadily.

Arguably, if public legitimacy is the main motivator underlying the increasing flow of briefs, then there should be other options available aside from exposing the inner workings of a clandestine operation.¹²¹ These covert operations require more appropriate oversight not uninformed judgement in the court of public opinion. This could come in the form of greater internal oversight, intelligence reform, or a system of checks and balances. While governments loath to admit it, the increasing courting of public opinion with post-op briefing reflects the decline of the formal oversight systems set up in the 1970s. This in turn reflects a profound structural problem to do with the steady decline of Congressional committee activity that extends beyond intelligence to many aspects of foreign policy.¹²² While unlikely to see the light of day, a secret court reviewing the sorts of decisions taken on Bin Laden and Soleimani, sort of FISA for covert operation, would perhaps obviate the need to address the court of public opinion.

However, other factors are at work here that extend beyond the United States. While some have argued that for decades covert operations have often been ‘implausibly deniable’ nevertheless all around the world we are seeing further change. Leaders in many countries are flaunting covert operations, including brutal killings such as that of the New York Times journalist Jamal Khashoggi, to look tough or to project commitment, coercion, and fear. Perhaps, we are moving into the era of performative covert operation designed by heads of state.¹²³

This paper has argued for a shift in favour of improved secrecy, especially in cases wherein exposure of covert operations might prove unnecessarily consequential for the directing agency, or where they might have potential to negatively affect, impede, or threaten national and/or international security. Cause and effect are hard to measure, typically the possibility of retaliation being taken, not against figures in the underworld of the secret agencies but through the kidnapping of everyday diplomats and routine military personnel. Typically, the impact of intrusion into Pakistan or strikes on Iranian leaders may be felt by those least expecting it since citizens of the United States work in almost every country in the world.

The cost is not only in terms of operational security, but also growing disrespect for government secrecy. The obvious hypocrisy exercise by both Obama and Trump in releasing details of these operations only heightens the conviction amongst hard working officials that secrecy law is a function of rank. This has long been the case, but only recently have commentators recognised that legally it is impossible for president to ‘leak’, or indeed commit espionage. Presidents are the ultimate source of authority on declassifications and so by virtue of a president releasing something, it ceases to be classified. This is an absurd state of affairs and ought to be reviewed.¹²⁴

Overall, there is much to be said that covert operations should remain covert – what Loch Johnson has called the ‘quiet option’. Covert operations are a critical state function and if they become noisy, even deliberately boisterous, they lose much of their utility. Long regarded as a tool of foreign policy, this stratagem has been surreptitiously employed by intelligence agencies to mitigate threats, facilitate intelligence collection, and inform policymaking while avoiding provocation. Yet, at every step, the risk of exposure presents a very palpable threat. Up until now, this threat was mainly posed by foreign actors seeking to facilitate their counterintelligence pursuits. Recently, however, it seems like domestic party-political actions have contributed to this as well. Such actions may garner short lived political advantage or facilitate foreign policy pressure, but these short-term advantages are counterproductive and dangerous in terms of the long-term pursuit of national security.

Acknowledgment

I would like to extend my profound gratitude to Professor Richard J. Aldrich for his invaluable advice and unwavering support. It is an ineffable honour and privilege to have such an eminent scholar provide his insights on this article. I would also like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Ruxandra Oana Vlad

Ruxandra Oana Vlad is an Assistant Professor of Homeland Security at Rabdan Academy in Abu Dhabi, UAE. For correspondence, please email: [email protected].

Notes

1. See for example Taylor, Trust Betrayed.

2. Willmetts, ‘The Burgeoning Fissures of Dissent’.

3. The original study sought to determine the legitimacy of the strike by examining and testing the US’s claim of pre-attack self-defence, see Vlad, ‘Striking the Shadow Commander’.

4. Colton. ‘Speaking Truth to Power’, 571–613.

5. Gibson, ‘Secrecy: The communication dilemma of CIA’, 27–38.

6. Wise and Ross, Invisible Government.

7. Moran, Company Confessions.

8. Segal, ‘Secrecy in flux’.

9. Tovar, ‘Covert Action’, in Godson, 67.

10. Moran, ‘The Last Assignment’, 337–55.

11. McCarthy, Selling the CIA.

12. Woodward, Veil.

13. Johnson, Spywatching.

14. O’Rourke, Covert Regime Change.

15. Kosack and Fung. ‘Does transparency improve governance?’.

16. See Robin Levinson-King. ‘Why Politicians Keep Misplacing Classified Documents’, BBC News, 25 January 2023; James Shires. ‘Damaging the Opponent “the New Way”: Understanding the Tactics behind Hack-and-Leak Operations’, Atlantisch Perspectief, vol. 44, no. 4 (2020): 20–25; and Michael Walzner. ‘Just and Unjust Leaks: When to Spill Secrets’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 97, no. 2, (2018): 48–59.

17. See Adam Goldman. ‘How David Petraeus Avoided Felony Charges and Possible Prison Time’, The Washington Post, 25 January 2016; Nicky Woolf. ‘David Petraeus Sentenced to Probation for Sharing Classified Information’, The Guardian, April 23, 2015; Peter Maass. ‘Petraeus Plea Deal Reveals Two-Tier Justice System for Leaks’, The Intercept, 04 March 2015; and Zoe Tillman. ‘Jail Time and Wrist Slaps: US Secrets Probes Boast Messy History’, Bloomberg, January 25, 2023.

18. Warner, ‘A Matter of Trust’, 33–41.

19. Ibid.

20. Joseph and Poznansky, ‘Media Technology, Covert Action, and the Politics of Exposure’, 320–335; for a discussion on the impact that secrecy in covert operations has had on democracy and decision-making in the United States, see Ellington, ‘Secrecy and disclosure’, 67–90.

21. Gibbs, ‘Secrecy and International Relations’, 213–228; see also Kearns, ‘Secrecy and absence in the residue of covert drone strikes’, 13–23; and Melley, The Covert Sphere.

22. Mobley, Terrorism and counterintelligence.

23. Ibid. see also Harber, ‘Unconventional Spies’, 221–236,

24. See Capozzola. ‘Afterburn: Knowledge and wartime’, 811–826; Horn. ‘Logics of political secrecy’, 103–122; and Balmer. Secrecy and Science.

25. Ibid.

26. Horn. The secret war; and McCarthy and Fluck, ‘The concept of transparency in International Relations’, 416–440.

27. Glazzard, ‘Losing the Plot: Narrative’, 1–16.

28. Carson, Secret Wars, 5.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid. To avoid ambiguity, Carson’s definition of covert operation will be employed herein.

31. Kibbe, ‘Covert Action’, 1–2. For a history on the cultural meanings of secrecy, including a discussion on different types of secrecy, see Lochrie, Covert Operations; author notes that there are two other categories of covert operation, albeit not as popular with states, namely propaganda and political action.

32. Birchall, ‘Managing Secrecy’, 152–163.

33. Halperin and Hoffman, ‘Secrecy and the Right to Know’, 132.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Gabriel Schoenfeld, Necessary Secrets; Birchall, ‘Managing Secrecy’, 152–163.

37. Ibid.

38. Gabriel Schoenfeld, Necessary Secrets, 12–24.

39. Fenster, The Transparency Fix.

40. Stampnitzky. ‘Truth and Consequences?’.

41. Ibid., 598.

42. Otto and Spaniel. ‘Doubling Down’, 510.

43. Ibid.

44. Aldrich and Moran. ‘Delayed Disclosure’; Colaresi. Democracy Declassified; Rittberger and Goetz. ‘Secrecy in Europe’.

45. Kuo, ‘Secrecy among Friends’, 63–89.

46. See also Sagar, Secrets and Leaks.

47. Cormac and Aldrich, ‘Grey is the New Black’, 477–494.

48. Poznansky, ‘Revisiting plausible deniability’, 1–23.

49. Cormac and Aldrich, ‘Grey is the New Black’, 479.

50. Treverton, Covert Action, 10–11.

51. Ibid.

52. See Randy Forum, R. Scott Shumate and Mario Scalora. ‘Psychology of Leaking Sensitive Information: Implications for Homeland Security’, Homeland Security Review, 2005: p. 97; and Scott Taylor. Trust Betrayed: Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and the Selling Out of America’s National Security, Simon and Schuster, 2015.

53. The White House. ‘Osama Bin Laden Dead’, The White House, May 02, 2011.

54. The Obama White House. ‘President Obama on Death of Osama Bin Laden’, YouTube, May 02, 2011: https://youtu.be/ZNYmK19-d0U.

55. Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. ‘Osama Bin Laden’. Encyclopedia Britannica, April 28 2022, Accessed November 21, 2022, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Osama-bin-Laden.

56. See Augustine Anthony. ‘Al Qaeda Confirms Bin Laden is Dead, Vows Revenge’, Reuters, 06 May 2011.

57. See also Martin Pengelly. ‘To Give Him Space: Biden Reveals Why He Told Obama to Wait on Bin Laden Raid’, The Guardian, 05 December 2020; and Jessica Pearce Rotondi. ‘9 Unexpected Things Navy SEALs Discovered in Osama Bin Laden’s Compound’, History, 08 April 2021.

58. See Russell Goldman. ‘Special Ops Group Attacks Obama for Bin Laden Boasts, Leaks’, ABC News, 15 August 2012; Scott Shane. ‘Ex-Officers Attack Obama Over Leaks on Bin Laden Raid’, The New York Times, August 15, 2012; Alicia Mundy. ‘Faulting Obama, Former Officers Plan Ads on Bin Laden Leaks’, The Wall Street Journal, August 15, 2012; Mark Mardell. ‘Ex-Seals Attack Obama’s Leaks Over Bin Laden’, BBC News, August 16, 2012; and Garrett M. Graff. ‘I’d Never Been Involved in Anything as Secret as This’, Politico, April 30, 2021.

59. See for example Jon Greenberg. ‘Group Blames Obama for Linking CIA to a Pakistani Doctor’, Politifact, August 22, 2012; and Katie Glueck. ‘Navy SEAL Vet Hits Obama on Osama’, Politico, August 17, 2012.

60. See M Ilyas Khan. ‘Shakil Afraid: The Doctor Who Helped the CIA Find Bin Laden’, BBC News, October 09, 2019; Richard Leiby and Peter Finn. ‘Pakistani Doctor Who Helped CIA Hunt for Bin Laden Sentenced to Prison for Treason’, The Washington Post, May 23, 2012; Mark Memmott. ’33 Years in Prison for Pakistani Doctor Who Aided Hunt For Bin Laden’, National Public Radio, May 23, 2012; and Reza Sayah. ‘Pakistani Doctor Accused of Helping US Gets 33 Years in Prison’, CNN, 24 May 2012.

61. See Reuters. ‘Barack Obama Dismisses Attacks on National Security Record From “Birther-Linked” Anti-Leak Group’, Reuters, August 21, 2012.

62. Adam Taylor. ‘Why Obama Didn’t Release Footage of the Raid that Killed Osama Bin Laden’, The Washington Post, October 20, 2019.

63. See US Department of Defence. ‘Reinforcing Operations Security and the Importance of Preventing Unauthorized Disclosures’, Memorandum, DOD, July 20, 2020; and Lindy Kyzer. ‘Following Leaks, Pentagon Introduces Mandatory Operations Security Training’, Government Executive, August 06, 2020.

64. See Kathleen Miles. ‘OPSEC “Dishonourable Disclosures” Video Says Hollywood Received Leaked Information from Obama’, Huffington Post, August 17, 2012.

65. Quote from Tim Fitton, Judicial Watch President.

66. Shaw and Jenkins. ‘From Zero to hero’; Powers, ‘Zero Dark Thirty’.

67. Nate Jones and Lauren Harper (eds.) National Security Archive, ‘The Zero Dark Thirty File: Lifting the Government’s Shroud Over the Mission That Killed Osama Bin Laden’ NSA Electronic Briefing Book No. 410, January 17, 2013 https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB410/

68. Ibid.

69. Philip Kennicott, ‘A Chilling Portrait, Unsuitably Framed’. The Washington Post. June 8, 2005.

70. London, ‘The Intelligence Community’.

71. Burns, ‘The United States Needs a New Foreign Policy’.

72. Tetlock and Mellers, ‘Intelligent management of intelligence agencies’, 542.

73. Zurcher, ‘Could the Killing of Iranian General Help Trump Get Re-Elected’; see also Trump via Twitter on November 29, 2011 <https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/141604554855825408?s=20> and Vlad, ‘Striking the Shadow Commander’, 255.

74. See Russ Read. ‘World’s most feared drone: CIA’s MQ−9 Reaper Killed Soleimani’, The Washington Examiner, January 03, 2020.

75. See Kevin Lipton and Maegan Vazquez. ‘Trump on strike that killed Soleimani: We did not take action to start a war’, CNN, January 03, 2020; and Al Jazeera Staff, ‘Iran Launches Missile Attacks on US Facilities in Iraq’, Reuters, January 08, 2020 (‘[t]he worst expectation that Iraq had, that it will again become a theatre of confrontation between world powers seems to be coming true again… as Iraq was the place where the US chose to take out Soleimani and Iraq again is the place where the Iranians chose to attack US forces’).

76. See for example Aaron Rupar. ‘These Media Posts Will Serve as notification: Trump’s dangerous Iran tweets, briefly explained’, VOX, January 06, 2020.

77. Donald J. Trump, ‘Remarks on the Death of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Major General and Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani of Iran in Palm Beach, Florida’, The American Presidency Project, 03 January 2020; Karoun Demirjian, Karen DeYoung, and Shane Harris, ‘Trump’s Team Offers Mixed Messages About Imminent Attack from Iran as Justification for Killing Soleimani’, Washington Post, January 07, 2020.

78. See Mary Louise Kelly and Emma Bowman. ‘CIA concludes Russian Interference Aimed to Elect Trump’, National Public Radio, December 10, 2016.

79. See for example Dennis Romero and Yuliya Talmazan. ‘Trump Threatens Attacks on 52 Sites if Iran Retaliates for Soleimani Killing’, NBC News, January 05, 2020.

80. See also Reuters Staff. ‘Ukraine: Black box transcript confirms illegal interference with jet downed in Iran in January’, Reuters, July 24, 2020.

81. See Alice Friend, Mara Karlin, and Loren Schulman. ‘Why Did the Pentagon Ever Give Trump the Option of Killing Soleimani’, Brookings, January 14, 2020.

82. See Carol E. Lee and Courtney Kube, ‘Trump Authorized Soleimani’s Killing 7 Months Ago, with Conditions’, NBC News, January 13, 2020.

83. Jack Goldsmith. ‘The Soleimani Strike: One Person Decides’, Lawfare, January 03, 2020.

84. Executive Order 13,526.

85. Jack Goldsmith. ‘Can Trump Sell US National Security Secrets with Impunity?’ Secrecy and Leaks, Lawfare, October 31, 2020.

86. Jack Goldsmith. ‘Thoughts on the Mar-a-Lago Search’, Donald Trump, Lawfare, 14 August 2022.

87. Jack Goldsmith. ‘Can Trump Sell US National Security Secrets with Impunity?’ Secrecy and Leaks, Lawfare, October 31, 2020.

88. See also Jack Goldsmith. ‘Trump’s Aberrant Pardons and Commutations’, Pardons, Lawfare, July 11, 2020.

89. Jack Goldsmith. ‘Trump’s Circumvention of the Justice Department Clemency Process, Pardons, Lawfare, December 29, 2020.

90. For instance, 50 USC 3036 gives the CIA responsibility for ‘provide(ing) overall direction for and coordination of the collection of national intelligence outside the US through human sources by element of the IC’; EO 12,333 states that ‘the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall coordinate the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence collected through human sources or through human-enabled means and counterintelligence activities outside the U.S’. (the FBI has coordination responsibility within the U.S.); and Intelligence Community Directives 304, 310, 311 all cover HUMINT clandestine operations overseas and domestically; see also US Congressional Research Service Report R45191; and Andru E. Wall, ‘Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities and Covert Action’, Harvard National Security Journal, Vol.3, 2011: pp. 85–142, and p. 103 for Figure 1: Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Activities and Military Operations.

91. See for example Joseph B. Berger, ‘Covert Action: Title 10, Title 50, and the Chain of Command’, National Defence University Press, Issue 67, 4th quarter 2012; Robert Chesney, ‘Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate, Journal of National Security Law and Policy, Vol.5, 2012: p. 539; and Marshall C. Erwin, ‘Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions’, Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2013.

92. See Jennifer Kibbe, ‘CIA/SOF Convergence and Congressional Oversight’, Intelligence and National Security, August 2022.

93. Prothero. ‘Iran says it has found a CIA informant who helped the US assassinate Qassem Soleimani and has sentenced him to death’; see also Jack Murphy and Zach Dorfman, ‘“Conspiracy is hard”: Inside the Trump administration’s secret plan to kill Qasem Soleimani’, Yahoo News, May 8, 2021.

94. See i24News. ‘Israel handed Soleimani’s phone numbers to US ahead of Baghdad drone strike: report’; and Iran International. ‘Military Spy Chief Confirms Israel’s Role in Soleimani Killing’.

95. Sims, ‘Foreign intelligence liaison’, 195–217.

96. Zimmt. ‘Portrait of Qasem Soleimani’, 8.

97. See Arango et. al., ‘Qassim Suleimani, Master of Iran’s Intrigue’; Hacohen, ‘Qassem Soleimani’s Unique Strategic Significance’, p. 13; and Diaconu, ‘Iranian Grand Strategy in The Greater Middle East’.

98. Blake, ‘When the United States and Qasem Soleimani Worked Together’; see also Filkins, ‘The Shadow Commander’.

99. See Wright, Sacred Rage, 270; Baer, See No Evil, 92–115; Davis, Buda’s Wagon, 83, 86; Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History, 73; Naftali, Blind Spot, 159–76; and Naylor, Relentless Strike.

100. See ‘Israeli Intel Chief Reveals Role in American Operation to Assassinate Iran’s Top General Qasem Soleimani’.

101. See Vlad, ‘Striking the Shadow Commander’.

102. See Lee and Kube, ‘Trump Authorized Soleimani’s Killing 7 Months Ago, with Conditions’.

103. Ward. ‘Probably the worst briefing I’ve seen”. ‘At one point, the CIA director told lawmakers to read an intelligence report instead of just briefing them’.

104. Ibid; Atwood, ‘State Department Security Officials Weren’t Notified of Imminent Threats to U.S. Embassies’; Demirjian, DeYoung, and Harris, ‘Trump’s Team Offers Mixed Messages’; and US Department of Defence, ‘Press Briefing by Secretary of Defence Mark T. Esper’.

105. See Behravesh, ‘Qassem Soleimani’s Assassination and Iran’s Pledge of Severe Revenge’,; Hashim, ‘Iranian General’s Killing: How Will Iran Respond?’.

106. Robin Wright. ‘ISIS’s Leader, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi – The World’s Most Wanted Man – Is Dead’. The New Yorker, October 27, 2019.

107. Tom Porter. ‘National Security Officials Say Trump Revealed Secret US Tactics by Describing the Raid That Killed ISIS Leader Al-Baghdadi, Possibly Compromising Future Operations’, Insider Politics, October 28, 2019.

108. Donald J. Trump. ‘Remarks by President Trump on the Death of ISIS Leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi’, White House Diplomatic Reception Room, October 27, 2019.

109. Donald J. Trump. ‘Remarks by President Trump on the Death of ISIS Leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi’, White House Diplomatic Reception Room, October 27, 2019.

110. Alex Ward. ‘A Former Top US Counterterrorism Official Explains What Baghdadi’s Death Means for ISIS’, VOX Media, October 27, 2019.

111. Wesley Morgan. ‘How Trump Gabbed Too Much About the ISIS Raid’, Politico, October 27, 2019.

112. Wesley Morgan. ‘How Trump Gabbed Too Much About the ISIS Raid’, Politico, October 27, 2019.

113. Donald J. Trump. ‘Remarks by President Trump on the Death of ISIS Leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi’, White House Diplomatic Reception Room, October 27, 2019.

114. Tom Porter. ‘National Security Officials Say Trump Revealed Secret US Tactics by Describing the Raid That Killed ISIS Leader Al-Baghdadi, Possibly Compromising Future Operations’, Insider Politics, October 28, 2019.

115. Tom Porter. ‘National Security Officials Say Trump Revealed Secret US Tactics by Describing the Raid That Killed ISIS Leader Al-Baghdadi, Possibly Compromising Future Operations’, Insider Politics, October 28, 2019.

116. David Nakamura. ‘In Creating Spectacle Around Baghdadi’s Death, Trump Departs from Obama’s More Measured Tone on Bin Laden’, The Washington Post, October 27, 2019.

117. See Donald J. Trump. ‘The United States of America was not involved in the catastrophic accident during final launch preparations for the Safir SLV Launch at Semnan Launch Site One in Iran. I wish Iran best wishes and good luck in determining what happened at Site One’, Twitter, August 30, 2019 at 9:44pm: https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1167493371973255170?s=20&t=644PX2MuLrolaXE5qD9Guw; ‘Agence France-Presse. ‘Trump Tweets Photo of Iran Rocket Site and Says US “Not Involved” in Failed Launch’, The Guardian, August 31, 2019; David E. Sanger and William J. Broad. ‘In a Tweet Taunting Iran, Trump Releases an Image Thought to Be Classified’, New York Times, 30 August 2019; and Andrew Feinberg. ‘Trump Revealed to Have Tweeted Classified Image from Spy Satellite’, Independent, November 18, 2022.

118. Priest and Arkin, Top Secret America; Cogan, ‘From Hunters to Gatherers’.

119. Burke, Lee-Koo, and McDonald, Ethics and Global Security, 144.

120. Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, 183.

121. Johnson, Spy Watching, 307–310.

122. Fowler, Linda L. Watchdogs on the Hill. See also Ornstein and Mann. ‘When Congress checks out’.

123. Cormac and Aldrich, ‘Grey is the New Black’, 480.

124. Goldsmith, ‘Can Trump Sell U.S. National Security Secrets with Impunity?.