Pinochet’s poisons: examining Chile’s historical interest in chemical and biological weapons

ABSTRACT

Under military rule (1973–1990), Chile embarked upon several top-secret chemical and biological weapons (CBW) programmes. ‘Project ANDREA’ and the development of sarin is the best known, although other programmes have also been reported. However, these programmes remain poorly understood – particularly in English language sources. To resolve this, this paper draws upon local-language reporting, Cold War histories and other sources to provide insight into the histories, key personalities, and evolution of Chile’s historical CBW programmes. This paper contributes to wider literature on Chile’s dictatorship, but also literature on CBW-proliferation, which remains confined to a relatively small set of case studies.

Introduction

On 11 September 1973, Chile’s military overthrew the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende. Led by Augusto Pinochet, the military regime used its secret police – the National Intelligence Directorate (Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional: DINA) – to systematically crush all domestic opposition. The regime ended after democracy was restored in March 1990. Although the regime’s various human rights’ abuses have been well documented, less attention has been paid to the regime’s clandestine operations, including the top-secret development of chemical and biological weapons (CBW). One such programme developed the nerve agent sarin. Subsequently identified by DINA officer Michael Townley as ‘Proyecto Andrea’ (‘Project ANDREA’), the term has become the de facto moniker for Chile’s various CBW programmes, although the term is little recognised within Chile itself.¹

In addition to the DINA, Chile’s Directorate of Army Intelligence (Dirección de Inteligencia del Ejército: DINE) had an interest in CBW, inheriting the country’s sarin programme as well as developing its own botulinum toxin programme. In 2021, five former DINE officers were found guilty of poisoning seven inmates with the toxin in December 1981.² Victims included common criminals as well as political prisoners belonging to the Revolutionary Left Movement (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria: MIR) organisation. A small defensive programme researching an anthrax vaccine also took place under DINE. Although sarin and botulinum toxin can have military significance, in Chile’s case CBW agent was only produced and used on a small scale. Despite reported ambitions to create a military capability,³ it is doubtful that these ambitions were achieved. That said, far less information is available on the latter years of the programme and its full extent remains unconfirmed. As such, Chile’s historical interests in CBW remain poorly understood, particularly in English language sources. Part of this stems from the urgent need for post-Pinochet governments to investigate the regime’s human rights abuses. However, the waters are also muddied by the different strands of CBW interest, programme secrecy, the transfer of staff across programmes, destruction of evidence, and the untimely deaths of key witnesses.

Significant questions remain over what happened to Chile’s CBW programmes, the people involved, and whether justice will be delivered to their victims. Much work remains, but to help address some of the uncertainties this paper revisits Chile’s historical interest in CBW. Section 1 outlines the broad context for readers including the rise of Pinochet regime and the establishment of the DINA. Section 2 focuses on the DINA’s ‘Mulchén Brigade’, and the work conducted by Michael Townley and Eugenio Berríos – key individuals in ANDREA. Section 3 outlines ANDREA in greater detail, identifying motivating factors, reported locations and production milestones, and reported instances of use. As noted, the DINE also had CBW interests. These are outlined in Section 4, which covers the DINE’s research into botulinum toxin and an anthrax vaccine. Section 5 concludes by summarising the available information.

Section 1: rise of the DINA

After overthrowing the Allende government, the military junta stamped its authority over the country to destroy all ‘political parties and “enemies of the state” considered “dangerous” to national security’.⁴ Not content with establishing control over Chilean politics, ambitions to remove all threats extended beyond the country’s borders. On the ‘internal front’, subduing the opposition was an expansive task because of the widespread support for Allende’s Popular Unity coalition: for example, in the March 1973 parliamentary election, just six months before the coup, the Popular Unity coalition received 43 per cent of the popular vote despite ongoing economic turmoil.⁵ Moreover, although many in the opposing centre-right Christian Democrats initially supported the coup,⁶ this support ended when it became clear that the military would not return power to civilian rule. In turn, the military would come to view Christian Democrats with increasing hostility and suspicion.⁷ The rightist National Party (which won just 20 per cent of the 1973 parliamentary vote) was the only mainstream party to openly support the military.⁸

Persecution began with the far left, but would soon progress across Chile’s political spectrum. Estimates vary,⁹ but the junta’s terror was so wide-ranging that it led to ‘a complete shutting down of civil society and its interfaces with the state’.¹⁰ To achieve this, Pinochet established a new type of intelligence agency as existing organisations were ill-equipped to conduct mass persecutions. Prior to the coup, Chile’s various military intelligence organisations were organised along service lines and primarily focused on external threats. They saw little need for greater coordination or cooperation between forces, remaining siloed in their respective areas. For example, the DINE grew out of the Army’s Department of Reconnaissance and Information;¹¹ while the Army’s Military Intelligence Service (Servicio de Inteligencia Militar: SIM) was tasked to counter potential outside military threats.¹² To counter threats from domestic terrorism or political subversion, Chile relied on traditional law enforcement mechanisms, such as the national detective police’s Investigaciones division, and the Carabineros [police] Intelligence Service (Servicio de Inteligencia de Carabineros: SICAR). Notably, prior to the coup, SICAR ‘had remained a truncated and unassertive service’.¹³

In November 1973, the junta established the National Secretariat of Detainees (Secretaría Nacional de Detenidos: SENDET) via Decree 517 ‘to handle the administration of the dozens of prison camps’ anticipated by the junta.¹⁴ However, the decree also established a new department within SENDET that was mandated to both ‘determine the degree of dangerousness of the prisoners’ and ‘to maintain permanent co-ordination with the Intelligence services of the Armed Forces, Carabineros, and Investigaciones’.¹⁵ This new body was the DINA and, although initially conceived as a coordinating body, under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Contreras it became a powerful organisation, able to convert previously separate military and domestic intelligence agencies into a unified tool of oppression. Pursuant to Decree 517, DINA operations began in early 1974 growing rapidly from an estimated 700 agents and officials, to approximately 2,000 regular members and ‘an additional force of 2,100 civilian personnel deployed throughout the nation’ by 1975.¹⁶ The war against internal enemies began in earnest, with the DINA conducting almost 250 arrests per week.¹⁷ In a foreboding indication of what was to come, those conducting arrests ‘arrived after curfew, wore civilian clothes, and refused to identify themselves’.¹⁸ After arresting their victims, they blindfolded them ‘and threw them into the canvas-topped beds of pickup trucks without license plates’.¹⁹ However, it was not until June 1974 and publication of Decree 521 that the DINA formally became a separate entity, although Articles 9, 10, and 11 of the decree remained secret. These were particularly sensitive because they effectively subordinated all of Chile’s other intelligence services to the Directorate.²⁰

Despite this formal power, Chile’s existing intelligence agencies did not readily relinquish their authority and, in practice, the DINA’s power derived from Contreras’s personal connection with Pinochet, who was now the undisputed head of the junta.²¹ Moreover, the DINA’s wide-ranging mandate ‘to produce intelligence necessary to formulate policy, planning and the adoption of measures to safeguard national security and the country’s development’,²² would lead to the creation of ‘a network of spies inside the military government’.²³ This allowed for the constant surveillance of government employees and allowed the Directorate to develop quickly, ‘at the expense of other sectors of the military’.²⁴ Inter-service rivalry was high, with many objecting to Contreras’s personal power and his disrespect towards other agencies, while the DINA’s accumulation of power and influence provoked ‘the enmity and suspicion’ of other regime leaders.²⁵ In his typography of intelligence control systems, Gregory Weeks characterises the DINA as having ‘Personal – unilateral’ autonomy which is characterised by ‘no democratic control’ with any additional oversight being ‘highly unlikely’.²⁶ In effect, the DINA became the vanguard of the new Pinochet regime ‘without any effective legal control’.²⁷

In addition to the internal front, Contreras also craved an exterritorial capability to deny regime enemies sanctuary abroad. This would culminate in ‘Operation Condor’, the now infamous agreement between Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay to share information on national dissidents and assist in their persecution.²⁸ Operation Condor now represents the excesses of the period although, to date, there is no credible evidence that Chile sought to promote or transfer its CBW capabilities abroad.²⁹ However, media reporting suggests that at least one Condor victim, Communist Party member Alexei Jaccard Siegler, was later killed with sarin after being abducted in Buenos Aires. The Condor network was also used to help hide the chemist Eugenio Berríos (codenamed ‘Hermes’), after he was called to testify in the investigation into the 1976 murder of former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier in the United States.³⁰

Section 2: the Mulchén Brigade

To staff the DINA, personnel were drawn from across Chile’s pre-existing intelligence services, although the majority were drawn from the army. Approximately 20 per cent of staff were civilians. These were ‘mostly recruited in slum areas from among thugs and petty criminals’, although there was also a ‘more elite group handpicked from Patria y Libertad [the Fatherland and Liberty party] and other [far-right] groups’.³¹ Links between Patria y Libertad and the junta were forged prior to the coup, most notably through the attempted kidnapping of Army Chief of Staff General René Schneider in 1970. This provocation was necessary because Schneider’s objection to military interference in politics was a considerable barrier to the coup plotters. The strong military tradition of non-interference in politics meant non-military personnel would be required for the attack.³²

Within the DINA, teams were organised as ‘an intricate structure of groups, units, brigades and specialized departments headed by a General Command of approximately 50 persons’.³³ These broadly reflected the DINA’s internal and external priorities, although FBI reports also noted at least one ‘secret brigade’.³⁴ In fact, there may have been many secret brigades. For example, the Mulchén Brigade was established by Contreras in 1976 specifically ‘to carry out secret elimination missions and other [tasks] exclusively for the director’.³⁵ These included technical tasks such as ‘chemical and electronic [signals intelligence] operations’.³⁶ Other brigades established for covert tasks include the Purén and Caupolicán Brigades which both oversaw human rights’ abuses at Villa Grimaldi, a former private estate turned detention centre.³⁷ Similarly, the Lautaro Brigade was established to provide Contreras’ personal security,³⁸ while the Delfin (‘Dolphin’) Brigade was established specifically to target the leadership of Chile’s Communist Party.³⁹ Both operated out of the Simón Bolívar barracks in La Reina commune, Santiago.

Stationed at Lo Curro, an upper-class neighbourhood of Santiago, the Mulchén Brigade was based at Vía Naranja N° 4925 (also seen as the ‘DINA Technical Research and Development Centre’, or ‘Quetropillián barracks’).⁴⁰ The brigade appears to have been no larger than 10–15 individuals at any one time, with direct command reported to have gone through Deputy Director General Raul Eduardo Iturriaga Neumann and Captain Guillermo Salinas.⁴¹ Despite its formal designation, Lo Curro was also the home to DINA operative Michael Townley and his wife, the author Mariana Callejas.⁴² Outwardly, both portrayed a normal life together but in reality both were Patria y Libertad members recruited by the DINA.⁴³ According to Dinges and Landau, “Townley was one of a large number of civilians who had come to Contreras’ attention because of their audacity as [Patria y Libertad] terrorists”. This was because, although they were amateurs, ‘they could be trained, and their proven single mindedness impelled by an ultra-right-wing ideology equipped them for tasks that career military men shunned’.⁴⁴ Tasked at Contreras’ discretion, Townley’s orders included the assassination of several prominent Chilean opponents living abroad; including the 1974 murder of Chilean General Carlos Prats in Buenos Aires. Townley also orchestrated the 1975 murder attempt on Christian Democratic politician, Bernardo Leighton, in Rome; and the 1976 murder of Orlando Letelier.⁴⁵ Other plots include unsuccessful attempts to kill Carlos Altamirano, a Chilean Socialist leader, and Velodia Teitlboim of the Chilean Communist Party.⁴⁶

Section 3: project ANDREA

Another inhabitant of Lo Curro was Eugenio Berríos who, like Townley, was a social misfit who had briefly flirted with far-left politics before finding purpose in Patria y Libertad. ⁴⁷ Berríos had various roles within Chile’s intelligence apparatus although in Lo Curro his role was to support Townley in developing sarin. After his extradition, Townley identified the programme as ‘Project ANDREA’.⁴⁸ The term has since become the de facto moniker for the programme, although it is unclear if the term was used outside of the Townley’s circle.⁴⁹ Indeed, the term is not widely recognised within Chile although the FBI credits ANDREA as being the ‘code word for [the] Chilean Government’s nerve gas project’.⁵⁰ Few sources have comprehensively documented ANDREA or Chile’s other CBW interests, although Monica González from the Centro do Investigación Periodística (CIPER) perhaps provides the most detailed coverage. Other notable coverage of the personalities involved include Jorge Molina’s book Imperfect Crime: The story of the DINA chemist Eugenio Berríos (in Spanish),⁵¹ and the book Labyrinth by Taylor Branch and former US Prosecutor Eugene Propper, who investigated the Letelier murder and debriefed Townley.

Drawing on these authors, local language reporting, and other sources; the below provides an overview of ANDREA. However, it is important to note the limitations of these sources and of subsequent analysis. Firstly, discussion of Chile’s historical interest in CBW is highly fragmented and largely covered in the context of the country’s historical human rights abuses. Where referred to, poisonings are often mentioned in passing, with little examination of the underlying organisation or infrastructure. Secondly, reported instances of use are hotly debated and even seemingly concrete legal convictions have been overturned. Thirdly, as noted, Townley remains the primary source for information on ANDREA, although this only appears indirectly in open reporting: for example, Townley’s testimony to Propper informs Labyrinth, while Townley’s July 2006 testimony to US Prosecutor William Baxter and Judge Alejandro Madrid, who was appointed to investigate the Letelier murder, was covered in local media.⁵²

Despite this coverage, ANDREA’s seemingly small-scale and rudimentary nature, the murder of key witnesses (see below), destruction of evidence, and an overall obscurity of the programme makes robust interrogation of reports difficult. Such examination is vital because, as noted by the FBI, ‘Throughout his letters, Townley furnished the recipients numerous items of disinformation which, for the most part, were self-serving’.⁵³ The FBI report continued that ‘Townley obviously has attempted to minimize damage to his and his families [sic] interests… In some instances, it appears that Townley may have knowingly lied’.⁵⁴ This is important because, in some form or other, Townley’s testimony, along with trials related to the Pinochet era, form the basis of much local reporting. Despite their limitations, available sources nonetheless give important insight into the programme; especially as no official report on Chile’s historical interest in CBW has been made public.

Section 3.1: motivation

ANDREA’s main aim appears to have been to develop sarin for strategic military purposes. According to Eugene Propper, ‘The original idea [for sarin] was that it would be deployed along the short border with Peru in the north of Chile’. In the 1970s, a territorial dispute with Argentina over the Beagle Channel also emerged. Should war have broken out, Chile’s army would have been overmatched, thus ‘In that event, ANDREA would [also] be used to guard the few passes in the Andes mountain range through which Argentine soldiers might pour into Chile’.⁵⁵ In a second potential scenario, Berríos also ‘conceived a plan to poison Buenos Aires water with laboratory chemical and biological products’, in the event of war with Argentina.⁵⁶ After his extradition to the US, Townley testified that Contreras ordered him and Berríos to devise a way of producing sarin. Journalist Jorge Molina suggests this order took place sometime in 1974,⁵⁷ although Mónica González places the initial tasking in 1975.⁵⁸ In either case, Contreras’s interest in sarin appears to predate the establishment of the Mulchén Brigade.

In terms of Townley’s personal motivation, it appears that group dynamics and personal prestige were important motivating factors. Propper gives more details for the motivation in Labyrinth. Despite his limited formal schooling, Townley had a talent for electronics and in Patria y Libertad he developed a reputation for being technically capable. During the Allende years, Townley impressed his fellow fascists by refining Molotov cocktails and explosives. He also intercepted secure government communications and devised an illegal mobile radio system that broadcast messages of dissent.⁵⁹ After the failed assassination attempt on Bernardo Leighton in Rome on 6 October 1975, Townley flew to London. Accordingly, ‘Now, alone, he is free to work on the most sensitive of the assignments heaped upon him by Contreras, Project ANDREA’.⁶⁰ Propper continues, according to Townley ‘Contreras anticipates war against the leftist generals in Peru, and he yearns to have a secret weapon’. In return, Townley ‘hopes to add to his reputation as a technical wizard who can accomplish practically anything in his basement laboratory … [and] has promised to supply Contreras and DINA with a private arsenal for chemical warfare’.⁶¹

Chemical weapons could also be used to discreetly execute unwanted individuals. Despite mis-matching scales, both strands of described use are supported by testimony at Contreras’s 2006 trial; with subsequent reporting describing how chemical weapons were ‘slated to be used against Pinochet’s personal enemies and in a massive form against enemy troops in the event of an invasion by Argentina’ [emphasis added].⁶² Sarin would then be a logical choice here, being an established chemical weapon agent that also leaves few overt traces of foul play.

Section 3.2: production

Available literature suggests that ANDREA-related activities took place across three sites: the Quetropillián barracks in Lo Curro, Santiago Province; the Army Chemical and Industrial Complex in Talagante, Talagante Province; and an unidentified laboratory in Nos, Maipo Province. However, the levels of reporting and detail vary considerably, while several other sites have also been reported, including Colonia Dignidad (Dignity Colony) – a sinister German sect, established by the child abuser and former Nazi Paul Schäfer. Indeed, colony members such as Hartmut Hopp oversaw the abuse of colonists with psychotropic drugs⁶³ and forced sedations to subdue unruly colonists.⁶⁴ The site had a close relationship with Chile’s intelligence services and is the reported site where DINA agent Miguel Becerra was killed with a poisoned apple, after he expressed a wish to leave the site.⁶⁵ Townley claims Colonia Dignidad produced the sarin that killed former Chilean President Eduardo Frei Montalva. However, the cause of Frei’s death is disputed (see below) and the existence of any laboratory in Colonia Dignidad remains unconfirmed. In addition, the ‘House of Prosín’,⁶⁶ and a ‘High Command, the Chemical Complex Lo Aguirre’,⁶⁷ have also been referred to in various reporting. However, details of the latter sites are scarce and their existence – or relationship to other sites – is unconfirmed.

The Quetropillián barracks, Lo Curro

The first site associated with ANDREA is Townley’s home address of Lo Curro, en Vía Naranja N° 4925. This has the most consistent reporting where, according to Gonzales, a laboratory was located on-site in a converted caretaker’s house, refitted ‘with metal doors and windows sealed with bricks’ and then kitted out with laboratory equipment sourced from Gallemkamp and Co., in London; Fisher Scientific in the US; Jose Santos in New Jersey; and PRC, in Orlando, Florida.⁶⁸ The equipment is reported to have been installed by a ‘Wolff Von Arnswaldt’, who Townley claimed also fitted the poisons laboratory in Colonia Dignidad.⁶⁹

After Townley’s initial tasking to develop sarin in 1974/5, Contreras soon provided additional staffers including Berríos, and Francisco Oyarzún Sjöberg, a biochemist ‘whom Townley had also met in the early 1970s in far-right groups, and who had [previously] fled to Belgium after carrying out an attack’.⁷⁰ Berríos and Oyarzún ‘added a new rhythm to the Andrea project’ and minute quantities of sarin were first produced in 1976.⁷¹ Following initial animal tests,⁷² the sarin’s effectiveness was demonstrated at the Simon Bolivar barracks on two unidentified Peruvians who were sprayed with sarin before being injected with cyanide to ensure they were dead.⁷³ The use of sarin here is supported testimony from Towley’s secretary⁷⁴ and from Jorgelino Vergara, then a teenager who worked in the Pinochet household, who witnessed the killing.⁷⁵

Although ANDREA is primarily associated with sarin, work at Lo Curro is reported to have included research on an eclectic range of CBW agents. According to Townley, after his trips to Europe ended in late-1975, he dedicated himself ‘almost exclusively to the development of sarin and the completion of the Vía Naranja house laboratory and the planning of products such as sarin and tabun and highly toxic elements such as clostridium botulinum, among others’.⁷⁶ According to Gonzalez, these other toxins included saxitoxin and tetrodotoxin,⁷⁷ although it is noteworthy that toxins are poorly suited to creating towards large-area effect and are generally associated with small-scale use. Like much of ANDREA however, despite broad agreement, the precise nature of individual activities is disputed, and sarin (and possibly botulinum toxin) are the only demonstrated CBW product from Lo Curro.

Although some of the reported CBW agents have military or strategic potential, there is little credible reporting on efforts to either scale-up production or develop effective means of dissemination. According to Kornbluh, ‘By the time of the mission to kill Letelier in D.C., [the] DINA had manufactured significant amounts of sarin and Townley was working on a military delivery system that would allow the gas to be deployed on a wartime setting’.⁷⁸ However, such a timeframe appears too soon – sarin was only first synthesised in Easter 1976 and Letelier murdered that September. Moreover, if Berríos’ vision of producing sarin ‘on a large enough scale that it could be used on open terrain, in combat’,⁷⁹ were reflected within the wider military, tasking the design of a chemical munition to a small, improvised laboratory was an odd choice. It is especially peculiar because Townley and his crew are not known to have had expertise in specialist munitions engineering and because Chile’s domestic arms industry was small but well established.⁸⁰ Nonetheless, some ingenuity was demonstrated with an adapted perfume atomiser being used to carry sarin. According to Townley, he took the sarin-filled perfume atomiser with him into the US on his mission to kill Orlando Letelier,⁸¹ in an apparent idea to use a female operative to seduce Letelier.⁸² The existence of the sarin-filled perfume atomiser is supported by accounts of the 1976 murder of the estate agent Renato León Zenteno, where the bottle was left behind on the bedstand and features in crime-scene photographs⁸³; and in reports of Berríos’ tempestuous relationship where he is described as threatening his girlfriend with a bottle of perfume during a fight.⁸⁴

Although unconfirmed, potential reasons for the apparent neglect of researching dissemination methods could include inadequate resourcing, a focus on individual assassination, and/or a pre-occupation by the scientists with overcoming individual technical challenges associated with researching and producing different agents. Another potential reason for the failure to scale-up production at Lo Curro may have been the need to move location. This move was necessary because, on the ‘external front’, Pinochet also targeted regime opponents living abroad. This included the September 1976 murder of Orlando Letelier, the former Chilean ambassador to the US and a figurehead of opposition to Pinochet. Letelier was killed with a car-bomb in Washington D.C. Although the bomb was planted by members of the Cuban Nationalist Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Cubano: MNC), it had been organised by Townley. Letelier’s death in the heart of American democracy would lead to a dogged and complex investigation, that would result in considerable US pressure on Pinochet to both reform the DINA and extradite Townley.⁸⁵

Following US pressure, the DINA was subsequently reorganised as the National Information Centre (Central Nacional de Informaciones: CNI). The reorganisation did little to stop Chile’s human rights abuses, with the CNI actually acquiring ‘significant judicial powers, in that it did not differentiate between civilians and military officers, and directed military tribunals that prosecuted civilians’.⁸⁶ However, as part of this reorganisation, it became rumoured that Contreras would be replaced by General Odlanier Mena, ‘one of his internal enemies’.⁸⁷ This sparked an attempt to poison Mena’s coffee with an unspecified ‘lethal bacteria’,⁸⁸ (likely botulinum toxin) as well as the destruction of documentation related to the Mulchén Brigade.⁸⁹ In turn, this suggests that ANDREA was confined to Contreras’ personal portfolio, and not a wider part of DINA activities.

The ‘army chemical and industrial complex’ in Talagante

As pressure was building on Contreras and the DINA, sarin production is reported to have moved to the Army Chemical and Industrial Complex (Complejo Químico e Industrial del Ejército) in Talagante, after ‘being claimed’ by the Directorate of Army Intelligence (Dirección de Inteligencia del Ejército: DINE).⁹⁰ Operated under the supervision of Colonel Gerardo Huber, Talagante generated illicit funds for the regime by processing cocaine so it could be ‘smuggled past drug agents in the US and Europe’.⁹¹ Berríos also moved to Talagante where, in addition to his work on so-called ‘black cocaine’, he was tasked to ‘perfect’ sarin production.⁹² Berríos would stay at Talagante until 1984, although he played an increasingly minor role as his mental instability grew. There is no formal paperwork detailing his leaving, but Molina suggests he was ejected due to his increasingly volatile behaviour including alcoholism, drug addiction and bad debts.⁹³ In addition to poor professionalism, it appears that Berríos was able to exploit poor security at the site and remove several samples of sarin from the laboratory.⁹⁴ If Lo Curro’s production equipment was moved after Townley’s extradition, it may explain why Townley only identified Lo Curro and Colonia Dignidad as poison production sites although, as noted above, Townley’s testimony is often self-serving and therefore problematic.

In addition to producing sarin and narcotics, Talagante is reported to have received an ether plant from Chile’s Bacteriological Institute,⁹⁵ and have included a ‘Bacteriological Unit’, overseen by Dr Eduardo Arriagada Rehren.⁹⁶ The unit’s activities are unconfirmed although Arriagada has also been connected to illicit research on botulinum toxin at the ‘Army Diagnostic’s Laboratory’ (‘Laboratorio de Diagnóstico del Ejército’) – described below.

Unidentified laboratory, Nos, San Bernardo

Under DINE, the junta’s CBW programme appears to have received new initiative with construction of ‘a new chemical laboratory’ in Nos, San Bernardo commune, beginning in 1981.⁹⁷ The name of the site has not been identified and its location and purpose also remain unclear. For example, Chilean journalist Manuel Salazar Salvo reports the site was housed at the Army Intelligence School (Escuela de Inteligencia del Ejército: EIE),⁹⁸ although it could also refer to a branch of the Army Diagnostics Laboratory, which was co-located with the EIE.⁹⁹

Section 3.2: Russian allegations

Although ANDREA may have been, in part, motivated by a desire to create a military CW capability, it appears that production remained rudimentary and limited in scale. Curiously however, in 1993 Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (‘SVR’) assessed that between 1973 and 1990 Chile developed a full military CW capability. According to the report: A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Chilean research into CW was centred on the Institute of Chemical Research of the Chilean Armed Forces (Instituto de Investigaciones Quimicas del Ejerctito de Chile), wherein CW were ‘regarded as a kind of counterbalance to Argentina’s nuclear program’.¹⁰⁰ According to the SVR, work at the Institute had advanced far beyond research and development, with assembled weapons reported to include ‘aerial bombs and rocket- and cannon-launched projectiles filled with chemicals’.¹⁰¹ The agent type(s) were not specified.¹⁰²

One possibility is that the SVR’s ‘Institute of Chemical Research of the Chilean Armed Forces’, located ‘on the outskirts of Santiago’, is reference to the Army Chemical and Industrial Complex in Talagante (Talagante province being one of six provinces of the Santiago Metropolitan Region). Indeed, according to Salazar, at Talagante ‘It is presumed that there [Berríos] had a decisive participation in the manufacture of chemical warheads for rockets and missiles’.¹⁰³ However, the Russian allegations were ‘flatly denied’ by President Patricio Aylwin in January 1993,¹⁰⁴ while the SVR assessment remains unique in its accusations. For example, accounts of a military CW programme are missing from both local reporting and other contemporary assessments such as US Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks’ 1991 presentation of ‘probable possessor’ CW states to Congress,¹⁰⁵ despite Chile being on a watch list for ‘countries being monitored for a CW acquisition program’.¹⁰⁶ Chile is also missing from open source surveys on CBW proliferation,¹⁰⁷ and it is noteworthy that Santiago did not formally acknowledge a CW programme in its declarations to either the Mendoza Declaration (1991) or the CWC (signed 1993, ratified 1996).

Section 3.3: assessing use

Given the military focus, using sarin for political assassinations appears to have been a secondary consideration although it is the latter cases that appear to form the majority of uses. To assess how Chile used CBW for political assassinations, reports of CBW use were collated by the author. Only a small number of reported instances were found, although attributing death to poisoning is difficult as there are various competing hypothesis for each apparent event. As such, the extent to which CBW were used by the Pinochet regime cannot be confirmed and will remain speculative without further official investigations. A prevailing assumption here is that states may prefer poisonings over other forms of coercion because discreet deaths can help avoid rallying effects, while (im)plausible denials serve to signal and intimidate other dissidents.¹⁰⁸ However, available evidence suggests that in Chile, CBW were used sporadically and impulsively against individuals already in custody, or otherwise within the grasp of Chile’s security forces. Rather than achieving any particular strategic political aim, patterns of use suggest that CBW were used as sophisticated poisons and were essentially seen as a sadistic means of killing individuals who fell afoul of the DINA.

CBW are alleged to have been used, or considered for use, against numerous high-profile individuals. For example, sarin was considered for use against Letelier, with Townley taking a small bottle of sarin with him to Washington.¹⁰⁹ Sarin is also reported to have been used against the Spanish diplomat Carmelo Soria, who was suspected of using his diplomatic immunity to help dissidents escape Chile. In August 2006, Chile’s La Nación newspaper reported that Soria was detained and tortured in Lo Curro.¹¹⁰ After refusing to talk, Soria is alleged to have been subjected to sarin. However, he is reported to have survived, only to be detained and tortured at Villa Grimaldi before being killed.¹¹¹ Townley’s wife does not refute Soria’s exposure to sarin, but rather she reports that Soria was killed at Lo Curro.¹¹² Soria was already in custody and, in the first instance, there were no apparent efforts were made to disguise his death: Soria’s body was found in the boot of a car that had been dumped into an irrigation canal two days after his abduction. Chilean authorities subsequently had to embark upon a cover up with Contreras taking control of the investigation,¹¹³ then release a cover story claiming Soria was involved in a drink-driving accident.

Other reported deaths of high-profile individuals include the Chilean Nobel Laureate and Communist Party Senator, Pablo Neruda,¹¹⁴ and the Christian Democratic Party’s Eduardo Frei Montalva. Reflecting the difficulties in attribution, the details surrounding these deaths are hotly debated. For example, Pablo Neruda officially died of prostate cancer on 23 September 1973, just days after the military coup. However, in 2011 Neruda’s driver Manuel Araya claimed Neruda had been poisoned. According to Araya, Neruda claimed that an unknown doctor had injected him in the stomach on the day that he died.¹¹⁵ The unknown ‘Dr Price’ matched Townley’s description,¹¹⁶ although at the time Townley was hiding in the US after Patria y Libertad members accidentally killed a man during a sabotage operation which Townley organised.¹¹⁷ Nonetheless, the accusations triggered an investigation which categorically ruled out cancer cachexia, the stated cause of death. Instead, the investigation found evidence of staphylococcus bacteria on the exhumed cadaver¹¹⁸; although staphylococcus aureus is associated with numerous hospital infections and its presence alone does not indicate malicious activity. Nonetheless, in 2015 the Chilean government stated that it was ‘highly likely’ that a third party had been involved in Neruda’s death.¹¹⁹ In 2017, scientists from McMaster University and the University of Copenhagen noted the presence of clostridium botulinum in a molar tooth, extracted as part of the posthumous examination.¹²⁰ As a result, another investigation was launched, with its results becoming public in February 2023. Although the presence of C. botulinum was confirmed and widely reported as being conclusive that Neruda was murdered,¹²¹ doubts remain that it was the cause of death.¹²² Neruda’s death came very early into the junta's rule, and predates ANDREA’s establishment, and the known chronology of toxin use. The poet Luis Waldo Silva Caunic is also alleged to have been a victim of poisoning,¹²³ although little information on this allegation is available.

Former President Eduardo Frei Montalva is another suspected victim. Frei initially supported the military coup but later became a vocal critic of the Pinochet regime. He died on 22 January 1982 after undergoing a hernia operation at the DINA’s London Clinic in Santiago. According to Townley, Frei was poisoned with sarin produced at Colonia Dignidad,¹²⁴ although further intrigue into Frei’s death stems from a hypothesis that several prisoners were poisoned with botulinum toxin in a trial run of his death, and the fact Frei’s treatment included doctors from the Santa Maria Clinic – the same hospital where Neruda died.¹²⁵ In 2009, Judge Madrid determined that Frei had been poisoned with low doses of thallium and mustard gas over an extended period while in hospital.¹²⁶ However, as a sign of the difficulty in attribution, in January 2021, Chilean appeal judges overturned the conviction, noting that ‘The evidence gathered … was not able to demonstrate that the death is attributable to any fraudulent or negligent action … Eduardo Frei Montalva was not a victim of homicide, but died as a result of medical complications’.¹²⁷

Although lower profile, the Mulchén brigade is reported to have used poisons on others, including to silence potential witnesses. For example, sarin is reported to have been used on the Foreign Ministry’s Director of Protocol, Carlos Guillermo Osorio, who oversaw the granting of false identities for covert missions. Osorio died in an apparent suicide just months before he could be questioned by the FBI in relation to Letelier’s assassination.¹²⁸ Osorio was found dead with a gunshot to the head although, according to La Nación, in his debriefings Townley claimed Osorio had been killed with sarin.¹²⁹ Estate agent Renato León Zenteno is also suspected of being murdered with sarin in 1976, after he refused a ‘completely irregular’ request to transfer land deeds from suspected dissidents to unidentified DINA agents.¹³⁰ According to his brother, Zenteno confided to him that these deeds were given to him by ‘three military officers, dressed in civilian clothes … [who told him that] they had dedicated themselves to searching the archives for the properties of people linked to the Popular Unity [party] who had left Chile and who had to be punished’.¹³¹ Zenteno’s murder by the Mulchén brigade appears to be linked to this refusal. A perfume bottle, reportedly filled with sarin, was accidentally left behind on the bedstand at the murder scene and can be seen in photographs taken in the subsequent investigation.¹³²

Sarin is also alleged to have been used on DINA member Corporal Manuel Leyton as punishment for revealing secret information although, again, this is disputed. For example, Gonzalez asserts that Leyton was poisoned with sarin after being detained by the Carabineros for stealing a car.¹³³ Arrested alongside fellow DINA member Heriberto Acevedo, Contreras accordingly sent Lieutenant Colonel Vianel Valdivieso to rescue his two men, and ‘At 2 am on 24 March 1977, the police station where Leyton and Acevedo were detained was surrounded by a DINA contingent armed for war’.¹³⁴ Leyton and Acevedo were released, but during captivity much was taken in evidence, including ‘numerous identity cards found in a box belonging to detainees who were no longer [alive]’.¹³⁵ It was feared that during police custody Leyton had revealed how bodies of ‘the disappeared’ were dumped into the sea. However, a second version of Leyton’s death provides more detail. As noted by journalist Jorge Molina, three days after his release, Leyton was detained by the DINA and interrogated at the London Clinic by Osvaldo Pinchetti,¹³⁶ a claimed spiritualist who used sadistic means, including drugging and crude ‘hypnosis’, to interrogate his victims.¹³⁷ Leyton died after this interrogation, although rather than being poisoned with sarin it is more likely that it was ‘the torture applied by Pinchetti with pentothal, plus the interrogation sessions’, that killed Leyton.¹³⁸ Sodium Pentothal is commonly associated with being a ‘truth serum’, although it is also used in the US as a means of delivering lethal injections.

Molina’s account of Leyton’s death by torture and interrogation is perhaps more convincing, particularly in light of Pincetti’s wider activities. Known as ‘The Talk’ (‘El Charla’) or ‘Doctor Torment’ (‘Doctor Tormento’) by his victims, Pincetti has been associated with interrogations at Villa Grimaldi,¹³⁹ but also the London Clinic.¹⁴⁰ In addition to Pincetti, Colonia Dignidad’s Hartmut Hopp is also reported to have frequented interrogations.¹⁴¹ According to former Army Nurse Petty Officer Carlos Norambuena Retamales, there was a code in the clinic …

which was a warning: a ‘package is coming’. It meant that a detainee was coming and it was understood that staff did not have to get involved in anything, only those already briefed. A DINA vehicle would arrive and people we did not know would put the detainee down on a stretcher, then they would admit him to a room, they would give him something and then the patient would leave dead.¹⁴²

Norambuena provides further details, noting how the clinic’s staff would supply ‘eight milligrams of pentothal, which immediately caused an arrhythmia in the patient, followed by a cardiorespiratory arrest, [causing the person to] die in the clinic. About an hour and a half later they took him out at night, half camouflaged’.¹⁴³ This account is largely corroborated by Vergara who witnessed DINA operations and described how after an interrogation a clinic nurse would inject ‘five milligrams of pentothal … to ensure death’.¹⁴⁴ Nor is this the only reference to pentothal. Journalist Javier Rebolledo describes how between May and June 1976 the Lautaro Brigade at the Simón Bolívar barracks ^was ordered to receive the Delfin Brigade. When they arrived, ‘They came from Villa Grimaldi with an apple crate loaded with injections of pentothal (truth drug), and a group of about twenty agents, all experts in detention and torture’.¹⁴⁵

Few other individuals are reported to have been poisoned. The final victim identified by the literature review is Alexei Jaccard Siegler, who was arrested in Buenos Aires on 16 May 1977 along with two other Communist party members.¹⁴⁶ According to La Nación, the three were on a mission to deposit USD20,000 to the Communist Party in Santiago. All three subsequently disappeared under the auspices of Operation Condor and, according to former agent Eduardo Oyarce Riquelme, Siegler was killed with sarin although he did not know by whom.¹⁴⁷

Section 4: Bacteriológico and the Army Diagnostics laboratory

In addition to the DINA’s CBW interest, the DINE also pursued several CBW projects. These included a small defensive programme centred on an anthrax vaccine, but also a second strand that explored the use of botulinum toxin as a poison. Information regarding the defensive programme came to light in 2004 after details of ‘the Army Diagnostics Laboratory’– also seen as the ‘Army’s Bacteriological Warfare Laboratory’ (‘Laboratorio de Guerra Bacteriológica del Ejército’: LGBE) – emerged. According to testimony from Veterinary Colonel (rtd.) Rosende Ollarzu in the El Mostrador newspaper, this laboratory was housed at Calle Carmen 339, Santiago Centro, in a building that is now the judicial archive, and tasked with producing an anthrax vaccine.¹⁴⁸ The laboratory was under the formal directional of ‘Bacteriológico’, the Bacteriological Institute of Chile although in practice it was controlled by the Army.¹⁴⁹ Work on the anthrax vaccine appears to have been conducted between 1977 and 1991. According to Rosende:

In the year 1977, approximately, when bilateral relations with Argentina were bad, I remember that my boss, Doctor Eugenio Tastest Solís (now deceased), called me to his office, where he introduced me to the Health Doctor of our military Institution, Dr. Eduardo Arraigada Rehren, where I learned that the latter was in charge of a project to create an anthrax antidote, since intelligence information revealed that Argentina had a Bacteriological Warfare School and it was feared that if there was an eventual war with that country, it was presumed that they were going to contaminate the animal population or the waters.

Rosende reports that it was there he was asked to work with Dr Arriagada ‘to create an anti-carbuncle (anthrax) serum’. According to Rosende:

This project lasted until approximately 1991, for which Dr. Arriagada visited me periodically in my laboratory. I learned that when I started working on this project, in 1977, Arriagada Rehren was working for the Intelligence Service at the time.¹⁵⁰

This defensive interest in anthrax may explain Contreras’ reported interest in anthrax, which are referred to alongside botulinum and sarin.¹⁵¹ However, similar to Townley’s testimony, Rosende’s testimony appears to be self-serving and downplays apparent knowledge of nefarious work undertaken by the laboratory, in particular work involving the botulinum toxin. In 2021, Arriagada and Rosende were both found guilty of aggravated homicide of a group of prisoners. Here, after an initial attempt to kill prisoners with a poisoned cake, seven prisoners – including five political prisoners from MIR – were poisoned.¹⁵² During the trial, former Bacteriológico Director Colonel (rtd.) Joaquín Larraín Gana testified that he was made aware of the interest in botulinum after a meeting with Arriagada and Rosende.¹⁵³ At the meeting, Arriagada is reported to have asked Larraín if the laboratory possessed botulinum toxin, arguing that ‘the army needed them, due to tensions with neighbouring countries’.¹⁵⁴ Reference to tensions with Brazil places this conversation to around 1977.¹⁵⁵ Following this meeting, Bacteriológico acquired the toxin from the Butantan Institute of Sao Paulo, in Brazil, via diplomatic pouch.¹⁵⁶ Seemingly, parts of this batch were discovered and secretly destroyed in 2008 by Ingrid Heitmann, then head of the Institute of Public Health (Instituto de Salud Pública: ISP),¹⁵⁷ Bacteriológico’s successor organisation. According to Heitmann, she panicked when they were found and destroyed the samples unaware of their importance to the judicial process. Two boxes were reported to have been found, although some of some capsules were missing and ‘presumed to have been used against opponents of the dictatorship’.¹⁵⁸

According to subsequent reporting of the trial, in approximately July 1981 Lieutenant Colonel Jaime Fuenzalida (Head of Security and Finance) was ordered by Larraín to go to the Foreign Ministry to ‘remove a package from Brazil’.¹⁵⁹ After its arrival at Bacteriológico,¹⁶⁰ chemist Marcos Potuve Frugone testified that he was ordered to repair a lyophilizer (freeze-drying) machine from the National Cepario Lyophilization Plant (‘Planta de Liofilización del Cepario Nacional’). After fixing it, he was ordered to ‘take it to the [church] Vicaría de Carabineros, located on Calle San Isidro, where a veterinarian would receive it’. However, ‘since the person who would receive it was not there, it stayed behind the altar’.¹⁶¹ It is only a short distance from Calle San Isidro to Calle Carmen and from there it is hypothesised that ‘If the botulinum toxin could be lyophilized, it could well have been thrown into the food of the members of the [detainees at …] the former Public Prison’.¹⁶² According to Potuve, these were his first thoughts when he heard about the mass poisonings and, according to survivor testimony, prisoners only survived after their fellow prisoners purged their systems by making them drink water mixed with detergent. The test on the prisoners is hypothesised to have been as trial run to kill Frei, although 2019 convictions for Frei’s murder were overturned in 2021.¹⁶³

Section 5: summary

Despite apparent ambitions to develop a military CW capability, a review of Chile’s historical CBW interest suggests that progress was limited to a number of small-scale programmes. Chile’s efforts to develop sarin under Project ANDREA are perhaps the best described, however, the programme remains poorly understood and significant knowledge gaps remain. Sarin is likely to have been successfully produced at two sites: including the DINA’s initial development at Lo Curro; before being transferred to DINE facilities at Talagante. In addition to Lo Curro and Talagante, several other sites have been associated with Chile’s interest in CBW although the nature of these sites remains to be confirmed. For example, according to Townley, former President Frei was killed using sarin produced at Colonia Dignidad. However, despite these claims, no evidence has come to light of any such laboratory at the colony and in January 2021, Chilean appeal judges overturned previous ruling that Frei had been poisoned.¹⁶⁴ In addition, the reported ‘new chemical laboratory’ in Nos, San Bernardo commune, has yet to be identified, although this likely refers to the Army Diagnostics Laboratory, co-located at Nos with the Army Intelligence School. Given that the Laboratory may also have engaged in defensive CBW work, it is important to clarify the nature of any work conducted at Nos. Indeed, understanding the full extent of Chile’s historical programmes remains a significant challenge and warrants further investigation.

According to the available information, despite its technical success, ANDREA nonetheless appears to have remained a small scale and, ultimately, amateurish operation that lacked clear purpose – as evidenced by lax personnel security, limited resources, fantastical claims of future delivery systems, and the ultimate failure to produce weapons of military or political significance. Russian reports that Chile successfully developed a military CW capability lack corroboration, while ANDREA’s seeming inattention to scaling up production and research on an electric range of CBW agents (that in practice would have achieved similar results), suggest a lack of focus, while the heavy compartmentalisation of the programme suggests such strands remained little more than pet projects for Contreras at Lo Curro, then Huber at Talagante. Moreover, although the full scale of use is unlikely to ever be confirmed, a review of reported DINA victims shows a mixed picture on target selection. On one hand, many DINA victims appear to have been poisoned in DINA-run clinics, where – in addition to physical and psychological torture – drugs and medication were misused to interrogate and finally kill victims. On the other hand, the erratic use of CBW by the Mulchén brigade to poison victims appears to be indicative of a small group of people working in a high-stress environment. All reported instances of poisonings remain highly debated, with the few credibly reported instances seemingly conducted out of sadism and/or a need for personal prestige in demonstrating the capability.

Similarly, DINE operations at Bacteriológico and the Army Diagnostics Laboratory appear small scale and limited in scope. DINE interest appears to have included both a small programme to weaponise botulinum toxin, and a small anthrax vaccination programme. However, just as ANDREA appears to have seen limited use, use of botulinum toxin appears limited with the sole reported instance taking place against political prisoners already in custody. Such use had little practical value especially given the widespread use of torture and undocumented disappearances at this time. The reported interest in the anthrax vaccine is also curious given that such vaccines were also commercially available at this time.¹⁶⁵

Both DINA and DINE operated were highly compartmentalised, as seen by Contreras’ attempt to murder General Mena; the destruction of evidence related to the Mulchén Brigade during the DINA’s re-organisation; and the failure to engage with Chile’s domestic arms industry in developing CW munitions. Similarly, knowledge of the DINE’s Army Diagnostics Laboratory only came to light in 2004, over 20 years after the fall of the Pinochet regime. Nonetheless, despite this compartmentalisation, there appears to have been a degree of coordination between involved units, as seen through the transfer of specialists such as Berríos between organisations.

Although the broad contours of Chile’s CBW historical interest are available, there remains considerable variation in levels of reporting. Part of this stems from the highly secretive nature of the programme, but also the considerable lengths taken by the junta to conceal its clandestine activities. This included the establishment of ‘Casualty Control System’, by the Army Intelligence Battalion (Batallón de Inteligencia del Ejército: BIE).¹⁶⁶ BIE used the old Condor network to hide agents in danger of being exposed to justice, or kill those who may betray the regime. BIE victims include Berríos whose partial remains were found on the Uruguayan beach of El Pinar, a resort near to the capital of Montevideo. Berríos had been hidden away in Uruguay before he could testify in the Letelier murder, was deemed to be a liability and was murdered. On 13 April 1995, he was found handcuffed and dumped face-down in the sand as befitting a traitor.¹⁶⁷ Similarly, after being stationed at Talagante, General Huber moved to the Army’s Logistics Directorate, overseeing the purchase and sale of weapons for the regime. In 1992, Huber was kidnapped and murdered at the EIE site in Nos before he was able to testify on illegal arms sales to Croatia.¹⁶⁸ Given these efforts to conceal illicit activities, beyond the broad outlines, it is unclear if the full extent of Chile’s historical aspirations or activities will ever be fully understood.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to express his gratitude to both Glenn Cross and Seth Carus for their invaluable feedback on previous drafts of this article. The author would also like to thank Gunnar Jeremias for his assistance in researching Chile’s international declarations, and Stephan Blancke for his assistance in researching Colonia Dignidad. All errors are the authors own.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Karl Dewey

Karl Dewey is a Research Associate at the Centre for Science and Security Studies (CSSS), based in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London.

Notes

1. The author would like to thank to Glen Cross for this astute observation.

2. teleSUR, “Chile Convicts Dictatorship’s Ex-Agents for Poisoning Prisoners,” teleSUR (Online) 2021, https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Chile-Convicts-Dictatorships-Ex-Agents-for-Poisoning-Prisoners-20210203–0001.html.

3. Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassissified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability New York: The New Press, 2013.

4. Edward C. Snyder, “The Dirty Legal War: Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Chile 1973–1995,” Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law 2, no. 2 (March 1995): 261, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/232682936.pdf.

5. Office of the Historian, “Outcome of 4 March 1973 Chilean Congressional Elections,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–16, Documents on Chile, 1969–1973 Document 133. Memorandum for the 40 Committee. Washington, April 6, 1973

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve16/d133

6. Mary Helen Spooner, Soldiers in a Narrow Land: The Pinochet Regime in Chile. London: University of California Press, 1999. 92

7. John Dinges and Saul Landau, Assassination on Embassy Row. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980.

8. Spooner, Soldiers in a Narrow Land, 93

9. According to the 1991 National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation that investigated the Junta’s human rights abuses, over 2,000 victims of human rights violations were documented with 1,068 people confirmed killed, and a further 957 people who disappeared after their arrest. Though authoritative, organisations such as the International Commission of Jurists assert that the Commission under-reported the extent of human rights’ abuse because its brief ‘was limited to human rights violations resulting in death, [and] official statistics do not exist on the number of credible allegations of torture, of those arbitrarily detained or imprisoned without due process and fair trial’ [emphasis in original]. Because of the limited remit, other estimates suggest that as many as 42,486 people were detained by government decree between 1973–1976, with a further 40,043 political arrests between 1976–1989.

For official estimates, see Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación, Informe de la Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliatión, Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación (Santiago, 1991), https://bibliotecadigital.indh.cl/handle/123456789/170.

For critiques of official estimates, see International Commission of Jurists, Chile: A Time of Reckoning – Human Rights and the Judiciary Centre for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers (Geneva, September 1992), https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/1992/01/Chile-time-of-reckoning-thematic-report-1992-eng.pdf.

For upper estimates, see Vicariate of Solidarity, Algunas Cifras sobre Atentados a los Derechos Humanos Durante el Regimen Militar, Unpublished (Santiago, 1990). Cited in Jurists, A Time of Reckoning, 48–49.

10. M.L. Pratt, “Overwriting Pinochet: Undoing the Culture of Fear in Chile,” in The Places of History: Regionalism Revisited in Latin America Durham: Duke University Press, 1999, 26.

11. Ginter, Kevin. “Latin American Intelligence Services and the Transition to Democracy”. Journal of Intelligence History, 2008: 69–93.

12. Dinges and Landau, Embassy Row, 125.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Decree 517, published in Official Gazette, December 31, 1973 cited in Dinges and Landau, Embassy Row, 126. For more details on the DINA’s establishment, also see Chapter 4, ‘Dirty Warriors’, in Spooner, Soldiers in a Narrow Land.

16. Kornbluh. The Pinochet File

17. Dinges and Landau, Embassy Row.

18. Ibid., 128.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., 133.

21. Kornbluh. The Pinochet File

22. Huneeus, Carlos. The Pinochet Regime. London: Lynne Renner Press, 2007, 50 - cited in Ginter, ‘Latin American Intelligence Services’.

23. Kornbluh. The Pinochet File, 167

24. Kornbluh. The Pinochet File, 173

25. Ginter, “Latin American Intelligence Services,” 84.

26. Gregory Weeks, “A Preference for Deference: reforming the military’s intelligence role in Argentina, Chile and Peru”. Third World Quarterly, 2008: 45–61, 49–50

27. Jurists, A Time of Reckoning, 58.

28. For more information on Operation Condor, see Kornbluh, The Pinochet File

29. Reports that Berrios approached Libya to sell sarin also remain unsubstantiated. For claims see Mónica González, ‘Las armas químicas de Pinochet’, CIPER, August 22, 2013.

30. Samuel Blixen, “Pinochet’s Mad Scientist,” Transnational Institute, January 13, 1999, https://www.tni.org/en/article/pinochets-mad-scientist.

31. Dinges and Landau, Embassy Row, 132.

32. Taylor Branch and Eugene M Propper, Labyrinth: The Sensational Story of International Intrigue in the Search for the Assassins of Orlando Letelier Harrisonburg, Virginia: Penguin, 1983, 62.

33. Jurists, A Time of Reckoning, 58.

34. For more details on the DINA structure, see Kornbluh. The Pinochet File, 168 and Department of Defense Information Report, cited in Kornbluh pp.192–96.

35. González, “Las armas químicas de Pinochet”.

36. Ibid.

37. Villa Grimaldi – Corporación Parque por la Paz, ‘Estructura Represiva – Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (DINA) en Villa Grimaldi’, [Repressive Structure – National Intelligence Directorate (DINA) in Villa Grimaldi] ed. organigrama_dina_final.pdf (Online: Villa Grimaldi – Corporación Parque por la Paz, 2014). https://villagrimaldi.cl/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/organigrama_dina_final.pdf.

38. Rodrigo Alvarado, “La historia íntima del secreto mejor guardado de la Dictadura,” [The intimate history of the best kept secret of the Dictatorship] The Clinic, July 3, 2012, https://www.theclinic.cl/2012/07/03/la-historia-intima-del-secreto-mejor-guardado-de-la-dictadura/.

39. Jorge Escalante and Javier Rebolledo, “Los ‘delfines’ que exterminaron al PC,” La Nación, April 1 2007, https://www.memoriaviva.com/Boletin/boletin159.pdf.

40. Named after a volcano god in the Mapuche language.

41. González, “Las armas químicas de Pinochet”.

42. Memoria Viva, “Recinto DINA Vía Naranja No 4275, Lo Curro, Santiago,” [DINA Campus Vía Naranja No 4275, Lo Curro, Santiago] in Memoria Viva (Online, Undated). http://www.memoriaviva.com/Centros/00Metropolitana/recinto_Dina_via_naranja_no_4275_lo_curro.htm.

43. Dinges and Landau, Embassy Row; Branch and Propper, Labyrinth.

44. Dinges and Landau, Embassy Row, 129.

45. Ibid.; Branch and Propper, Labyrinth.

46. David Burnham, ‘Letelier Killers’s Link to Other Plots Hinted’, The New York Times (Online), March 8 1979, https://www.nytimes.com/1979/03/08/archives/letelier-killers-link-to-other-plots-hinted-pleabargaining.html.

47. Jorge Molina Sanhueza, Crimen Imperfecto: Historia del químico DINA Eugenio Berrios y la muerte de Eduardo Frei Montalva [Imperfect Crime: History of the DINA chemist Eugenio Berrios and the death of Eduardo Frei Montalva] Santiago de Chile: LOM Ediciones, 2002)

Manuel Salazar Salvo, ‘El Químico de la DINA que Producía Cocaína y Das Tóxico’, [The DINA Chemist who Produced Cocaine and Toxic Gas] Interferencia (Online), July 1 2019, https://interferencia.cl/articulos/el-quimico-de-la-dina-que-producia-cocaina-y-gas-toxico.

48. FBI, Report on Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA), Online: The National Security Archive, George Washington University, 1982.

49. Though limited in use, the term ‘ANDREA’ is not unique to Townley and has been recognised by other members of the Mulchén Brigade. For example, according to Alejandra Damiani, Townley’s secretary, after the investigation into the murder of Orlando Letelier and his American co-worker Ronni Moffitt began to exert ever-greater pressure on the DINA, she received orders ‘that it was necessary to review the papers that were in Lo Curro to make documentation disappear – secret, papers linked to some operations that the DINA had carried out, such as Operation Andrea’. When asked what was meant by Operation Andrea, Damiani replied ‘The aforementioned Operation Andrea consisted of testing a chemical product that, applied to the face, could cause fatal injuries when breathed in. I understand that it caused convulsions and ultimately led to death’. This description appears to depict the live testing of sarin undertaken by Townley at the Simón Bolívar barracks. Testimony by Damiani, cited in González, ‘Las armas químicas de Pinochet’.

50. FBI, Report on the DINA, 1.

51. Molina Sanhueza, Crimen Imperfecto

52. Jorge Escalante, “Tras los pasos del gas sarín,” La Nación (Online), November 12 2006, http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/chile/doc/sarin.html

53. FBI, Report on the DINA, 2.

54. Ibid.

55. Branch and Propper, Labyrinth, 318.

56. Mónica González, “En 1978, la DINA planeó envenenar el agua de Buenos Aires,” [In 1978, the DINA planned to poison the water of Buenos Aires] Clarín (Online), October 19 2002, http://www.lanacion.com.ar/442030-chile-planeo-un-ataque-biologico-en-1978.

57. Molina Sanhueza, Crimen Imperfecto, 39.

58. González, “Las armas químicas de Pinochet”.

59. Branch and Propper, Labyrinth.

60. Ibid., 309.

61. Ibid.

62. Jonathan Franklin, “Pinochet ‘sold cocaine to Europe and US’,” The Guardian (Online), July 11 2006, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jul/11/chile.drugstrade

63. ”Commune head sentenced for child torture,” The Sydney Morning Herald (Online), July 12 2008, https://www.smh.com.au/world/commune-head-sentenced-for-child-torture-20080712-3dx1.html.

64. Bruce Falconer, “The Torture Colony,” The American Scholar, September 1, 2008, https://theamericanscholar.org/the-torture-colony/.

65. Maier, Dieter, and Jan Stehle. “Hinter den sieben Bergen, bei den sieben Zwergen: Colonia Dignidad – Der Mord mit dem Giftapfel [Behind the seven mountains, with the seven dwarfs: Colonia Dignidad – The murder with the poisoned apple]”. Latein Amerika-Nachrichten, January 2009.

66. Manuel Salazar Salvo, “El secreto de Berrios: Sangre y Cocaína en los Servicios de Inteligencia,” [Berrios’ secret: Blood and Cocaine in the Intelligence Services] Rebelión (Online), May 25 2006, https://rebelion.org/el-secreto-de-berrios-sangre-y-cocaina-en-los-servicios-de-inteligencia/. Notably, Townley purchased his equipment for ANDREA under the fictitious company ‘Prosin Ltd’. See Kornbluh, The Pinochet File, 179.

67. González, “Las armas químicas de Pinochet”.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid. In addition to providing laboratory equipment for Townley, von Arnswaldt appears to have been a fixer for the DINA. According to Propper, Townley met von Arnswaldt ‘his contact at [Chile’s national airline] LAN Chile’, in Frankfurt, as part of his tasking to kill Carlos Altamirano. See Branch and Propper, Labyrinth, 305.

70. González, “Las armas químicas de Pinochet”.

71. Ibid.

72. Mónica González, “Todas las muertes conducen a Berríos,” [All deaths lead to Berríos] CIPER, 8 December, 2009, https://www.ciperchile.cl/2009/12/08/todas-las-muertes-conducen-a-berrios/.

See also testimony of the Lo Curro gardener José Eleazar Lagos Ruiz, cited in Juan Cristobal Peña, “Lo Curro: Un Cuartel Familiar,” [Lo Curro: A Family Barracks] in Los Archivos del Cardenal: Casos Reales, [The Cardinal’s Files: Real Cases] ed. Nicolás Acuña, Andrea Insunza, and Javier Ortega (Santiago: Catalonia-UDP Journalism, 2011).

73. González, “Las armas químicas de Pinochet”.

74. See testimony by Damiani, footnote xlix.

75. Alvarado, “La historia íntima del secreto mejor guardado de la Dictadura”.

76. Townley, cited in El Mostrador, “Exclusivo: Descubren laboratorio de guerra bacteriológica del Ejército,” [Exclusive: Army Germ Warfare Laboratory Discovered] El Mostrador (Online), September 27 2004, https://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2004/09/27/exclusivo-descubren-laboratorio-de-guerra-bacteriologica-del-ejercito/.

77. González, “Las armas químicas de Pinochet”.

78. Kornbluh, The Pinochet File, 179.

79. Samuel Blixen, “Uruguay: Berríos the Bothersome Biochemist,” in Crime in Uniform: Corruption and Impunity in Latin America, ed. Theo Ronken Amsterdam, Holland; Cochabamba, Bolivia: Transnational Institute (TNI); Acción Andina, 1997.

80. “Historia De Las Fábricas Y Maestranzas Del Ejército”, [History of the Army Factories and Workshops] FAMAE, 2019, accessed November 23, 2022, http://www.famae.cl/historia-de-las-fabricas-y-maestranzas-del-ejercito/.

81. John M. Goshko, Laura A. Keirnan, and Charles R. Babcock, “Nerve Gas Brought Into U.S. In Letelier Plot, Townley Says,” The Washington Post, December 13 1981, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/12/13/nerve-gas-brought-into-us-in-letelier-plot-townley-says/.

82. Blixen, “Pinochet’s Mad Scientist”.

83. Myriam Carmen Pinto, “Téngase Presente: El Olvidado Mártir del Poder Judicial y su Sentencia de Muerte,” Crónica Digital (Online), October 26 2016, https://www.cronicadigital.cl/2016/10/26/tengase-presente-el-olvidado-martir-del-poder-judicial-y-su-sentencia-de-muerte/.

84. Molina Sanhueza, Crimen Imperfecto, 62.

85. For more details on this, see Branch and Propper, Labyrinth.

86. Matei, Florina Cristiana, and Andrés de Castro Garcia. “Chilean Intelligence after Pinochet: Painstaking Reform of an Inauspicious Legacy”. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 2017: 340–367.

87. González, “Las armas químicas de Pinochet”.

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid.

90. Ibid.

91. Jonathan Franklin, “Pinochet ‘sold cocaine to Europe and US’”.

92. González, “Las armas químicas de Pinochet”.

93. Molina Sanhueza, Crimen Imperfecto, 63.

94. Ibid.

95. Arnaldo Pérez Guerra, “Los venenos de la Dictadura,” Rebelión (Online), March 13 2014, https://rebelion.org/los-venenos-de-la-dictadura-2/.

96. Ibid.

97. González, “Las armas químicas de Pinochet”.

98. Salazar Salvo, “El secreto de Berrios”.

99. Manuel Salazar Salvo, “Roto el pacto de silencio en la Inteligencia Militar,” [Breaking the pact of silence in Military Intelligence] Punto Final (Online), March 24 2006, https://web.archive.org/web/20071008204231/http:/www.puntofinal.cl/611/rotoelpactodesilencio.htm.

100. Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence (SVR) Report, Russian Federation: Foreign intelligence service report – A new challenge after the Cold War: Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, translated by JPRS (United States: JPRS, March 5 1993), https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=QeLvw2VAYNMC&dq=93WP0089A++A+New+Challenge+After+the+Cold+War%3A+Proliferation+of+Weapons+of+Mass+Destruction&q=, 104

101. Ibid.

102. Regarding biological weapons, the SVR report notes ‘There is no reliable information about work in this area’.

103. Salazar Salvo, “El secreto de Berrios”.

104. Patricio Aylwin, Television Nacional de Chile. Broadcast 29 January 1993. Cited in ‘Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin’, ed. Matthew Meselson and Julian Perry Robinson Washington D.C.: Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, March 1993.

105. Michael Wines, “After The War: Chemical Arms; Navy Report Asserts Many Nations Seek or Have Poison Gas “The New York Times, March 10 1991, https://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/10/world/after-war-chemical-arms-navy-report-asserts-many-nations-seek-have-poison-gas.html.

106. Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief 1B89042, Congressional Research Service (Washington D.C., 1990). Cited in ‘Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin’.

107. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Chemical and Biological Weapons: Possession and Programs Past and Present, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Online, March 2008), https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/2008-Chemical-and-Biological-Weapons_-Possession-and-Programs-Past-and-Present.pdf.

108. Dewey, Karl. “Poisonous affairs: Russia’s evolving use of poison in covert operations”. Nonproliferation Review, 2023.

109. Goshko, Keirnan, and Babcock, “Nerve Gas Brought Into U.S. In Letelier Plot, Townley Says”.

110. Jorge Molina Sanhueza, “El último secreto del crimen de Soria abre la puerta para condenar a brigadier (R) Lepe,” La Nación (Online), August 21 2006, https://memoriaviva.com/~memoriav/criminales/criminales_r/rios_san_martin_jose_remigio.htm.

111. Ibid.

112. González, “Las armas químicas de Pinochet”.

In addition to Callejas’ testimony, rumours began to emerge about Lo Curro. For example, local Plumber Martín Melián González, testified that he had ‘heard tales of a man who came one afternoon and they [DINA inhabitants of the house] applied something that I don’t know about and he began to shake and died … . Based on news about a Mr. Soria … I concluded that he could be the same person who had died in the Lo Curro house’. See González, cited in Peña, ‘Lo Curro: Un Cuartel Familiar’.

113. Branch and Propper, Labyrinth, 322.

114. Hector Tobar, “Was Pablo Neruda poisoned? Who was the ‘doctor’ at the scene?,” Los Angeles Times (Online), June 3 2013, https://www.latimes.com/books/la-xpm-2013-jun-03-la-et-jc-a-murder-mystery-in-pablo-nerudas-death-20130603-story.html.

115. BBC News, “Unravelling the mystery of Pablo Neruda’s death,” BBC News, April 8 2013, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-22027787.

116. Associated Press, “Neruda Assassin ‘Dr. Price’s’ Description Matches Michael Townley,” Latin Open Magazine (Online), June 2 2013, https://latinopen.wordpress.com/2013/06/02/neruda-assassin-dr-prices-description-matches-michael-townley/.

117. Dinges and Landau, Embassy Row.

118. Adam Feinstein, “Pablo Neruda poisoning doubts fuelled by new forensic tests,” The Guardian (Online), June 5 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/jun/05/pablo-neruda-poisoning-doubts-fuelled-by-new-forensic-tests.

119. Laura Wagner, “Chile Says It’s Possible That Poet Pablo Neruda Was Murdered,” NPR (Online), November 6 2015, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/11/06/455029171/chile-says-its-possible-that-poet-pablo-neruda-was-murdered?t=1658478392406.

120. Michelle Donovan, “Was Pablo Neruda poisoned? New analysis shows covert assassination remains a possibility in Chilean poet-politician’s mysterious death,” Brighter World (online), February 15 2023,

https://brighterworld.mcmaster.ca/articles/pablo-neruda-assassination-botulism-poinar/

121. Sam Jones and John Bartlett, “ Forensic study finds Chilean poet Pablo Neruda was poisoned,” The Guardian (Online), February 14 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2023/feb/14/forensic-study-finds-chilean-poet-pablo-neruda-was-poisoned-says-nephew

122. Clare Roth, “Pablo Neruda’s death: Why the science is inconclusive,” Deutsche Welle (Online), February 20 2023, https://www.dw.com/en/pablo-nerudas-death-why-the-science-is-inconclusive/a-64745264

123. González, “Todas las muertes conducen a Berríos”.

124. González, “Las armas químicas de Pinochet”.

125. El Mostrador, “Suprema confirma expulsión del Colegio Médico de exdirector de la siniestra Clínica London de la DINA que había pedido su reingreso,” [Supreme Court confirms College expulsion of former director of sinister DINA London Clinic who requested reinstatment] El Mostrador (Online), March 5 2019, https://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2019/03/05/suprema-confirma-expulsion-del-colegio-medico-de-exdirector-de-la-siniestra-clinica-london-de-la-dina-que-habia-pedido-su-reingreso/.

126. Jorge Molina Sanhueza, “Con bajas dosis de Talio y gas mostaza durante varios meses asesinaron a Frei,” [Frei was assassinated with low doses of thallium and mustard gas for several months], El Mostrador (Online) December 7 2009, https://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2009/12/07/con-bajas-dosis-de-talio-y-gas-mostaza-durante-varios-meses-asesinaron-a-frei/.

127. Reuters, “Chile court overturns convictions for 1982 murder of former president Frei,” The Guardian (Online), January 25 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/25/chile-court-murder-pinochet-era-president-frei.

128. Branch and Propper, Labyrinth.

129. Escalante, “Tras los pasos del gas sarín”.

130. Carmen Pinto, ‘Téngase Presente’. González, ‘Todas las muertes conducen a Berríos’.

131. Carmen Pinto, “Téngase Presente”.

132. González, “Las armas químicas de Pinochet”.

133. Ibid.

134. Ibid.

135. Ibid.

136. Jorge Molina Sanhueza, ”Cuando Hipócrates dio vuelta la cara: El ex-presidente Frei estuvo en manos de médicos de Pinochet,” Nación Domingo (Online) 2006, https://rebelion.org/el-ex-presidente-frei-estuvo-en-manos-de-medicos-de-pinochet/.

137. Alvarado, “La historia íntima del secreto mejor guardado de la Dictadura”.

138. Molina, “Cuando Hipócrates dio vuelta la cara”.

139. See testimony in Michael J. Lazzara, Luz Arce and Pinochet’s Chile: Testimony in the Aftermath of State Violence Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2011. Also see Alvarado, ‘La historia íntima del secreto mejor guardado de la Dictadura’.

140. Molina Sanhueza, “Cuando Hipócrates dio vuelta la cara”.

141. Ibid.

142. Ibid.

143. Ibid.

144. Alvarado, “La historia íntima del secreto mejor guardado de la Dictadura”.

145. Ibid.

146. “El trágico final del ex marido de Paulina Veloso,” La Nación (Online), October 14 2007, http://www.memoriaviva.com/Desaparecidos/D-J/jaccard_siegler_alexei_vladimir.htm.

147. Ibid.

148. Mostrador, “Descubren laboratorio de guerra bacteriológica del Ejército”.

149. Pérez Guerra, “Los venenos de la Dictadura”.

150. Mostrador, “Descubren laboratorio de guerra bacteriológica del Ejército”.

151. For example, see Franklin, ‘Pinochet “sold cocaine to Europe and US”’.

152. teleSUR, “Chile Convicts Dictatorship’s Ex-Agents for Poisoning Prisoners”.

153. Pérez Guerra, “Los venenos de la Dictadura”.

154. Ibid.

155. Mostrador, “Descubren laboratorio de guerra bacteriológica del Ejército”.

156. Pérez Guerra, ‘Los venenos de la Dictadura’.

157. Mauricio Weibel, “Pinochet dispuso de toxinas para eliminar a miles de personas durante la dictadura,” El Mundo (Online), August 22 2013, https://www.elmundo.es/america/2013/08/22/noticias/1377168848.html.

158. Ibid.

159. Pérez Guerra, “Los venenos de la Dictadura”.

160. Mostrador, “Descubren laboratorio de guerra bacteriológica del Ejército”.

161. Ibid.

162. Ibid.

163. Reuters, “Chile court overturns convictions for 1982 murder of former president Frei”.

164. Ibid.

165. Andrew W. Artenstein, “Chapter 18 - Vaccines for Military Application,” in Vaccines for Biodefense and Emerging and Neglected Diseases, ed. Alan D. T. Barrett and Lawrence R. Stanberry London: Academic Press, 2009.

166. Salazar Salvo, “Pacto de silencio”.

167. Blixen, “Pinochet’s Mad Scientist”.

168. “Huber habría estado secuestrado en la Escuela de Inteligencia del Ejército”, [Huber would have been kidnapped at the Army Intelligence School] El Mostrador (Online), November 29 2005, https://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2005/11/29/huber-habria-estado-secuestrado-en-la-escuela-de-inteligencia-del-ejercito/.