Overt action: congressional oversight, private activism and Afghan covert action policy in the Reagan administration

ABSTRACT

Intelligence scholars routinely portray intelligence oversight as a means of restraining intelligence activities, particularly covert operations. The consensus overlooks situations where oversight can instead channel popular passions. This paper documents how Reagan era activists recruited legislators to the Afghan resistance cause. Their legislative-civic alliance demanded the CIA launch more aggressive operations in Afghanistan, sidelining established oversight committees. The resulting covert action campaign risked Soviet escalation, eliminated plausible deniability, and gave advanced U.S. technology to potential terrorists. This episode highlights how well-organized lobbyists may affect the intelligence agenda and challenges assumptions that wider engagement in oversight will always restrain intelligence agencies’ overreach.

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to Jon and Rebecca Brumley and the Brumley NextGen Graduate Fellowship program at the Strauss Center for International Security and Law for funding the research for this paper. Dr. Mark A. Lawrence, Dr. Eleanor Williams and other participants in the North American Society for Intelligence History (NASIH) Graduate Writing Group, and two anonymous reviewers were instrumental in helping to shape the final paper and its arguments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

1. Roller, et. al., “Civic Intelligence Oversight”, 189–204, 189.

2. Kniep, et. al, “Towards Democratic Intelligence Oversight”, 2.

3. Paicu, “Data-Driven Security and Democratic Intelligence”, 711.

4. Matei, “The Media’s Role in Intelligence Democratization”, 73–108.

5. Zegart, Eyes on Spies, 94.

6. McCubbins and Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked”, 165–179.

7. Zegart, Eyes on Spies, 73.

8. Ibid., 76.

9. L. Britt Snyder, Sharing Secrets with Lawmakers, 56–7.

10. Ibid., 88–9.

11. Zegart, Eyes on Spies,

12. Johnson, 212–213.

13. Johnson, Spy Watching, 462.

14. Hillebrand, “The Role of News Media in Intelligence”, 693.

15. Hall and Deardorff, “Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy’.

16. Gregg, ‘Congress and the Directorate of Operations’, 31.

17. See Carson, Secret Wars, 47–49.

18. Gates, From the Shadows, 146.

19. Carlucci to Aaron, January 26, 1979.

20. Gates, From the Shadows, 146.

21. Author interview, February 20, 2019.

22. Carter told NSC members that ‘he was convinced we will not be able to get the Soviets to pull out of Afghanistan, but Soviet actions over the next 10 to 20 years will be colored by our behavior in this crisis’. NSC Minutes, January 2, 1980.

23. Welch and Westad, “Nobel Symposium 95”, 143–144.

24. Riedel, What We Won, 120.

25. Kemp and Raymond, “Afghanistan”.

26. Bolsinger, ‘Deception and Manipulation in an Intelligence Liaison Relationship’, 57.

27. Carson, Secret Wars, 238–282.

28. Zegart, Eyes on Spies, 72.

29. Asia Society, “Organizations”, 2–4.

30. Burke, Revolutionaries for the Right, 164.

31. Central Intelligence Agency Director William Casey claimed Singlaub’s ideas had influenced Reagan’s message. Burke, Revolutionaries for the Right, 125. Reagan, ‘State of the Union’.

32. Goodman “Speaking for Ourselves”.

33. Fitzgibbon, US Politics, Propaganda and the Afghan Mujahedeen, 47.

34. Burke, Revolutionaries for the Right, 166.

35. Lundberg, “Politics of a Covert Action’, 20.

36. Blair, “FAAA Lobbying Guide”.

37. The author worked in Lantos’ Capitol Hill office in 1983 and attended Caucus hearings on both topics. See also King, “The Human Rights Legacy of Congressman Tom Lantos”.

38. Crile, Charlie Wilson’s War, 326.

39. Congress.gov. Accessed May 4, 2019. Some HPSCI and SSCI members did propose Afghan legislation either before joining or after leaving intelligence committees. For example, Congressman Bill McCollum introduced his ‘McCollum Flight’ amendment in 1985 and was appointed to HPSCI in 1987. Congressman Bob Livingston left the HPSCI in 1986 and introduced the ‘Freedom Fighter Assistance Act’ the next year.

40. Author’s tally, drawn from Congress.gov; Crile, Charlie Wilson’s War, 327.

41. ‘Afghan Arms Cutoff’. It’s entirely possible that Senator Bradley was not fully briefed on the full extent of the CIA’s Afghan Program.

42. Jacoby, “Liberalism’s Debt to Paul Tsongas”.

43. Raymond, “Letter to McFarlane”.

44. Lundberg, “Politics of A Covert Action”, 18.

45. Gries, “The CIA and Congress: Uneasy Partners”, 81.

46. Smist, Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community, 229.

47. Ibid., 78.

48. Ott, “Partisanship and the Decline of Intelligence Oversight”, 76. By way of comparison, former CIA Inspector General L. Britt Snyder reports that the Agency provided 188 substantive briefings to legislators in 1975 and only 420 in 1979. Snider, Sharing Secrets with Lawmakers.

49. Interview with author, March 15, 2022.

50. Ritch, Hidden War, 40–41.

51. U.S. Senate, S.Con.Res.74, 98^th Congress.

52. Oberdorfer, “Despite Doubts on Effectiveness”; Rogers, ‘House Panel Votes to Give Afghan Rebels $50 Million’.

53. Crile, Charlie Wilson’s War, 263.

54. Eiva, “Action Needed”.

55. ‘1984 Democratic Party Platform’; ‘1984 Republican Party Platform’.

56. Oberdorfer, “Despite Doubts on Effectiveness”.

57. McMahon had disciplined Cannistraro and removed him as Chief of the unit supporting the Contras after journalists discovered fighters had been provided with ‘assassination manuals’. Crile, Charlie Wilson’s War, 334.

58. Baitenmann, “NGOs and the Afghan War”, 79.

59. Lundberg, “Politics of a Covert Action’, 54.

60. Kuperman, “The Stinger Missile and U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan”, 223.

61. Lundberg, “Politics of a Covert Action”, 41.

62. Cogan, “Partners in Time’, 76.

63. NSC, National Security Decision Directive Number 166, 1.

64. Schweitzer, Victory, 212–213.

65. Rodman, More Precious Than Peace, 330.

66. Roderick, Leading the Charge, 256–261.

67. Woodward, “U.S. Covert Aid to Afghans on the Rise”.

68. Zegart, Eyes on Spies, 51.

69. Van Puyvelde, “Intelligence Accountability and the Role of Public Interest Groups in the United States”.

70. Vickers, By All Means Available, 186.

71. Ibid., 115–138.

72. Woodward, “Covert Aid to Afghans on the Rise”.

73. Lundberg, Politics of a Covert Action, 174.

74. Bearden and Risen, The Main Enemy; Devine, Good Hunting, 94.

75. CBS News, “Charlie Did It”.

76. Kuperman, “The Stinger Missile and U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan”.

77. Weymouth, ‘Moscow’s “Invisible War” of Terror Inside Pakistan’; Rory Cormac, 192.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Research for this paper was funded by Jon and Rebecca Brumley through the Brumley NextGen Graduate Fellowship program at the Strauss Center for International Security and Law. [N/A].

Notes on contributors

Diana I. Bolsinger

Diana I. Bolsingerv., is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Criminal Justice and Security Studies and the former director of the Intelligence and National Security Studies (INSS) graduate program at The University of Texas at El Paso.