‘Vital and irreplaceable facilities’: explaining leverage when states host great powers’ spying operations

ABSTRACT

Great powers use others’ territory for spying. Existing work shows that hosts of spying sometimes enjoy high leverage over great powers in exchange for their cooperation. At other times, hosts wield less leverage. Why? This paper points to the quality of intelligence that great powers glean from a host’s territory and the availability of alternatives to account for this variation. In U.S. spying on the Soviet Union from Iran, changes in these factors during the 1960s caused Iran’s leverage over the United States to increase. U.S. concessions enabled the Shah’s excesses. But the United States retained access to extraordinary intelligence.

Acknowledgements

For their excellent feedback and comments, I wish to thank John Childress, Brendan Doherty, Alexis Lerner, Iris Malone, Andrew Miller, Lorne Teitelbaum, participants at the 2022 International Studies Association conference, and my colleagues at a U.S. Naval Academy political science faculty research seminar. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their very constructive suggestions. I also thank the editors of Intelligence and National Security.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Memorandum of Conversation, 27 August 1979, Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS] 1977–1980, Vol. 13, doc. 264.

2. Ibid.

3. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance and Secretary of Defense Brown, 11 July 1979, FRUS 1977–1980, 13, doc. 253.

4. Ibid.

5. Cooley and Spruyt, Contracting States.

6. Sims, “Foreign Intelligence Liaison”.

7. Bolsinger, “Not at Any Price”.

8. Ibid.

9. Long and Green, “Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy”.

10. Coe and Vaynman, “Arms Control”.

11. Bateman, “Trust but Verify”.

12. On states’ decisions to share intelligence with international organizations, see Carnegie and Carson, “The Disclosure Dilemma”.

13. See, among others, Lefebvre, “Difficulties and Dilemmas,” 534; Sims, “Foreign Intelligence Liaison,” 203–204.

14. Walsh, Politics of Intelligence Sharing, 19–20.

15. Bock, “Anglo-Soviet Intelligence Cooperation”; Brown and Farrington, “Depth of Intelligence Sharing”. For a useful and wide-ranging review of this literature, see Crawford, “Intelligence Cooperation”.

16. Tuinier, “Depth and Breadth”; Hoffman, “Circulation, Not Cooperation”.

17. Mainwaring and Aldrich, “Empire of Signals Intelligence,“ 60.

18. O’Neil, “The ‘Five Eyes’”, 529–43.

19. Odinga, “’We Recommend Compliance’”.

20. Bolsinger, “Not at Any Price”.

21. Ibid., 58–59.

22. Sims, “Foreign Intelligence Liaison,” 198.

23. Cooley and Spruyt, Contracting States, 26–27.

24. Ibid., 105–112.

25. Lake, “Anarchy and Hierarchy,” 14.

26. Cooley and Spruyt, Contracting States, 106.

27. Ibid., 109.

28. Ibid., 112–136.

29. Hanyok, Spartans in Darkness, 73.

30. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, 11 February 1967, FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 24, doc. 327.

31. Richelson, “Calculus of Intelligence Cooperation”.

32. Sims, “Foreign Intelligence Liaison”.

33. Cherry, “Intelligence and the Shah”.

34. Richelson, Wizards of Langley, 34.

35. Richelson, Wizards of Langley, 86.

36. Bernard, Telemetry Part One, 10. I follow the pagination at the bottom of the pages of Bernard’s manuscript, available at https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012–001-doc-1-part-1.pdf and https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012–001-doc-1-part-2.pdf.

37. Wheelon, “Technology and Intelligence,” 248.

38. Ibid.

39. Helms, Look Over My Shoulder, 417.

40. Bernard, Telemetry Part One, 21.

41. Wheelon and Graybeal, “Intelligence”, 4.

42. Ibid., 8–9.

43. Wheelon, “Technology and Intelligence,” 249.

44. Wheelon and Graybeal, “Intelligence,” 7–12.

45. Bernard, Telemetry Part One, 10.

46. Ibid., 24.

47. National Security Council Report, 6 July 1960, FRUS, 1958–1960, 12, doc. 293.

48. Memorandum From Secretary of State Herter to President Eisenhower, 21 April 1960, FRUS, 1958–1960, 12, doc. 289.

49. McGlinchey, US Arms Policies, 18.

50. Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, 103.

51. Richelson, Wizards of Langley, 80.

52. Ibid., 83.

53. Poteat, “Stealth, Countermeasures, and ELINT,” 53.

54. Ibid.

55. Bernard, Telemetry Part One, 47.

56. Ibid.

57. Richelson, Wizards of Langley, 88.

58. Daugherty, Shadow of the Ayatollah, 19–20.

59. Richelson, Wizards of Langley, 88.

60. Buono, “’This Grim Game’”, 849.

61. Zak, “The ‘K’ Project,” 149.

62. Poteat, “Stealth, Countermeasures, and ELINT,” 53; Wheelon, “Technology and Intelligence,” 253.

63. Wheelon, “Technology and Intelligence,” 253.

64. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 2 June 1964, FRUS 1964–1968, 22, doc. 30.

65. Letter From the Shah of Iran to President Johnson, 7 January 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 22, doc. 2.

66. Letter From President Johnson to the Shah of Iran, 19 March 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968, 22, doc. 8.

67. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Jernegan) to Secretary of State Rusk, 20 March 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968, 22, doc. 9.

68. Letter From the Ambassador to Iran (Holmes) to Secretary of State Rusk, 20 May 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968, 22, doc. 24.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson, 4 June 1964, FRUS 1964–1968, 22, doc. 33.

73. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 2 July 1964, FRUS 1964–1968, 22, doc. 46.

74. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran, 2 July 1964, FRUS 1964–1968, 22, doc. 47.

75. McGlinchey, US Arms Policies, 41; Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 27 June 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968, 22, doc. 45.

76. Ibid.

77. Interview with William Green Miller, 10 February 2003, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, 87.

78. Letter From the Ambassador to Iran (Holmes) to Secretary of State Rusk, 20 May 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968, 22, doc. 24.

79. See, e.g., Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran, 25 August 1965, FRUS, 1964–1968, 22, doc. 94.

80. For an example of U.S. concerns regarding Turkey, see Secretary Rusk recommends President Johnson approve the second $50 million increment of U.S. military sales credit to Iran, 12 May 1967, Gale U.S. Declassified Documents Online, doc. no. CK2349001809.

81. Harris, Troubled Alliance, 165.

82. Ibid., 166.

83. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran, 25 August 1965, FRUS, 1964–1968, 22, doc. 94.

84. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 13 September 1965, FRUS, 1964–1968, 22, doc. 100.

85. Memorandum From the Assistant Administrator for Near East and South Asia of the Agency for International Development (Macomber) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Kitchen), 2 February 1966, FRUS, 1964–1968, 22, doc. 118.

86. Presidential approval of foreign assistance commitment to Iran, circa May 1966, Gale U.S. Declassified Documents Online, doc. no. CK2349022284, 3.

87. Emphasis in original; Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, 21 May 1966, FRUS, 1964–1968, 22, doc. 141.

88. Ibid.

89. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, 27 May 1966, FRUS, 1964–1968, 22, doc. 146.

90. McGlinchey, US Arms Policies, 45.

91. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 23 July 1966, FRUS, 1964–1968, 22, doc. 160.

92. Ibid.

93. Letter From Vice Presidential Aide George Carroll to Vice President Humphrey, 27 July 1966, FRUS, 1964–1968, 22, doc. 163.

94. Ibid.

95. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, 29 July 1966, FRUS, 1964–1968, 22, doc. 165.

96. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran, 5 July 1966, FRUS, 1964–1968, 22, doc. 170.

97. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), 16 April 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol E-4, doc. 63.

98. Ibid.

99. Supplementary Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson, 7 June 1968, FRUS, 1964–1968, 22, doc. 291.

100. Memorandum for the Record, 23 August 1967, FRUS, 1964–1968, 22, doc. 230.

101. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson, 7 June 1968, FRUS, 1964–1968, 22, doc. 290.

102. McGlinchey, US Arms Policies, 53.

103. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, 29 April 1968, FRUS, 1964–1968, 22, doc. 281.

104. Ibid.

105. See, e.g., Background Paper Prepared in the Department of State, 15 August 1967, FRUS, 1964–1968, 22, doc. 220.

106. McGlinchey, US Arms Policies, 18.

107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran, 2 July 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968, 22, doc. 47.

108. McGlinchey, US Arms Policies, 47.

109. Ibid., 53.

110. Intelligence Memorandum ER IM 72–79, May 1972, FRUS, 1969–1976, E-4, doc. 181.

111. McGlinchey, US Arms Policies, 53–54.

112. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Hart) to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read), 19 November 1968, FRUS, 1964–1968, 22, doc. 315.

113. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird, 12 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, E-4, doc. 90.

114. Telegram 174651 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran, 23 October 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, E-4, doc. 92.

115. Telegram 5566 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 30 December 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, E-4, doc. 108.

116. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), 16 April 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, E-4, doc. 63.

117. Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger, 16 April 1970, Box 601, National Security Council Files, Country Files – Middle East, Folder [02] IRAN, Vol. II, June 1 – December 1970 [1 of 2], Nixon Presidential Library.

118. Telegram 1247 From the Ambassador in Iran to the Assistant of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs (Sisco), 1 April 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, E-4, doc. 57.

119. Telegram 3144 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 22 July 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, E-4, doc. 78.

120. Takeyh, The Last Shah, 172.

121. Ibid.

122. Johns, “The Johnson Administration,” 69.

123. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 29 April 1967, FRUS, 1964–1968, 22, doc. 191.

124. Rubin, Good Intentions, 158.

125. Ibid., 211.

126. Ibid, 180.

127. Burr and Rosenberg, “Era of Stalemate,” 97–98.

128. NIE 11-8-68, “Soviet Strategic Attack Forces,” 3 October 1968, doc. 0001178232, CIA ERR, 12.

129. Richelson, Wizards of Langley, 149–155; Rovner, Fixing the Facts, 89–112.

130. Richelson, Wizards of Langley, 88.

131. Daugherty, Shadow of the Ayatollah, 31.

132. Coe and Vaynman, “Arms Control”.

133. Rubin, Good Intentions, 187.

134. Poteat, “Stealth, Countermeasures, and ELINT,” 58.

135. Daugherty, Shadow of the Ayatollah, 31.

136. In the 1959 executive agreement, the United States promised “appropriate action … as may be mutually agreed upon” in the event that Iran were attacked. See Lenczowski, ‘United States’ Support,” 55. Thus, the Correlates of War Formal Alliance data set classifies the agreement as an entente, rather than a defense pact. See https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/formal-alliances/.

137. Aldrich, GCHQ, 288–289.

138. Haas and Yarhi-Milo, “Disclose or Deceive?”; Brown, Lupton, and Farrington, “Embedded Deception”; Bolsinger, “Deception and Manipulation”.

139. Mainwaring and Aldrich, “The Secret Empire of Signals Intelligence,” 57.

140. Sullivan, Mission to Iran, 21.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Cullen G. Nutt

Cullen G. Nutt is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the U.S. Naval Academy. His research examines the causes and effects of states’ attempts to act secretly. The views expressed in this article are the author’s and do not reflect the views of the U.S. Naval Academy, Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.