Decentralization, Governance and Capacity Building in Cambodia

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Notes

¹ For more information on the period see Chandler, History of Cambodia, or Chanda, Brother Enemy. Useful resources can also be found from the Yale Cambodia Genocide project at www.yale.edu/cgp

² Despite being largely expelled from the country, the Khmer Rouge was successful in maintaining international recognition of its status as the legitimate government of Cambodia; as a result, the UN declined to provide development aid to the Vietnamese-backed administration that took power in 1979.

³ Officially, the events of 1975–1979 are not regarded as genocide since genocide is defined as an act against an ethnic group other than one's own. However, the systemic nature of the violence in Cambodia was certainly of a scale comparable to the major genocides of the twentieth century.

⁴ Cambodia remains amongst the poorest countries in Asia, comparable to Afghanistan and Timor L’este in its level of economic development.

⁵ The Japan International Cooperation Agency is closely focused on human security issues in Cambodia, more information can be found from http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/policy/reform/human/cambodia.html

⁶ Building functional capacities at the community level remains important in global approaches to participatory development. To a certain extent the focus on local capacity in Cambodia should be seen in the context of broader ideational change within the development community globally, which has seen participatory development techniques applied in most regions of the world. In Cambodia however, local capacity building remains particularly relevant.

⁷ In this context, de-concentration refers to the dispersal of actual decision-making, decentralization by itself does not ensure that decisions are being taken at different levels of government, particularly if limited capacity exists.

⁸ Communes are an important strata of societal organization in Cambodia, typically consisting of around ten villages.

⁹ Further useful statistics are available from www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cb.html

¹⁰ Cambodia Poverty Assessment (The World Bank, 2006). Available from http://www–wds. worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/02/22/000012009_20060222102151/Rendered/PDF/352130REV0pdf.pdf

¹¹ The United Nations Transitional Authority for Cambodia. The Authority was responsible for transitional administration and overseeing elections following the end of the Cambodian civil war in 1993.

¹² Seila means ‘cornerstone’ in the Khmer language. The SEILA programme was designed to be the centrepiece of local development initiatives.

¹³ http://www.seila.gov.kh

¹⁴ United Nations Development Programme.

¹⁵ For more information see http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/asia/cambodia.asp

¹⁶ Previously the Local Development Fund (LDF).

¹⁷ Cambodia's Seila Program: A Decentralized Approach to Rural Development and Poverty Reduction 2004.

¹⁸ Detailed information is available from the US State Department. Particular concern has been expressed about the relationship between corruption and trafficking in both drugs and people.

¹⁹ SEILA is structured on the basis of five year plans for development, the first of which lasted from 1996–2001.

²⁰ Cambodia Poverty Assessment (The World Bank, 2006).

²¹ PLG data can be accessed from UNDP, which is the major sponsoring agency. http://www.un.org.kh/undp/?url=/undp/project_fact_sheet/gov_seila

²² Towards Understanding: Cambodian Villages Beyond War (Nee and Heely, 2003).

²³ Many central government institutions remain comparatively weak, and may not exert full, nationwide, authority.

²⁴ Second Mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Human Rights in Cambodia. A summary can be found through the following link: http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/424e6fc8b8e55fa6802566b0004083d9/89c4eb2be6d9b6c8c125713f007e5e9e/$FILE/Statement%20made%20by%20Yash%20Ghai%20SRSG%202nd%20mission%2028%20March%202006%20final.pdf.