Abstract
This paper argues for a solution to a problem that contrastivism faces. The problem is that contrastivism cannot preserve closure, in spite of claims to the contrary by its defenders. The problem is explained and a response developed.
Notes
[1] I argue this point in Kvanvig (Citation2007).
[2] See Jonathan Schaffer (Citation2004).
[3] See, for example, Keith DeRose (Citation1992) and Stewart Cohen (Citation1998).
[4] Timothy Williamson (Citation2000) proposes the general approach in terms of competent deduction, and the qualifications beyond competent deduction can be found in John Hawthorne (Citation2004).
[5] Schaffer’s most developed approach is contained in “Closure, Contrast, and Answer” (Schaffer Citation2007), defending a closure principle along the lines of C1. His most recent account favours turning the consequent of the closure principle into the claim that a certain individual is in a position to know rather than actually knowing. Since I am not sure what being in a position to know is supposed to involve, I prefer to develop a closure principle not containing this notion, as I attempt here.
[6] See Fred Dretske (Citation1970) and Alvin Goldman (Citation1978).
[7] See Gail Stine (Citation1976).
[8] See Stephen Cade Hetherington (Citation2001).