Implicit Trust in the Space of Reasons and Implications for Technology Design: A Response to Justine Pila

Abstract

In this issue, Pila (2009) has criticised the recommendations made by requirements engineers involved in the design of a grid technology for the support of distributed readings of mammograms made by Jirotka et al. (2005). The disagreement between them turns on the notion of “biographical familiarity” and whether it can be a sound basis for trust for the performances of professionals such as radiologists. In the first two sections, this paper gives an interpretation of the position of each side in this disagreement and their recommendation for the design of technology for distributed reading, and in the third the underlying reasons for this disagreement are discussed. It is argued that Pila, in attempting to make room for mistrust as well as trust, brings to the fore the question of having and reflecting upon reasons for trust or mistrust. Pila holds that biographical familiarity is not a sound reason for trust/mistrust, as it seems to obliterate the possibility of mistrust. In response to her proposal, an analysis is proposed of the forms of trust involved in biographical familiarity. In particular, implicit trust is focused upon—as a form of trust in advance of reasons, and as a form of trust contained (in the logical sense) within other reasons. It is proposed that implicit trust has an important role in establishing an intersubjectively shared world in which what counts as a reason for the acceptability of performances such as readings of X‐rays is established. Implicit trust, therefore, is necessary for professionals to enter into a “space of reasons”. To insist upon judgements made in the absence of the form of implicit trust at play in biographical familiarity is to demand that radiologists (and other relevantly similar professionals) make judgements regarding whether to trust or mistrust on the basis of reasons capable of being reflected upon, but at the same time leave them without reasons upon which to reflect.

Keywords:

• Trust
• Information Technology
• Computer‐mediated Collaborative Work
• Philosophy

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to Mark Hartswood, Marina Jirotka, Giovanni De Grandis, May Thorseth, Bjørn Myskja and audiences at the Templeton Lecture Series on Trust, SUNY, and the James Martin Advanced Seminar Series, University of Oxford for comments on this paper. It goes without saying that the final result reflects only the author’s views, and the limitations thereof.

Notes

[1] E‐Science, otherwise known as cyber‐infrastructure science, is science that is enabled by Internet‐related technologies, such as the Grid or, more recently, the “cloud”. It uses technology to enable distributed access to data, computing resources (such as analytical or interpretational tools, or supercomputing resources), or to other researchers.

[2] See www.myexperiment.org/

[3] Although I have benefited greatly from discussions with Mark Hartswood and Marina Jirotka, the paper should in no way be seen as a response on their behalf, or on behalf of any of the authors of the papers in question, and does not necessarily reflect their views.

[4] In this paper, I deal only with Pila’s comments concerning e‐DiaMoND and not with those concerning CalFlora, as this is a very different kind of application: the first involves work practices among professionals whereas the second involves the activities of amateurs and professionals; in addition, there is nothing in CalFlora that aligns with the responsibility and accountability of healthcare professionals. The scope of consequences of actions and judgements in these two applications make it difficult to cover both in one brief paper on trust.

[5] Interview with members of the requirements team.

[6] This is informed by the Peircean understanding of an indexical sign (Peirce 1931–58, 2.306).

[7] The quotation from Shapin’s A Social History of Truth occurs in the context of a discussion of a “sceptical experiment” describing Shapin’s own work in a genetics laboratory, extracting DNA from mammalian cells (1994, 17). In it Shapin describes the extent to which trust of others for small details—including, for example, the labeller of substances in the laboratory—simply had to be assumed, but, more importantly, that even if he were sceptical, then for each discrete act of scepticism he would have to trust something. Pila takes this not as a descriptive and interpretive account of trust, but as a recommendation of how to arrive at somehow “better” trust practices.

[8] For a criticism of the shift from trust to confidence in healthcare that is relevant to this suggestion, see Smith (2005).

[9] Since the analogy of a literary work has been used, it should be noted that it is not at all clear that this stringently anti‐intentionalist stance is the only possibility for a rich understanding of a work. For example, in literature and other art forms, it is certainly accepted practice that knowledge of other works by the author or artist is relevant to the interpretation of individual works. The form of knowledge in question is also knowledge by acquaintance rather than description, since it is necessary for interpreters actually to have read the other works for themselves. Thus the analogy with literary interpretation could cut both ways.

[10] Garfinkel (1963). See also Jayyusi (1991).

[11] I believe that Pila is picking up on this aspect of the paper by Jirotka et al. (2005) when she claims that a recommendation for maintaining the practices as they are is based on the view that they are “ethical” (Pila 2009, 22) and not open to question by an analyst, a view of which she makes short shrift. It would take more than this paper to unpack that notion, but see for example Jayyusi (1991) and Marcon and Gopal (2008).

[12] See for example Crabtree (2004).

[13] Email correspondence

[14] I am grateful to Mark Hartswood for this point.

[15] See Origgi (2004, 7). Another form of an external account of trust, but this time in an a priori form, is that given by Coady (1992), when he claims that trust is required for a common language: again this is a generic justification for trust, and not a justification of specific instances of trust available to trusters.

[16] See communitarian accounts of trust, such as Kutsch (2002). Note also that this is not a reductive claim; that is, unlike communities of practice proponents, I am neutral on the question whether this is all there is to a reason in a disciplinary or professional domain.

[17] Note that in the quotation from the radiologist above, the speaker becomes more confident about her own performance because she notes alignment with the judgement of another.

[18] See Wittgenstein on rule‐following (1958, 56 ff.).

[19] For example, Bacharach and Gambetta (2001), Luhmann (1988), and Hardwig (1991) among several others.

[20] See for example Pettit (1995); other writers, such as Sztompa (1999), stress the cultural foundations for trust which include socialisation for trusting behaviour.