Abstract
Contrastive epistemologists say knowledge displays the ternary relation “S knows p rather than q”. I argue that “S knows p rather than q” is often equivalent to “S knows p rather than not‐p” and hence equivalent to “S knows p”. The result is that contrastive knowledge is often binary knowledge disguised.
Acknowledgements
My thanks to Darren Bradley and Adam Morton for helpful comments.
Notes
[1] See, for example, Jonathan Schaffer (Citation2004, Citation2005, Citation2008), Adam Morton and Antti Karjalainen (Citation2003, Citation2008), Walter Sinnott‐Armstrong (Citation2004, Citation2006) and Martijn Blaauw (Citation2008). For detractors, see, for example, Duncan Pritchard (Citation2008), Ram Neta (Citation2008), and Jonathan Kvanvig (Citation2007). Articles by Pritchard, Neta, and Morton and Karjalainen appear in a Citation2008 edition of Social Epistemology devoted to contrastive knowledge (volume 22, issue 3).
[4] This inference is legitimate given the following stipulations: S can evidentially eliminate q‐alternatives; and q‐alternatives are small in number. These stipulations are allowed in discussions of closure over contrastive knowledge states. See, for example, Schaffer (Citation2004, Citation2005). The inference is prima facie invalid (replace q).
[5] For discussion about how “wide” contrast classes are, see Walter Sinnott‐Armstrong (Citation2006, 83–97) and Martijn Blaauw (Citation2008).
Schaffer
,
J.
2004
.
From contextualism to contrastivism
.
Philosophical Studies
,
119
:
73
–
103
.
Schaffer
,
J.
2005
.
“
Contrastive knowledge
”
. In
Oxford studies in epistemology
,
Edited by:
Hawthorn
,
J.
and
Gendler
,
T.
235
–
73
.
Oxford
:
Oxford University Press
.
Schaffer
,
J.
2008
.
The contrast sensitivity of knowledge‐ascriptions
.
Social Epistemology
,
22
:
235
–
45
.
Morton
,
A.
and
Karjalainen
,
A.
2003
.
Contrastive knowledge
.
Philosophical Explorations
,
6
:
74
–
89
.
Morton
,
A.
and
Karjalainen
,
A.
2008
.
Contrastivity and indistinguishability
.
Social Epistemology
,
22
:
271
–
80
.
Sinnott‐Armstrong
,
W.
2004
.
“
Classy Pyrrhonism
”
. In
Pyrrhonian skepticism
Edited by:
Sinnott‐Armstrong
,
W.
188
–
207
.
Oxford, Oxford University Press
Sinnott‐Armstrong
,
W.
2006
.
Moral skepticisms
,
Oxford
:
Oxford University Press
.
Blaauw
,
M.
2008
.
Contesting Pyrrhonian contrastivism
.
The Philosophical Quarterly
,
5
:
471
–
8
.
Pritchard
,
D.
2008
.
Contrastivism, scepticism, and evidence
.
Social Epistemology
,
22
:
305
–
23
.
Neta
,
R.
2008
.
Undermining the case for contrastivism
.
Social Epistemology
,
22
:
289
–
304
.
Kvanvig
,
J.
2007
.
Contextualism, contrastivism, relevant alternatives, and closure
.
Philosophical Studies
,
2
:
131
–
40
.
Morton
,
A.
and
Karjalainen
,
A.
2008
.
Contrastivity and indistinguishability
.
Social Epistemology
,
22
:
271
–
80
.
Schaffer
,
J.
2008
.
The contrast sensitivity of knowledge‐ascriptions
.
Social Epistemology
,
22
:
235
–
45
.
Schaffer
,
J.
2008
.
The contrast sensitivity of knowledge‐ascriptions
.
Social Epistemology
,
22
:
235
–
45
.
Morton
,
A.
and
Karjalainen
,
A.
2008
.
Contrastivity and indistinguishability
.
Social Epistemology
,
22
:
271
–
80
.
Schaffer
,
J.
2004
.
From contextualism to contrastivism
.
Philosophical Studies
,
119
:
73
–
103
.
Schaffer
,
J.
2005
.
“
Contrastive knowledge
”
. In
Oxford studies in epistemology
,
Edited by:
Hawthorn
,
J.
and
Gendler
,
T.
235
–
73
.
Oxford
:
Oxford University Press
.
Sinnott‐Armstrong
,
W.
2006
.
Moral skepticisms
,
Oxford
:
Oxford University Press
.
Blaauw
,
M.
2008
.
Contesting Pyrrhonian contrastivism
.
The Philosophical Quarterly
,
5
:
471
–
8
.
Schaffer
,
J.
2004
.
From contextualism to contrastivism
.
Philosophical Studies
,
119
:
73
–
103
.
Schaffer
,
J.
2005
.
“
Contrastive knowledge
”
. In
Oxford studies in epistemology
,
Edited by:
Hawthorn
,
J.
and
Gendler
,
T.
235
–
73
.
Oxford
:
Oxford University Press
.
Pritchard
,
D.
2008
.
Contrastivism, scepticism, and evidence
.
Social Epistemology
,
22
:
305
–
23
.