Contrastive Explanations as Social Accounts

Abstract

Explanatory contrastivists hold that we often explain phenomena of the form p rather than q. In this paper, I present a new, social‐epistemological model of contrastive explanation—accountabilism. Specifically, my view is inspired by social‐scientific research that treats explanations fundamentally as accounts; that is, communicative actions that restore one's social status when charged with questionable behaviour. After developing this model, I show how accountabilism provides a more comprehensive model of contrastive explanation than the causal models of contrastive explanation that are currently en vogue.

Keywords:

• Contrast
• Explanation
• Social Epistemology
• Accountability
• Norms

Notes

[1] Even when these ideas appear to be intersecting, buyer beware: for example, in the special issue of Social Epistemology (vol. 22, no. 3) dedicated to epistemological contrastivism, a promissory note appears in the introductory essay: “Schaffer's view on the use of ‘knows’ … makes contrastivism directly relevant to social epistemology in general, and to topics such as testimony and expertise in particular” (Blaauw 2008, 228). Sadly, none of the contributors saw fit to discuss these issues.

[2] Darwall (2006) has recently made accountability a central feature in his theory of moral and practical reasoning. Comparisons with his view exceed this paper's scope.

[3] Of course, certain factors mitigate account‐giving in this manner; for example, when account‐givers perceive their audiences as lacking legitimate authority, refusals tend to eclipse reason‐giving behaviours such as excuses and justifications (Lerner and Tetlock 1999).

[4] See the Appendices for a more thorough treatment.

[5] More concrete versions of these examples can be culled from Achinstein (1983); Kitcher (1989); Risjord (2000); Ruben (1990); Thalos (2002); van Fraassen (1980). Not all of these examples are explicitly contrastive, but I submit that they can be rendered so without loss of meaning.

[6] See the Introduction for relevant references.

[7] Others who are at least as permissive as I am include Churchland (1989), Harman (1986) and Lycan (1988).

[8] Closely related to this problem is the problem of explanatory symmetries. Space prohibits addressing it here, but my reply is akin to Richardson (1995).