On the Use of the Culture Concept in the Indigenous Psychologies: Reply to Hwang and Liu

Abstract

The culture concept used in the indigenous psychologies is important since these psychologies aim to be rooted in the local culture of the research participants. Culture is an empirical phenomenon. Thus, the extent to which meaning content is shared in a society, and by what categories of people, is an empirical issue. It should not be solved by default by the use of a culture concept that assumes that all cultural content is shared. The philosophical and pragmatic–political reasons suggested by Hwang and Liu are not convincing enough to change this conclusion. Moreover, irrespective of the cultural concept used, it is imperative that the researcher has empirically informed him/herself about the cultural understanding of the participants in the study. Finally, the indigenous psychologies are not intrinsically allied with the nation state and need to be seen as a part of cross‐cultural psychology.

Keywords:

• Indigenous Psychologies
• Culture Concept
• Meaning
• Reification
• Heterogeneity
• Research Programme

Notes

[1] Somewhat broader defined understanding can also be taken to also include skills and abilities.

[2] Hwang (2006) provides a more elaborated version of the epistemology he argues for in his response to my original paper. See also, for example, Wallner and Jandl (2006), who describe the constructive realism on which Hwang relies. Parenthetically, it can also be noted that my assumption above that meaning content can, in general, be assumed to show variation between actors appears to be compatible with the approach to meaning taken by Wallner (for example, Wallner and Jandl 2006).

[3] In this context it can also be noted that Confucianism and other religions/life‐philosophies are instances of culture where there exist canonical texts that contribute to content stability. Other parts of cultural content are not supported by texts that can be interpreted by successive generations.

[4] But, another type of criticism may be (and has been, many times) levelled against mainstream psychology; namely that it may be insufficiently aware of its cultural rootedness.

[5] See, for example, Allwood (1989), where I argue for a naturalistic interpretation of Gadamer’s hermenutical approach.

[6] See, for example, Hwang (2006, 73): “Bitter debates occurred among psychologists supporting indigenous psychology and cross‐cultural psychology (Hwang & Yang, 2000).”