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ABSTRACT
The philosopher Quassim Cassam has described a concept called ‘Conspiracy Theories’ (capitalized) that includes several ‘special features’ that distinguish such theories from other theories positing conspiracies. Conspiracy Theories, he argues, are unlikely to be true. Indeed, he implies that they are, as a class of ideas, so unlikely to be true that we are justified in responding to them by criticizing the ideology they are (presumed to be) associated with, rather than engaging them solely on their individual epistemic merits. This article argues that Cassam’s ‘special features’ are ambiguous. Under some interpretations, they are not epistemically problematic. Under other interpretations, they do not fairly describe many of the theories Cassam treats as examples of Conspiracy Theories. In the end, there seems to be no interpretation of these features that would justify the inference that theories Cassam treats as Conspiracy Theories, including JFK Conspiracy Theories, can be reasonably dismissed on account of having these features.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Brian Martin, as well as anonymous reviewers, for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
Disclosure statement
I have a forthcoming book on the philosophy of conspiracy theories for which I may receive royalties.
Correction Statement
This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
Notes
1. See Coady Citation2006 for a collection of early works, and Dentith Citation2018a for a more recent collection. See also the following special issue journal collections: Episteme 4.2 (Citation2007) and Argumenta 3.2 (2018, ”Issue 6”). There are many other relevant works published as journal articles and book chapters, some of which can be found in the bibliography, below. Although Cassam, the subject of critique here, mentions the work of Brian Keeley, Charles Pigden, and David Coady, his engagement with the relevant philosophical literature is rather limited.
2. Insofar as Karl Popper’s critique of the ‘conspiracy theory of society’ is interpreted as a critique of conspiracy theories generally, it can be thought of as a generalist critique. Also, Keeley (Citation1999) attempted a generalist critique of conspiracy theories, but he was perceptive enough to recognize, and intellectually honest enough to acknowledge, in that very article, that it didn’t work. Clarke (Citation2002), Mandik (Citation2007), and Levy (Citation2007) have also made arguments that have been characterized as generalist. Each has faced significant critique, and Clarke appears to have abandoned his original view (see Clarke Citation2006). For a detailed critique their arguments see Hagen (CitationHagen, forthcoming).
3. Most of the philosophers who have a significant history of publication on the topic of conspiracy theories have endorsed particularism. They include Charles Pigden, David Coady, Lee Basham, M Dentith, Brian Keeley, and (waveringly) Juha Räikkä, in addition to myself. The recent anthology, Dentith Citation2018a, reflects the current dominance of particularism, some recent challenges notwithstanding.
4. Due to space limitations, I will not address the issue of harm in this essay, other than to say this: My position is that Conspiracy Theories may often indeed be harmful, but they are not always harmful. Further, taking Conspiracy Theories seriously may sometimes actually be beneficial – and that benefit may be massive. Indeed, undermining Conspiracy Theories in the way Cassam suggests is dangerous as well as being inherently problematic. Between people who believe Conspiracy Theories and people who support ideas like Cassam’s, determining which group poses the greater danger would require an extended and complex analysis with attention to empirical considerations. I would argue Cassam’s ideas represent the greater danger. But that is a discussion for another time.
5. Cassam writes, ‘Conspiracy Theories are political gambits whose real function is to promote a political agenda … by advancing seductive explanations of major events that, objectively speaking, are unlikely to be true but are likely to influence public opinion in the preferred direction’ (10–11, cf. 7). And that direction, Cassam suggests, is a racist, anti-Semitic, right-wing direction. However, it is far from clear that this is fair.
6. The harm a theory can be expected to cause is related to whether it points to something true. So, if we misjudge its likeliness to be true, we probably thereby misjudge its likeliness to be harmful. Also, regarding the connection between propaganda and the special features of Conspiracy Theories, Cassam writes, ‘[I]t’s precisely these special features of Conspiracy Theories that make them unlikely to be true. This is why it makes sense to think of such theories as forms of propaganda’ (Cassam 28).
7. Hereafter, references to Cassam Citation2019 will simply indicate the page number without repeating ‘Cassam Citation2019‘.
8. Though Cassam clearly implies this, and he requires it to support his conclusion, he avoids stating it directly. In the case quoted, he could claim to have been only referring to some Conspiracy Theories.
9. Scholars who focus on the most outlandish theories, and the people who believe them, tend to shine misleadingly biased light on the underlying issue – the epistemic status of (purported) Conspiracy Theories. See Hagen Citation2018a, Citation2018b, CitationHagen, 2018c, Citation2020a for critiques of social science scholarship that tends to search for anomalistic thinking among conspiracy theorists.
10. Cassam counts the idea that ‘the government had either assisted in the attacks or knew about them in advance and did nothing to stop them’ as a Conspiracy Theory (37).
11. It might also be wondered, conversely, whether the Northwoods schemes were even real. It is possible, after all, that the document is not genuine, or that it served some mole-hunting function, or some other purpose. Cassam seems too willing to treat some kinds of evidence as conclusive, while refusing to give other kinds of evidence due consideration.
12. It is noteworthy, in this context, that the Warren Commission was under considerable pressure to pin the guilt of JFK’s assassination simply on Oswald, whether that conclusion was genuinely based on solid evidence or not. See Olmsted Citation2009, 114–119.
13. Cassam then equivocates, seeming to try to turn this into an issue about the opinions of experts. Levy (Citation2007) offers a more developed argument along similar lines, suggesting that we should believe ‘epistemic authorities’. I respond to Levy’s argument in Hagen (CitationHagen, forthcoming), in a section called ‘Neil Levy and Epistemic Authorities’.
14. Indeed, I happen to believe that there are good reasons to think that Oswald was being impersonated, at least before the assassination. It is a position that the House Select Committee on Assassinations took seriously. But my argument here does not require that I establish its truth.
15. If historians are not amateurs (in the relevant sense), then presumably lawyers are not either. Besides, if lawyers can try cases in courtrooms, with direct and substantial real-world effects, why would they be considered amateurs when they make a case in the court of public opinion?
16. Perhaps this is the weakest example. It may not be clear that being a secret service agent assigned to protect the president qualifies one as a non-amateur when it comes to theory construction. But surely, depending on what had been observed in this position, it may be grounds to offer salient considerations and proffer an opinion regarding the implications. Indeed, it seems unreasonably arrogant and closedminded to dismiss such contributions as ‘amateurish’.
17. Wecht has been the Allegheny County Coroner and Medical Examiner, the president of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, and a member of the forensic pathology panel for the House Select Committee on Assassinations.
18. For a response to Popper on this issue, see Pigden Citation1995. For an argument that the ‘paranoid style’ does not well describe many popular conspiracy theories, see Hagen Citation2018b.
19. Regarding 9/11, (purported) Conspiracy Theorists commonly regard the timing of the collapse of Building 7 as a kind of screwup. See Hagen Citation2018b, 29, for additional examples.
20. For a critique of Mandik’s arguments, see the section called, ‘Pete Mandik’s Absurdism’, in Hagen (CitationHagen, forthcoming).
21. For more on the notion that conspiracy theories attribute too much power and competence to conspirators, see Hagen Citation2018b, 29.
22. This is especially true if we adopt the interpretation of ‘premodern’ as merely ‘hav[ing] a deeper meaning’, which is how he characterizes it in this context (29).
23. Even Patrick Stokes, who is ‘reluctant’ to accept particularism, admits that ‘blithe’ or ‘naïve’ generalism is problematic (Citation2018, 26). Keith Harris attempts a similar balancing act (see Citation2019, 240). For my responses to Stokes and to Harris, see Hagen (CitationHagen, forthcoming) and Hagen Citation2020b, respectively.
24. For a critique of another attempt at a ‘statistical argument’, see Hagen Citation2020a, 428–430.
25. These should be understood vaguely enough so that they are not considered false merely because they involve some inaccuracies or disallowed as theories on account of insufficient specificity. Let’s be fair.
26. Keeley (Citation1999), which Cassam cites approvingly, explains, ‘we have reason to believe that there exist forces with both motive and capacity to carry out effective disinformation campaigns’ (Keeley Citation1999, 121). See also (Hagen Citation2018b, 27–28, 31)
27. Philip Shenon, a mainstream journalist who defends the surviving staff lawyers of the Warren Commission, nevertheless finds that the FBI (Citation2013, 25, 26, 540–542, 548), the CIA (221, 533, 534, 544, 546, 548), the Secret Service (374), the Dallas police (342), and the Warren Commission itself (146, 549) all engaged in cover-up activities. See also Shenon (Citation2015). Stokes (Citation2018, 30) also admits there is evidence of relative benign conspiracies to conceal negligence on the part of the FBI and CIA in relation to the JFK assassination.
28. For critiques of the related idea that conspiracy theories are unfalsifiable, see (Keeley Citation1999, 120–121; Harris Citation2019, 243–246; Hagen Citation2018b, 27–28, 31).
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Kurtis Hagen
Kurtis Hagen is an independent scholar, and former Associate Professor of Philosophy at SUNY Plattsburgh. He is the author of Lead Them with Virtue: A Confucian Alternative to War and The Philosophy of Xunzi: A Reconstruction as well as co-author of Philosophers of the Warring States: A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy. He has published several articles on the philosophy of conspiracy theory, with a book on that subject forthcoming: Conspiracy Theories and the Failure of Intellectual Critique.