Climate Change and Culpable Ignorance: The Case of Pseudoscience

ABSTRACT

Moral philosophers, when arguing in favor of curbing climate change, tend to take for granted that ignorance about climate change is culpable. Existing data on knowledge and beliefs on climate change, however, show a concerning amount of false beliefs. Few studies have investigated the culpability of those who exhibit ignorance about climate change. As a result, this paper focuses on ignorance about climate change arising from encounters with pseudoscience. In this paper, we will present the extant data relating to climate change, which shows how distinguishing between science and pseudoscience may pose a challenge to the untrained eye. We will apply the existing theories on epistemic responsibility to the case of ignorant agents who encounter pseudoscience. We will first focus on the conditions that make their ignorance culpable, by referring to epistemic vices. Afterwards, we will explore the conditions for being excused, by analyzing the infosphere that surrounds climate change. We will argue that, in topics like climate change, there is a significant effort from interested parties in producing and disseminating hard-to-detect pseudoscience and disinformation. This significantly influences the attribution of blame to ignorant agents, as epistemically virtuous persons might end up with false beliefs without being blameworthy for them.

KEYWORDS:

• Climate ethics
• culpable ignorance
• pseudoscience

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. For the distinction between ignorance and false belief see, e.g. El Kassar (2018).

2. It is worth emphasizing that we are not assuming that possessing correct beliefs on climate change will lead to adopting environmentally conscious behavior. We are claiming something quite different, namely that holding incorrect beliefs about climate change will lead to apathy for environmental causes, which might reflect in corresponding behavior. However, this is not necessary: one might be apathetic towards climate change or sincerely believe it to be beneficial, all while maintaining a negligible environmental impact due to other circumstances.

3. There is a debate over the control we exercise over our beliefs. We are not responsible, however, for direct, voluntary control of them, as indeed we do not directly control what we actually believe (Meylan 2019, 878–880). As Peels (2017, 2896) observes, even without total control of our beliefs, we can still influence them by, e.g. gathering evidence or working on our intellectual vices and virtues: this grounds doxastic responsibility. The mere ability to influence our beliefs, e.g. by working on how we conduct an inquiry, is enough to be responsible for the conclusions we reach.

4. One could open a parenthesis here, considering the possibility of applying a criterion of gradualness to the moral judgment towards the ignorant agent. Nelkin (2016), for example, discusses the difficulty and sacrifice that may be involved in performing a particular task (such as, in our case, acquiring information) that could be considered as parameters for making a moral judgment calibrated to the circumstances. Bradford (2017), on the other hand, suggests assessing not so much the difficulty of acquiring knowledge (since difficulty is, for the scholar, a totally subjective factor), but rather what is morally at stakes, that is, analyzing the consequences of ignorance itself. If, as a result of ignorance, one is in danger of seriously harming someone, then such ignorance will be less justifiable (Bradford 2017, 190–191). We decided not to go in depth into this analysis, as it would imply the discussion of several parameters for establishing the degrees of culpability, and we would rather devote a separate analysis to this important topic.

5. To this extent, a final consideration might be useful. As Torcello observed, pseudoscience originates from the so-called pseudoskepticism, i.e. the attitude of those who question science and contest it without having the scientific basis nor the expertise to do so, and then spread their opinions which are not, in fact, scientifically accurate. Very different is the role of the so-called scientific skepticism, the one that is located at the origin of the genuine (and necessary) scientific debate, thanks to which science sometimes revises, and refutes, beliefs that may be shared for a long time (see Torcello 2016, 21–24).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Francesca Pongiglione

Francesca Pongiglione is Associate Professor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Philosophy at Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milano. Her current research interests lay at the intersection between ethics and epistemology. She works on epistemic vices, obligations to know, and culpable ignorance. She has also worked extensively on climate ethics.

Carlo Martini

Carlo Martini is Associate Professor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Philosophy at Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milano. His primary research interests are in philosophy of the social sciences and social epistemology. He works on the role of expertise in knowledge transfer from science to policy, on expert disagreement and on public trust in scientific experts. He is a visiting fellow at the Centre for Philosophy of the Social Science, University of Helsinki.