A Gadamerian Critique of Kuhn’s Linguistic Turn: Incommensurability Revisited

Abstract

In this article, I discuss Gadamer’s hermeneutic account of understanding as an alternative to Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis. After a brief account of Kuhn’s aesthetic account and arguments against it, I argue that the linguistic account faces a paradox that results from Kuhn’s objectivist account of understanding, and his lack of historical reflexivity. The statement ‘Languages are incommensurable’ is not a unique view of language, and is thus subject to contest by incommensurable readings. Resolving the paradox requires an account of incommensurability that is self‐referentially consistent, open‐ended, and historically reflexive whereby we recognize that our very interest in incommensurability is historically conditioned. By meeting these conditions, Gadamer’s account of historical understanding offers a middle ground between two extremes: on the one side is the claim that understanding involves becoming a native of an incommensurable language, and on the other side is the rejection of the prospect of understanding a contextually removed language altogether. Gadamer is discussed as a mediator between Kuhn’s epistemic and historical projects, and thus paves the way for a new hermeneutics of science. The notions of traditional horizon, historically effected consciousness, the universality of interpretation, alienation, dialogical openness, and the fusion of horizons are also discussed.

Acknowledgements

An earlier sketch of this paper was presented at the 12th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, August, 2003. I would like to thank the participants of the conference who were most generous with their questions and objections. I would also like to acknowledge the contribution of the anonymous referees of ISPS for their insightful and helpful comments on an earlier draft.

Notes

[1] For an account of the origin of the idea in Feyerabend, see Oberheim and Hoyningen‐Huene (1997). For a comparison between Kuhn’s conception of incommensurability and that of Feyerabend, see Hoyningen‐Huene (2000).

[2] For excellent reviews of the development of Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis, see Chen (1997), Hoyningen‐Huene (1990), Sankey (1993), and Buchwald and Smith (1997).

[3] A different line of interpretation suggests that the gestalt metaphor equivocates between two senses of the word ‘experience’: an epistemological sense that involves the organizational role of language, and a physiological sense which pertains to the causal process involved in perception (Malone 1993, 81–83). Malone suggests that the problem of incommensurability pertains to the epistemic not the physiological sense of experience, since observations are not theory‐laden in the sense that undermines objectivity. The argument begs the question, since it needs to show rather than assume that observations are not theory‐laden.

[4] For a detailed look at the distinction between global and local incommensurability, see Simmons (1994, 120–21). Simmons suggests that local incommensurability excludes global incommensurability because of the substantive overlap between the rival theories. But it remains unclear how changes in local areas do not induce large‐scale changes. Chen (1990) discusses this difficulty.

[5] Whether Kuhn’s interpretation of these arguments is fair is an interesting question, but it will not be pursued here.

[6] See Sharrock and Read (2002, 141–43), for a detailed account of the mathematical origin of the concept.

[7] Hoyningen‐Huene (1990, 491–92) raises this issue against Kuhn and argues that a general theory of world constitution requires that the historiographer brackets all elements from their own particular world, but that such bracketing is impossible on pains of self‐contradiction.

[8] For a thorough survey of recent research on the phenomenon of ‘transfer’ and the different ways in which a source language influences the learning of a target language, see Odlin (2005). Odlin suggests that empirical research done over the last decade on Second Language Acquisition seems to give significant credence to theories of conceptual relativity whereby the understanding of the target language is mediated by the source language.

[9] Against Quine’s claim for multiple possible interpretations (Quine, 1987), Kuhn (1990, 300) suggests that in cases of communicative breakdown, there are usually none at all. These cases Kuhn suggests are the ones that require conscious contextual interpretation where a unique meaning is uncovered.

[10] This argument shows that Kuhn’s account of local incommensurability can only be accepted at the cost of denying the interconnectedness of theoretical terms.

[11] Hesse anticipates this objection when she suggests that Kuhn’s distinction between translation and interpretation is not as sharp as he makes it. Hesse thinks that communication between languages adopting different taxonomies need not assume an identity of shared taxonomy; a sufficient intersection between the relevant taxonomies would do (Hesse 1983, 708).

[12] For passages in Structure against the ethnocentric attitude of tradition historiography of science and of science textbooks, see Kuhn (1970, 126, 138, 140). In later writings, Kuhn seems to think that he can establish his philosophical position a priori without appealing to the historical record. See especially Kuhn (2000b).

[13] To be sure, Kuhn is aware that many translations of the same text may exist (see, for example, Kuhn 2000a, 164) but does not seem to be aware of the significance of this claim for first‐order statements like ‘no translation exists for term x’, nor to second‐order statements like ‘there is a structure to scientific theories’.

[14] For a wonderful exposition of Gadamer’s ontology of language as anti‐objectivist, see Kertscher (2002, 135–49). It must be noted, though, that Kertscher’s opposition between truth and tradition misses the very point of the contextualism Gadamer espouses. This will be examined below.

[15] For empirical research on how this is displayed in learning a second language, see Odlin (2005).

[16] While cognizant of the narrow range of Kuhn’s linguistic account of incommensurability, Buchwald and Smith (1997, 375) dismiss the problem as a matter of scope of interest rather than a defect in the account. I submit that Fuller’s diagnosis of the narrowness of the account as symptomatic of the Cold War era’s turn away from the politics of knowledge production provides a better ground for understanding Kuhn’s linguistic turn (Fuller 2000, 5–32).

[17] See Warnke (1987, 82–91). I disagree with Warnke’s assessment that Gadamer is conservative. But lacking the space for a detailed argument, I shall just assert that viewed in relation to a naive radical revisionism that seems to believe that one can break free of all tradition; Gadamer’s position may be viewed as a reflexive revisionist.

[18] In a stronger argument that includes natural languages, Kuhn (1999, 36) argues that enriching a source language by adding categories it flatly denies would make for a self‐contradictory language that will perish along with its users. The major error Kuhn commits here is conflating enrichment with the acceptance of categories, but with the taxonomic account of language that Kuhn supports such conflation seems necessary.

[19] To be sure, Structure (Kuhn 1970, 52–91) describes the ways in which a scientific community identifies and deals with anomalies.

[20] A classic example of this is the psychoanalytic notion of projection where otherness is reviled for mirroring one’s own flaws. This is a case where alienation (from the other and from oneself) is not a result of a linguistic incompatibility but a result of our unwillingness to make the concessions that understanding requires of us.

[21] For example, Gadamer (2001, 4) states that

the question whether there is also a hermeneutics appropriate to the natural sciences needs to be taken seriously. In the philosophy of science since Thomas Kuhn this point has been widely discussed. I think this is above all because natural scientific methods do not show us how to apply the results of scientific work to the practice of living life in a rational way.

[22] Fuller (2000, 5–32) suggests that Kuhn’s neglect of his own historicity has significantly contributed to the death of philosophical history, and managed to reverse the attention away from the politics of knowledge production in the philosophy of science.

[23] For a concise account of the historical and biographical bearings of this move, see Fuller (2003, especially chapters 2 and 6). Fuller’s account shows that Kuhn’s consistent move away from the social towards the reductive is a case in which the effect of tradition (here the tradition in which Kuhn was initiated into philosophy) is displayed.

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Notes on contributors

Amani Albedah

Amani Albedah is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy, Kuwait University.