Knowledge of Counterfactual Interventions through Cognitive Models of Mechanisms

Abstract

Here I consider the relative merits of two recent models of explanation, James Woodward’s interventionist‐counterfactual model and the model model. According to the former, explanations are largely constituted by information about the consequences of counterfactual interventions. Problems arise for this approach because countless relevant interventions are possible in most cases and because it overlooks other kinds of equally relevant information. According the model model, explanations are largely constituted by cognitive models of actual mechanisms. On this approach, explanations tend not to represent any of the aforementioned information explicitly but can instead be used to produce it on demand. The model model thus offers the more plausible account of the information of which we are aware when we have an explanation and of the ratiocinative process through which we derive many kinds of information that are relevant to the evaluation of explanations.

Acknowledgements

I thank the British Society for the Philosophy of Science, the Society for the Metaphysics of Science, and the Department of Philosophy at Western Michigan University for allowing me to present these ideas and for the valuable feedback that I received as a result. I am also indebted to James Woodward and most of all to the two anonymous referees of International Studies in the Philosophy of Science whose thoughtful critique resulted in many improvements to this article.

Notes

[1] At times, Woodward appears to embrace this stronger claim. For instance, when discussing the information that sometimes goes unstated when giving an explanation, he claims, ‘It must be information that those who use such explanations … [not only can, but do] recognize as relevant to the import of the explanations they offer’ (Woodward 2003, 180). Surely to recognize the relevance of information to an explanation, one must be aware of that information, or have a conscious thought or belief involving it.

[2] The general idea that cognitive models of mechanisms underlie at least some explanations has also been endorsed by Brewer (1999), Horst (2007), and Wright and Bechtel (2007). Closely related is Bechtel and Richardson’s (1993) proposal that we discover mechanisms by relying on certain cognitive heuristics.

[3] In Waskan (2006) I consider the possibility that some explanations are constituted by the combination of ICMs and mathematical formalisms as well as such objections as that probabilistic explanations and the explanations supplied by fundamental physics do not fit the model model mold.

[4] The intrinsic‐extrinsic distinction was introduced by Palmer (1978) and modified by Waskan (2003; 2006).

[5] There are, of course, differences between scale models, InCoMs, and ICMs (Waskan 2003; 2006).

[6] This is similar to Glennan’s (1996) analysis of the metaphysics of causal relations, but see Waskan (2006, 298).

[7] One might object that there are cases where we believe that a causal connection exists but lack knowledge of the mechanisms that enforce the connection (Woodward 2002, 2004). This issue demands more extensive treatment than can be provided here (but see Waskan 2006, 211–212, 240–243). For now I will merely say that if we have no beliefs about underlying mechanisms whatsoever, then the information we possess is not sufficient to render the effects of such (putative) causes intelligible. In other words, I would classify such cases, which are far rarer than one might think, as non‐explanatory.

[8] Also helping us overcome memory limitations is our ability to work through, in piecemeal fashion, interconnected chains of events (Hegarty 2004).

[9] Woodward, who was gracious enough to comment on an earlier draft of this paper, has claimed that ‘many of the beliefs about counterfactuals that people entertain when they are in possession of causal explanations are not occurrent, but merely [tacit].’ Again, however, it cannot be in virtue of our possession of tacit beliefs that the explanandum is rendered intelligible. It must, then, be the one or few beliefs about counterfactuals that are occurrent that play this role. If I read his further comments aright, in the killer asteroid case he does settle upon just one counterfactual—namely, the one concerning what would have happened if the impact had not occurred. However, saying that this is the content of the explanation leads to further difficulties discussed below. Notice also that this response supports my contention that on Woodward’s view to possess an explanation is to have certain beliefs.

[10] ‘Version’ may be the operative word here in that there appear to be multiple distinct explananda in such cases. This means that we need not view interests as actually infusing the explanatory relationship itself (Woodward 2003, 230). I readily confess that Making Things Happen has made me more consistent on this point (see Waskan 2006, 226, 241) and has advanced my thinking on many other matters besides.

[11] Though Machamer (2004, sec. 4) does seem to be a significant step in the right direction.