The Argument from Underconsideration as Grounds for Anti‐realism: A Defence

Abstract

The anti‐realist argument from underconsideration focuses on the fact that, when scientists evaluate theories, they only ever consider a subset of the theories that can account for the available data. As a result, when scientists judge one theory to be superior to competitor theories, they are not warranted in drawing the conclusion that the superior theory is likely true with respect to what it says about unobservable entities and processes. I defend the argument from underconsideration from the objections of Peter Lipton. I argue that the inconsistency that Lipton claims to find in the argument vanishes once we understand what the anti‐realist means when she claims that scientists are reliable. I also argue that collapsing the distinction between relative and absolute evaluations, as Lipton recommends, has its costs. Finally, I briefly examine Richard Boyd’s influential defence of realism.

Acknowledgements

I thank the following people for comments on earlier drafts: Lori Nash, Kristina Rolin, Anjan Chakravartty, and Mark Newman. As well, I thank my audience at the 2008 Pacific Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association, especially Jerry Doppelt, for feedback on the paper. Finally, I thank the editor and referees for International Studies in the Philosophy of Science for their valuable feedback on an earlier draft.

Notes

[1] The argument from underconsideration has appealed to anti‐realists for some time. See, for example, Sklar (1981), van Fraassen (1989, 142–150), and Stanford (2006).

[2] Indeed, judgements of relative simplicity are rather complex. For example, as Kuhn (1977) notes, two competing theories may each be simpler than the other but in different respects. And there is the further concern that we really do not know what the relationship is between the simplicity of a successful theory or model and the unobservable structure of the world (in this regard see van Fraassen 1989, 147–148; Cartwright 1983). I will not pursue these concerns here.

[3] Boyd is also concerned that the anti‐realist cannot explain ‘the legitimate role of theoretical considerations in [our] methods’ (Boyd 1985, 31).

[4] Interestingly, Laudan (1984) grants that scientists are generally reliable with respect to methods but argues that this is compatible with scepticism about the truth of our theories.