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Abstract
Colin Howson argues that (1) my sociologistic reliabilism sheds no light on the objectivity of epistemic content, and that (2) sorites does not threaten the reliability of modus ponens. I reply that argument (1) misrepresents my position, and that argument (2) is beside the point.
Acknowledgements
For their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay, I thank David Bloor, Martin Kusch, Alex Rueger, and Martin Tweedale.
Notes
[1] Kochan (Citation2009) argues that the account of objectivity advanced by Howson’s former teacher, Karl Popper, can be interpreted in sociologistic terms.
[2] Kochan (forthcoming) discusses the topic–resource distinction in more detail.
[3] See Bloor (Citation1997, ch. 5) and Kusch (Citation2004). Howson also confuses my concept of ‘existential agreement’ with a Peircean notion of truth as convergence of opinion (i.e., ‘epistemic agreement’) even though I clearly rejected this latter position (Kochan Citation2008, 33).
[4] Since McGee (Citation1985, 468) contrasts his compound conditionals with ‘simple’ conditionals, Howson’s claim that McGee is dealing in ‘fairly simple cases’ is questionable.