Multisemiosis and Incommensurability

Abstract

Central to Kuhn’s notion of incommensurability are the ideas of meaning variance and lexicon, and the impossibility of translation of terms across different theories. Such a notion of incommensurability is based on a particular understanding of what a scientific language is. In this paper we first attempt to understand this notion of scientific language in the context of incommensurability. We consider the consequences of the essential multisemiotic character of scientific theories and show how this leads to even a single theory being potentially ‘internally incommensurable’. We then discuss Kuhn’s lexicon‐based approach to incommensurability and the problems associated with it. Finally we argue that this approach by Kuhn has interesting overlaps with the problem of meaning associated with multisemiosis, particularly the challenge of understanding the process of symbolization in scientific theories.

Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Seminar on the Incommensurability Thesis organized by the Department of Philosophy, University of Hyderabad, India. We are grateful to Howard Sankey for his critical comments as well as insightful suggestions on the paper, both during and after the seminar. We also thank S. G. Kulkarni and Prajit Basu for their helpful comments on the paper. Detailed critical responses by two anonymous referees as well as the editor of this journal helped us considerably strengthen the paper. We are particularly grateful to them for taking the trouble to do this. Our thanks are also due to the librarian at National Institute of Advanced Studies, Hamsa Kalyani, for making available the needed references in time.

Notes

[1] This explicit expression is not to be found in Newton’s Principia. The earliest expression of the well‐known formula force = mass × acceleration is to be found in Euler (Jammer 1961, 89).