Friedman’s Relativised A Priori and Structural Realism: In Search of Compatibility

Abstract

In this article I discuss a recent argument due to Dan McArthur, who suggests that the charge that Michael Friedman’s relativised a priori leads to irrationality in theory change can be avoided by adopting structural realism. I provide several arguments to show that the conjunction of Friedman’s relativised a priori with structural realism cannot make the former avoid the charge of irrationality. I also explore the extent to which Friedman’s view and structural realism are compatible, a presupposition of McArthur’s argument. This compatibility is usually questioned, due to the Kantian aspect of Friedman’s view, which clashes with the metaphysical premise of scientific realism. I argue that structural realism does not necessarily depend on this premise and as a consequence can be compatible with Friedman’s view, but more importantly I question whether Friedman’s view really implies mind dependence.

Acknowledgements

Many thanks are due to James Ladyman, Matt Farr, Michael Friedman, Stathis Psillos, the editor of this journal, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and discussions. This work is funded by the British Society for the Philosophy of Science.

Notes

[1] Scientific realists have of course suggested solutions to the problem of incommensurability (Psillos 2007). Also note that there are two aspects of McArthur’s point, which should not be conflated: rationality in theory change and realism about scientific theories. The former does not necessarily lead to the latter. Laudan (1977), for example, believes we can establish that theory change is rational even though he is not a realist about scientific theories.

[2] Van Dyck (2009) emphasises the incompatibility of scientific realism with Friedman’s view and further suggests that Friedman’s claim about convergence of constitutive principles cannot be accommodated on the basis of his Kantianism but also cannot be read as realist.