Causal Relations and Explanatory Strategies in Physics

Abstract

Many philosophers now regard causal approaches to explanation as highly promising, even in physics. This is due in large part to James Woodward's influential argument that a wide variety of scientific explanations are causal, based on his interventionist approach to causation. This article argues that some derivations describing causal relations and satisfying Woodward's criteria for causal explanation fail to be explanatory. Further, causal relations are unnecessary for a range of explanations, widespread in physics, involving highly idealized models. These constitute significant limitations on the scope of causal explanation. We have good reason to doubt that causal explanation is as widespread or important in physics as Woodward and other proponents maintain.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to audiences at the 2012 PSA and 2012 Pacific APA meetings for helpful feedback on this project. I would like to thank Stefan Linquist, Juha Saatsi, Paul Teller, Pablo Zavala, and two anonymous referees of this journal for helpful comments on an earlier draft. This research was supported by an Insight Development Grant from the Social Studies and Humanities Research Council of Canada.