How Inclusive Is European Philosophy of Science?

Abstract

The main question of this article is given by its title: how inclusive is European philosophy of science? Phrased in this way, the question presupposes that, as a mature discipline, philosophy of science should provide an inclusive account of its subject area. I first provide an explanation of the notion of an inclusive (in contrast to a restricted) philosophy of science. This notion of an inclusive philosophy of science is specified by discussing three general topics that seem to be missing from, or are quite marginal in, restricted philosophy of science. These topics are the philosophy of historical inquiry, the role of technology in science, and the socio-political and moral dimensions of science. On this basis, I address the question whether European philosophy of science qualifies as more inclusive as compared with Anglo-American philosophy of science.

1. Introduction

As a discipline, a mature philosophy of science should encompass a diversity of approaches and welcome any significant philosophical engagement with the sciences. More specifically, an inclusive philosophy of science is an approach that, first, includes as parts of ‘science’ all the disciplines taught and researched at universities or other academic institutes, and, second, includes all branches of philosophy that significantly engage with these disciplines. The first condition implies a choice for a broad notion of ‘science’ as including the formal sciences, the social sciences, the humanities, and the engineering sciences. The second condition supports the inclusion of a broad range of philosophical studies of science, for instance moral, social and political philosophy of science, philosophical research ethics, and the like.

In contrast, a restricted (or narrow) philosophy of science excludes the humanities, marginalizes technology and the engineering sciences, and mostly disregards moral, social, and political issues. I take the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science and most of the current Anglo-American introductions, companions, and handbooks as typical examples of a restricted philosophy of science. In a temporal sense, I focus on philosophy of science during the past four decades, say, since around the mid-1970s.

Advocating either an inclusive or a restricted approach implies a normative stance. In this respect, the two approaches do not differ. However, the justification of leaving out particular academic disciplines and philosophical topics is more difficult than that of their inclusion. The reason is that the excluded disciplines and topics may have an impact on, or be relevant to, the disciplines and topics that are addressed within a restricted philosophy of science. In the course of this article, I will provide several examples of the philosophical significance of this point.

To make the distinction between the two approaches more concrete, in the next three sections I discuss three general topics that are a legitimate part of an inclusive approach, but are missing from or are quite marginal in a restricted philosophy of science. A first topic is the philosophy of historical inquiry. This subject of philosophical research, still extensively debated by classical authors such as Karl R. Popper, Carl G. Hempel, and Ernest Nagel, has almost disappeared from current philosophy of science. The second topic is the role of technology in science or, somewhat more broadly, the science–technology relationship. While the great significance of technology for science is (or should be) obvious, restricted philosophy of science lacks sustained and critical discussion of the science–technology relationship. The third topic concerns the socio-political and moral dimensions of science. In as far as restricted philosophy of science is normative, it usually focuses on methodological soundness and epistemological justification. Equally important for an inclusive philosophy of science, however, should be the issue of the socio-political and moral significance and legitimacy of science. This issue may bear upon science in general or upon particular scientific disciplines and practices.

The last section then addresses the question of the position of ‘European philosophy of science’ in terms of the distinction between an inclusive and a restricted approach, and its specification with the help of the three topics.¹ My provisional conclusion is that the answer to this question should be differentiated. In two of the three cases, European philosophy of science is more inclusive than Anglo-American philosophy of science, while in the third it is not. A more systematic discussion of this question would require a comprehensive research project in the recent history of philosophy of science. A plausible result of the present article is the moderate claim that the integration of certain approaches and topics from different European countries may contribute to a more inclusive, and hence a more mature, philosophy of science.

Finally, two caveats. In the paper I will make claims such as ‘the science–technology relationship is a neglected topic in Anglo-American philosophy of science’. Such claims should not be understood as being universal or absolute, since there will always be exceptions. Instead, my claims refer to significant patterns concerning the relevant phenomena. More generally, given its broad topic and the limited space available, this paper is primarily explorative. This implies, in particular, that the examples given can be no more than illustrations (rather brief in sections 3 and 4, and somewhat more detailed in section 2).

2. Philosophy of Historical Inquiry

The philosophy of historical inquiry (or historiography) was still extensively debated by classical authors such as Popper, Hempel, and Nagel. In contrast, in current philosophy of science it is almost completely missing. Yet, historical inquiry is a legitimate and significant research area in academic institutions, such as universities and other institutes for research or higher education. It is part of what I prefer to call the ‘human sciences’ (instead of ‘humanities’). Hence, it should be incorporated within an inclusive philosophy of science. An important further reason for the study of historiography by philosophers of science is the existence of the so-called ‘history and philosophy of science’ (HPS) approach. I will come back to this at the end of this section.

To be sure, there is a substantial body of philosophical reflection on historiography by general historians. Yet, developing a philosophy of science perspective on historical inquiry has additional advantages. The most significant reason for the study of historiography by philosophers of science derives from the importance of the interactions of historical inquiry with other academic disciplines. For instance, many of the central philosophical issues in historiography return in the social sciences, especially in their interpretative and critical traditions (Delanty and Strydom 2003). Therefore, these issues can be fruitfully addressed from both perspectives at once. Furthermore, the long debate on the role of explanation and understanding in the human and natural sciences resulted in a qualification of their dissimilarity by acknowledging the significance of interpretation for the natural sciences (Hesse 1980; Rouse 1987; Gonzalez 2015). A more recent example is the current debate on the merits and problems of ‘digital humanities’. Here, research tools and methods (e.g. interactive visualization and simulation procedures, the construction, maintenance, and use of digital databases, and computational techniques of pattern recognition in big data sets) are adapted from a range of other disciplines.² These novel approaches are often interpreted through the notion of ‘data-driven research’. Again, this debate could profit from a philosophy of science input, in particular from the many analyses and assessments of inductive methods and the role of theory ladenness.

Building on the work by general historians, it is not difficult to specify important research questions to be studied by philosophers of historiography.³ Here (and in the next two sections) I will mention and briefly discuss three different kinds of questions: empirical/historical, theoretical–philosophical and normative questions.

In the case of historiography, empirical/historical questions address the ways in which historians practice the writing of history, analogous to the ways in which historians of science study scientific practices and their historical development. As in history of science, we cannot expect that historians follow one single approach. Yet, it does make sense to search for certain broader patterns in the research practices of historians.

Theoretical–philosophical questions include methodological, epistemological and ontological issues concerning historical inquiry. Methodologically, historians use a large number of different methods, including anachronical, diachronical, interpretive, explanatory, structural, hypothetical, scientometric, and experimental methods (Kragh 1987). Are some methods better than others? Are the better methods ‘better in general’ or only for certain purposes, for instance for writing history of science? If so, how could this be established? The central epistemological question is whether or not historiography produces knowledge. If so, what kind of knowledge? If not, what are the main features and accomplishments of historical inquiry? Ontologically, the major questions address the conceptions of human beings (or groups or nations) implied by particular historiographical approaches. Further important ontological questions bear upon the conceptions of history, historical change or historical progress presupposed by these approaches.

A crucial normative question concerns the fact–value distinction. Does this distinction apply at all to (the results of) historical inquiry? Many historians and philosophers claim that it does not, since the core notions employed or presupposed by historians are always value laden. Think, for example, of the endorsement or rejection of the notions of national identity (the German character), historical periodization (the Renaissance), historical progress (the Scientific Revolution) or historical significance (Mode-2 science).

Of course, this is not the kind of article even to start answering all of these wide-ranging questions. What I can do is provide a few examples of an inclusive philosophy of science approach to historiography. The first concerns the methodology of historical inquiry. Consider the following question regarding the philosophy of recent physics: which have been the most significant achievements of physics since the 1960s? The usual response by philosophers of physics is: the standard model of elementary particles and their interactions, accounted for by the fundamental theories of relativity and quantum physics. However, a different historiographical methodology, based on scientometrics, could lead to a quite different assessment. Consider, for instance, the 1965 article by W. Kohn and L. J. Sham, titled ‘Self-Consistent Equations Including Exchange and Correlation Effects’ (Kohn and Sham 1965). This article addressed, and solved, several significant problems in solid-state physics, molecular physics, and quantum chemistry, and it paved the way to a tractable computational modelling of phenomena in these areas (Lenhard 2014). Remarkably enough, this paper turns out to be one of the most cited in physics (thus far, in March 2015, with almost 24,000 citations). Yet, in spite of this large and continuing impact, the article is never mentioned in mainstream philosophy of physics. The obvious questions then are: why this neglect and what does it tell us about the dominant ways of conceiving the (recent) history of physics?

A similar question may be posed for the recent and contemporary social and human sciences: who are the most influential social and human scientists? Of course, any answer to this question presupposes a specification of what we mean by ‘the most influential’. And again, specifying this phrase from a scientometric point of view (as ‘the most cited’) could lead to surprising results. One conclusion could be that, at least in 2007, the three most influential scholars in these sciences were Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, and Jacques Derrida (Heilbron 2011, 17–19). More generally, the list of the first 29 most cited book authors is strongly dominated by ‘continental’ scholars (US author Noam Chomsky, for instance, figures only at place 12 and Thomas S. Kuhn at place 29). To be sure, both here and in the preceding example my point is not that scientometric historiography is the natural approach to the history of science. Rather, the point is that there is no natural approach and that it is important, for that very reason, to reflect explicitly on the pros and cons of the various historiographical approaches.

My second illustration concerns the claim that the core historiographical notions are always value laden.⁴ I think that this claim applies both to general historiography and to the historiography of science. As to the latter, consider the following two quotations from Kuhn. The first concerns the aim of Kuhn's HPS: ‘Its aim is a sketch of the … concept of science that can emerge from the historical record of the research activity itself’ (Kuhn 1970a, 1). In the second quotation, Kuhn describes his view of what counts as scientific significance:

For a scientist, the solution of a difficult conceptual or instrumental puzzle is a principal goal. His success in that endeavour is rewarded by other members of his professional group and by them alone. The practical merit of his solution is at best a secondary value, and the approval outside the specialist group is a negative value or none at all. (Kuhn 1970b, 21)

A problem of the view proposed in the first quotation is that the historical record does not exist. Kuhn's own record, for instance, differs substantially from the record of a historian who practices the scientometric approach. A significant difference is that, in their understanding of science, Kuhn and many contemporary historians of science adhere to the method of the double hermeneutic. This method includes the normative methodological claim that, in addition to the interpretations of the historians, the content of the self-interpretations of the scientists should be taken into account (even if the historians need not always agree with them).

Furthermore, it will be clear that the claims made in the second quotation cannot be derived from an ‘objective’ historical record, since they constitute the normative stance underlying Kuhn's historiographical paradigm. This paradigm advocates a strongly internalist history of science and as such implies normative claims about the nature of, and the relation between, science and society. For instance, from this perspective notions such as Mode-2 or post-academic science, which focus on the ‘practical merit’ of science (Nordmann, Radder, and Schiemann 2011), will be seen merely to bear upon its ‘secondary’ or even ‘negative’ value.

Finally, although the topic of this section is the philosophy of historical inquiry in its own right and not the relationship between HPS, the former is, or should be, quite relevant to the latter. During the 1980s, there was an extensive debate on the relevance of historical inquiry for philosophy of science. This debate was triggered by the so-called programme of ‘testing theories of scientific change’ by means of historical case studies (Laudan, Laudan, and Donovan 1988). The general conclusion has been that this programme failed (Nickles 1986; Radder 1997, 636–640). Recently, a new and sustained interest in these problems has emerged, under the name of ‘integrated history and philosophy of science’ (Schickore 2011; Mauskopf and Schmaltz 2012). Yet, the focus of these new studies is again the preferred relationship between history and philosophy. In contrast to what one might have expected, they do not include much discussion of the kind of empirical/historical, theoretical–philosophical, and normative questions mentioned above. For this reason, Katherina Kinzel rightly concludes that

in order to secure the historical adequacy of philosophical conceptions of science, we do not only need to engage in case study research. We also need a better understanding of the historiography of science, and of the case studies it produces—an understanding that appreciates the methodological complexities involved in the practices of historical reconstruction, and the philosophical questions that arise with regard to the epistemic status of historical writing. (Kinzel 2015, 56)⁵

This assessment of the current HPS approach underlines the importance of an inclusive philosophy of science, in which the philosophy of historiography owns its legitimate place.

3. The Science–Technology Relationship

In restricted philosophy of science, substantial studies of the role of technology for science are rare. A remarkable illustration is provided by Quine (1990, 2), who acknowledges that ‘control and modification of the environment’ (thus, including technology) is a ‘major purpose’ of science, but then continues his book without spending any further words on it. A more recent example is The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia (Sarkar and Pfeifer 2006). Its index includes 110 differentiated items related to ‘theory’ but only nine, quite general items on technology.⁶

In contrast, for the general public, for policy-makers, and for many scientists, it is an obvious fact that science and technology are intimately related. To see this, a brief look at the science section of our newspapers or opinion magazines is enough.⁷ Therefore, an inclusive philosophy of science should comprise a significant body of work on the science–technology relationship. Interesting and important research questions abound. Let me give a few examples, again using the distinction between empirical/historical, theoretical–philosophical, and normative questions.

The central subjects of empirical/historical research are the actual connections between science and technology, both in the past and at present. Which patterns characterize these connections and how can we plausibly model these patterns: through primacy models (in which either science is seen as driving technology or technology as steering science), two-way interactive models, or seamless-web models (Radder 2009a)? A substantial body of work on these questions is already available (Forman 2007; Radder 2009b). The task, therefore, is to incorporate this work in philosophical accounts of the historical development and contemporary practices of the sciences.

There is no shortage of interesting theoretical-philosophical questions either. What are the similarities and dissimilarities between scientific and technological methods and between scientific and technological knowledge? More specifically, what is the place of engineering science in relation to (natural, social and human) science and to technology? The 1450-page volume on Philosophy of Technology and Engineering Sciences (Meijers 2009) constitutes a rich source for studying and answering such questions. A related question is suggested by the above reference to Quine. Several philosophers of science have attempted to characterize science in terms of its central aim or aims, for instance in terms of truth, explanation, problem solving or empirical adequacy. Therefore, those who think that attributing central aims to science makes sense, should seriously consider whether contributing to the development of technologies can be seen as such an aim. More radical views have questioned the very distinction between science and technology through their advocacy of the notion of technoscience. This entails two important further issues (Nordmann, Radder, and Schiemann 2011). The first is how to define the notion of technoscience. Second, there is the issue of the range of application of this notion: does it apply only to recent sciences or to any sciences, present and past?

Obviously, including the role of technology strongly increases the kinds and the number of normative questions for philosophy of science. Here are just two examples. An important class of questions concerns issues in which epistemic and social or moral norms are entangled. Consider, for instance, the claim (resulting from genetic testing by a commercial company) that a specific individual has a probability p of contracting a particular disease. Such a case raises two connected and normatively relevant questions, namely: how certain is this claim and how high should the value of p be before it is socially and morally justifiable actually to conduct the test and inform the individual, and possibly his or her relatives, of the result (Wyatt, Harris, et al. 2013)? These questions become even more urgent if no, or no good, therapy is available for this disease. The critical point is that even the mere information about such a claim (which is provided by a commercially interested firm, is of a statistical nature only, and in which the value of p will always possess some uncertainty) may have a huge impact on the life of the individual and his or her relatives. A second and topical normative issue is this: is the increased focus of scientific research on technological innovation normatively desirable (because it is said to increase the ‘social relevance’ of science) or is it undesirable (because it goes at the expense of basic science)?

To illustrate the implications of including the science–technology relationship, consider the recent views of Philip Kitcher on the role of science in a democratic society. Kitcher advocates a science-as-knowledge account and he interprets this knowledge, roughly, as a set of certified, and hence correct and reliable statements. However, science does more than providing statements. Through experimentation and experimental technologies, it also provides realizations of statements. For instance, science not only teaches us where to find fresh water (Kitcher 2011, 87) but also includes laboratory procedures for making fresh water. Similarly, Kitcher writes a lot about climate science but does not mention climate engineering. Thus, he shares with restricted philosophy of science a blind spot for the important relations between science and technology.

This neglect has important implications, not the least for Kitcher's own project.⁸ I sympathize with his project for a more democratic organization of the role of science in our current societies. For this purpose, Kitcher emphasizes the significance of developing an effective depository of public knowledge. However, limiting the public significance of science to statements, to know-that, is at best incomplete. After all, the public is confronted with the results of the sciences also, or even primarily, through its know-how, through its contribution to technologies.

If we do take into account the material and social realization of scientific knowledge, new epistemic and social issues arise (Radder 2009b, 2009c). There is, for instance, the important question of where and when the relevant knowledge can be realized. This leads us to the problem of external validity. Scientific knowledge and methods are often developed within, and certified with respect to, artificially limited contexts (laboratory experiments, field tests, modelling practices, closed surveys, and the like). Internal validity is the validity for those (limited) contexts. Present-day scientists and policy-makers, however, are increasingly interested in external validity, that is, validity beyond the artificially limited contexts. Scientific knowledge is required to be realizable not merely in vitro but also in vivo. The point is that the successful realization of external validity claims typically requires knowledge about a diversity of quite specific material and social conditions. This knowledge is not always available to the scientists but it may be available to certain citizens (for instance, to particular local farmers or groups of patients). In these cases the scientists may need to be tutored by the citizens, in contrast to the one-way tutoring of citizens by scientists advocated by Kitcher (Radder 1996, ch. 7; Wyatt, Harris, et al. 2013). What examples like this also show is that studying the relationship between science and technology will often require engaging with their socio-political and moral issues. These are the issues to which I now turn.

4. Socio-political and Moral Philosophy of Science

Restricted philosophy of science often focuses on methodological, epistemological and ontological issues. However, given that science is, and has always been, in society and as such has been the subject of many debates on a variety of socio-political and moral issues, there is no reason not to include such issues within an inclusive philosophy of science. Of course (and this also applies to the two previous sections) this requirement bears upon philosophy of science as a discipline. A mature philosophy of science should encompass a diversity of approaches and welcome any significant philosophical engagement with the sciences, both in its research and in its teaching practices. This does not mean, however, that each individual philosopher of science should address all the different subjects that may come up in such an inclusive philosophy of science. On the individual level, a certain measure of division of labour makes sense.

Again, three different kinds of socio-political and moral questions need to be addressed. The basic empirical/historical questions may be phrased in analogy to the case of the science–technology relationship. How to describe the actual connections between science, society and morality, and which patterns characterize these connections, both in the past and in the present? Similarly, there is the question of how to model these patterns: through primacy models, two-way interactive models, or seamless-web models?

Furthermore, a socio-political and moral philosophy of science entails a variety of novel theoretical-philosophical questions. Restricted philosophy of science is usually limited to questions of methodological soundness and epistemological justification. Added to this should be the in-depth study of the socio-political legitimacy of science in general and of specific sciences and scientific practices in particular. For instance, as a consequence of increasing privatization and commodification (Radder 2010a), in our current situation the issue of the meaning and significance of ‘science in the public interest’ has acquired a new urgency. This leads to a group of significant, new questions. What do we understand by a ‘public interest’? What by ‘science in the public interest’? Furthermore, what are the characteristics of basic science, and is ‘basic science’ in the public interest? And what about these questions in the cases of applied science or technoscience? Finally, an inclusive philosophy of science should encompass substantial theoretical-philosophical analyses of research ethics, both at the institutional and at the individual level (Briggle and Mitcham 2012). For instance, what do we understand by fraud, by deception, by sloppy or bad science, or by lack of scientific integrity? Which institutionalized practices are vulnerable to these kinds of research-ethical problems, and how could these problems be remedied?

Thirdly, there is a host of important normative questions. How to evaluate the ideal-typical models of autonomous science, commodified science, and public-interest science? What is, or should be, the place of science in a democratic society? How does science relate to the ideal of human flourishing and human emancipation? Which type of science policy could bring us closer to this ideal?⁹

By way of illustration, consider the question of the socio-political and moral analysis and assessment of academic patenting, which is one of the forms of the commodification of academic research. Basically, a patent is a commercial monopoly granted to individual inventors and/or their institutional employers.¹⁰ A central empirical/historical question concerns the precise role of patenting in the historical development of the sciences (Mody 2011, 59–60). Whatever the answer, it is clear that, during the past decades, the number of patent applications and acquired patents by scientists from publicly funded or non-profit universities and research institutes has increased substantially, especially in the areas of medical, biological, and pharmaceutical research and in the computer and information sciences (Sterckx 2010; for the Netherlands, see Horlings et al. 2013).

A detailed study of the theory and practice of (academic) patenting raises many profound and socio-politically or morally relevant questions for an inclusive philosophy of science (Radder 2013). Here are some examples. Patents cannot be granted to discoveries of natural objects or processes. This raises the theoretical-philosophical questions of how to distinguish between the natural and the artificial, and between discovery and invention. Similarly, theories and concepts cannot be patented because patentable subject matter needs to be material. This requires a plausible account of what theories and concepts are and how they differ from material entities. A further question is whether science is, essentially or primarily, a collective or an individual enterprise. If many scientific inventions result from the collective efforts of a diffuse and large group of researchers, can the assignment of patents to individual scientists or their institutes be justified? Finally, one of the basic issues of research ethics concerns the compatibility or incompatibility of financial interests and the norms of science (Resnik 2010). In the context of academic patenting, a crucial normative question concerns the (in)compatibility of the patenting practices of academic research institutes with the ethical codes of good scientific conduct endorsed by those same institutes (Radder 2010b, 244–252).

An important feature of such questions is that topics from traditional philosophy of science prove to be closely related to socio-political and moral questions. For this reason, an inclusive philosophy of science approach to these issues differs from studies undertaken from an exclusively socio-political or ethics perspective.

5. The Distinctiveness of European Philosophy of Science

On the basis of the three preceding sections, I can now discuss the question of the distinctiveness of European philosophy of science, the subject of this symposium. However, before I start with the main exposition, there is a preliminary issue that needs to be addressed. What do we understand by ‘European’ and what by ‘non-European’ philosophy of science? In line with the remarks made in the introductory section, in this article I shall confine the latter to Anglo-American philosophy of science (chiefly, Australia, Canada, the UK, and the USA).¹¹

On this basis, the question to be answered is: can European philosophy of science be characterized as more inclusive, and hence less restricted, than Anglo-American philosophy of science? That is to say, does European philosophy of science, in contrast to Anglo-American philosophy of science, substantially address the three topics discussed in the previous sections: the central philosophical issues in historiography, the significant role of technology in science, and the important socio-political and moral issues involved in past and present science?

The first topic is the philosophy of historical inquiry, including the philosophy of the historiography of science.¹² An important fact is that the broad European conception of science (wetenschap, Wissenschaft, and the French science) includes the human sciences, that is, the scholarly study of history, culture, language, art, literature, and religion. Therefore, it provides a legitimate place for a philosophy of historiography (and a philosophy of the human sciences more generally). In this respect, it is plausible that the inclusion of this topic by Popper and Hempel is related to their European background. Their views include an extensive response to claims concerning the distinct, and yet scientific, position of historical inquiry by German historicism and hermeneutics.

More recently, some European scholars have made substantial contributions to the philosophy of the historiography of science. In my view, the best book on the relevant issues is still An Introduction to the Historiography of Science, by the Danish historian and philosopher of science Helge Kragh (1987). A philosopher of science who has promoted the study of the philosophy of historiography is James W. McAllister, for instance through his research programme on ‘Philosophical Foundations of the Historiography of Science’ at Leiden University (PFHS 2009). One of its results is the article by Kuukkanen (2013), cited in note 5. More generally, McAllister (2008, 2) also argues for a stronger focus on the philosophy of the Geisteswissenschaften, for example in the sessions of European philosophy of science conferences. Finally, the German Journal for General Philosophy of Science has carried various articles on this topic. Yet, as I have also emphasized, it is not the case that this topic is addressed exclusively by European philosophers of science. See for instance Peter Galison's ‘Ten Problems in History and Philosophy of Science’, a programmatic article that includes perceptive observations on the philosophical problems of the historiography of science (Galison 2008). My preliminary conclusion is that European philosophy of science offers more opportunities to include the philosophy of historical inquiry, and that this topic has thus far been studied more frequently by European philosophers of science than by their Anglo-American colleagues.

Secondly, there is the issue of the role of technology in science or, broader, the science–technology relationship. Quite a few European philosophers have rightly emphasized the great significance of technology for science (Gaston Bachelard, Michel Foucault, Bruno Latour, Martin Heidegger, Herbert Marcuse, Jürgen Habermas, Peter Janich, Srđan Lelas, Kurt Bayertz, Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, and many others). Often, their approach consisted in pointing out conceptual similarities between scientific experimentation and technological production.¹³ In line with this tradition, I myself have addressed the science–technology relationship in some detail through the notions of the material realization and the reproducibility of observations, experiments and technologies (Radder [1984] 2012, 1996, 2006, 2009b). But again, we should also acknowledge notable, though clearly more recent, work by North American authors.¹⁴ My conclusion on this point is that European philosophers of science have contributed significantly to the study of the role of technology in science, while more recently interest in this topic in Anglo-American philosophy of science is increasing.

Thirdly, consider socio-political and moral philosophy of science. My assessment of this point should be even more differentiated than in the case of the first two topics. Here are some examples. On the one hand, in his Science and Values, Larry Laudan reassures his readers that his book is not about ‘the decidedly second-rate literature that agonizes over the ethical dilemmas posed by … science and technology’ (Laudan 1984, xi). Although I suppose that current authors will be wary of such crude and dismissive judgements, until recently most Anglo-American philosophy of science still endorsed a fundamental distinction between epistemic or cognitive values (as a legitimate subject for philosophy of science) and social or moral values (perhaps a subject for sociology or psychology of science). In contrast, the 1970s and 1980s have seen extensive European debates on fundamental socio-political and moral issues concerning the sciences. Just think of the debates (e.g. in Germany, France, and the Netherlands) on science, power, emancipation, and democratization, inspired by the work of Habermas, Foucault or the so-called Starnberg group (see e.g. Böhme and Schäfer 1983; Kunneman [1986] 1990). Or consider the emphasis on the socio-political views of the Vienna Circle by Herman Koningsveld (primarily based on their manifesto, The Scientific Conception of the World), already put forward in 1976 in his Dutch-language introduction to philosophy of science.

Originally, the philosophy of the Vienna Circle was … socially engaged in a very strong sense. Its inspiration was the importance of a better society. It is only from this point of view that we can understand their militant attitude regarding the many metaphysically oriented political and social views from the 1920s: they practised a critical (also: a social-critical) philosophy. (Koningsveld 1976, 39; my translation)

On the other hand, North American philosophy of science of the last decades includes substantial (analytical and critical) studies of the role of women and gender in science, for instance in the work of Helen Longino (1990, 1995). More recently, Kitcher's work on the relationship between science and democracy has attracted a lot of attention. As a consequence, these issues seem to have become legitimate topics in current North American philosophy of science.¹⁵ Furthermore, these kinds of studies are still relatively rare in recent work by European philosophers of science.¹⁶ Finally, with hindsight we also have to conclude that, during the following decades, Koningsveld's attempt at developing a social-critical philosophy of science attracted fewer and fewer followers in the Netherlands.¹⁷ My conclusion is that, recently, Anglo-American philosophers of science have developed new and important insights concerning socio-political and moral philosophy of science. Distinct European perspectives were important somewhat longer ago, while contemporary European philosophers of science are only beginning to incorporate the insights of their North American colleagues.

Without ignoring restricted European philosophy of science and without belittling inclusive Anglo-American work, we may draw the following overall conclusion.¹⁸ European philosophers of science have made substantial and worthwhile contributions to the philosophy of historiography, including the historiography of science, and to the topic of the science–technology relationship. These contributions deserve to be incorporated and further developed in an inclusive philosophy of science. Concerning socio-political and moral issues, the situation is more differentiated. Here aiming at constructive interactions between European and North American contributions seems to constitute the best way forward. In this respect, a promising development is the recently established EPSA women's caucus and the recent institution of a joint PSA/HSS caucus for socially engaged philosophers and historians of science.

Finally, consider the leading question of this symposium: how distinct is European philosophy of science? I have interpreted this question in terms of the distinction between an inclusive and a restricted philosophy of science and a further specification of this distinction in terms of three important topics for an inclusive philosophy of science. In these terms, the question has received the qualified answer, depending on the relevant topic, summarized in the preceding paragraph.

Acknowledgements

For helpful comments on an earlier version of this article I would like to thank Katherina Kinzel, James McAllister, and Sally Wyatt. Most of the work on this article was done during an extended research stay in Bielefeld. It is a pleasure to thank Martin Carrier for having offered me this opportunity.

Notes

1 Of course, this constitutes a specific way of addressing the question of the possible distinctiveness of European philosophy of science. An interesting alternative would be to focus on conceptually relevant differences in language. Consider the fact that many European languages differentiate between weten en kennen (or wissen and kennen, or savoir and connaître) as compared to the single English verb ‘to know’. An intriguing question is whether this fact has significant epistemological implications. For more on the role of language in relation to the topic of this symposium, see Wolters (2015).

2 For an overview and some examples, including historiographical projects, see Wyatt, Scharnhorst, et al. (2013).

3 For extensive analyses of the philosophical issues in general historiography, see Lorenz (1990), Iggers (1997), Raphael (2003), and Day (2008). Kragh (1987) not only provides a detailed discussion of the historiography of science, but also includes illuminating substantive analyses of general historiography.

4 For an illuminating reflexive analysis of the role of normative presuppositions in general historiography, see Lorenz (1994, 320–326), who illustrates his analysis with an account of the role of values in the Historikerstreit (which concerned the place of National Socialism in German history) in the 1980s and 1990s.

5 Two other articles relevant in this context are Mladenović (2007) and Kuukkanen (2013).

6 Sometimes, if the relationship between science and technology is discussed, the proposed account is outdated and inadequate. An illustration can be found in Mahner (2007, 539–540), whose account is exclusively based on the questionable views of Bunge (for a criticism of these views, see e.g. Radder 2009b, 66–74).

7 See also Kroes's apt characterization of the relation between science and technology as two sides of the same coin (Kroes 2014).

8 For an important alternative view on the relation between science and democracy, see Brown (2009).

9 In addressing the empirical/historical questions, inclusive philosophy of science can certainly gain from work in science and technology studies. This is far less the case with regard to the theoretical-philosophical and normative questions, however (Radder 1996, chapters 5 and 8; 1998; 2009c, sections 4.1 and 4.3).

10 The theory and practice of patenting constitutes an intricate subject. Therefore, philosophers of science addressing this subject should take care to avoid misunderstanding. For example, Kitcher (2011, 242) states that patenting implies the private ownership of knowledge. This questionable statement perpetuates an unfortunate though common mistake about the nature of patents. What may be patented is the commercial use of scientific knowledge, not the knowledge itself. In fact, it is one of the main aims (and requirements) of the patent system to publicly disclose the knowledge on which a patentable invention is based.

11 Of course, further issues would come up if we were to include Latin America, Asia or Africa.

12 But note again that the topic is the philosophy of historical inquiry in its own right and not the relationship between history of science and philosophy of science.

13 Therefore, as Janich (1998, 94–97) rightly points out, the philosophy of scientific experimentation did not start in 1983 with Hacking's work.

14 For instance, work by Joseph Pitt, Peter Galison, Joseph Rouse, and Don Ihde (but note that the latter two have been significantly influenced by European philosophers).

15 In contrast, in the UK such work is almost totally absent (just take a quick look at the contents of the volumes of the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science).

16 See, for example, Leuschner (2012), Yoshida (2012), and Cartieri and Potochnik (201 4). Reading their socio-political analyses and critiques of science might suggest the more extreme view that there is hardly any critical philosophy of science outside North America. Typically, these analyses and critiques are phrased in terms of values, often underwritten by ideals of individual freedom and equality (Longino 1990; Douglas 2009; Kourany 2010; Kitcher 2011). This contrasts, for instance, with more structural or practice-based Foucaultian critiques of science in the European tradition, which emphasise the role of interests and power (see e.g. Radder 1996, chapter 6; Derksen 2001; Dehue 2008).

17 One reason for this was the strong rise of the (allegedly non-normative) science and technology studies since the 1980s, in the Netherlands and elsewhere (cf. Radder 1996, chapter 5; 1998).

18 As I have stressed, my discussion thus far has been preliminary. However, the question of the possible distinctiveness of European philosophy of science is worth a much more detailed scrutiny. It could, for instance, be carried out by members of the HOPOS community, scholars of history of philosophy of science. In view of the complexity of the question, one would need historians of the stature of a Paul Forman to accomplish such an in-depth investigation (see, for instance, his impressive historical account of the cultural views of the science–technology relationship in Forman 2007).