From the Characterization of ‘European Philosophy of Science’ to the Case of Philosophy of the Social Sciences

Abstract

How distinct is European philosophy of science? The first step is to characterize what is or might be considered as ‘European philosophy of science’. The second is to analyse philosophy of the social sciences as a relevant case in the European contribution to philosophy of science. (1) ‘European perspective’ requires some clarification, which can be done from two main angles: the historical approach and the thematic view. Thus, there are several structural and dynamic things to be considered in European philosophy of science and compare with other conceptions: (i) the topics discussed; (ii) the contents proposed; and (iii) the style of thought used. (2) The case of philosophy of the social sciences is relevant for the historical approach and for the thematic view. Historically, the Erklären–Verstehen methodological controversy arose in this continent, where the main authors and most of the influential approaches are located. Thematically, we can consider the contributions made by these European approaches to philosophy of the social sciences. They give us some distinctive features of European philosophy of science.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Nicholas Rescher for his comments on a previous version of this paper and to Hans Radder for his suggestions regarding the ‘double hermeneutics’ approach. In addition, I am pleased with the discussion at the University of Helsinki, where the previous version of this paper was presented. Finally, many aspects have been made explicit after the suggestions of the editor of this journal.

Notes

1 The expression ‘philosophy of science’ itself was introduced by William Whewell, according to Richard Yeo (1993, 110–111). In addition, Whewell has been credited as the first to coin the expression ‘philosophy of biology’ (Gayon 2009, 201).

2 In general philosophy of science, we can think of conceptions related to the Vienna Circle, Hans Reichenbach, Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos, John Worrall, etc. In philosophy of the social sciences, the analysis here of the Erklären–Verstehen controversy offers a large list of conceptions.

3 See, in this regard, the features in Steering Committee (2006).

4 The most important case in this regard is the European Philosophy of Science Association (EPSA), founded in 2007.

5 A relevant example is the European Science Foundation programme, ‘The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective’, which in five books develops many aspects of such a perspective: Stadler et al. (2010), Dieks et al. (2011, 2012), Andersen et al. (2013), and Galavotti et al. (2014).

6 Initiatives of recent years are the European Journal for the Philosophy of Science and the new Springer book series, ‘European Studies in the Philosophy of Science’. According to Stadler (2014, 747), in 2007 the number of journals located in Europe more or less strongly associated with history and philosophy of science was 170.

7 It seems clear that the Vienna Circle was focused on structural elements, whereas the Lakatosian methodology of scientific research programmes put emphasis on dynamic features, including historicity of science.

8 On these components, which are characteristic of science and are relevant for its relations to technology, see Gonzalez (2013c, esp. 14–18).

9 The preference for the descriptive outlook, which is open to the integration of history and philosophy of science, is clear when the focus is on the ‘schools of thought’ that are characteristic of a country (e.g. French historical epistemology). This outlook is commonly the case not only in philosophy of science but also in philosophy in general (e.g. with British empiricism, French rationalism, or German idealism).

10 This reflection can be connected with some issues of recent years: (a) the need for more reflection on applied science (see Niiniluoto 2013); (b) the concern for the application of science that includes ethical considerations (see Worrall 2006, 2007); and c) the attention to the sciences of the artificial, in general, and to the sciences of design, in particular (Gonzalez 2008; Kuipers 2013).

11 This view connected to a semantic interpretation of mathematical intuitionism, developed by Michael Dummett and Crispin Wright, and is particularly relevant when discussing the problem of truth (Gonzalez 1990).

12 There is now a variety of versions of structural realisms, cf. Frigg and Votsis (2011).

13 There are some topics that received more attention in Europe than in other continents. This is the case of the discussion on ‘structural realism’, which John Worrall started (Worrall 1989), and which has been discussed, among others, by Stathis Psillos and James Ladyman. One of the features is the attention to the possible role of metaphysics around the ‘no miracle’ argument (see e.g. Worrall 2011).

14 The comparison is made here with the countries of North America insofar as they are particularly important in this field. In this regard, there is a difference concerning philosophies of science based on Wittgensteinian ideas or hermeneutical contents, which have been influential in Europe, especially in the area of philosophy of social sciences.

15 A characteristic American style of thought is pragmatism, where the primacy of practice is explicitly proposed. A good example in this sense is Nicholas Rescher's philosophy, which is holistic. See in this regard Rescher (1992–1994, 2012).

16 These elements of science have been used for the analysis of central philosophical problems, such as scientific prediction, where three realms of study are included: basic science, applied science, and application of science (Gonzalez 2015).

17 The comparison can be focused on the ‘internal perspective’ (constitutive elements) or the ‘external perspective’, where the contextual aspects (social, cultural, economic, etc.) are relevant (Gonzalez 2005, esp. 13–26).

18 On the one hand, the sciences of the artificial, which are related to designs made according to some aims, which follow certain processes in order to achieve some expected results, are different from the social sciences. But, on the other, there are sciences that can be dual: a design science as well as a social science, as is the case of economics. This feature is crucial in understanding its complexity (Gonzalez 2011a).

19 In the case of the Erklären–Verstehen controversy, the main names involved in the nine conceptions of this methodological controversy are Europeans: Wilhelm Dilthey, Max Weber, Carl G. Hempel, Peter Winch, Hans Georg Gadamer, Georg Henrik von Wright, Karl Otto Apel, Anthony Giddens, and Hans Lenk. Their positions are central in section 3 of this article.

20 The European perspective may be focused on science in general (such as Worrall's structural realism), a group of sciences (such as Gadamer's hermeneutics) or on a specific discipline (such as Mark Blaug's philosophical approach to economics). See, in this regard, Blaug (1980), Marchi and Blaug (1991), and Blaug (1994).

21 Here the analysis is built on the basis initially developed in Gonzalez (2010a, esp. 223–227).

22 Structural realism is an approach that has become de facto a school of thought, which includes a variety of options. According to the list of the proponents, it is basically a European philosophy of science movement: ‘John Worrall, Ioannis Votsis, Steven French, Angelo Cei, James Ladyman, Simon Saunders, Michael Esfeld, Vincent Lam, Katherine Brading, Mauro Dorato, Dean Rickles, Fred Muller, and—exceptions prove the rule—Anjan Chakravartty and John Stachel’ (Lyre 201 0, 381).

23 The ‘Finnish school of philosophy of science’ around critical scientific realism can be associated with Ilkka Niiniluoto, Raimo Tuomela, Matti Sintonen, Tarja Knuuttila, etc.

24 There are some topics that have been somehow neglected and should be considered philosophically: see Gonzalez (2013a).

25 More clearly than in the case of the structural realist school, there is a Popperian school (John Watkins, David Miller, Hans Albert, Anthony O'Hear, Gerard Radnitzky, Gunnar Anderson, Larry Briskman, etc.), which used to have counterparts in other countries, especially in the Commonwealth (Alan Musgrave, Graham Macdonald, Jeremy Sheamur, etc.). Regarding the social sciences, the hermeneutical school (Hans Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, Karl Otto Apel, Jürgen Habermas, Hans Lenk, etc.) has been influential. As usual, it includes variations in the approaches, some of which are discussed in section 3.

26 Many times pragmatism is accompanied by naturalism (at least methodological and ontological) in the USA (Wesley Salmon, Philip Kitcher, James Woodward, etc.).

27 There are some philosophical conceptions in contemporary philosophy that started on European soil and have had influences on philosophy of the social sciences. These views include the following ‘styles of thought’: (i) the analytical philosophy of language developed by Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, etc.; (ii) the logical empiricist views based on Rudolf Carnap, Hans Reichenbach, Carl G. Hempel, etc.; (iii) the hermeneutical tradition of thinkers interested in historical aspects, such as Hans Georg Gadamer or Paul Ricoeur; (iv) the link between reason and life developed by José Ortega y Gasset and Julián Marías in connection with the change of generations; and (v) the postmodern approaches of structuralist roots that have had particular relevance in French authors.

28 Besides associations, such as EPSA, or professional journals, such as the European Journal for the Philosophy of Science, the existence of many research centres devoted to this field in this continent should be emphasized. The proposal of the programme, ‘The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective’, included a number of research centres in Europe focused on philosophy and methodology of science: Institute Vienna Circle, Vienna, Austria; Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Ghent University, Belgium; Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany; Zentrum für Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie, Konstanz University, Germany; Zentrum für interdisziplinäre Forschung, University of Bielefeld, Germany; European Cultural Centre of Delphi, Delphi, Greece; Interdisciplinary Research Centre for Epistemology and History of Science, University of Bologna, Italy; Institute for History and Foundations of Science, Utrecht University, Netherlands; Swedish Collegium for Advanced Studies in the Social Science, Uppsala, Sweden; Centre for Philosophy of the Natural and Social Science, LSE, London, UK.

29 Many schools of thought in Europe related to social sciences use Kuhnian ideas as their background. Among them are sociological approaches, such as the strong programme developed by Barry Barnes and David Bloor, originally based at the University of Edinburgh; the Empirical Programme of Relativism, proposed by Harry Collins at the University of Bath; or the finalization thesis, the conception of the Finalizierung der Wissenschaft, endorsed by the group that worked at the Max-Planck-Institut in Starnberg. But Thomas Kuhn, who knew quite well the work of a European (Ludwik Fleck), was not particularly interested in philosophy of social sciences. Moreover, he becomes rather upset by the use of his ideas in the context of a strongly sociological and epistemologically relativist constructivism. See Kuhn (2000, 91 and 110).

30 Actually, someone can claim that what really matters is having ‘good’ philosophy of science. Obviously, this is right, but the issue at stake here is the possible identity of the European philosophy of science.

31 In philosophy as well as in other intellectual undertakings, there is no clear-cut ‘European identification’ that can be equivalent to the case of the ‘American identification’, when it used to mention the USA. Among the philosophers in favour of the union of Europe with a characteristic profile is José Ortega y Gasset: see Raley (1971).

32 Michael Dummett, who has considered semantic realism and semantic anti-realism, has emphasized that the acceptance of objectivity is key for a realist approach based on semantics, whereas the intersubjective content has a central role in other kind of approaches (Dummett [1963] 1978, 1982).

33 See, in this regard, the difference between Ilkka Niiniluoto's papers in this sphere and the publications made by Kristin Shrader-Fechette in this area: Niiniluoto (1993, 1995) and Shrader-Frechette (2005).

34 These constructivists approaches (the strong programme of Edinburgh of Barnes, EPOR of Collins, Finalizierung of the group in Starnberg, etc.) ended up in some forms of relativism, which are far from the original Kantian roots on concepts.

35 In this second case, a representation is neither genuinely subjective or private, properly speaking, nor merely intersubjective (a representation of a group or a society): it can grasp contents of the world.

36 The present paper revises and enlarges the study made in Gonzalez (2003, esp. 34–37).

37 This is also the case if we think of specific views concerning complexity and evolution in the area of philosophy of economics. We can consider the Keynesian approach and the views of the Austrian school (e.g. in F. von Hayek).

38 Especially during the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth centuries, the lines of research associated with Geisteswissenschaften, moral sciences, cultural sciences, human sciences (as opposed to social sciences), … received a lot of attention in Europe. Besides the emphasis on the differences with the methods of the natural sciences, they commonly shared philosophical tenets opposed to naturalism (mainly, ontological naturalism).

39 This position is, for him, different from what he called ‘historicism’ (Historizismus). See Popper (1957, 17) and Popper (1966, vol. 2, 208 and 214).

40 On the characteristics of Historismus and its presence in Dilthey, see Gonzalez (1984, esp. 115–117).

41 An example in this regard is José Ortega y Gasset, whose views on historicity are more sophisticated than Dilthey's conception. See Ortega y Gasset (1946–1983). His main disciple, Julián Marías, was the translator of the main work of Dilthey on this topic: Introducción a las Ciencias del Espíritu (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1956). This book was published with a prologue by Ortega y Gasset.

42 Many years after this ‘value-free’ position—around the 1980s—general philosophy of science moved toward a ‘value-laden’ viewpoint (Gonzalez 2013d). Nevertheless, there are still controversies regarding the value-free ideal and the possibility of science as being value laden but only in some aspects as human activity.

43 Regarding European philosophy of science and the Viennese heritage see Galavotti, Nemeth, and Stadler (2014).

44 The views of logical positivism and logical empiricism can be distinguished according to their clear differences during this period. (i) Hans Reichenbach, the leader of the Berlin School, avoids Vienna's positivism because it impedes having statements of the future, which makes scientific prediction impossible. (ii) He rejects other central theses of Vienna Circle, such as the ‘verification’ principle; instead, he stands for the idea of ‘verifiabilility’ according to his emphasis on probability (Reichenbach 1936, 1938). On these views, see Gonzalez (1995).

45 This denomination, which was proposed by Putnam, was useful for the study of the verificationist conception (Suppe 1977).

46 Wesley Salmon pointed out in 1990 that

  a little over forty years ago (1948) Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim published their epoch-making essay ‘Studies in the Logic of Explanation’. Ironically, this now classic article was virtually ignored throughout the first decade after its appearance. Then, around 1958, it became the focus of intense discussion and heated controversy. Almost everything written on the nature of scientific explanation in the last thirty-odd years derives directly or indirectly from that essay. (Salmon 1990, ix; Hempel and Oppenheim [1948] 1965. See also Fetzer 2000.)

47 Within general philosophy of science, his ideas have influenced Stephen Toulmin. See Toulmin (1953, 13–14, 51, 81, 88–89, 129, 162–163, and 172). In the area of philosophy of mathematics, Wittgenstein has an influence on Georg Kreisel and Crispin Wright. A quite interesting topic is the relation to the school developed by L. E. J. Brouwer (Gonzalez 1991).

48 Later, he published on this issue: Taylor (1981, 1985a, 1985b).

49 According to Joseph Rouse,

  Taylor argues that although the natural sciences are interpretative, the human sciences are doubly interpretative. Not only are social sciences engaged in interpretation when they study human beings, but the objects of their study are self-interpreting, such as that their self-interpretation must be taken into account in any adequate social scientific interpretation of them. This consideration, he thinks, must lead to differences in method, and more important, in the degree of objectivity obtainable in our interpretations and the predictive capability to be expected from them. (Rouse 1987, 170; see Taylor 1980)

50 See, in this regard, Özel (2003, esp. 232–236).

51 Rescher, personal communication, 19 July 2013. Among them are historical terms versus systematic terms, focused on external aspects (contextual factors) or on internal components (constitutive elements), qualitatively oriented (e.g. metaphysical) versus quantitatively oriented (e.g. empirical), primarily descriptive or dominantly prescriptive, non-naturalist approach or naturalist approach, etc.

52 Its contribution is better known to the author of this article than that made in other countries.

53 The absence of actual interest in history for the social sciences in very influential American social scientists, such as Herbert Simon, is remarkable. In his case, regarding economics, the first paper that he published on this topic was when I asked him for a monographic issue that I organized on philosophy and methodology of economics: Simon (1998).

54 One of the reasons for the success of Kuhn was precisely his calling attention to the relevance of the history of science for doing philosophy of science. It was a feature of novelty in the 1960s in the USA. On the role of historicity in philosophy of science, see Gonzalez (2011b).

55 The details of this controversy are available in Gonzalez (2003, 40–44).

56 Those authors that insist on adopting methods akin to natural ones (the backers of Erklären) usually end up giving a relevant role to prediction. However, the defenders of strict Verstehen tend to consider prediction as less relevant for science.

57 This is still an area where a clear improvement to get the level of rigour the publications on quantitative methods is needed.

58 The relevant elements of the European philosophy of science, such as those pointed out in the sections 2.2 and 3.1, are a clear example of this phenomenon.

59 The concept of ‘historicity’ goes beyond the idea of ‘evolution’: Gonzalez (2013b, esp. 304–307).