A Critical Assessment of the Programmes of Producing ‘Islamic Science’ and ‘Islamisation of Science/Knowledge’

Abstract

In the present article, working from within the framework of critical rationalism and focusing mostly on the views developed by some Iranian writers, I argue that the programmes of producing ‘Islamic Science’ (cIS) and ‘Islamisation of Science/Knowledge’ (IoK) are doomed to failure. I develop my arguments in three parts. I start by explaining that the advocates of the programmes of producing cIS or IoK subscribe to mistaken images of science that are shaped by either a positivist or outmoded culturalist/interpretivist theories of science. I shall then focus on the similarities and differences of ‘science’ and ‘technology’, arguing that despite close interconnection between the two it is of utmost importance, for analytical purposes, to keep these two socially constructed entities apart. Drawing on the above distinction, I argue that while creating ‘Islamic’ or ‘indigenous’ sciences is impossible, constructing ‘Islamic’ or ‘indigenous’ technologies is, in principle, feasible. Lastly, I turn to some of the more recent works on creating/constructing cIS and/or IoK. I shall try to show that none of the arguments introduced by the advocates of the projects of cIS/IoK is tenable.

Acknowledgements

David Miller, James McAllister (editor of ISPS), and two anonymous referees of this journal have made many useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I am grateful to them all. However, the responsibility for possible errors is solely mine.

Notes

[1] The term cIS used in the context of the present article does not denote the works of Muslim scholars in the pre-modern period, mostly written in Arabic, Persian, and Ottoman Turkish. It refers, as will be explained in the article, to ‘new models of science’ which, according to their advocates, surpass modern sciences in their efficacy in explaining various aspects of reality (whether natural or socially constructed). cIS, in the classic sense of the term, would denote practices and disciplines such as Fiqh (jurisprudence), Usul al-Fiqh (lit. the principles of Fiqh, meaning a semantic-hermeneutical tool in the service of developing Fiqh), Rijal (the method of ascertaining the trustworthiness of the narrators of ahadith (sayings and deeds of the Prophet, and Imams in the case of Shi‘i Islam), Dirayeh (the method of demarcation of genuine ahadith from pseudo-ahadith), Philosophy, Kalam (theology) and Tafsir (Quranic exegesis and interpretation). Apart from the last three disciplines all other disciplines/practices collectively known as cIS in the classic sense of the term, are technologies rather than science proper (see section 3 and Paya 2015b). I use the two technical terms ‘science’ and ‘knowledge’ in tandem and sometimes interchangeably. Both refer to our efforts to ‘understand’ various aspects of reality as it is, as against our efforts to change reality according to our plans. The latter give rise to various types of technology. In the sense explained above, both empirical sciences and philosophy belong to the general field of knowledge/science. Theology and Quranic interpretation, as long as their aim is to understand the mind of God, belong to the same field (more specifically, the field of humanities or human sciences).

[2] The literature on all the above three topics is very rich. The following are just a few examples: Nasr ([1980] 1989), International Institute of Islamic Thought ([1982] 1988), Sardar (1989), Nasr (1991). Furlow (1996), Stenberg (1996), Snively and Corsiglia (2001), Abaza (2002), and Nanda (2004, 2005), who is a critic of Hindu science; Haneef (2005), which contains a list of many works on cIS/IoK. Among the new works on cIS/IoK published in Iran the following are worth mentioning: Bagheri ([2003] 2012), Riyahi, Safavi-far, and Attari (2004), Bostan et al. (2005), Golshani (2006), and Hasani, Alipour, and Taqavi (2006). It must be emphasised that the arguments and approaches produced by the above authors and other whose works are not cited here present a great deal of diversity. To discuss all these diverse positions, even to introduce them even in a very brief manner, would be far beyond the remit of this article. Within the space available in the context of the present article, the differences in the approaches and arguments of some of these authors will be critically discussed.

[3] In Iran, and almost immediately after the victory of the Islamic revolution in 1979, some individuals began to promote the idea of the necessity of producing cIS (Bostan et al. 2005). These individuals were either self-motivated or were inspired by the examples set in some other Islamic countries especially Pakistan during General Zia-ul-Haqq’s rule. They received some official support and assistance. However, somewhat like the plans of their Pakistani’s counterparts the early efforts of Iranian practitioners of cIS, too, did not bear any fruit. With regard to Pakistan’s fanfare about the cIS during Zia-ul-Haqq’s rule, it is alleged that all the hype was a red herring to distract attentions from Pakistan’s nuclear programme which was the real recipient of Saudi’s generous funds. For a critical assessment of Pakistan’s experience in developing cIS with the financial support of the Saudi Arabia, see Hoodhboy (1991).

[4] Needless to say, all socially constructed realities are somewhat related to mind. But as Searle (1995) has explained, they are the product of collective intentionalities and are independent of individual minds. Moreover, as Trigg (1980) has argued, even in the case of mental states, when they are our objects of study, they are no longer mind dependent: we study them as objective entities.

[5] An anonymous referee who has made constructive and useful comments on some aspects of the paper has made the following observation with regard to my discussion concerning the culturalist/interpretivist position:

While Dilthey was not a direct participant in this debate [i.e. radical distinction between PBS and HSS], his position that the human sciences were radically ontologically different from the natural sciences was strongly opposed by Max Weber—whose influence on the interpretive current has been far stronger than Dilthey’s—and other neo-Kantians (e.g. Rickert) who argued for the ontological similarity between the natural and social sciences. Weber and the neo-Kantians argue that the Naturwissenschaften and the Sozialwissenschaften are ontologically similar, and only differ with respect to their process of concept formation. … Moreover, Weber, who was not an advocate of hermeneutics per se, also did not wish to restrict verstehen to its psychological roots (i.e. empathy) because he regarded the Sozialwissenschaften as ontologically similar to the Naturwissenschaften (as pointed out above) and sought to duplicate their level of objectivity even as he sought to defend the legitimacy of verstehen. The difficulty for Weber was two-fold: one, to argue for objectivity in the Sozialwissenschaften whilst also holding onto the ideal of verstehen; two, to take verstehen out of its psychological basis and to locate it in empirical social reality.

The above observation invites further explanation. As the referee has pointed out, the views of Weber who has exerted a good deal of influence on the culturalist/interpretivist trend, was more nuanced with regard to the radical difference between PBS and HSS. But even his views, which had many things in common with critical rationalism and were different from the views of radical interpretivists/culturalists, were not exactly up to the mark as critical rationalists would expect. As Malachi Haim Hacohen has observed, Weber subscribed to ‘historical relativism’, albeit a nuanced one (Hacohen 2002, 476). And despite rejecting the distinction made by the like of Dilthey and Rickert between explanation and interpretation, maintained that ‘social science was interpretive (verstehende)’ (Hacohen 2002, 474). He ‘accepted the Neo-Kantian view that “value relevance” constituted the objects of social research’ (Hacohen 2002, 474). For Popper however, value relevance ‘added nothing “to the methodological analysis.” Scientists were interested in phenomena for multiple reasons, and this made no difference for procedure’. (Hacohen 2002, 473). Popper notes:

Meyer writes … ‘The selection of facts depends upon the historical interest taken by those living at the present time, … ’. Weber writes … ‘Our … interest … will determine the range of cultural values which determines … history.’ … Weber, following Rickert, repeatedly insists that our interest, in turn, depends upon ideas of value; in this he is certainly not wrong, but he does not add anything to the methodological analysis. None of these authors, however, draw the revolutionary consequence that, since all history depends upon our interest, there can be only histories, and never a ‘history’, a story of the development of mankind ‘as it happened’. (Popper [1945] 2013, 731n9; emphasis in the original)

Popper also notes that:

Weber always rightly emphasized that history is interested in singular events, not in universal laws, and that, at the same time, it is interested in causal explanation. Unfortunately, however, these correct views led him to turn repeatedly … against the view that causality is bound up with universal laws. (Popper [1945] 2013, 730n7; emphasis in the original).

[6] The conversion of a singular (existential) statement into a general (universal) statement is of course based on a simple logical rule: ∃x (Fx & Gx & Kx) ↔ ∀x (Fx → (Gx & Kx)). Needless to say such general claims are as, Popper ([1945] 2013, 689) has noted, ‘of hypothetical character and must be tested’. The arguments in the paragraph in the text are mostly based on Ben-Israel (1989).

[7] According to Losee (2001, 104), Herschel (1830) made a clear distinction between the context of discovery and the context of assessment of conjectures. Losee writes: ‘He [Herschel] insisted that the procedure used to formulate a theory is strictly irrelevant to the question of its acceptability.’

[8] Of course we talk about ‘Greek philosophy’ or ‘Polish logic’ or ‘Islamic astronomy’ and so on. What is meant in such cases are intellectuals constructs developed by individuals who happen to be Greek, Polish, Muslim, and so on. As has explained in the text, all genuine knowledge/science claims are regarded as true assertions about various aspects of reality. They are true in the sense that they correspond to the reality aspect in question. Such claims represent the ‘reality’ in question in a truthful way. If they, instead, reflect scientists/scholars’ personal biases, ideological preferences, cultural traditions, they can no longer be regarded as genuine and truthful knowledge claims. Knowledge claims, if true, are universal, and do not belong to any particular way of life, religion, ideology, culture, paradigm, tradition, civilisation, and so on. Of course, scientists/scholars’ personal biases, ideological preferences, cultural traditions can be the subject matter of proper scientific research. But is this case, once again, the outcome of such research must be objective, that is, publicly accessible and publicly assessable.

[9] In this section I draw to some extent on some of my earlier papers, including Paya (2012, 2013b). For critical assessments of the views of some of well-known earlier advocates of cIS see Stenberg (1996); Abaza (2002). For earlier works on Iok, see Al-Attas (1979); International Institute of Islamic Thought ([1982] 1988; [1982] 1995); Nasr (1989).

[10] One may raise an objection to the above argument in the following way: a religious person might say that the pious scientist does not need luck, since he is or she inspired by God. That is the difference. (I owe this point to David Miller.) But the above reasoning is rather fallacious. God rewards only those who, when faced with a challenge or problem, work hard and in a systematic and appropriate manner towards meeting the challenge/finding a solution for the problem. No amount of prayer in the absence of a proper approach to the challenge/problem in question will act as a magic wand. Moreover, even if a believer does his or her best to meet the challenge in question, there is still no guarantee that he or she will find the correct solution. The right solution for Fermat’s last theorem had to wait three centuries to be found.

[11] I have kept only the most important points discussed in the table and have dropped all the extra explanations.

[12] To the above, the following could also be added. Genuinely religious individuals are less likely to succumb to the perils of nihilism and cynicism. They are more likely to keep hope and persevere even in the face of adverse calamities (Paya forthcoming-a).