Was Feyerabend a Postmodernist?

ABSTRACT

This article asks whether the philosophy of Paul K. Feyerabend can be reasonably classified as postmodernist, a label applied to him by friends and foes alike. After describing some superficial similarities between the style and content of both Feyerabend’s and postmodernist writings, I offer three more robust characterisations of postmodernism in terms of relativism, ‘incredulity to metanarratives’, and ‘depthlessness’. It emerges that none of these characterisations offers a strong justification for classifying Feyerabend as ‘postmodern’ in any significant sense. Indeed, what does emerge is that Feyerabend’s work was fundamentally informed by a humanitarian vision of the value of science that is, in fact, strikingly modern.

Acknowledgements

I am very grateful for the comments, suggestions, and encouragement of Matt Brown, Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Daniel Kuby, Harry Lewendon-Evans, an audience at Durham, to two kind and thoughtful anonymous referees, and to the editor.

Notes

1. Norris (1997) is a good example of someone who places Feyerabend in proximity to postmodernism, but does not classify him as postmodernist.

2. This point is made by Preston (1998, 245–256), when commenting on a description of John Dupré’s work as postmodernist by virtue, in part, of its epistemic and ontological pluralism.

3. See, especially, ‘Postscript on Relativism’ (Feyerabend 1993, 268–272).

4. Nola and Irzik (2003) offer a more sustained critique of Lyotard’s remarks on science in The Postmodern Condition.

5. This theme is particular clear in Feyerabend (1993), chs. 11 and 14.

6. The characterisation of postmodernism in terms of ‘depthlessness’ is developed by Cooper (1993, 2008), on whose account I draw liberally.

7. This third antipathy was proposed by Solomon (1988) as a major theme of Continental philosophy, with roots going back at least to Nietzsche and Schopenhauer.

8. The nature of ‘Being’ and its relationship to our epistemic and linguistic activities is explored by Tambolo (2014), Brown (2016), and Kidd (2017).

9. Compare Rouse’s (1996) view that the subject is as much a part of the system as anything else.

10. Many classicists are sceptical about Snell’s thesis, something that Feyerabend was either unware of, or failed to mention. See Clark (2002), 251–252.