Are Pseudosciences Like Seagulls? A Discriminant Metacriterion Facilitates the Solution of the Demarcation Problem

ABSTRACT

In this article, I develop a philosophical framework, or ‘metacriterion’, for the demarcation of pseudoscience. Firstly, ‘gradualist demarcation’ is discussed in depth, considering an approach to the demarcation problem that presupposes the existence of a spectrum between science and pseudoscience; six general problems are found by means of this analysis. Secondly, based on the subsequent discussion of these problems, a discriminant metacriterion composed of four philosophical requirements is proposed. Lastly, it is shown that this metacriterion is able to guide the development of a workable and well-founded demarcation criterion for pseudoscience.

KEYWORDS:

• Pseudoscience
• demarcation problem
• demarcation criterion
• family resemblance

Notes

1 Similar criticism over Pigliucci’s approach to demarcation can be found in Schindler (Forthcoming).

2 This definition of science is linked to applied science, so pure science is beyond its scope. I’m using this example to show that Pigliucci’s definition involve a similar limitation regarding applied science, such as SETI, and studies focused on the detection of correlational patterns and prediction.

3 For example: if the code of ethics of clinical psychologists states that clinicians must reject pseudoscientific practices, and a particular clinician accepts a demarcation criterion with normative power that defines primal therapy, bioenergetic analysis, thought field therapy, and orgone therapy as instances of pseudoscience, then the practitioner is ethically compelled to avoid the use of these techniques. Otherwise, she must either reject the code of ethics or the demarcation criterion of pseudoscience.

4 For example: two philosophers agree on Gruenberger’s criteria—Pigliucci’s can also be applied to the same case. Further, they agree on the degree of authoritarianism, humility, open-mindedness, and paranoia of flat-earthers, orgone therapists, or graphologists by means of some reliable and intersubjective measurement tools—a scenario regarded as practically impossible by Gruenberger, but let’s consider it as feasible. Insofar as there are no constraints on how, when, and where to establish the borderline, they could choose different tolerance thresholds. That is to say, one can consider a unit of demarcation as pseudoscientific starting from forty points, whereas the other can do so starting from fifteen points. Under these conditions, demarcation is not an intersubjective and externally consistent task. These philosophers do not need to reject their shared non-normative demarcation criterion in order to justify their endorsement of practices and beliefs that the other regards as pseudoscientific.

5 I’m using the term ‘measurement’ in a wide sense, also covering classification into categories not designated by numbers.

6 (1) Canada and the United Stated have border disputes. (2) Mexico and the United States have border disputes. (1) and (2) do not entail that Canada and Mexico have border disputes.

7 Personally, I consider it very likely that science has blurred boundaries with, among others, proto-science and soft science. Moreover, I also consider it likely that pseudoscience could have blurred boundaries with other types of radical non-science, as some forms of science mimicry are ambiguous. Nevertheless, this situation is not as problematic as these authors state. If pseudoscience is accounted as an extreme category — denoting radical epistemic flaws —, it does not directly overlap with science. This conception entails an explicit rejection of ambiguous cases as instances of pseudoscience (e.g. string theory, sociobiology, evolutionary psychology, neoclassical economics, astrobiology, and the like), thus ensuring a narrower conceptual scope.

8 As happens with the promotion of pseudoscientific beliefs, one can participate in misconducts unwittingly — deliberate intentions to deceive are a necessary condition for science fraud, but not for pseudoscience. By means of self-deception and motivated reasoning, pseudoscientific believers are often disconnected from the search for truth. Hence, pseudoscience is to intentional fraud as bullshit is to lies (for an in-depth discussion on this issue see Ladyman 2013).

9 Alchemy is better defined as hermeticism, or even as a proto-science, not as a form of pseudoscience in contemporary terms.

10 Conspiracy theories are defined as ‘lay beliefs that attribute the ultimate cause of an event, or the concealment of an event from public knowledge, to a secret, unlawful, and malevolent plot by multiple actors working together’ (Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, and Furnham 2010, 749). Conspiracies exist and there are well-known historical examples, although these beliefs are unwarranted when they are an unnecessary assumption when other explanations are more likely.

11 It should not be assumed that the Wittgensteinian family resemblance only refers to behavioural or observable aspects. Wittgenstein could have admitted that genetic, unobservable kinship is part of the family resemblance of cousins. Nevertheless, he might not have accepted an explanation in objective terms on why this specific feature is more relevant than others. Instead, he would have possibly stated that its pre-eminence is based on its role within language-games that involve cousins.

12 Other authors, such as Kuhn, have provided another potential solution for the wide-open texture problem by including not only similarities between members of the same class, but also dissimilarities to members of other classes (Andersen 2000). So, as contrasting concepts may mutually limit the extensions of each other, it would be better to concentrate on the dissimilarity between contrast classes. It is my intention to defend a similar solution within the context of demarcation: pseudoscience would be better defined as a contrast class by means of its distinctive dissimilarities or ‘discriminant’ characteristics.

13 It is worth mentioning that ‘to study pseudoscience’ is not the same as ‘to produce pseudoscience’. Indeed, unwarranted beliefs constitute a valid and worthy study domain, as can be seen from clinical research on alternative medicine, anomalistic psychology, and other related scientific research on conspiracy ideation and the cognitive roots of science denial. This scientific approach to pseudoscience is based on the acceptance of a normative approach to demarcation, as well as on some methodological standards that are beyond the demarcation problem—such as validated measurement, meaningful comparisons, and proper data analysis.

14 Of course, there are risky and potentially fruitless projects that may be funded to increase research variability, but projects based on pseudoscientific assumptions are known beforehand to be unsuitable of funding—particularly, unworthy of public funding.

15 As decision theory shows, we can perform decision-making under conditions of uncertainty through the assessment of probabilities. Nevertheless, probabilistic reasoning may be preferable or not, and surely all sources of uncertainty reduction are more than welcome. In the context of demarcation, a workable and well-founded cut off is preferable in general terms than probabilistic uncertainty. Gradualist demarcationists would agree on this general principle, although they do not consider sharp categorical assessment of pseudoscience as feasible. Discriminant demarcation, to be developed in the next section, is more optimistic in this regard.

16 From my point of view, legitimate criticism over ‘silver bullets’ (Popper’s falsifiability, Lakatos’ progressivity, Kuhn’s puzzle solving, etc.) led philosophers to favour ‘machine guns’ of diffuse (often gradualist) criteria. As such, the problem that has impeded demarcation for the last century was a counterproductive dismissal of the discriminant characteristics of pseudoscience. Despite there being no such silver bullet, it is feasible to demarcate pseudoscience by means of few precise, discriminant criteria—most being already well-known, e.g. untestability, and complete lack of both reliability and confirmatory evidence.

17 This discriminant metacriterion must be interpreted as a whole. For example, without R4, R1 would be more about achieving consensus than about getting it right.

18 This does not mean that they are irrelevant when assessing the level of quality of science and when assessing how deviant pseudoscientific doctrines are.

19 As I mentioned previously, the borderline between pseudoscience and other types of unwarranted beliefs could be blurred. Discriminant demarcation only sets a framework for a clear cut off between science and pseudoscience.