ABSTRACT
Practice-based philosophy of science has gradually arisen in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) and science and technology studies (STS) during the past decades. It studies science as an ensemble of practices and theorising as one of these practices. A recent study has shown how the practice-based approach can be methodologically justified with reference to Peirce and Dewey. In this article, I will explore one consequence of that notion: science, as practice, is necessarily social. I will disambiguate five different senses in which science is social. First, science presupposes language, which is essentially social. Second, practices, including science, are adaptations of the behaviour of an organism to an environment, of which other organisms are a part. Third, practices, including science, are public and hence shareable. Fourth, scientific knowledge can serve as a vehicle of social and moral reform. Fifth, scientific knowledge can be applied to improve the human condition. This fivefold result bears on the problem of realism.
Acknowledgements
This paper was presented in the 3rd conference of East European Network for Philosophy of Science (EENPS) in Belgrade on 9–11 June 2021.
Notes
1 The expression ‘theory bias’ is Don Ihde’s (Citation1993, 19).
3 The thesis of the theory-ladenness of observation is also known as Duhem-Quine thesis, after Pierre Duhem (Citation1861–1916) and W. V. O. Quine (1908–2000). It is equivalent to the thesis of the empirical underdetermination of theories. Lakoff and Johnson (Citation1999, 450–468) have questioned the scope of Quine’s version since it follows from a formal notion of thought and language which second-generation cognitive science has refuted. I suggest that expectations, whether theoretical or not, may sometimes, but maybe not always, influence the act of observation. Expectations arise from the establishment of habits in John Dewey’s (Citation1916a, 54–58; Citation1922, 14ff.) sense.
4 Rouse (Citation1996, Citation2002, chapter 4) argues that the mainstream positions—scientific realism, instrumentalism, historical rationalism, and social constructivism—have a common denominator: the commitment to representationalist epistemology and philosophy of language.
5 Kuhn has usually been understood as a proponent of the theory-dominant view. Joseph Rouse (Citation1987, chapter 2) has challenged that interpretation. He suggests that Kuhn understood science as practice instead of theory and the notorious concept of paradigm as shared practice instead of shared belief.
6 There have been people who seem to have subscribed to this extreme interpretation. According to Lakoff and Johnson (Citation1999, 461–462, 467), Richard Rorty may be one of them (see also Kremer Citation2009, 70; Vuorio Citation2009). According to Hickman (Citation2009, 64), Stanley Fish may be one of them.
7 Rouse (Citation1996, Citation2002, chapter 4) has, however, argued that social constructivists still retain the notion that science consist in representation.
11 This formulation may seem incomplete, but I have a reason not to conclude that (1) sociality is essential to practice; (2) practice is essential to science; hence (3) sociality is essential to science. I consider the implied transitivity of essence problematic. By the ‘transitivity of essence,’ I mean the thesis that if A is essential to B and B is essential to C, then A is essential to C. This creates problems for very complex entities like science: arbitrarily many things could be essential to them. Imagine the length of the definitions of such things. It would make these definitions inapplicable in practice, because that would be too cumbersome. Then it would be practically impossible to speak definitely about very complex entities at all, risking the intelligibility of philosophy of science. Hence, even if essence is transitive in many—perhaps most—cases, that might not hold universally. Hence positing transitivity needs a justification in every case.
12 For possible differences with Peirce, see West and Anderson (Citation2016).
15 For Peirce’s own account of fallibilism, see especially ‘Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man’ (CitationCP 5.213–263; CitationEP 1, 11–27), ‘Some Consequences of Four Incapacities’ (CitationCP 5.264–317; CitationEP 1, 28–55), ‘The Fixation of Belief’ (CitationCP 5.358–387; CitationEP 1, 109–123) and ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’ (CitationCP 5.388–410; CitationEP 1, 124–141). Fallibilism completely permeates Peirce’s philosophy after 1868. He denied that positive certainty be accessible (CitationEP 2, 26), forswore demonstrative proofs in his philosophy (CitationCP 1.7), and even defined proof as the mere removal of particular doubts rather than the establishment of an irrevocable truth (CitationCP 3.432).
16 Isaac Levi (Citation1983) is one of the notable exceptions. He rejected fallibilism in favour of what he called corrigibilism. I am unsure whether these positions differ except in name.
17 The reader may consult the second volume of The Essential Peirce (Peirce CitationEP 2) and Semiotic and Significs (Peirce and Welby Citation2001).
18 Sometimes Peirce calls the sign-vehicle representamen.
19 Short (Citation2007, chs. 4 and 5) has provided a naturalist account of teleology.
20 This notion connects semiotics with fallibilism.
21 Readers interested in the concept of truth in classical pragmatism may consult Peirce (CitationCP 5.407, 5.430, 5.553; CitationEP 1, 139; CitationEP 2, 379–380, 432–433), James ([Citation1907] Citation1916, 64, 80, chs. VI–VII; Citation1909, v–xx, chs. III, V–IX, XII–XIII) and Dewey (Citation1916b, 240–241, 324–325; Citation1920, 155–160; Citation1938, 7–9; Citation1941, 178–179). It is easy to see how each author has a different notion of truth. For historical background, see Aristotle (Citation1933, 1011b25) and Thomas Aquinas ([Citation1256–Citation9] Citation1918, pt. 1, q. 16, a. 2, arg. 2). For possible empirical criticism, see Lakoff and Johnson (Citation1999, 6, 94–95, 98–106).
22 I follow Rouse (Citation1996, Citation2002, chapter 4) and define mainstream analytic philosophy as the union of scientific realism, empiricism/instrumentalism, historical rationalism, and social constructivism.
23 The expression ’proxy for concrete operations’ means that instead of actual operations, a symbolic operation, which refers to potential operations, is performed instead. Dewey (Citation1916a, 169) might have added that a theory completely abstracted from practice cannot even be intelligibly articulated as a theory.
24 See also Bennett and Hacker’s own treatment of the subject (Citation2003, chapter 4).
25 Recall that Peirce (CitationCP 4.531) conceived knowledge as habit and habit in a technical sense.
27 I will explain the belief-doubt model shortly below.
28 I am aware of a possible precedent. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels may have understood science as practice half a century earlier. But their position is only implicit at best.
29 In Lindholm (Citation2021b), I cite the correct pages and paragraphs but a wrong title and year. The passages cited appear in ‘On Science and Natural Classes’ (1902), not in ‘The First Rule of Logic’ (1898).
30 Dewey does not explain this expression himself. I will suggest an interpretation below.
31 This notion may appear already in Peirce (CitationCP 1.324, 1.336). I have derived a ‘cybernetic epistemology’ from it in my (2021a). Its idea is that the knower and the known constitute a feedback system. The knower affects the known already by their mere presence. It requires skill from the knower to allow the known to appear as a determinate entity.
32 Second-generation cognitive science seems to support this notion; see, e.g., Lakoff and Johnson (Citation1999) and Noё (Citation2004).
33 I will not discuss truth in detail here. It suffices to say that Peirce’s position about truth seems to have changed, but what is relevant here is his emphasis on its sociality.
34 Ave Mets suggested this notion to me (private communication).
36 Traditionally, instrumentalism has been understood as the position that scientific theories about unobservables are not literally true but only serve as conceptual shorthands which systematise observation reports; and the result is ‘economy of thought’. If Hickman ([Citation1990] Citation1992, xii) is correct, then Dewey is an instrumentalist in a completely different sense (see esp. Dewey Citation1916b). To my knowledge, he never denied the existence of certain unobservable entities like electrons or genes. I believe that observation and observability are secondary for him; manipulability or interactionability (cf. Määttänen Citation2015, 80) trumps both. Presumably he would have embraced Ian Hacking’s (Citation1983, 22–24) thesis that electrons exist because we can spray them. To my knowledge, Dewey also never denied that scientific theories may sometimes accurately represent unobservables. Moreover, Dewey (Citation1941, 178–179) subscribed to the correspondence theory of truth in an ‘operational’ sense—that is, without transcendence.
37 On the other hand, Dewey’s account on ends and means in Democracy and Education (Citation1916a, 117–124) is somewhat different. There he emphasises that an end is the completion, conclusion, or a culmination of a continuous, progressive series of actions. He also distinguishes between ends that are external and ends that are internal to an activity. An external end is inflexible because independent of the ongoing activity. Hence it does not allow revision on the basis of what occurs during the activity. That risks irrationality. On the other hand, an internal end is tentative and provisional and hence flexible. It can be adjusted, updated or abandoned if need be. That calls for practical reasoning. Only an internal end is simultaneously a means.
39 For instance, Kuusinen (Citation1959, 113–115) uncritically labels him an idealist—without citation or argument. Anderson (Citation2009) discusses the influence of German idealism to pragmatism. He concludes that Dewey adapted some key elements of Hegel’s objective idealism but rejected others. He overcame idealism by making its positive, constructive import instrumental in experimental science and democratic society.
40 Dewey (Citation1916a, 120) defines mind as intentional purposeful activity controlled by perception of facts and their mutual relationships; and, alternatively, as capacity to refer present conditions to future results, and future consequences to present conditions.
41 Curiously, Rouse (Citation1996, Citation2002) seems to use ‘language’ in an equally broad sense, which is surprising, given his earlier preference of practical hermeneutics over theoretical or linguistic hermeneutics (Rouse Citation1987, chapter 3).
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Funding
This study was supported by the Estonian Research Council [PRG 462], the Estonian Ministry of Education and Research [IUT 20-5], and by the European Union European Regional Development Fund (Centre of Excellence in Estonian Studies).
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6829-295X
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